

XXI. ARGUMENTS ABOUT ATTACK PREPAREDNESS

Across the span of approximately the past four decades, any and all programs of attack preparedness civil defense have been subjected to strong criticism by a vocal, articulate and very small minority of Americans who have sought to prevent their financing and their implementation. In the late 1980's, the basic argumentation has remained just about the same as it has been all along.

It is thus quite important to explore the extent to which some of the central arguments, most of them of attack preparedness adversaries and a few by protagonists, are credible to the EMOs. After all, confronted with the various arguments, the EMOs cannot counteract them effectively unless they themselves reject the argumentation of program adversaries and, at least to some measure, accept the arguments of program supporters.

No judgement here needs to be rendered concerning the possible validity of the arguments themselves, itself a matter of some, even considerable, complexity. Be that as it may, the study of the EMOs, the key results of which are reported here, included questions bearing on a number of those arguments which the researchers considered to be central in shedding light on the manner in which the EMOs view them. And this, to repeat, is essential in providing some insight into the mindsets of the EMOs who, after all, have the responsibility, with Federal support and under Federal guidance, for carrying out and implementing programs that would, or might, enhance the protection of "our people against the hazards of nuclear war" as the original, and in this respect never amended, Civil Defense Act stipulated.

The respondents were asked to express their agreement/disagreement with each argument stated. The response scale ran from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree." A summary provided here will collapse the two agreement and the two disagreement categories into but one, agree (which includes "strongly agree" and "agree") and disagree ("strongly disagree" and "disagree"). Invariably, there were many more respondents who chose the "milder" response, "agree" or "disagree," as the case may be, rather than the more extreme answer, "strongly agree" or "strongly disagree."

One class of arguments has to do with assertions that there is no need at all for attack preparedness measures. Indeed, it is altogether reasonable to say that "there would be no need for civil defense programs" in the absence of a threat of a nuclear conflict, that is, if a nuclear confrontation were to be assigned zero probability for now and into the future. And it is similarly not unreasonable to argue that no attack preparedness measures would be called for if the nation were convinced that strategic defense capabilities serve as such an overwhelming deterrent such that nuclear war is rendered impossible, or just about impossible, in that any adversary would not dare to launch an attack faced with the retaliation that would be the immediate consequence of such a venture.

Thus one argument, along this axis, postulates that nuclear war, for whatever reasons, would never come. The second argument postulates that the strategic might of the United States is a sufficient guarantee to prevent nuclear war from ever actualizing. Table 65 shows how the EMOs think about these two key arguments against programs of attack preparedness.

Table 65
 "NO NEED FOR ATTACK PREPAREDNESS"

	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Unsure</u>	<u>Disagree</u>
There is no need for attack preparedness because nuclear war will not come	5.6	17.8	75.4
Given our strategic might, no enemy would dare to attack, so there is no need for attack preparedness	3.4	7.6	87.9

Although a few of the EMOs subscribe to these arguments to some extent at least, and some are unsure one way or another, it is clear that robust majorities of the respondents do not consider these types of arguments to be credible. This is certainly not surprising in the light of the fact that only about 1.5 percent said that "nuclear war will never happen" in reaction to the question about the likelihood of a nuclear conflict. For a few others, perhaps zero likelihood of nuclear war was included in the "very unlikely" response category.

Other major arguments along this dimension of need for attack preparedness have to do with the interaction between active and passive defense programs. If, for example, cities as well as major military installations were to be defended by point-defense ABM's, one might believe that there would be less of a need for passive defense attack preparedness programs. In a similar vein, if area-defense systems, say of the broadly conceived SDI varieties, were deployed there might also be less perceived need for civil

defense measures in so far as such active defense would sufficiently attenuate or blunt an attack.

