

ANNEXE 4: SOMALIA CASE STUDY

1. Context

Somalia is a prominent example of a chronic conflict that has continued for almost a decade since the onset of factional fighting and the collapse of the government in 1991. Persistent poverty, drought and factional violence cause an estimated 750,000 people to remain vulnerable and food insecure across the country. However, the northern parts of the country have been free of the worst of conflict for last five years.

In 1991 the north west province of Somaliland declared itself independent, later enshrining this in a constitution in 1997 constitution, and although not recognised internationally, its administration seeks to perform governmental functions. In 1998, the neighbouring northeast province declared itself the Puntland State following joint statements from the Somalia Aid Coordination Body (SACB) – including the UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS), the European Commission (EC), the Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator, UN agencies, donors and NGOs - that it would support peaceful regions and emerging regional administrations as the building blocks for a peaceful, federated state. Unlike Somaliland, Puntland continues to see itself as part of Somalia and has established an administration, although public services are minimal.

In the south, the Transitional National Government (TNG) has been in place since November 2000 as a result of agreement brokered among factions in Djibouti. It has not, however, extended its hold beyond parts of Mogadishu. Neighbouring Ethiopia continues to demonstrate its antipathy to an Islamic state in the south of the country by offering the support to particular factions of Ethiopian troops posted inside Somalia.

The UN's involvement in Somalia cannot be divorced from the legacy of the events during the early 1990s, and a series of ill-fated efforts by peacekeepers to facilitate humanitarian aid. The beginning of the 1990s witnessed a swathe of asset stripping and violence against the population by armed factions, resulting in a descent into violence and an acute famine emergency between 1991 and 1993. This prompted the UN Security Council to deploy peacekeepers to protect the delivery of humanitarian assistance. The initial force – the small, weakly mandated UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) – appeared to fuel protection rackets rather than feed the hungry. It was replaced by the US-led mission of Operation Restore Hope that in turn was replaced by UNSOM II. The October 1993 debacle which involved the deaths of 20 troops – 18 of them American – in retaliation for UNOSOM's pursuit of one warlord for his part in killing 28 Pakistani peacekeepers, prompted the UN to withdraw from Somalia, its credibility in tatters.

Since this debacle, donor fatigue with crisis in Somalia has grown and deepened. Consequently, Somalia has witnessed a steady stream of departing humanitarian agencies as well as the downscaling of operations among those agencies that have remained.

2. Coordination Structures

Nairobi

In Nairobi, coordination coheres around the SACB at various levels. The SACB was founded through the agreement of international agencies that the rehabilitation of the devastated country required stronger donor involvement in coordination. The Addis Ababa declaration of 1 December 1993 envisaged that the SACB would include donors, UN agencies and programmes, NGOs, multilateral and regional institutions and organisations to coordinate on various aspects of international aid to Somalia. The mandate ascribed to SACB was to 'operate until such time as Somalia re-establishes institutional machinery for national development management and aid coordination, and for coordination of development assistance with its international partners.' The EU, Somalia's single largest donor, was given the chair of the SACB. (However, it no longer holds the chair of any of the main SACB committees.) Membership of the SACB is voluntary and today consists of 117 partner agencies. Its enacts its work through a number of committees.

