



## Patterns of Group Activity and Power in State Hazard-Mitigation Legislation

The play of political decision making on the state level is bound to be a more complex drama, as compared to local communities. Not only does it involve a change in scale, there are marked structural differences as well. For example, in many local communities, particularly small and rural ones, elected officials tend to be part-time officials, while governors and sometimes state legislators are often completely absorbed into their roles on a full-time basis. States tend to have bicameral legislatures with fairly elaborate committee structures, whereas city and county councils are rarely bicameral and are often too small to have any but the most simple committee structures. State capitals tend to be the focus of many diverse interests collecting from the various constituencies of a state that might be a maritime, agricultural, and industrial state all at once. Local communities have fewer interest groups that can be formed around local economic and political sectors.

Although we can therefore expect the politics of state decision making to be more complicated and diverse, we can also expect that the same general principles apply: Those who have statutory power to make decisions—governors and legislatures—will be the focus of attention. In addition, those agencies, firms, and associations that have interests in the outcome of disas-

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ter legislation will also be involved at the state level. Industries that may have little to do with local government decision making (e.g., insurance firms), can be expected to play more of a role on the state level.

The approach we take to state decision making is similar to that used to analyze local governments (see Chapter 7). We have it modified to take into account the structural differences between state and local governments. As before, we deal with the reputational aspects of power and influence rather than with actual decision making.

We are handicapped because our sample of 20 states is too small to permit extensive multivariate analyses. It is very easy to run out of degrees of freedom in analyses resting on so small a case base; thus, relationships have to be very large in order to reach conventional standards regarding statistical significance. For this reason, we relax conventional standards somewhat and discuss seriously findings that most other analyses might regard as too weak statistically to discuss in detail.

### ACTIVITY LEVELS

It will come as no surprise that the elected officials of state governments are regarded as among the most active of all groups in dealing with state hazard-mitigation legislation, as shown in Table 8.1. Indeed, the position viewed as the most active is that of governor, who is so regarded by almost 90% of elite respondents. Clear majorities also regard state congressional leaders, as the chairs of relevant committees as active in disaster legislation. Local officials from high-risk areas are also active. Of the remaining eight positions/groups that are regarded as active by a majority of respondents, four represent government agencies—the Civil Defense director, the state planning agency, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and the National Guard. From the private sector, insurance firms and the construction industry are considered active. Conservation groups and the Red Cross director conclude the list. Sixty-eight percent of the respondents regard themselves as active, and an 74% regard their own agencies as active. These two findings clearly vindicate our method of identifying elite subjects for our study.

A factor analysis of these activity ratings, shown in Table 8.2, classifies the 25 groups into seven clusters. With only 20 observations (states), factor structures tend to become somewhat unstable, reflecting the individual idiosyncracies of particular states rather than the general tendencies that obtain across states. Such instability is reflected in Table 8.2, where factors are not as clearcut those in analyses of local communities. Although it was possible to name all but one of the factors according to the predominant

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TABLE 8.1

State Level Group Activity in Disaster Mitigation Legislation (N = 461)

Group/Position	Active <sup>a</sup>	Not Active	Don't Know	Not Applicable
Governor	88	10	2	0
Civil Defense Director	82	9	8	1
Local Officials in High Risk Areas	79	14	6	1
Conservation Groups	73	19	7	1
State Planning Agency	68	19	12	2
Chair, House Committee	66	21	12	2
Red Cross Director	65	22	12	1
Chair, Senate Committee	65	22	11	2
House Democratic Leader	64	25	8	3
U.S. Corps of Engineers	64	23	11	1
Insurance Firms	62	26	10	1
Senate Democratic Leader	62	26	8	4
National Guard	58	33	8	1
House Republican Leader	55	28	9	8
Senate Republican Leader	55	28	9	8
Construction Industry	51	38	10	1
Leading Industries	48	42	9	1
FDAA Regional Office	48	27	24	1
National Assn. Homebuilders	44	40	15	1
Engineering Associations	41	40	18	1
State Chamber of Commerce	41	46	12	2
Leading State Banks	40	45	14	1
Construction Unions	34	50	15	1
State Real Estate Board	30	55	14	1
Bureau of Reclamation	28	37	32	2
Yourself	68	30	1	1
Your Agency (firm, etc.)	74	21	1	5

<sup>a</sup>Responses to question, "Tell me whether each (on this card) is active or not active in state natural disaster legislation or regulations?"

character of the groups making up each cluster, some of the groups participated in more than one cluster. This indicates lack of clarity and clear separation among factors.