Table 66

ATTACK PREPAREDNESS PROGRAMS AND ACTIVE DEFENSES

	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Unsure</u>	<u>Disagree</u>
Less need for civil defense with ABM's	4.7	13.1	80.8
Less need for civil defense with SDI	11.0	14.3	73.3
More need for civil defense without active defenses	38.6	24.4	31.1

The EMOs quite evidently do not subscribe to the idea that active defense would be a sufficient substitute for passive defense programs and the data imply complementarity of active and passive defense measures and systems. In turn, their views are quite split on the proposition that attack preparedness measures would be even more needed in the absence of deployed active defenses. The response makes good sense if the EMOs believe that attack preparedness programs are sorely needed: for many of them then, the absence of active defenses - a current situation anyway - would then not make the already pressing need more pressing while for some, perhaps with a view to the future, the need would be actually enhanced if active defenses were not, at least at some point, actually deployed. This interpretation, of course, is somewhat speculative but it would account for the aggregate and divided response on this issue

There, too, is the argument that there would be less of a need for programs of attack preparedness if an agreement were reached with the Soviets not to produce additional nuclear weapons, a kind of "nuclear freeze" situation. And, it might follow that the need would be lesser if the stockpiles of strategic nuclear weapons were to be sharply reduced. On the latter dimension of this form of argumentation, however, there are no data in this study.

- * 18.2 percent of the EMOs agree that the need for attack preparedness programs would be lessened if an agreement to stop further production of nuclear weapons were to be reached with the Soviets;
- * 15.1 percent are uncertain whether such an agreement should make a difference in the need for civil defense;
- * 65.4 percent do not agree that such agreements with the Soviets would make civil defense less needed.

While almost two thirds of the respondents disagree that capping the weapons stockpiles would make attack preparedness programs less necessary, almost one in five express their agreement (but to emphasize: the issue is one of lesser need, not one of no need for such programs). This, too, lends itself to an interpretation, if also a somewhat speculative one: those who disagree might well be recognizing that stopping further production of strategic weapons in the form of a "nuclear freeze" amounts to maintaining a level of weaponry as high as it has become, and thus would have no effect in helping to reduce the probable magnitude of devastation a possible attack would induce.

Those, by contrast, who agree that such an agreement would make for a lesser need for attack preparedness might well be thinking in terms of an improved international

climate resulting from almost any Soviet-American arms control agreement so that the likelihood of nuclear war would decline and so would the more pressing need for measures to protect our people against a threat which is becoming less and less likely to be actualized. Nothing of course, even in this category of response implies that attack preparedness programs would not be needed at all.

Another class of arguments has to do with program effectiveness: whether it would or would not work. In simplest form, the issue concerns the fundamental objective of any civil defense program: to help save lives if worst came to worst. On one side of the argument are those who claim that "no attack preparedness program makes sense because it would not be able to help save enough people." On the other side, of course, are those who are convinced that attack preparedness efforts have a significant payoff in their life-saving potential.

Table 67
LIFE SAVING EFFECTIVENESS OF CIVIL DEFENSE

	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Unsure</u>	<u>Disagree</u>
No program would save enough lives	10.9	13.0	74.9
Attack preparedness programs could save many lives	70.6	17.4	10.6

Even with attack preparedness programs, the EMOs certainly did not prove to be overly, or perhaps, naively optimistic. This was clearly shown in the data on survivability (Chapter XX.). Thus those who agree (and perhaps many of those who are "unsure" one way or another) that not enough lives would be saved and who may also disagree that

many lives could be saved may well be suggesting that the enhancements in survivability due to attack preparedness programs are not of magnitudes which, for them, would represent "enough" or "many" lives saved. But the main thrust of the data is clear: the EMOs do not see as credible the argument that measures to protect our people would lack effectiveness and therefore make no sense, and they, for the most part, strongly believe that many lives could, indeed, be saved which otherwise would be lost.

Two of the often used arguments against attack preparedness efforts concern psychological effects: for one, that such programs would increase anxiety among the nation's public; and second, that the people could become more complacent about nuclear warfare in that they could come to believe that a nuclear war would be just another war rather than the veritable holocaust which it would be bound to become in reality. The arguments, in a way, contradict each other: one would, in principle, become less anxious about nuclear war if one were to conclude that it was "just like any other war;" whereas if one were to become more anxious, it is difficult to see how nuclear war would become "more acceptable" by being considered just like any other war. Yet, in the argumentation against civil defense programs both propositions have been used as if both mirrored troublesome, if not truly devastating, consequences for the national psyche.

As it turns out, many more of the EMOs agree that programs to protect our people against nuclear war might induce some additional anxiety. Perhaps simply because their very dynamic and existence force people to think about the "unthinkable," something most people prefer to avoid most of the time, and certainly under normalcy conditions. But the complacency argument is rejected by about seven out of ten respondents, though

"out in the field," at local and county levels, it is not unproblematic that so many of the EMOs would tend to agree or be unsure about this issue.

