

OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS DISASTER RELIEF CO-ORDINATOR
(UNDRO)

The Iraq/Kuwait Crisis

International Assistance to Displaced People Through Jordan

(August - November 1990)

CASE REPORT



UNITED NATIONS

Map of Jordan

Entry points and transit camps




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PURPOSE OF THE REPORT

1. The report analyses the response of the international community to the emergency that arose as a result of the sudden influx into the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (hereinafter referred to as Jordan) of third country nationals fleeing Kuwait or Iraq from early August to the beginning of November 1990.
2. According to statistical information provided by the Government of Jordan, over 700,000 third country nationals, from at least 10 developing countries (Bangladesh, Egypt, India, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Thailand and Yemen) entered Jordan during the three-month period. The Government of Jordan opened its border to the influx. Nationals of developed countries were not permitted, except for a small number, to leave Iraq during that period.
3. The emergency operation consisted in assisting the Government of Jordan to arrange for the repatriation of third country nationals to their country of origin, and in facilitating their stay in Jordan from the time they entered the country to the time they left.
4. International assistance to Jordan for this operation was co-ordinated by UNDRO, which had been designated as lead agency for that purpose by the Secretary-General of the UN. The first UNDRO representatives arrived in Amman on 24 August 1990, twenty-four hours after the receipt of the request for international assistance made by the Jordanian Government and immediately started their work.
5. The purpose of the report is not to make a full evaluation of the operation, but rather to review its main features so as to gain experience for similar operations in the future and render humanitarian assistance more effective.
6. The report does not deal with emergency operations conducted by UNDRO in other countries having also received third country nationals fleeing Kuwait and Iraq. It does not cover contingency plans for a sudden increase in arrivals of third country nationals which were devised - innovating on past practices - while relief operations were ongoing.
7. As for the people themselves, they are defined as either 'evacuees' (as they were called in Jordan) or 'third country nationals' or 'displaced persons'. From the outset, it was clear that, on the whole, they were not refugees, inasmuch as they were not fleeing their home countries.

Policy Choices and Priorities

8. In order to reduce human suffering and avoid disease and deaths, policy choices had to be made and priorities established by the United Nations as well as by the Government:
 - Firstly, priority had to be given to repatriation of the third country nationals stranded in Jordan. Basic amenities should be provided in camps, but the focus of activity would be to arrange for transport of evacuees back to their home country
 - The second priority, closely linked to the first would be to make the necessary arrangements to ensure a quick pace of repatriation. The target was indeed to be able to have more people leaving the country every day than entering it. Although UNDRO managed one air transport operation (the Antonov operation mentioned below) it became clear very quickly that UNDRO would not have the capacity to organize between ten and forty flights of evacuees per day as were needed. In late August, UNDRO made the policy choice, which was not necessarily well understood then, of requesting IOM to handle the transport operation, alongside with the EEC, which was already handling several flights per day, and with national governments concerned such as India and Pakistan. This decision was of paramount importance for the success of the repatriation operation.

- The third priority was to raise money for the operation. Through the consolidated appeal it launched on behalf of the Secretary-General, and through regular contact with donors and by reporting on the situation, UNDRO facilitated the funding of the repatriation exercise through IOM, and also generated funding for inland transportation of evacuees. However, as explained below, most of the initial financial resources for the emergency came from the Jordanian Government itself out of its own meagre reserves. This decision of the Government to use its own resources greatly contributed to avoiding a possible tragedy.
- The fourth priority was to ensure smooth, flexible but effective logistics for the whole operation. As explained below, the Government of Jordan established a strongly centralized system of operations, which, *inter alia*, avoided the usual chaotic situation witnessed in most emergencies concerning the receipt by the host country of huge quantities of unnecessary materials, and relief teams working in an unco-ordinated way.
- The fifth priority was to ensure that there would be a constant monitoring of camp conditions so that no epidemics or famine would occur, and that any psychological trauma among the affected population would be minimized. Although all camps were under the control of the Jordanian government, international and local NGOs played an important role in running them and providing adequate camp conditions. The provision of emergency aid constituted an arduous task. From the time they crossed the Iraqi border, over 350 kilometres east of Amman, to their boarding of return flights, people had to be transported, fed and given shelter, water and medical care, mainly in an inhospitable desert environment. During the months of August and September, when there was the largest influx of evacuees, temperatures sometimes reached 44 degrees centigrades (120 degrees Fahrenheit) during the day, and fell precipitously at night.
- Finally, effective co-ordination of all efforts was needed in order to ensure the full success of the operation. In view of the day-to-day variations of the number of arrivals, the whole operation needed to function in a flexible manner. It also required close contacts and partnership between a particularly large number of participants - including the host government, other governments, UN organizations, local and foreign NGOs and the press - which accomplished many different, yet interconnected tasks.