- The **Executive Committee**, now chaired by a representative of the Danish Embassy, meets once monthly as the principal policy approval forum on relief, development and security issues. It operates through consensus 'in which unanimity is not essential'. Although donor membership is unrestricted, it also includes four UN Country Team members selected by the UN Country Team including the United Nations Security Coordinator (UNSECOORD), UNPOS, three (plus or minus one) INGO members selected by INGO Consortium. Additional invitees are allowed in accordance with the agenda.
- The **Steering Committee**, composed of the chairpersons of the SACB sectoral committees, donors, and UN agencies, is chaired by the Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator. It plays a key role in inter-sectoral coordination and is mandated to monitor the success of sectoral activities.
- **Sectoral Committees** on health, food security, water and sanitation, education, and a fifth working group on governance chaired by the Italian ambassador, meet monthly. These all meet to discuss and agree action on technical issues. Many of the sectoral committees have further subcommittees working on specific issues, for example, the health committee has the Cholera task force, TB group, HIV/AIDS, measles, nutrition, and a group on hospitals. Current efforts focus on forming strategies for each of these sectors.
- The **Consultative Group** is open to all SACB members and the general public as a monthly forum for update and information exchange. This has been established more recently than the other structures with the aim to involve Somalis in Nairobi in coordination. It is chaired by a representative of the NGO Consortium.
- The **SACB Secretariat** is funded by UNDP and the EC. It organises and minutes meetings, disseminates outcomes and maintains an archive of material.
- The SACB also has a **Main Body Meeting** that is held when necessary to consider impact of major changes on the situation for SACB policy. The last one was held in May 1997 in Rome.
- The **NGO Consortium** consists of an executive committee and a main body involving international and local NGOs who elect representatives to sit on the SACB's committees.
- All members of the UN Country Team participate in the SACB at various levels. However, the UN retains a number of coordination mechanisms and structures.
- The **UN Country Team** meets roughly once a month, as does its Joint Working Group – a sub-group on interagency operations that focuses on the technical or operational issues arising from UN Country Team discussions – and the Security Management Team.
- The **UN Coordination Unit** was established in 1997 as a UNDP project supported by OCHA; it is now also funded by the Swedish government and the US Agency for International Development (USAID). Its budget for 2001 is \$1.3m to support a proposed structure for 2001 that expands the office to include five professional and three national staff who service the UN Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator and the UN Country Team, and thus the SACB. Its functions include support to the Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator, information management, data collection, analysis and reporting, and the promotion of common UN strategies.¹³¹

Somalia

In Somalia itself, coordination on the ground is more minimal. In Puntland and Somaliland, coordination structures involve local authorities, including relevant line ministries.

- In **Somaliland**, the UN has a coordination Focal Point in Hargeisa, although the post has been left unfilled for long periods. The NGO Consortium Focal Point plays a role in coordination, while security coordination is led by the UN Zone Security Officer. UNICEF Regional Programme Officers and UNDP Area Programme Officers are key to coordination.
- In **Puntland**, a UN Focal Point combines roles for coordination and the UNDP's Area Programme Officer, and divides her time between the administrative capital Garowe and the trading capital Bosaso – where UNICEF has its headquarters. As in Somaliland, the NGO Consortium Focal Point plays a role in coordination, while the UN Zone Security Officer leads security coordination.
- In the south, OCHA has recently appointed a Humanitarian Affairs Officer to provide support to coordination in the south and central region based in Baidoa. Hitherto, INGOs and UN agencies had performed ad hoc coordination functions. Efforts to hold monthly meeting of INGOs and UN agencies in south and central Somalia were described as suffering from poor attendance. Elsewhere across the south, coordination is based on the initiative of individuals and agencies in particular areas. A UN Zone Security Officer has also recently been deployed.

¹³¹ However, the United Nations Coordination Unit for Somalia (UNCU) received approximately only a quarter of \$1.3m last year.

3. Coordination Tools

The principal coordination mechanisms for Somalia are:

- Regular meetings at all levels in Nairobi. (Field-level meetings are said to be gradually increasing in regularity and importance.)
- Regular bulletins of information from the Food Security Assessment Unit, Data Management Information Unit, UNCU and the SACB Secretariat.
- Matrixes of agency activities, for example, on governance.
- The Consolidated Appeal
- The SACB Policy Framework for Continuing Cooperation in Somalia (drawn up since the establishment of the TNG to articulate the SACB's impartiality).
- The SACB Operational Framework that attempts to collate sector strategies for all SACB partners.