Table 68
ANXIETY AND COMPLACENCY ARGUMENTS

<u>Programs would:</u>	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Unsure</u>	<u>Disagree</u>
Increase anxiety	36.6	19.4	42.6
Increase complacency	10.0	20.7	68.3

The view that programs of attack preparedness would somehow, by whatever dynamic, make "further arms control agreements more difficult" lacks credibility among the EMOs:

- * 78.2 percent of the EMOs disagree that further progress on the arms control "front" would be made more difficult if the nation engaged in attack preparedness efforts;
- * 15.6 percent are unsure of the effects of such programs on arms control negotiations;
- * and 4.6 percent agree that civil defense efforts could create significant difficulties in arms control prospects.

By their opponents, attack preparedness programs have also been seen as endangering the very brittle stability of the international situation. Indeed, they have been portrayed as provocative to the Soviet Union and thus actually increasing the probability of nuclear war. By contrast, protagonists of civil defense measures have often argued that attack preparedness programs have a positive effect on deterrence since they show to the potential adversaries that the United States is prepared even for the worst situation and this, as the argument goes, would tend to make their willingness, or even desire, to

engage in warfare less likely as it would decrease the likelihood of an attempt at "nuclear blackmail."

Table 69
EFFECTS OF PROGRAMS ON THREAT OF WAR

	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Unsure</u>	<u>Disagree</u>
Increase chances of war due to provocativeness	5.9	14.7	78.2
Decrease chances of war by enhan- cing deterrence	54.9	21.6	23.0

If by far most, some eight out of ten, of the EMOs are convinced that civil defense programs would not increase the probability of nuclear war by serving as a signal to the Soviets that "we are preparing for war" (and thus being provocative), only somewhat more than one half of the respondents see such programs as contributing to war prevention by strengthening the nation's deterrence. Yet still, many more of the EMOs agree with the deterrent potential of attack preparedness measures than disagree, though almost as many disagree who are also not sure about the interaction between such war preparedness programs and deterrence.

Finally, the study incorporated two major arguments about the aftermath of a nuclear confrontation. A more pessimistic perspective suggests that "life would not be worth living" even if people were to survive a nuclear war. A more optimistic view is based on the proposition that "even after a nuclear war, the survivors could rebuild America and make the best of it under the circumstances."

Table 70
IN THE AFTERMATH OF A NUCLEAR WAR...

	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Unsure</u>	<u>Disagree</u>
Life would not be worth living	11.3	29.2	58.2
Survivors could rebuild America	53.4	29.0	16.6

Thus, predominantly, the EMOs reject the pessimistic viewpoint and, at the same time, endorse the more optimistic one. But almost as many are undecided, or unsure, take the opposite view, though many more of the latter are in the "unsure" category than in the more pessimistic category (of those who say that life would not be worth living and those who say that survivors, perhaps, could not rebuild the country).

Naturally, no one is prepared to argue, on some objective grounds, what would actually happen. But it needs to be said that programs of attack preparedness, were they to increase the numbers of survivors (and the EMOs are convinced that they would do so), represent only opportunities to survive and in no way imply whether life in the aftermath of a holocaust would or would not be worth living. After all, that is the kind of decision individuals and families would have to make, but they could not even make such a decision if they did not survive in the first place. And whether or not America could be rebuilt is still another question as it begs the issues as to what kind of America could, or would, be rebuilt. Yet, implicit in the question is, of course, a kind of indirect assessment of longer term survival chances: the survivors could not rebuild the country no matter what if they were to live for but a few months or a couple of years after a nuclear war.

On the other hand, the wording which includes making "the best of it under the circumstances" also taps a sense of pioneering, one of the key characteristics of which, of course, was making the most under whatever circumstances one would have encountered.