OUTLINE OF OPERATIONS

A) The Events

9. Approximately 3 million foreign workers and technicians were estimated to be working in Kuwait and Iraq at the beginning of August 1990. According to press reports and other sources, the estimated numbers by nationality were as follows:

	<u>Kuwait</u>	<u>Iraq</u>
Egypt	120,000	1.2 million
Sudan	300,000-400,000 total in Iraq and Kuwait	
Yemen	22,000-25,000	1,000-1,200
Palestinians	300,000	170,000
India	170,800	10,000
Pakistan	90,000	up to 10,000
Sri Lanka	100,000	not available
Bangladesh	63,000	15,000
Iran	55,000	not available
Philippines	45,000	5,000
Morocco	6,000	30,000
Yugoslavia	260	7,000
USSR	200	9,000
Thailand	5,600	6,200
China (P.R.)	3,000	up to 4,800
Turkey	2,500	up to 4,000
Tunisia	1,565	2,000
Poland	29	2,700
Republic of Korea	96	612
Indonesia	709	not available
Japan	33	446
Czechoslovakia	at least 9	350
Hungary	5	182
Brazil	333 total in Kuwait and Iraq	
Argentina	51 total in Kuwait and Iraq	
Hong Kong	19 total in Kuwait and Iraq	
Mexico	17 total in Kuwait and Iraq	
Chile	7 total in Kuwait and Iraq	
Malaysia	0	not available
Taiwan	2	0
Western Nationals	7,879	3,101

(Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany (Federal Republic of), Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, USA).

10. On 2 August 1990, the armed forces of Iraq entered Kuwait. The ensuing crisis precipitated a major displacement of foreign nationals from Kuwait and Iraq into Jordan. The influx commenced on 3 August and soon became a swelling tide. At the beginning, most of the evacuees were Egyptians, but there were also Yemenites, Sudanese and Pakistanis. Cars, buses, trucks and tired, heat-dazed people packed the roads, car parks and every other available space at border points and in Amman. For a variety of reasons, only a limited number of evacuees were able to cross over to Turkey, Iran and Syria.

11. The Government of Jordan responded by establishing a Higher Committee for the Welfare of Evacuees, which was led by the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Interior and had the overall task of directing the emergency operations and liaising with the relief agencies involved. Reception/transit centres were opened near Ruweished, Azraq, Amman, Irbid, Ma'an and Aqaba. Emergency help was provided through respective Ministries (such as the Ministry of Health), the Jordanian National Red Crescent Society (JNRCS) and non-governmental organizations. An effective and generous collective effort from all national sources, including many private citizens, was mounted.

12. Egyptians crossed Jordan by bus, taxi or private vehicles and embarked in Aqaba for the Egyptian ports of Nuweiba, Suez and Sharm-el-Sheikh, on ships provided by the Governments of Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Both governments supplied aircraft for the repatriation to Cairo. The EEC also provided sizeable assistance. Altogether, resources made available to help the Egyptians totalled US\$ 100 million. Nationals of other countries sought to return home by any available mode of transport either independently or with the help of their Embassies.

13. Given the growing numbers of people crossing through the border - 14,000 arrivals in one day, on average in early September - and the fact that nationals of countries other than Egypt, Sudan and Yemen were becoming a large part of the incoming evacuees - it became apparent that the Jordanian Government would be faced with a task beyond its capacities both logistically and financially.

14. Between 23 and 24 August, the Government of Jordan was obliged to close its border with Iraq for approximately 40 hours, the number of displaced persons having swelled to almost 100,000.

15. The problem then looked formidable. A camp population increasing very rapidly, few opportunities for immediate repatriation, the risk of epidemics, inadequate shelter under harsh desert conditions, a foreseeable lack of food. All the ingredients for a human tragedy of immense dimension were in place. An added difficulty in dealing with the situation came from its high visibility profile in world news (position taken by Jordan in the conflict, potential human tragedy, unrestricted access to Jordan). There was therefore also a need to take care of the preoccupations and perceptions of the world media in trying to solve the problem.

16. In the context of contacts that UNDRO had undertaken, the Government of Jordan appealed for international assistance on 22 August, through the United Nations Resident Coordinator. The appeal was received by UNDRO on 23 August. The next day, 24 August, an UNDRO emergency team arrived in Jordan and immediately started working on the assessment of emergency needs in consultation with the Government, non-governmental organizations and United Nations agencies such as UNICEF, WFP, WHO, UNHCR and UNRWA. Representatives from the International Organization for Migration (IOM), which had been requested by UNDRO to assume the lead role with regard to repatriation, also joined in this assessment.

17. On 27 August, the United Nations and IOM issued, through UNDRO, a concerted international appeal covering the care and maintenance needs of 120,000 people over a three month period as well as for repatriation costs for the same caseload. Updates to this appeal were issued subsequently as the situation and needs evolved.