4. Good Practice

- The SACB has engendered a habit of cooperation through regular interaction. Some of the SACB's agreements attain a level of detail that suggests notable commitment to coordination on paper.
- The full-time Coordinator of the health sectoral committee uses sectoral committees effectively to increase the accountability of participants to agreements made through effective follow up. He focuses on the field through regular travel to the field. As a former NGO worker he has managed to keep NGOs on board effectively. Having worked in Somalia for more than five years, he acts as institutional memory.
- There appears to be less preoccupation with who should coordinate among UN agencies than in other complex emergencies. This relative harmony among UN agencies is variously attributed to the fact that donors are watching closely, and to the role of the Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator in bringing people together.
- The UNCU provides first class analysis to feed into strategy development. (However, the SACB members cannot make effective use of it in a shared strategy because contradictory interests divide them).
- A Humanitarian Analysis Group promotes discussion of the pressing challenges and disseminates succinct findings to others.
- A secretariat function that organises meetings, takes minutes, disseminates and builds an archive of material that is accessible to everyone is highly valued.
- The numerous initiatives to gather and disseminate information mean that a key coordination activity is to coordinate information flows. An 'information officers group' reviews information inflows, though interviewees suggested that duplication remains.
- There is systematic consultation by UNICEF staff in Nairobi of colleagues on the ground on the policies being discussed within the SACB or UN Country Team.
- There are well-coordinated/jointly implemented projects between UNICEF and WFP in Baidoa, for example, UNICEF providing support in the form of medical supplies for healthcare, following WFP food-for-work activities to reconstruct building for the Rabdure women's cooperative.
- A regional exercise to stimulate pastoral networks was found to be hugely beneficial by all participants, and an indication once again of how few problems stay within borders and the imperative of retaining regional analysis and strategy.

5. Weaknesses

- The time and resources invested in the SACB are striking, but it is not clear what the impact is on the ground.
- The lack of systematic field staff consultation processes and limited transmission of information from Nairobi to the field suggests that for some activity in Nairobi has become end in itself. This is clearly a consequence of the lack of presence in Somalia of many organisations due to the security situation and the realities of a 'remote control' cross-border operation. Those NGOs who are able to fly people back and forth, and (the few) UN personnel that travel regularly to the field do act as important go-betweens and increase the potential for the SACB to support the field.
- The weakness of coordination on the ground. A proposal on field coordination simply slipped off the agenda despite having been stressed at the general meeting of the SACB held in Rome.

- The SACB was established to compensate for the lack of central government administration to be the chief interlocutor for the aid effort. Yet the participation of Somalis in efforts to assist Somalia appear minimal. In the field, participation and consultation is a fraught activity involving a generation of many competing claims from local groups. The greater fluidity of the security situation in the south/central region clearly makes this particularly difficult.
- Although there are different views about the extent to which the SACB is a donor coordination group, there is agreement that the donors do not present a united front or even elements of a common strategy. At best, the SACB framework appears to have constrained one or two members from adopting a different direction from that of the other members, for example, in the degree of action to recognise the TNG.
- INGOs have the potential to influence the decisions and conduct of the SACB by virtue of its consensus-based structure, but have been too donor-dependent or poorly organised to marshal an effective counterweight to UN agencies and donors in the SACB at the higher levels
- Participants cite the value of a forum in which people come together and get to know each other, but many interviewees stressed the importance of transparency and honesty, which implies that the quality of the interactions is not satisfactory.
- Although the SACB has the potential to be an effective peer review and accountability mechanism, a lack of outspokenness and activism on the part of the majority of SACB members means that problems or failings are either not raised, confronted or followed up. One result of this is that donors are reported to continue to fund poorly performing agencies.
- Although in Nairobi there are agreements among all actors on rents, salaries and bonuses, these have been poorly disseminated or implemented. Field staff in Baidoa were unaware of such efforts. In a setting where the ready availability of arms invites opportunistic threats from individuals or communities who feel they have lost out in the aid effort, the absence of coordination on matters such as minimum operating standards or staff salaries has security implications.
- There are a plethora of documents and agreements among and between agencies but not one clear strategy for action for the aid effort.
- There has been much debate over the past few years about the appropriate political strategies that the international community should adopt towards Somalia. Should the international community focus on consolidating those areas of stability that emerge (that is, building around the achievements of Somaliland and Puntland to extend authority over Somalia) or on establishing a centralised government for all of Somalia? Yet, since the declaration of the TNG, there has been little discussion inside the SACB structures on this.

ANNEXE 5a: KOSOVO CASE STUDY

1. Context

The Kosovo crisis has consisted of at least four identifiable phases:

- Up to 24 March 1999: the pre-bombing phase with limited IDP and refugee movements;
- 24 March – 13 June 1999: the major refugee exodus and international humanitarian response, particularly in Albania and Macedonia;
- 10 June 1999 – Spring 2000: the refugee return, including the humanitarian response within Kosovo leading up to and going over the winter of 1999/2000; also increased needs within FRY (excluding Kosovo) for IDPs;
- During 2000: a shift from emergency response to rehabilitation, typified by the ending of the UN Interim Administrative Mission (UNMIK) Humanitarian Pillar I in June 2000.