To sum up:

1. The EMOs reject the argument that there would be no need for attack preparedness programs.
2. They do not agree that active defense measures, or a "nuclear weapons freeze" would render such programs less needed than they are needed now.
3. They do not agree that not enough lives would be saved to make such programs pointless, and agree that many lives could be saved.
4. Many, though not most, agree that attack preparedness efforts might enhance anxiety among the public (though somewhat more of them disagree than agree), but they do not agree that people would become imbued with "a false sense of security" and would tend to be more complacent and look at a nuclear war as if it were "just another war."
5. The EMOs do not agree that arms control efforts would be made more difficult if the nation engaged in more of attack preparedness programs.
6. They do not accept the idea that such measures would be provocative and thus tend to actually increase the chances of a war which all seek to prevent, and they tend to agree more than disagree that programs to protect Americans against the hazards of nuclear war might contribute to deterrence and thus actually decrease the chances of nuclear war ever occurring.
7. Most of the respondents do not subscribe to the idea that "life would not be worth living" even if people were to survive a war, and they are inclined to agree (a modest majority of them) that survivors could, though not necessarily would, be able to rebuild the country and "make the best of it under the circumstances."

8. While the central arguments offered by opponents of attack preparedness programs are not credible to majorities of the EMOs, often robust majorities at that, it is crucial to recognize that not insignificant numbers of them accept this or that argument and that this view cannot but have effects on the way in which these EMOs, minority though they may be, may react to critiques of such programs, to questions by government officials, and to questions raised by the media or the public.

XXII. FUNDING

Two questions were raised in the instrument with regard to funding strategies for emergency management activities. The first item (Question 175) provided the respondents with four basic alternatives and asked them to identify, according to their views, the best of these options:

1. The current approach, in which the local government provides one half of costs of preparations that are useful in both peacetime and attack-related emergencies, while the Federal Government pays 100 percent of preparations that are mainly needed in attack preparedness programs.
2. Asking the local governments to share the cost of all items - including radiation detection instruments and whatever else may be needed primarily with respect to attack preparedness (even though such equipment and procedures or activities may have but limited value to cope with peacetime hazards).
3. To have the Federal Government pay 100 percent for all elements of attack preparedness.
4. To have the Federal Government absorb 100 percent of costs of all emergency and disaster programs, peacetime and war-related.

Those who would have selected Option 4, calling for the Federal Government to absorb costs of all disaster and emergency programs, were also asked to select one of the three remaining alternatives as the preferred one on the premise that "the Federal Government would be unable to provide 100 percent of the funding." Table 71 provides the basic percentages of the EMOs who chose each respective option as the "best" one.

And it is to be expected that only a very few of the respondents, 2.9 percent of them, thought that the local level governments should be expected to share the costs of all preparedness programs, including war-related ones. Table 72 includes the basic data

on the three remaining options as chosen by those. 33.0 percent, who favored full Federal funding for all hazards.

Table 71
PREFERENCES FOR FUNDING ALTERNATIVES

<u>Option</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Current approach	32.4
Local sharing for all emergencies	2.9
Federal funds for attack-preparedness	19.4
Federal funds for all disaster efforts	33.0

Table 72
PREFERRED FUNDING OPTION IF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
CANNOT PROVIDE FUNDS FOR ALL HAZARDS

<u>Option</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Full Federal funding for attack-related preparedness programs	45.5
Current approach	42.6
Local cost sharing for all hazards	6.3

In the sample as a whole, full Federal funding of attack-preparedness programs was selected by 19.4 percent of the EMOs. Furthermore, 45.5 percent of the 33.0 percent (and thus 15.1 percent of the sample as a whole) who preferred the Federal Government to fund all disaster and emergency programs also selected as second best full Federal funding for war-related programs. Since it cannot be assumed that the Federal Government would, or could, provide for 100 percent of costs for all hazards, peacetime and war-related, this means that 34.5 percent of all of the respondents held the

view that full funding ought to support attack-preparedness programs, this representing their initial choice (19.4 percent) or their second best option (15.1 percent).

The current pattern of funding, in turn, is favored by 46.6 percent of the respondents with 32.4 percent selecting it as their first best alternative, and 14.2 percent as the second best option (a percentage which represents 42.6 percent of those who initially chose full Federal cost absorption for all hazards).

In all then, the current approach in which the Federal Government provides full funding for activities and equipment that involves primarily attack-related preparedness programs and the local governments share half of the cost of all other programs is quite acceptable to the EMOs, though many would like to see the Federal Government taking over at least the full costs of all war-related programs.

XXIII. NATIONAL DECLARATIONS OF DISASTER AND EMERGENCY AREAS

When the President chooses to declare a particular situation in a particular area of the country a disaster or emergency area, Federal help, by FEMA, can be provided to the area and to the victims of a disaster. Such decisions are based on recommendations to the President by such officials to whom the responsibility is delegated. In turn, even the consideration of such disaster area declaration has to be based on a request by the Governor of the State or Commonwealth in which the event took place.