18. On 29 August 1990, the Secretary-General of the United Nations requested the United Nations Disaster Relief Co-ordinator to co-ordinate the efforts of the United Nations system, in close co-operation with the High Commissioner for Refugees with regard to people falling under his responsibility.
19. The Disaster Relief Co-ordinator was in Amman on 1 September 1990 to oversee international efforts. These efforts gained momentum in the first half of that month, and led to a significant decrease in the displaced population, as reflected in Annex I.
20. On 13 September 1990, the appointment of Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan as the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General for humanitarian assistance relating to the crisis between Iraq and Kuwait was announced. The Prince travelled to Jordan and met high ranking government officials, donors and representatives of relief agencies, and visited the camps.
21. The plight of the displaced people in Jordan drew world-wide attention, and several high-level personalities visited the area. During his stay in Amman, the Disaster Relief Co-ordinator had the opportunity to meet the Prime Minister of Japan on 4 October 1990.
22. As of the beginning of September, an effective logistical operation started to function, with daily transportation out of Jordan of a few thousand evacuees increasing to more than 8,000 daily in early October. In mid-September there was a drop in total camp population. After a small increase, early in October there was again a net daily outflow of evacuees, and the camp population steadily dropped to reach about 2,500 at the end of October.
23. From early September, efforts were undertaken to improve camp conditions. New camps were built and a constant monitoring of health conditions was undertaken.
24. UNDRO and several other organizations maintained a presence in Jordan as from the beginning of November, but with considerably reduced staff. Since that date attention has been given especially to contingency planning in case of a second influx of third country nationals.

B) Organizational, Logistical and Co-ordination Arrangements

25. As might be expected in such an unforeseen event, there was some time lost at the beginning of the emergency with regard to the setting up of appropriate administrative and logistical arrangements, both on the part of the Jordanian Government and more importantly on the part of the international community, in particular the United Nations.
26. It must be emphasized that the world, and the Jordanian Government, were taken by surprise when thousands of third country nationals started pouring into Jordan in August. Indeed, for the whole month of August, there was really no possibility of forecasting the number of people who would cross over the border, of estimating their length of stay in Jordan, or their dietary and medical needs.
27. The Jordanian Government, however, quickly organized itself to handle the emergency. An inter-ministerial committee with large powers was set up under the chairmanship of the Secretary-General of the Ministry of the Interior, Mr. Salameh Hammad. All concerned Ministries were represented on the Committee which was composed only of full-time civil servants working long hours every day, even on Fridays. The Committee made decisions on the location of transit camps, the movement of evacuees from the border to camps and in between different camps, the allocation of food and relief equipment (blankets, tents, etc.) to each camp, and the designation of camp managers (for example, ICRC). The decision was also made not to allow relief goods donated from abroad to be assigned to specific uses or to specific camps: rather all donations were to be stored in the Government's warehouses and distributed according to needs, to specific camps. The Committee was also responsible for ensuring appropriate linkages between inland transportation and outgoing transport of evacuees from Jordan to their countries of origin.

28. The United Nations took some time to organize itself mainly for two reasons. No early warning system was in place to alert its humanitarian agencies, and it was difficult to estimate the full extent of the support the Government of Jordan needed; on the other hand, the situation did not automatically fall within the mandate of one specific organization of the UN. The designation by the Secretary-General of UNDRO as lead agency for the UN system's response to the emergency was made on 27 August 1990. Despite initial difficulties to establish a co-ordinating role in Amman, with many NGOs and UN agencies already engaged in relief work, a flexible system of co-ordination was put into place by UNDRO which functioned well from the end of August. UNDRO established a close working relationship with the Government authorities, with the Resident Co-ordinator (under whose umbrella the UNDRO delegates were operating), with donor governments (in particular the EEC delegation), with local and foreign NGOs and with UN system organizations. A daily information bulletin with statistical and other information was circulated to all concerned, including the press. Weekly meetings of the main participants in the emergency were organized by the Resident Co-ordinator which were attended by Mr. Salameh Hammad of the Inter-ministerial High Committee, or one of his closest associates. The most difficult task, in such circumstances, was to establish trust and confidence between all concerned. UNDRO, in many cases and in close co-operation with the Resident Co-ordinator, acted as a facilitator between the Government and some of its partners, such as NGOs or IOM. The operation mounted by UNDRO can best be described as operational co-ordination and support to the Government. Speed, efficiency and a good command of the ingredients of an immediate response to emergencies both from a technical and informational point of view were needed. Important elements were the provision of information and the co-ordinating role of UNDRO at its headquarters in Geneva.