The Kosovo crisis up until the end of 1999 had a high level of political and media profile. The international response was typified by a plethora of agencies, ample - and sometimes too much - funding, and high levels of bilateral action as governments and agencies had to be seen to be active.

From 2000 onwards the focus has been on a shift from emergency response to rehabilitation and reconstruction, with responsibilities being taken over by the UNMIK and fledgling Kosovan departments. UNMIK has been slow to develop capacity to take over responsibilities previously undertaken by the humanitarian agencies.

At time of the case study visit (January 2001), the humanitarian response had been greatly scaled down since 1999. Many of the 'hot' issues which had been of concern during the height of the Kosovo crisis, such as the coordination of an extraordinary number of humanitarian actors and the relationship with, and role of the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR), had subsided.

Key humanitarian issues include the plight of the Serb, Roma and other minorities in Kosovo; winter needs, particularly for the vulnerable still living in temporary accommodation including those whose houses were completely destroyed; the possibility of IDP returns from the rest of FRY; and preparedness for future humanitarian needs arising from instability within and around Kosovo.

2. Coordination Structures

Any discussion about humanitarian coordination in the Kosovo crisis needs to specify which phase is being talked about. (This study does not deal with coordination in Albania and Macedonia which has been well documented in a variety of reviews and evaluations, notably in Suhkre et al 2000 and Telford 2000).

2.1 June 1999 – June 2000:

- UN SC Resolution 1244 enables the establishment of UNMIK, a then unprecedented structure with three non-UN organisations (European Union (EU), Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and NATO KFOR) within it and led by the SRSG.¹³² The UNMIK structure consisted of four pillars, each headed by a DSRSG:

- Pillar 1: Humanitarian Affairs (led by UNHCR)
- Pillar 2: Interim Civil Administration (led by UN)
- Pillar 3: Institution Building (led by OSCE)
- Pillar 4: Economic Reconstruction (led by the EU)

- Principal DSRSG responsible for overall coordination within UNMIK.
- Inter-Agency Coordination Unit (IACU) is supported by and housed within UNHCR and run by OCHA personnel. Initially, OCHA ran twice daily meetings for the wider humanitarian community, focusing on security issues.

¹³² From June 1999, the Acting SRSG was Sergio Vieira de Mello. Bernard Kouchner was the SRSG from July 1999 until January 2001.

- A Humanitarian Community Information Centre (HCIC), described as an initiative of the DSRSG – HA, opened in August 1999 supported by OCHA, international NGOs, UNHCR and other UN agencies with the objective of promoting and facilitating information exchange among all organisations engaged in emergency and rehabilitation work in Kosovo. Originally staff included a KFOR liaison officer and seconded staff from agencies (including WFP, UNHCR, Catholic Relief Services, International Council of Voluntary Agencies, Save the Children, Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe). With the reduction of humanitarian assistance, since December 2000, HCIC staff comprise OCHA personnel and a manager seconded from Save the Children.
- A UN Development Coordinator appointed in March 2000 to ensure complementarity of efforts and to lay the ground for sustainable development.

2.2 From June 2000

Changes as a result of the ending of UNMIK Pillar I:

- A Humanitarian Coordinator appointed for Kosovo (also UNHCR Special Envoy for FRY) replacing the DSRSG – HA, continuing to attend senior UNMIK and Joint Interim Administrative Structure (JIAS) meetings, including morning Heads of Pillars meetings.
- An OCHA senior humanitarian affairs officer is now head of OCHA office and Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator.
- The OCHA staff and office continue to work in support of the Humanitarian Coordinator, with responsibility for supervision and funding of the HCIC.
- Regional (sub-Pristina) coordination has been increasingly transferred from UNHCR to the UNMIK civil administration at municipal level. UNICEF has also transferred education coordination to UNMIK, but other UN agencies still lead regional coordination.
- Sectoral Coordination: Each sector is normally led by the appropriate UN agency, although NGOs may also have their own coordination meetings, for example, those involved in credit projects. Task or working groups have looked at specific issues such as winterisation and minorities (e.g. the Ad Hoc Inter-agency Task Force on Minorities).
- Pillar IV holds fortnightly meetings for donors to which OCHA brings humanitarian concerns.