It seemed prudent to explore whether the EMOs thought that extant procedures of recommending a Presidential declaration, or procedures criteria used in the requests of the respective Governors were adequate: unproblematic, as it were, or whether there were some special difficulties and problems that might merit further consideration. Here, no attempt is made to confront existing procedures and criteria with what the EMOs asserted in the way of problems. Rather, only responses to a few limited probes form the focus of this discussion. The respondents were asked whether there were "any problems with the criteria used in recommending that the President declare a situation to be a disaster or emergency." Those who responded in the affirmative were asked to suggest "what criteria they thought should be used or what changes should be made."

The respondents were also asked, whether they saw any problems in the procedures or criteria deployed in the requests by their Governors "that the President declare a situation a disaster or an emergency." And those, again, who did respond that such problems appear to exist were asked to suggest consideration of additional, or

alternative criteria that should be used and to suggest possible changes that ought to be considered.

The data of Table 73 and Figure 10 indicate that by far most of the respondents seem to be quite satisfied with current approaches, procedures and standards. Yet, some are not.

Table 73
APPROACHES TO DISASTER SITUATION DECLARATION

<u>Current approaches</u>	<u>No problem</u>	<u>Problems</u>
Recommendations to the President	80.5	14.6
Procedures or criteria for Governor's request for Presidential declaration	87.9	7.0




FIGURE 10

Even though only a minority of the responding EMOs "saw" problems in procedures or criteria in current usage, their suggestions for possible improvements and their

implicit criticisms of existing approaches are of considerable value. They are certainly worth taking into account. In Table 74 the most frequent suggestions are identified.

Table 74
SUGGESTED IMPROVEMENTS IN RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE PRESIDENT

<u>Recommendation</u>	<u>Percent Identifying Problems</u>	<u>Sample</u>
It takes too long, format should be simplified	27.6	3.1
Criteria should consider different circumstances of areas and communities	24.2	2.7
Initiate declarations at local level	7.4	1.6
The State, the Governor, should be able to declare emergency	6.8	0.8
Highest official of affected area should be able to declare	5.7	0.6

There are other, potentially important, suggestions:

- * The political factor "ought to be" taken out of the decision making process;
- * The "experts" providing information to the President are no experts and ought to be changed;
- * Criteria should be consistent from one disaster to another;
- * Criteria ought to be consistent from year to year.
- * Provisions are needed to facilitate disaster declarations when the President is out of the country.

These are but examples of other concerns and some of the responses do not deal directly with the problems of declaring a situation to be a disaster or emergency, but with subsequent management: even people with insurance provisions ought to be assisted by the Federal Government; more concern for the needs of renters and tenants; more assistance needed to help with damage or loss of public property as contrasted with private property losses; second homes of people should be included in the consideration of damage assessment eligibility; economic dislocations should be considered a disaster.

In all, 11.2 percent of the respondents gave the variegated suggestions - 76.7 percent of those (14.6 percent of the sample) who did respond in the affirmative to the question about problems and difficulties associated with recommendations to the President regarding declarations of disasters and emergencies. Of the 7 percent who expressed some uneasiness with procedures and criteria whereby their Governors seek Federal (Presidential) declaration of an emergency, 77.1 percent (5.4 percent of the sample) made some specific suggestions. The data of Table 75 highlight some of the suggestions which were made with some not uninteresting frequencies.

There, too, are additional concerns and suggestions:

- * Disaster declarations should not have to be made - the situation should simply meet pre-existing criteria;
- * More informational systems are needed for the victims;
- * More accurate and reliable description of the emergency is called for - the "experts" are no experts;
- * States should be responsible for disaster relief.

Table 75

THE REQUESTS OF GOVERNORS FOR PRESIDENTIAL DECLARATIONS

<u>Recommendation</u>	<u>Percent Identifying Problems</u>	<u>Sample</u>
It takes too long, approach should be changed	33.1	1.8
More local involvement in the decision making process	15.0	0.8
State should be responsible for declaring emergencies/disasters	14.2	0.7
The process should be depoliticized	7.9	0.4

Thus:

1. By far most of the EMOs are satisfied, perhaps only reasonably satisfied, with the procedures and criteria by which recommendations to the President are made regarding declaring a particular situation a disaster or emergency.
2. Similarly, and even more so, the respondents are not unhappy about the approaches, procedures and criteria in current use by which the Governors of the nation's respective States determine whether to request Presidential decision.
3. Those, minorities though they are, who identify problems along these lines offer a number of suggestions and these do merit consideration if only because they come from the emergency managers who are "out there" in the real trenches where disasters and emergencies touch on the lives of our people and of our communities.