29. In order to ensure that organizational arrangements for the emergency were well understood by all, UNDRO circulated on 18 September, the following information:

"The High Committee for the Welfare of Expatriates, headed by Mr. S. Hammad, General Secretary of the Ministry of Interior, has overall responsibility for the emergency.

The policy of the Government of Jordan is to arrange for the quick transfer outside of Jordan of all evacuees from Iraq and Kuwait and to take care of these evacuees during their transit stay.

UNDRO has the responsibility in Jordan and outside the country, to assist the Government in its relief efforts by mobilizing external assistance for the Government activities and by helping to co-ordinate this assistance, and by providing operational assistance when needed.

United Nations system organizations, foreign Governments, local and international NGOs provide support, financial or operational, to the Government of Jordan. ICRC provides assistance in conformity with its mandate. All contributions in kind and all supplies from outside the country have to be delivered to the central warehouses of the Government of Jordan, which proceeds to their allocation to various transit centers and authorizes their transport to these sites.

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) as well as concerned foreign Governments have the responsibility for organizing repatriation flights of nationals of Asian and other origin who would be presently transiting through Jordan.

There are several transit centers in operation. Each center has been assigned a specific manager or management team. The camp managers are to be contacted in case any problems arise or are noted since it is their responsibility to ensure that such problems are solved. The camp managers communicate their needs to the committee of the Ministry of Interior, which takes action to satisfy these needs."

30. Logistical arrangements were critical for an effective solution to the crisis facing Jordan. The following needs to be noted: with regard to camp policy, the Jordanian authorities realized at an early stage that it would be necessary to separate the camp population according to nationality. This measure was taken from a practical and organizational point of view in order to speed up the processing of passports, estimate the number of air passages to be arranged for a specific destination (e.g. Bombay or Dacca), and arrange inland transport for specific flights. At the same time, the adoption of such a measure meant that camp population would fluctuate widely, given the fact that, to take an example, 4,000 to 5,000 Indian nationals might leave a given camp in one day, and be replaced by an equivalent number of incoming evacuees.

31. The fluctuating nature of the camp population, so different from normal refugee situations, also meant that many traditional estimates of needs for relief items had to be revised. For example, as far as blanket requirements were concerned, quantities to be made available had to be calculated not on total camp population (for example 6,000) but on the total number of people having transited in a camp during a week (for example 9,000 individuals). Also, dietary needs could change significantly depending on national habits, and quantities of food might also vary, per individual, over a two-week period. Water requirements per person also varied greatly from one week to another. All the above clearly indicate that there was a need for innovation, flexibility and a lot of common sense in dealing with the situation.

32. The management of camps by organizations such as ICRC or Medecins sans Frontières, in close co-operation with the Jordanian police authorities responsible for the camps helped to ensure that evacuees were well cared for.

33. For obvious geophysical and political reasons, it was important for Jordan that any relief operations be placed within strict security considerations. Jordan would be particularly vulnerable in case of hostilities in the region. A large part of the Jordanian population was composed of Palestinian refugees before the Iraq/Kuwait conflict started.

C) Transport of Evacuees

34. The United Nations delegated the central role in the transport of evacuees to IOM. The EEC contributed to the international airlift, by financing IOM operations and by arranging its own airlifts (initially not co-ordinated with IOM's efforts). Airlifts were also organized by governments of affected countries. Bilateral donors, for their part, offered aircraft and funds.

35. This was an area in which international assistance was most effective. Airlines were mobilized from all parts of the world, and hundreds of thousands of people were repatriated to Asia and Africa so rapidly that their average stay in Jordan was limited to five days. At the peak of the operation, more than 7,000 people of various nationalities were flown out of Amman daily (Amman having the only airport in the country with the appropriate capacity).

36. The impressive results of the repatriation operation were due to the close collaboration which developed quickly between the EEC, IOM, donors and governments of affected countries in the context of the co-ordination mechanisms mentioned above.

37. The management by the Jordanian Government of inland bus transport was crucial to the success of the operation. In view of the tight schedules governing the air charter commercial market, international agencies could only give short advance notice of flights. Within this limited time, several movements between the border and various transit centres, and between the latter and the airport for boarding had to be synchronized. When problems of financing inland transport arose at the end of September, the entire repatriation operation risked coming to a standstill.

38. 162,992 people were repatriated by IOM and the EEC up to 14 November 1990. A breakdown by nationality is provided below:

Bangladesh:	37,456
Egypt:	38,047 (of whom 17,655 by ship)
India:	26,038
Pakistan:	3,940
Philippines:	14,421
Sri Lanka:	42,012
Sudan:	993
other countries:	85

39. These data include 29,668 passengers on aircraft made available for the international airlift by the Governments of Belgium, Brunei, France, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, Switzerland, Spain (together with the Red Cross), United Kingdom and United States of America, the Swedish Red Cross, ICRC, the Lutheran World Federation and UNDRO.