3. Coordination Tools

- Inter-agency coordination meetings reflecting IASC composition are held every fortnight. OCHA Community Briefing meetings focus on broad issues, but include regular security briefing.
- The OCHA Field Liaison Unit helps information flow in both directions between Pristina and regional centres, feeding into regional coordination meetings.
- The HCIC provide a range of services including Geographic Information Systems (GIS), maps and the Kosovo Atlas; the CD-ROMs of the Kosovo Encyclopaedia, Housing Reconstruction Guidelines and HCIC Toolbox; HCIC website, hosted by ReliefWeb; a list of coordination meetings, including composition, timing, who convenes etc.
- OCHA Humanitarian Updates produced monthly.
- The Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) led by OCHA.
- UNDP/UNDG work on Kosovo Common Assessment, with contributions from OCHA on behalf of the humanitarian agencies.

4. Good Practice

- Identifying gaps: Humanitarian Coordinator/OCHA/HCIC winter preparedness risk analysis survey created awareness among donors and in UNMIK of humanitarian needs for the 2000/01 winter in spite of the lateness of the work.¹³³ Most donors and agencies had little interest in preparing for winter during the European summer.¹³⁴ UNHCR had rapidly shifted out of its winter preparedness role undertaken in 1999/2000. UNMIK was unprepared to take on the planning and coordination role. OCHA therefore convened and chaired winter preparedness meetings attended by UN agencies, UNMIK departments, NGOs and donors. The Humanitarian Coordinator's advocacy role was important.

¹³³ An important initiative, but one which was also criticised for the cumbersome nature of the survey process.

¹³⁴ Although OFDA reported that it was pushing for work on winter preparedness during the summer of 2000.

- FAO provide an example of a well-focused strategy of coordinating and providing technical support to implementing agencies, working closely with donors to avoid duplications and advising on funding levels. They also monitor and evaluate seed programmes. This coordination was described by one INGO as 'exemplary'.
- The Humanitarian Accounting exercise in 2000 was an attempt to put more life into the Common Humanitarian Action Plan (CHAP)/CAP process and its mid-term review by asking each agency to report back on achievements and impact against objectives and constraints.¹³⁵ It also identified gaps in the humanitarian effort and assisted coordination of the preparation of CAP 2001.
- The transfer of responsibilities from UN agencies to the UNMIK civil administration structures worked well. For example, WFP is phasing out food distribution and shifting to a 'social case approach' run by the Department for Social Assistance and the Centres for Social Work. FAO is devolving coordination and technical support to the Department of Agriculture.

5. Issues

- How do humanitarian and development agencies function when the UN is the transitional government and the long-term status of Kosovo remains undecided?
- Looking back to the initial phase of the emergency response in Kosovo from June 1999 onwards, interviewees and reports note the calibre and skills of the senior OCHA personnel deployed, providing essential coordination services. However, the team was severely under-resourced in terms of equipment (vehicles, communications equipment, office equipment).¹³⁶
- Major coordination problems in Kosovo have been less to do with inter-humanitarian agency relationships and more to do with the humanitarian community's relationships with the UNMIK structures. If the traditional relief – development gap exists in Kosovo it is partly due to the slowness of UNMIK to take over and Kosova structures to develop and be given responsibility.
- As part of a wider issue of using and building local capacity, efforts to include Kosovans at senior levels in coordination structures have been slow to take effect.
- Uncertainty in some quarters about the appointment and role of the Humanitarian Coordinator. Some interviewees were clear about the Humanitarian Coordinator's role and UNHCR's role, while others were not. One donor said 'We don't differentiate between the Humanitarian Coordinator and UNHCR'. It begs the question of whether UNHCR is the lead agency or not? The Humanitarian Coordinator argued that it is not.
- Lack of clarity on role of head of OCHA office and relationship with the Humanitarian Coordinator (including role as Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator). There were no relevant up to date ToRs for either post.¹³⁷
- The absence of any public document which clearly describes the UN's humanitarian coordination arrangements in Kosovo after the dissolution of Pillar 1.
- OCHA's profile was contentious. During the Pillar 1 phase, it was subsumed within UNHCR office, with no mention of its role in some Secretary-General's reports to the Security Council. The blurred concept of the Humanitarian Pillar (led by UNHCR) within an integrated UN Mission that was sometimes referred to as the UNHCR pillar. UNHCR was seen by some outside the humanitarian community as the sole humanitarian agency.
- No OCHA staff member was given a proper briefing or induction, all the more important because of the lack of previous OCHA experience. However, one senior staff member has 20 years UN experience and the other has wide Balkan experience.
- Cooperation and liaison between the UN Humanitarian Coordinator and UN Development Coordinator appeared problematic.
- Many interviewees commented on ECHO's poor participation in coordination, due apparently to under-staffing and, in the case of some meetings, instructions from Brussels.
- During the study in Kosovo, the study team member attended three of the more than a dozen regular meetings organised in Pristina by UN agencies and UNMIK. These were poorly conducted, characterised by an absence of introductions, a failure sometimes to check on the language favoured by participants, a failure to prohibit the use of mobile phones etc.
- The domination of coordination meetings by international staff made it difficult for national staff to speak and be heard.