As articulated by the respondents, not all the comments, of course, are responsive to the question posed. Further analysis may, however, cast some light on whether such dissatisfaction as manifests itself relates mainly to the kind of effort that is required in developing necessary documentation on the basis of which Presidential declarations are based, or to the actual decision criteria involved in the process. But also: perhaps some of the dissatisfaction, though it characterizes a minority of the EMOs, could have its roots in a sense that even given a disaster area declaration not much gets done "by the Federals" or not much gets done in the way of help fast enough.

XXIV. INFORMATION NEEDS

In Question 181, the respondents were asked:

"During periods of no emergency, is there any information that you need to have or would like to have that is currently not readily available to you: that is, information that would enhance preparedness planning and programs?"

They were similarly asked whether there is any information

"they now do not have that would make the programs more effective in an emergency."

And also, the EMOs were asked about

"information needs or information they would like to have regarding the immediate aftermath of a disaster, that is, in the rescue and clean-up period."

Following each of these questions was an open-ended probe for those who said that they needed, or would like to have, additional or different information. For the most part, as the data of Table 76 show, the emergency managers did not find a compelling need for more or different information than that which might be available to them. But, at the same time, roughly one in five did mention some information needs, and many of those did identify what kinds of information they would like to have.

- * Of those that thought they would need, or like to have, additional information under "normalcy conditions" (22.8 percent of the sample), 90.8 percent identified at least one information need (21.6 percent of the sample) and 33.8 percent (7.7 percent of the whole sample) mentioned two types of information needs.
- * In an actual emergency situation, 88.2 percent of those who felt some need for additional or different information (21.3 percent of the sample), asserted at least one information requirement and 25.3 percent of them (representing 5.4 percent of the sample as a whole) cited two types of desirable information.

- * In turn, in the disaster aftermath, 18.5 percent of all respondents would like to have additional, or other, information than that which may be currently available to them, and of these EMOs, 71.4 percent identified one type of information need (16.2 percent of the sample as a whole), and 23.2 percent (4.3 percent of the sample) gave two examples of information that may be needed or desired.

Table 76
INFORMATION NEEDS OF THE EMOS

	<u>Information Needed</u>	<u>Not needed</u>
"Normalcy" conditions	22.8	70.7
During a disaster	21.3	70.6
In the aftermath	18.5	72.3

Table 77 identifies some of the expressed information needs and/or desires under "normalcy" conditions, in a situation in which no disaster or emergency appears to be imminent. Only a few of the responses, the ones most frequently offered, are tabulated here.

Table 77
INFORMATION NEEDS UNDER "NORMALCY"

<u>Type of information</u>	<u>Needing information</u>	<u>Sample</u>
Updated publications	13.5	2.8
Where and how to obtain grants	12.0	2.7
Resource lists (needed resources)	10.1	2.1
Hazmat information	8.7	1.8
Model programs, other agency resp.	8.2	1.7
Training employees/volunteers	6.8	1.4
General disaster information	6.8	1.4

In emphasizing the need for up-to-date publications and bulletins, the EMOs generally include some qualifiers: information that is relevant and truthful. In addition to

the information items which, as in Table 77 appear with some frequencies, a few respondents here and there mentioned other types of information they would like to have under "normalcy" conditions. Examples provide a good menu of such items:

- * Advice on involving FEMA in exercise and planning activities;
- * Probability maps, charts pertaining to disasters that might affect the area;
- * Information about prospective legislative overviews that might affect emergency management;
- * Shelter lists and appropriate guidance;
- * Details on host jurisdictions;
- * Definite answers on the status of fallout shelter programs;
- * Better weather information;
- * More information for use in public education;
- * Schedules of all available seminars for emergency personnel;
- * Home study courses;
- * Current civil defense plans for the nation;
- * Resources of surrounding areas;
- * Information in Spanish language;
- * Predicted fallout patterns from nuclear generating facilities;
- * Updates on political hotspots, national security conditions;
- * Lists of nationwide specialized agencies and personnel that deal with disasters and emergencies.