40. IOM, which, unlike the EEC, had to establish its presence in Jordan, operated its first airlift on 3 September. Both organizations were confronted with high insurance costs due to war risks, and the shortage of information on movements inside Iraq and Kuwait, which did not facilitate proper planning. In chartering aircraft, an effort was made to take into account the legitimate interests of Jordan and of affected countries.

41. The governments of the third countries themselves played a key role in repatriating their nationals. An exact account of the number of people who were returned home by these governments could not yet be finalized at the time of this writing. Their efforts should be all the more appreciated, considering that these governments already faced severe hardship due to the loss of remittance income and key sources of employment and trade.

42. UNDR0 also directly participated in the repatriation effort by operating an Antonov 124 with a capacity of 500 passengers. The Antonov transported 3,600 Bangladeshis back to Dacca. On the return flights from Dacca, 757 tons of rice and 5 tons of curry powder were sent back to Amman. There has been criticism about the time and efforts invested by UNDR0 in this endeavour. However, at the initial stages of the emergency, when there were not many IOM flights, the UNDR0 chartered aircraft provided a sizeable portion of the daily departures.

D) Camp Conditions and Supplies

43. The problem confronting the Jordanian border authorities was how to process an unprecedented influx of foreign nationals, most of whom had no funds, nowhere to go in Jordan and no means of repatriation. Many thousands of them had therefore to remain temporarily in the Ruweished border area between Iraq and Jordan. This led to the establishment of the Shalan 1 camp. There, conditions were particularly harsh, despite the efforts of the Jordanian Government, ICRC and the national Red Crescent. In addition to lack of shelter, the greatest problem was water supply, as it required the transportation of 180,000 to 250,000 litres of water per day from water sources located not less than 50 km away. Incidents of thirsty people seeking to fill their bottles or water cans and fighting over a few litres of water were not uncommon. Population figures were difficult to assess at first, but at the end of August, Shalan 1 was saturated with an estimated 45,000 people.

44. The Jordanian authorities, supported by the United Nations and non-governmental organizations, reacted by setting up the Shalan 2 camp, which was managed with the assistance of Médecins Sans Frontières, but that too was soon overcrowded. Shalan 3 (Mercy) was then opened by a consortium of NGOs led by the Save the Children Fund and the Middle East Council of Churches. Shalan 1 and 2 catered for all nationalities whereas Shalan 3 housed Bangladeshi nationals only.

45. As co-ordination and repatriation arrangements started to be rapidly implemented, the authorities eased the border crossing allowing large numbers of foreign nationals to travel to Amman where they were accommodated at the International Trade Fair, the Andalus Camp, and the Car Exhibition Hall, as well as at numerous small reception centres, churches, mosques, embassies, private homes and hotels.

46. Early in September, with the approval and support of the Government, ICRC began to build a well planned camp 85 km east of Amman, near the town of Azraq (Azraq 1), and the Jordanian Red Crescent, together with the League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, began a similar camp nearby (Azraq 2). The first site to be selected for these camps had been abandoned earlier due to the risk of contamination of Amman's water supply by the camps' latrines. These camps were designed to hold about 25,000 people each. Azraq 1 accommodated Indian nationals only. Azraq 2 sheltered Bangladeshis, Philipinos, Sri Lankans and Thais in separate blocks for different nationalities, which, experience had shown, was an important element for harmony and good management.

47. Azraq 1 and 2 opened before the middle of September and quickly provided adequate accommodation to displaced persons. An effective water supply system was developed with water tanks and a network of outlets. The notorious Shalan 1 camp could then be emptied and it closed on 20 September.

48. On 24 September the ICRC opened a new Reception Centre known as Transit 1, 28 km east of Ruweished. It was well-equipped with large tents to accommodate up to 5,000 people. Although it could shelter people for several days if necessary, its primary function was to provide new arrivals with overnight accommodation before continuing their journey to Amman.

49. By the beginning of October, the camp population was about 45,000 (excluding Arab nationals). In the second week of October, repatriation operations were accelerated, rapidly reducing the overall population to under 4,000. It then became possible to cease operation of Shalan 2, Shalan 3, Azraq 1 and Azraq 2 although continuing to maintain them on stand-by. Projects aimed at adapting facilities to winter conditions such as construction of all-weather drainage, access and in-site roads and parking areas for buses were then undertaken at Azraq 1, Azraq 2 and Andalus (Amman). In the latter camp and at the Ruweished checkpoint, UNDRO financed the construction of shelters more suitable than tents to withstand rain and cold.

50. By 31 October, the camp population (excluding Aqaba and the Ruweished checkpoint) was down to under 2,500 people. At that time, camps also hosted a caseload of refugees and asylum-seekers, which was becoming an increasing burden to UNHCR.