¹³⁵ Unfortunately this exercise did not apparently include any specific review of the effectiveness of coordination.

¹³⁶ Vehicle procurement was reported to have taken five months.

¹³⁷ The deputising role did not include, in practice, standing in for the Humanitarian Coordinator at UNMIK coordination meetings.

- The HCIC initiative has received much praise from UN and non-UN agencies, particularly for its sense of inclusiveness. Having managers with NGO backgrounds probably helped this. However an emphasis on neutrality has sometimes led to confusion over identity and ownership and to unclear relationships with the OCHA office and the Humanitarian Coordinator. HCIC could only collect and disseminate information given to it – therefore it was to an extent ad hoc.
- OCHA's lack of adequate management support to the HCIC resulted in staff uncertainties, gaps in staff replacements and a subsequent interruption of services. By January 2001, some of HCIC's information was in urgent need of updating. Its future after the transition, i.e. under whose umbrella it should sit, was also still unclear. It is important to learn the lessons of the HCIC by having an independent evaluation.
- Duplication of GIS and other databases.¹³⁸
- The sheer number of agencies working in Kosovo presented challenges for coordination. There was little or no considered assessment or study of the scale and impact of this problem. In most emergencies, the key issue will remain the effective coordination of the major UN humanitarian agencies, the Red Cross / Red Crescent family and probably not more than 20 – 30 major INGOs. The problem of a large number of additional small NGOs needs to be anticipated and dealt with in the coordination of large-scale high-profile emergencies.
- INGOs did not feel they were seen as full partners with UN agencies, rather implementers. They were asked to contribute to CAP discussion at very late stage. On the other hand, the INGO Council could probably be more effective. ICVA has failed to replace the NGO Liaison Officer post within HCIC.
- In spite of Civil-Military Cooperation Commission (CIMIC) initiatives and KFOR representative in the HCIC, agencies have found coordination with NATO forces problematic. Information flow tends to be one way – to the military. 'I get information out of KFOR in spite of the system'. The national KFOR units each have their own characteristics and approaches, and many do not see the need to coordinate their humanitarian actions with the agencies. 'They do what they think is good in the morning'. An added problem is the lack of institutional memory within national units as they often rotate completely every three to six months.
- International political pressure to encourage return of Serb IDPs from FRY is a matter of deep concern to some humanitarian agencies.
- Lack of coordination and cooperation within the broad ambit of civil society. There is little contact between the INGO and Kosovar NGO groupings. OSCE has established 10 NGO resource centres apparently with little liaison with the INGOs. (Relief and development are seen as separate activities.)
- There has been little work on standards or principles or gender within the humanitarian community (although CAP 2001 has focus on women). These could have been areas of work for the HCIC.
- Lack of institutional memory – no single place where evaluations and reviews can be accessed.
- As the political and media profile of the Kosovo crisis has decreased, so has the evaluative and reflective work of the humanitarian community. Very little appears to have been written about humanitarian coordination in Kosovo for the period from January 2000 onwards, the humanitarian pillar within UNMIK, its dissolution in June 2000 and the interaction between the humanitarian community and the rest of the international protectorate structures and KFOR.¹³⁹

¹³⁸ Noted in the mission report of the ERC a.i. of 9 June 2000.

¹³⁹ For example there appear to be no substantial reviews or evaluations of the major 1999/2000 winterisation response or the overall functioning and effectiveness of UNMIK.

