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URBAN TERRORISM: ITS CAUSES AND TREATMENT

"The upsurge in urban guerrilla warfare has caused worldwide concern since it has not been confined to developing countries. Terrorist bombings, the kidnapping of government officials, and street barricades have become commonplace in European cities. And as the inspection of briefcases and purses at the entrances to most Federal buildings testifies, neither is the United States actively immune from this threat."

Brian Jenkins, AN URBAN STRATEGY FOR
GUERRILLAS AND GOVERNMENTS (Rand,
August 1972)

I. WHAT IS URBAN TERRORISM?

"Terrorism is not, as is frequently believed, a subspecies of guerrilla (or 'revolutionary') warfare and its political function today is also altogether different. 'Urban guerrilla' is indeed urban, but it is not 'guerrilla' in any meaningful sense of the term; the difference between guerrilla (warfare) and terrorism is not one of semantics but of quality."

Walter Laqueur, TERRORISM (Little
Brown 1977)

A. Criminal violence vs. terrorism:

A definitional dilemma for lawyers,
judges and government policy makers.

- (1) U.S. view - "common crime" approach
- (2) Continental view - "political offense" approach
- (3) International law
 - (i) Hijacking and aircraft sabotage Conventions (ICAO)
 - (ii) Internationally Protected Persons Convention (UN)
 - (iii) Proposed Hostage Convention in current UNGA

II. MANIFESTATIONS

"One purpose of terrorism is to deprive a government of respect and legitimacy by demonstrating that it is unable to guarantee public safety, the requisit of all justice. Many years ago a Chinese theorist said: 'Kill one, frighten 10,000.' A modern student of terrorism has correctly said that in the age of television, the axiom should be: 'Kill one, frighten 10 million!'"

George F. Will, WASHINGTON POST
(August 12, 1979)

- A. Hijackings and Destruction of Commercial Aircraft
- B. Assassination of Political Leaders, Diplomats, Public Figures and Symbolic Individuals
- C. Hostage-Barricade Incidents, including Government and Diplomatic Premises

D. Mass Destruction Incidents

- (i) Bombings
- (ii) Use of automatic weapons in public places
- (iii) Potential employment of radiological, chemical or biological agents

III. TREATMENT AND/OR CURE

"* * Terrorism can succeed only if our willingness to face it realistically is replaced by governmental quaking and public alarm. Overreaction, such as government-imposed news blockouts or invasions of privacy, are unmistakable invitations to disaster.

"The prescription is toughness. Governments must not appear to cower in the face of a few 'killer bees.' They must resolutely match wits with their antagonists, recognizing the range of targets, even economic ones, that are well within the reach of the more imaginative."

Robert Kupperman and Darrell Trent,
TERRORISM (Hoover Institution 1979)

- A. Greater National Resolution to Combat Terrorism through legal means
 - (i) Deterrence through criminal laws and processes of justice (with care to avoid overreaction or enactment of repressive measures)
 - (ii) Strengthen international laws to combat terrorism and expanded international cooperation
- B. Effective Crisis Management Capability at all Governmental Levels, including international cooperation
- C. Strong emergency response capability to limit damage effects, including paramedic, medic, communication, transportation, etc.

IV. PROGNOSIS

"All told, transnational terrorism promises to pose a continuing and potentially gravely unsettling problem for the world community until such time--possibly years hence--that the international system gets into new and generally accepted contours. Although the frequency and intensity of violence in some current trouble spots will probably decline, it seems likely that:

- The overall number of terrorist groups engaged in transnational terrorist activity will, at best, remain at about the present level;
- The number of countries in which these groups are operating will increase;
- Because of their symbolic value, their availability, and the embarrassment they can create, the popularity of American targets will remain high;
- The world will witness steadily greater and more widespread sophistication in terrorist targetting, execution, and weaponry; and
- Although most terrorist groups will probably continue to be deterred by both moral considerations and calculations of the risks involved, the danger that a fanatic few might resort to weapons of mass destruction will increase accordingly."

CIA: INTERNATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL
TERRORISM: DIAGNOSIS AND PROGNOSIS
(April 1976)

"Although the oscillations in the overall level of terrorist activity in recent years render predictions hazardous, it is doubtful that there will be many more terrorist incidents in 1979 than in 1978. A cyclical pattern seems to have been established. For the typical terrorist group, a period of considerable activity lasting several weeks or months usually is followed by a lull, as governments adapt to terrorist tactics, groups leaders are arrested, problems of logistics or morale arise, and popular sympathy wanes. In time new terrorist recruits may appear, new methods may be developed, and a more favorable political climate may return. Then a new cycle for that group may begin. But as new or revitalized groups arise, others become dormant, and some eventually disappear."

CIA: INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN 1978
(March 1979)

- A. Terrorism is a "growth industry"--
which feeds on success
- B. Increase in Hijackings, Bombings and
Kidnappings in 1979
- C. Trends suggest escalation--
growing economic disparity, worldwide
inflation and unemployment, widening of
historic geo-political and socio-political
differences

"The use of terrorist tactics will persist. The actual amount of violence or threatened violence may increase, for terrorism has a built-in requirement for escalation if not in bloodshed, at least in audacity, drama, or magnitude of the threat. Potentially, terrorism could also decrease, for it has tended historically to be cyclical, with earlier waves

of terrorism subsiding in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Future potential terrorists could decide that terrorist tactics are unproductive, perhaps even counter-productive, spectacles. The repertoire of the terrorists may change as new tactics are invented, old ones discarded, for there is a constant requirement for novelty. When terrorism becomes mundane, it may lose its effect. The sources of terrorist violence may move about the world as groups disappear or discard terrorist tactics as a means of achieving their objectives while new groups adopt them. But considering all things, the use of terrorist tactics is not likely to end, for the basic idea behind terrorism that a small but determined group, lacking other means of getting attention and of coercion, can achieve disproportionate effects through dramatic acts of violence has been repeatedly demonstrated to work, at least in the short run. And that is probably enough to preclude total abandonment."

Brian Jenkins, *TERRORISM: TRENDS AND POTENTIALITIES* (Rand, 1977)