51. In early November, the following camps were on stand-by status:

<u>CAMP</u>	<u>CAPACITY</u>	
Transit 1	5,000	persons
Shalan 2	3,000	persons
Shalan 3 (Mercy)	7,000	persons
Azraq 1	25,000	persons
Azraq 2	25,000	persons
Andalus	3,000	persons

52. The evolution of the camps can be seen in Annex II.

i) Food

53. Fresh food (such as yoghurt and tomatoes) and bread were provided in transit centres by the Government. This was the main source of supply in the camps, particularly during the initial period, for which the government incurred heavy costs and which, at the time of this writing, had not been fully recovered. For its part, the World Food Programme resorted to extensive borrowing of wheatflour from its development projects and from UNRWA. WFP/USAID rice was airlifted from Bangladesh.

54. At the peak of the influx, in late August, shortages of food were apparent in camps, particularly at Shalan 1. This was mainly due to logistical difficulties. With UNDRO's financial support, United Nations Volunteers were dispatched to Jordan to assist WFP in the monitoring of food distribution operations.

55. An analysis of international food aid has shown that, out of a total of 23,000 metric tons pledged, only some 9,000 tons were actually received up to mid-November. Of these, only 926 tons were made available before 1 September - they were actually borrowed from existing stocks - and the bulk did not arrive until the second part of that month or later. Thus, when most of the food aid arrived, the number of displaced persons who would benefit from it had decreased substantially. Under the circumstances, it is not surprising that only a part of the food aid received appeared to have been actually distributed.

56. Although the WFP bulk food rations in bulk would not allow individual distribution to families and individuals, the wheatflour was used for baking bread to provide to the camps.

57. According to United Nations officials, it was difficult to distribute and to account for donated tinned food on the basis of WFP individual rations.

58. Donated food did not always meet the nutritional habits of each foreign community, and there were instances in which it was rejected. It is true that, sometimes, demands of the displaced people, mainly of urban origin, could be rather high.

59. A need that became evident immediately was for the provision of disposable kitchen sets as well as cooking facilities like stoves. ICRC used them with success in Azraq 1 and Transit camps. However, the authorities expressed reluctance to establish permanent cooking facilities in all camps. The need for them would have been obviated, if international aid had included pre-cooked emergency rations.

60. The experience in Jordan shows the advantage for the United Nations of keeping emergency food rations in storage. Naturally, their composition should be carefully studied to permit a long shelf-life and their use by the widest possible cultural and religious spectrum of people.

ii) Tents

61. From the very beginning of the crisis, the need for tents was both obvious and critical. Thus, many donors responded by airlifting tents of all types and sizes. At the time of this writing, a review by the Jordanian Government/UNDRO showed that 4,000 tents were in storage.

62. An example of inter-agency cooperation was UNDRO's purchase and airlift to Jordan of 3,000 UNHCR tents from Pakistan, in early September. The Japanese Government financed the purchase, while the United States Government arranged and paid for the airlift.

63. UNDRO is not in a position to indicate exactly how many tents were received. This is due to the fact that some donors did not inform of the quantities donated. It is hoped that in future emergency operations, donors will be able to provide all details concerning their contributions in kind.

64. It is difficult to make an assessment of the type of tents donated, because part of them are still in storage. Eyewitnesses after a major storm noted that tents of weaker fabric and with pegs and ropes of poorer quality had not withstood the strength of the wind. However, the majority was still able to accomodate a new influx.

65. Rubb-hall tents were erected in various transit centres and proved their usefulness for a variety of purposes (storage, health centres, etc.). Camp commanders noted their potential for temporarily accommodating large numbers of evacuees temporarily in case of sudden influxes of displaced people or deteriorating weather conditions.

66. Plastic sheeting was useful in the initial stage, as a means of supplementing tents or providing additional shelter for luggage and other goods.

iii) Blankets

67. Blankets were required in large quantities, since a number of evacuees took them along when they left the transit centres. This was not universal practice, though, and one could see them inside abandoned tents.

68. A positive initiative of cleaning and disinfecting blankets for recycled use was taken by a non-governmental organization. The operation allowed the treatment of 97,640 blankets from the centres of Andalus, International Fair (Amman) and Azraq 1 and 2 between 20 September and 5 November 1990.

69. At the time of this writing, some 65,000 blankets were still in storage.

iv) Medical Aid

70. WHO and UNICEF shared the key role in this area. In addition and especially in the early stages of the emergency, a number of non-governmental organizations assisted the Government of Jordan in providing medical aid to the displaced. Tribute must be paid in particular to the MSF and MDM teams, which ensured medical screening and medical examination of almost every evacuee upon arrival in a camp. Medical aid was also given by staff of the affected countries such as Egypt, India and Pakistan. Evacuees particularly appreciated the services offered by doctors of their own nationality.