The *elected officials* cluster is a strongly defined factor that contains all elected officials among the 25 groups or positions. This cluster also includes

## Activity Levels

TABLE 8.2

Factors and Factor Loadings State Level Activity Ratings (N = 20)

Group/Position	Elected Officials	Business	Disaster Agencies	Planning	Real Estate	Unnamed Factor
Senate Rep. Leader	.95	-.11	-.10	-.09	.00	.06
House Rep. Leader	.92	-.14	-.09	-.10	.09	.04
House Dem. Leader	.79	.37	-.25	-.04	.21	.10
Senate Dem. Leader	.76	.31	-.41	-.16	.21	.02
Chair, House Comm.	.74	.04	-.17	.42	.26	-.25
Chair, Senate Comm.	.71	.05	-.17	.26	.33	-.33
Governor	.54	.35	.10	.03	-.15	-.55
Conservation Groups	.50	.08	.45	-.11	.43	.30
Leading Industries	-.07	.80	.20	.16	.42	-.08
Chamber of Commerce	.15	.65	.20	-.10	.34	.14
Leading Banks	.14	.61	.26	.37	.38	.04
Insurance Firms	-.15	.53	.34	.01	.57	.24
U.S. Engineer Corps	-.19	.08	.88	.06	.25	.18
Red Cross Director	-.28	.01	.78	.33	.32	.03
National Guard	.04	.27	.78	-.17	.13	-.19
Civil Defense Dir.	-.25	.18	.77	.36	.08	.05
FDAA	-.38	.34	.67	.35	-.04	.16
State Planning Agency	-.12	.04	.27	.85	.06	.17
Engineers Association	.00	.07	.05	.52	.75	.15
Construction Firms	.20	.36	.25	-.02	.79	.06
Homebuilders	.21	.30	-.04	.10	.77	-.23
Construction Unions	.18	.09	.20	-.10	.74	.07
Real Estate Board	.17	.34	.14	.30	.72	.00
Bureau of Reclamation	.10	.25	.12	.37	.05	.81
Local Officials in High Risk Areas	.33	.09	.09	.40	.37	.13

<sup>a</sup>Computed using principal component method with varimax rotation.

"conservation groups" as a weak member.<sup>1</sup> The governor is also a fairly weak member of this cluster, perhaps reflecting only their high level of general activity (88%, see Table 8.1,) particularly when other elected officials are also in the picture.

A second cluster, *business*, includes industries, banks, insurance firms,

<sup>1</sup>Conservation groups participate almost as strongly in the clusters named *disaster agencies* and *real estate*, however

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and the state Chamber of Commerce. Insurance firms could also have been classified as belonging to the *real estate* cluster, a set of interests with which they are apparently often identified. *Disaster agencies* form a third cluster, crossing both state, federal, and private sector levels. Included in this cluster are such diverse groups as the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration (FDAA), the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Red Cross director, the Civil Defense director, and the National Guard. Although all these agencies perform important functions in the aftermath of disasters and hence may all be found on the scene when a disaster has occurred, it is not at all clear that they are unified on the issue of state nonstructural hazard-mitigation legislation. This cluster may represent conjectural responses, from our elites, who know postdisaster interagency cooperation and assume general cooperation.

Of the remaining three factors, only the *real estate* cluster is clearly identified. It includes construction firms, construction unions, the Real Estate Board, the U.S. Homebuilder's Association, and engineering associations. Although insurance firms and conservation groups participate weakly in this cluster, other organizations that might be relevant to the buying and selling of land and buildings (e.g., banks) conspicuously do not. Two additional factors emerge, one, *planning*, involving mainly the state planning agency and the other, *unnamed factors*, the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation. Neither factor makes much sense; these two agencies apparently are loners that do not become active when any particular set of other groups do.

Despite the lack of clarity in the factor structure of activity concerning natural disaster mitigation legislation, the structure is distinctively different from that involving activity concerning environmental questions, as Tables 8.3 and 8.4 show. Table 8.3, shows the proportions who are perceived to be active on environmental issues. While elected public officials are among the more active groups/positions, as in Table 8.1, the remaining highly active groups differ quite strikingly from those active in natural disaster issues. The disaster related agencies—Red Cross, Civil Defense, and federal agencies—are not seen as active in environmental issues, while the State Planning Agency, the State Chamber of Commerce, and leading industries are active.