ANNEX 5b: FRY CASE STUDY (EXCLUDING KOSOVO)

1. Context

The humanitarian focus in FRY, excluding Kosovo, has been on the Serb and Roma IDPs from Kosovo, the overall deterioration in living conditions within FRY over recent years, exacerbated by the NATO bombing campaign and sanctions and the continuing caseload of refugees from earlier conflicts.

Humanitarian agencies operating in FRY have had to keep their distance from both the federal and Serbian authorities until October 2000. The operating context for INGOs has been very difficult, given no legal status and staff at times suffering harassment. There has not been a flood of agencies into FRY since the fall of the Milosevic government. The small number of agencies relative to Kosovo has made coordination less of a challenge in Belgrade.

2. Coordination Structures

- Humanitarian Coordinator for FRY (excluding Kosovo), Resident Coordinator a.i. and UNICEF Special Representative for FRY (including Kosovo).
- OCHA office headed by Senior Humanitarian Affairs Officer who is also Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator for FRY, excluding Kosovo.
- UN Liaison Office providing the UN's political representation.
- Humanitarian aid coordination forum for donors/diplomats, attended by Humanitarian Coordinators and UN agencies.
- Sectoral coordination meetings led by the relevant UN agencies.

3. Coordination Tools

- Weekly Heads of Agencies coordination meetings chaired by the Humanitarian Coordinator, service by OCHA with an IASC membership (NGOs represented by ICVA) and including the Head of the UN Liaison Office. *'The Heads of Agencies meeting works well – exactly as it should be'* (Head of agency)
- OCHA Weekly Situation Reports.
- OCHA Humanitarian Risk Analysis reports, produced in conjunction with the UN and other agencies.
- Overviews of UN Humanitarian Activities.
- OCHA Podgorica produced surveys including one a household income and expenditure survey.
- OCHA in both Belgrade and Podgorica producing humanitarian operations databases.
- The CAP led by OCHA.
- The ICVA Directory of Humanitarian and Development Agencies in FRY (June 2000).

4. Good Practice

- Humanitarian Coordinator's role is clearly delineated from UNICEF's operation in Serbia and Montenegro. UNICEF is not seen as a lead agency.
- OCHA's Humanitarian Risk Analysis reports are much appreciated.
- OCHA's work on the energy situation in FRY is seen as an important area not being covered by other agencies.
- Handover of the OCHA sub-office in Podgorica to the UNDP liaison office in February 2001 following the signing of a joint Memoranda of Understanding (MoU).
- The integrity and effectiveness of the Yugoslav Red Cross has been a major issue, about which the agencies have collaborated constructively.
- Good collaboration over monitoring the sensitive situation in Southern Serbia and mounting an inter-agency assessment mission in February 2001.

5. Issues

- ICVA has played an important role and represents NGOs at fortnightly heads of agencies meeting, but there is some concern about the flow of information to and from those meetings to the NGOs.
- Some interviewees, particularly from INGOs, felt that OCHA could have made more use of the data and information which it has collected and were sometimes unaware of how the information has been used.
- The transition from a mainly humanitarian response to one of reconstruction facilitated by moves such as the OCHA field office coordination responsibilities being handed over to UNDP and the UNDP officer in charge in Belgrade leading an inter-agency assessment mission to Presovo in Southern Serbia in February 2001.

6. Regional Issues

- This study was not able to make a full assessment of regional coordination in South East Europe. In relation to Kosovo there appeared to be considerable "cross-border" coordination over the sensitive Presovo region in south east Serbia, particularly between the Humanitarian Coordinators in Pristina and Belgrade. The fact that both Humanitarian Coordinators have regional envoy roles within their respective organisations has fostered regional perspectives. However, it was not clear whether there were adequate international coordination structures in place in order to build and maintain a comprehensive regional analysis. At least one senior official in the region was scathing about the absence of such regional mechanisms.
- Different definition of regions in each organisation.
- Tension between the political pressure to encourage the return of Serbs to Kosovo in order to demonstrate the existence of a multi-ethnic international protectorate and the humanitarian space needed to provide effective protection for them.
- The CAP for South Eastern Europe is said to provide the only formal instrument that brings agencies together on a regional basis.
- There have been few studies and evaluations of the Kosovo crisis that have taken a comprehensive regional (Balkan) perspective including the whole of FRY, so there is little written about the nature of regional humanitarian coordination.