71. But the bulk of medical aid was granted by Jordan. It should be added that, given the general good health conditions of the majority of the displaced people, who were essentially in the prime of their lives, this aspect of the emergency operation was not the key one and by and large the situation always remained under control. In most instances, minor pathologies were encountered (colds, diarrhoeas) and only a few surgical cases had to be referred to hospitals. However, the risk of contagious diseases due to the sanitary conditions in transit centres was a cause for concern. The limited average duration of stay in the centres contributed to the prevention of any outbreak.

72. IOM, with the help of non-governmental organizations, instituted a much appreciated system of medical care in the repatriation flights themselves.

73. It was reported that some of the medicines donated had too limited a shelf-life or were even out-of-date.

v) Sanitation

74. This was a major concern in most transit centres. The fact that the displaced persons were going through the centres for a limited period did not encourage them to organize themselves to ensure adequate sanitary conditions. The different sanitary habits aggravated the problem. Although UNICEF, UNRWA, WHO and Oxfam and other non-governmental organizations made various efforts, both the United Nations and NGOs' could, in future, strengthen their activities in this field, so as to adapt better to emerging situations.

75. In some transit centres, the shortage of basic sanitation equipment such as garbage trucks and of staff dedicated to this task was evident. Even simple items like garbage containers are essential in the initial phase of such an emergency.

vi) Camp Management

76. Non-governmental organizations (both international such as MSF and national such as the Jordanian Red Crescent and the Queen Alia Social Welfare Fund) as well as ICRC played a key role in this respect. Each camp had a camp manager (representing one or several NGOs) who worked closely with the police camp director.

77. Experience showed that the management of a camp would benefit if one non-governmental organization would undertake to become the key interlocutor for the camp with the Government and co-ordinate the work with other NGOs. At Shalan 1, no NGO was actually in charge of the camp, and ICRC's role was limited to the provision of curative medical care and water. However, this changed later during the emergency, after the closure of Shalan 1 when ICRC was given full responsibility for Azrak 1. Shalan 2, however, had a collegial management composed of MECC, Save the Children and other NGOs, and there were some management difficulties.

78. The Government assumed general responsibility for the distribution of donated relief supplies. This fact created misgivings with some NGOs, which found it difficult to explain to their own constituencies their inability to take charge of the supplies earmarked for them from abroad. UNDRO intervened several times to facilitate better understanding of the situation among those concerned. With the centralized approach taken by the Government, which was the only authority aware of prospective movements of thousands of people from one camp to another, the pooling together of donated supplies was meant to ensure optimum distribution at the place they were really needed.

79. Co-operation among NGOs was, on the whole, good. Sub-committees of NGOs were established, in order to tackle matters such as sanitation and food. UNDRO, as well as UNICEF and WHO were fully involved.

80. The Jordanian Government, as well as local NGOs and the UN system were able to limit to a minimum arrivals of unwanted or unnecessary goods. There were however some "photo opportunity" flights arranged by international NGOs; relief goods would be brought in, a photo taken of the sender organization's representatives delivering the goods, and this would be followed by the immediate departure of the donor organization's team. Fortunately, such cases were rare in the Jordanian emergency.

81. United Nations agencies seconded efforts in camp management. UNICEF and UNRWA were active in the fields of health, water, construction of facilities and sanitation. UNHCR undertook an UNDRO-funded technical assistance/training mission in emergency management from 4 to 13 September.

82. UNDRO's field staff, which included a logistics expert and a specialist in camp management on loan from UNHCR, supported the work of camp managers, through visits to the camps to discuss, to observe, to relay information and to bring problems or potential problems to the attention of those bodies best placed to resolve them. The Office's operations also helped to keep other organizations informed of matters of particular concern to them, e.g. for UNICEF the presence of substantial numbers of families with children in certain camps, or, for UNHCR the presence (or arrival) of persons with potential refugee status such as Eritreans and Somalis.

83. Liaison with concerned Embassies after camp visits was important. Diplomatic officials, unable to visit camps as often as they would have wished, welcomed information from UNDRO about the views and concerns of their nationals. Individuals and minority groups, sometimes unrepresented in Jordan, had their plight brought to the attention of appropriate authorities.

84. The Swiss Disaster Relief Unit established essential radio communications between camps and the Headquarters of ICRC and the Red Crescent in Amman.

E) Volume of Assistance

85. Total international assistance for the care and maintenance of the displaced persons and their repatriation, as reported to UNDRO as of 15 November 1990, was estimated at US \$180.1 million (of which US \$111.4 million from governments and United Nations organizations, US \$64.4 million from the EEC, US \$1.7 million from Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and US \$2.6 million from other sources). The total excludes contributions in kind and services, for which the donors did not indicate any value to UNDRO. Thus the actual amount could be much higher.