Similar differences obtain between the factor structures of Tables 8.2 and 8.4. The *real estate* cluster in Table 8.4 is larger, and the *federal agencies* form a cluster separate from the local disaster agencies. Finally, *businesses* that are not related to real estate form a small cluster of their own.

In short, the structure of activity on natural disaster issues appears to be unique to that area, but it does not form a distinctive pattern. This lack of structure may be largely a statistical artifact arising from the small number of states in our sample, or it may indicate that hazard-mitigation legislation takes place mainly on the local level, where specific interests are more clearly and directly engaged.

## Correlates of Cluster Activity Levels

TABLE 8.3

State Level Perceived Level of Group/Position Activity in Legislation Dealing with Environmental Issues

Group/Position	Active <sup>a</sup>	Not Active	Don't Know	Not Applicable
Conservation Groups	81	16	2	0
Governor	73	25	2	0
House Democratic Leader	63	32	2	3
Chair, House Committee	62	35	2	1
Chair, Senate Committee	61	35	2	1
Senate Democratic Leader	61	33	2	3
State Planning Agency	57	40	2	1
House Republican Leader	56	35	2	8
Senate Republican Leader	56	35	2	7
Leading Industries	55	42	2	0
State Chamber of Commerce	54	42	2	1
Local Officials in High Risk Areas	50	47	2	0
Construction Industry	46	51	2	0
Homebuilders Associations	40	57	2	0
U.S. Corps of Engineers	38	59	2	0
Construction Unions	35	62	2	0
State Real Estate Board	32	65	2	0
Civil Defense Director	26	71	2	0
Bureau of Reclamation	25	71	2	1
Engineers Association	25	72	2	0
Leading State Banks	25	72	2	0
Insurance Firms	25	73	2	0
FDAA Regional Office	18	79	2	0
Red Cross Director	17	80	2	0
National Guard	12	86	2	0
Yourself	45	52	2	1
Your Agency	44	53	2	1

<sup>a</sup>Based on responses to, "... which of these groups would be active - either supporting or opposing - in legislation dealing with environmental issues, for example, water or air pollution?"

## CORRELATES OF CLUSTER ACTIVITY LEVELS

The cluster patterning of group or position activity means that clusters of groups tend to become active under the same circumstances and that different situations tend to activate different clusters. The conditions of such activation is the topic of this section.

TABLE 8.4

Factors and Factor Loadings Group/Positions Activity Ratings on Environmental Issues (N = 20)

Position/Group	Public Officials	Real Estate	Federal Agencies	Business Industry	Disaster Agencies
House Dem. Leader	.88	.26	-.06	.16	-.00
Senate Rep. Leader	.85	.17	.01	.37	.12
Senate Dem. Leader	.84	.34	-.11	.23	-.05
Chair, House Comm.	.83	.42	.10	-.00	.00
House Rep. Leader	.83	.09	.06	.33	.18
Chair, Senate Comm.	.83	.47	.04	.03	-.06
Governor	.81	.02	.05	.01	.01
Local Official in High Risk Area	.58	.54	-.25	.23	-.15
State Planning Agency	.55	.19	.33	-.28	-.54
Real Estate Board	.22	.94	.03	.06	-.05
Homebuilders Assoc.	.16	.82	-.32	.17	.04
State Banks	.17	.79	.23	.23	.22
Construction Industry	.47	.73	-.05	.32	-.04
Engineers Association	.23	.75	.43	.17	.13
Insurance Firms	.07	.75	.42	.01	.09
Construction Unions	.35	.71	-.09	.31	.04
National Guard	.29	.54	.32	-.23	.49
U.S. Corps of Engineers	-.15	-.02	.92	.07	-.10
Bureau of Reclamation	.34	-.05	.75	.44	.09
FDAA	-.11	.37	.74	.15	.23
Chamber of Commerce	.23	.37	.18	.73	-.32
Conservation Groups	.44	.23	-.02	.65	.01
Leading Industries	.27	.55	.15	.59	-.16
Civil Defense Director	.02	-.18	-.07	-.28	.86
Red Cross Director	.08	.26	.23	.06	.82

<sup>a</sup>Computed by principal component method with varimax rotation.