Many perceived information categories are also mentioned in answering the question about information that would make a response during a disaster or emergency

more effective. Some of the major categories of responses are given in Table 78. It is not to be surprising that some of the items of Table 77 reappear in that the EMOs see such information as desirable, and currently not adequately available, in both pre-disaster conditions and in facilitating a more effective response during an emergency: better insight into how other agencies and jurisdictions have responded to disasters; better information about employee and volunteer training; data on needed and available resources.

Table 78
INFORMATION NEEDS FOR DISASTER RESPONSE

<u>Type of Need</u>	<u>Percent Needing Information</u>	<u>Sample</u>
Resource lists	14.9	2.8
More and updated information, relevant and truthful	12.8	2.4
Information on self-help	10.1	1.9
Information on hazardous materials	9.8	1.8
Reviews of programs of other agencies, plans and outcomes	8.0	1.5
Computer/data base information	6.9	1.3
Training employees/volunteers	4.8	0.9

Other information needs are specified, though with frequencies even lower than the items tabulated. Examples might suffice here but since the many faceted needs of the

EMOs are highly relevant to consider however they may have been articulated, an Appendix provides a detailed summary of the responses.

- * Information about other jurisdictions;
- * Probability charts for possible occurrence of disasters in the area;
- * Training information;
- * Where specialized help may be available during disasters;
- * Federal and State data information systems;
- * Information on model programs to facilitate starting one's own - how other agencies respond to disasters;
- * How to deal with handicapped people;
- * Clearcut budget and budget projections;
- * Information provided in Spanish language;
- * Questions answered on a timely basis;
- * Location of nuclear facilities and hazards they pose;
- * Findings of academic research on disasters.

Finally, the respondents identified information needs bearing on the "immediate aftermath" of a disaster, the rescue and clean-up period. Many of those who answered (22.8 percent of the 16.2 percent who provided insight into their information needs) referred to resources information needs, local, in surrounding areas as well as national and others (14.2 percent of those responding to the question) emphasized information on recovery and clean-up procedures as well as on the actual status of the process in the wake of a disaster or emergency.

Table 79
INFORMATION NEEDS FOR DISASTER AFTERMATH

<u>Type of information</u>	<u>Percent Needing information</u>	<u>Sample</u>
Resource and support information	22.8	3.7
Recovery, clean-up information	14.2	2.3
General disaster information	8.6	1.4
Where to go for answers, where help is available	8.0	1.3
Clearer understanding of protocols	8.0	1.3
Where to get updated information	7.4	1.2
Information on staff training and retraining	5.6	0.9
Hazardous materials information, including nuclear materials	5.6	0.9
Case studies of disaster experiences	4.9	0.8

Other responses include:

- * Information about successful (particularly new or innovative) programs;
- * More accurate information on program funding and how to seek to obtain such funding;
- * Improved guidance on damage assessment procedures;
- * Truth from industry on hazardous materials;
- * Local, state and national shelter capabilities;
- * How jurisdictions can obtain insurance for exercises;

- * Information on trauma care;
- * Better guidelines for using volunteers;
- * Military resources available at local bases for emergencies;
- * Information on classes and seminars being offered.

Again: more detailed data are provided in Appendix A.

Leaving the responses of the EMOs essentially unaltered, as has been done throughout the previous tabulations and itemizations, produces a number of redundancies: it seemed preferable, at this time, to the alternative of developing a simpler taxonomy. Thus "resource" related needs are cited in several different ways and with respect to all three situations, the pre-disaster, the trans-disaster and post-disaster circumstances. Issues of training and/or retraining, too, reappear as do more generic answers about the desirability of updated, relevant and truthful information and forms of access to it when needed.

It may be argued that in many instances the identified information needs could readily be satisfied by the EMOs themselves or, of course, an appropriate staff person or a volunteer (if such are available). But it seemed appropriate to let the respondents, the local and county emergency managers, have their say on their own terms and in their own words.

Above all, however, it needs to be emphasized that significant majorities of the respondents did not feel they needed, or would like to have, additional or different information than that which seems currently available to them. On the other hand, the minorities which did identify further information needs are certainly anything but insignificant and their responses do provide some crucial insights into the thinking of these responding EMOs.