86. Due to the lack of consolidated and definitive data, this estimate does not take into account the substantial contribution of the affected countries (which included financial support from the EEC) in arranging the bilateral repatriation of their own nationals and in providing them with assistance in Jordan.

87. Some donors announced their contributions to UNDRO without distinguishing the amount allocated to Jordan from that granted to other countries in the area. These contributions are not included in the above-mentioned estimate either.

88. Most international support to Jordan was in kind and in services. As of 15 November 1990, cash contributions amounted to US \$74 million, or 41 percent of the total aid.

89. According to UNDRO's records, the following 30 countries provided emergency assistance:

Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Brunei, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Lybia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, United Kingdom, United States of America.

90. Annex III contains a summary of contributions by category of donor, with governmental contributions listed by country.

91. According to UNDRO records the main channels of international aid were as follows:

<i>Channel</i>	<i>Amount (US DLRS)</i>
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Government of Jordan	8,672,037
UNDRO	29,223,638
WFP	5,954,496
Other U.N. Agencies (UNHCR, UNICEF, WHO)	1,967,251
IOM	35,338,488
EEC (including contributions of Member States)	70,145,329
ICRC	8,758,666
LRCS/Red Cross	4,311,640
NGO's/OTHERS	15,756,202
TOTAL	180,127,657

92. Funds channelled through UNDRO were further directed to other institutions/agencies, as follows:

Government of Jordan	5,482,401
IOM	18,322,221
WFP	1,050,362
WHO	1,284,907
UNHCR	668,300
UNICEF	681,454
UNRWA	150,000
UNV	6,500
ICRC	414,799

93. After taking into account these reallocations, the total contribution received by each agency/organization is as follow:

<i>Channel</i> -----	<i>Amount</i> <i>(US DLRS)</i> -----
Government of Jordan (including in kind)	14,154,438
UNDRO	1,162,694
WFP	7,004,858
Other UN Agencies (UNHCR, UNICEF, UNRWA, UNV, WHO)	4,758,412
IOM	53,660,709
EEC (including contributions of Member States)	70,145,239
ICRC	9,173,465
LRCS/Red Cross	4,311,640
NGOs/OTHERS	7,598,441
Undetermined	8,157,761
TOTAL	----- 180,127,657 -----

94. It should be noted that the amount of US \$70,145,239 through EEC consists of US \$4,100,061 for inland transport and relief supplies and US \$66,045,178 for repatriation. Thus of the total international aid of US \$180,127,657, an amount of US \$119,705,887 (66 percent) was earmarked for the repatriation operations.

95. These data are indicative, since UNDRO was not always provided with information concerning the ultimate channel and destination of contributions pledged (except for those which were actually received by the Office). However, they confirm that donors attached the greatest priority to repatriation (IOM, EEC), food (WFP), and camp management (Government of Jordan, ICRC).

96. The United Nations Resident Co-ordinator in Amman felt that, in emergency situations, a sort of accountability of governmental and non-governmental donors towards co-ordinating bodies would facilitate the latter's tasks. This matter requires careful consideration.

97. UNDRO contributions reports were criticized on various accounts. While their contents and accuracy depend entirely on the information provided by donors, the Office is reviewing its procedures with a view to providing clearer and more complete information to host countries and donors in future emergencies.

98. It was suggested that the title of UNDRO contributions reports "Displaced persons - Jordan" should have been replaced by "Displaced persons through Jordan" so as to reflect the humanitarian character of the assistance provided by the host country.

99. The relief supplies dispatched by UNDRO to Jordan are reflected in Annex IV.
100. Annex V contains a list of United Nations and non-governmental organizations which provided assistance to displaced persons in Jordan.

F) Role of International Media

101. The combination of the political dimensions and the humanitarian aspects of the problem drew unprecedented attention to the events by the media and international press. In fact, some relief officials were torn between the wish to provide requesting journalists with the largest amount of information and the need to dedicate their time to relief operations.
102. The wide coverage played a key role in stimulating international aid.
103. As in every disaster, there were incidents in which comments were not objective and rumors served as a basis for unsubstantiated conclusions. The constantly changing situation, the variations of the influx of displaced persons and the shortage of reliable data on events in Iraq and Kuwait did not facilitate the task of the media. The fact that victims did not share common habits and aspirations increased the risk of fragmentation in the news.
104. In view of the immediacy of the topic, it was not easy to resist the tendency towards sensational news. On the other hand, certain aspects of the operations, such as the complex inland transport arrangements made by the Jordanian Government, could have received a larger media coverage.
105. The experience in Jordan has highlighted the importance of close contacts with the media, through more intensive and frequent overall press briefings by co-ordinating bodies, particularly in the field.