Because the small number of states makes it difficult to conduct the same kind of analysis undertaken in with local communities (see Chapter 7), we have had to resort to a more simple approach. Each of the states has been given a cluster activity score, essentially the average level of activity reported for each of the main clusters of Table 8.2. These scores were then correlated with certain state characteristics derived either from documentary materials, such as the U.S. Census, or by constructing aggregate indexes from the responses of the elites interviewed in each state. It is also possible to

## Correlates of Cluster Activity Levels

characterize each state by the aggregate responses of the local elites within communities selected from that state. These represent the hazard-weighted climate of opinion among local community elites in a state.

Table 8.5 shows the simple correlation of the cluster activity score with variables derived from the responses of state elites or aggregated from community measures by averaging over the local communities studied in each state. When only 20 states are studied, a correlation coefficient has to be rather large before it is worth paying much attention to. In Table 8.5, we have circled correlations of  $r = .35$  (equivalent to the .05 level of significance) or greater. This is a rough guide to the relationships to which some attention should be paid.

The top panel of Table 8.5 lists a set of variables that pertain to state characteristics, aggregated over the state elites' responses or obtained from documentary sources. Of the 55 coefficients shown in that panel, 7 meet or surpass our threshold requirements. Furthermore, 5 of these 7 relate to the activity levels of public officials. They show that public officials are active when there is little opposition to the principle of nonstructural hazard-mitigation and when the state population is large and urbanized. Public officials seem to be responding to the climate of opinion among state elites, at least in part.<sup>2</sup> Being active in hazard-mitigation legislation does not necessarily mean that one is in favor of such legislation. Indeed, as we see later, there is little support for such measures among state elites. The remaining significant coefficients show that businesses are active in relatively poor states where median income is low and that disaster agencies are active when there is some opposition to state regulation of land-use in high areas.

The coefficients in the lower panel of Table 8.5 refer to variables created by averaging over local elites within each state. Public officials on the state level seem to be sensitive to the opinions of local elites on nonstructural hazard-mitigation legislation. The more favorable the local elites are to such legislation, the more active state public officials become. Consistent with that finding, public officials are more active when opposition to the NFIP is low. Since these variables were defined over an entirely separate population, elite respondents in each community in the state, these findings lend more weight to our earlier statement that state public officials are responding (positively or negatively) to the climates of opinion created by local elites. These state officials are not responding to hazard risk either as represented by experience in the 1960s or by the more recent memories of elite respondents. The remaining two significant coefficients show that activity levels of the business and real estate clusters are directly and positively related to the

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TABLE 8.5

Cluster Activity Scores Correlated with State and Local Community Variables (N = 20)<sup>a</sup>

I. STATE LEVEL VARIABLES:					
Variables	Total Activity	Public Officials	Business	Disaster Agencies	Real Estate
Disaster Salience <sup>b</sup>	.09	.20	.18	-.11	.06
Opposition to Federal Regulation <sup>c</sup>	-.01	-.00	.18	-.11	.03
Opposition to Flood Insurance Program <sup>d</sup>	-.14	(-.48)	.10	.13	-.01
Opposition to State Land Use Regs <sup>d</sup>	-.03	(-.48)	.29	(.37)	-.02
Opposition to Building Codes <sup>e</sup>	-.25	(-.53)	-.01	.25	-.35
Recalled Disasters <sup>f</sup> 1967-1977	.11	-.13	.32	.14	.07
Median Household Income, 1970	-.12	.27	(-.45)	-.24	-.06
Presidential Disaster Declaration <sup>g</sup>	.22	.13	.28	-.03	.14
Population 1970	.20	.34	.01	-.10	.11
Population Density 1970	.16	(.41)	-.15	-.11	.34
% Urban 1970	.06	(.41)	-.27	-.29	.14
II. LOCAL COMMUNITY VARIABLES:					
Variables	Total Activity	Public Officials	Business	Disaster Agencies	Real Estate
Number of Disasters 1960-1970 <sup>h</sup>	.34	.05	(.64)	.05	(.40)
Weighted Favorability to Disaster Legislation <sup>i</sup>	.09	(.47)	.06	.19	-.05
Recalled Disasters 1967-1977 <sup>f</sup>	.15	.15	.27	.05	.07
Disaster Salience <sup>b</sup>	-.01	.01	.21	.00	-.06

(Continued)

number of hazard events local communities experienced between 1960 and 1970.

In short, it appears that the business and real estate clusters are engaged when there are relatively high levels of risk in local communities and that state public officials are active when the preponderance of state and local opinion appears to favor nonstructural hazard-mitigation measures.

Table 8.6 uses the self-reports in Table 8.1 (bottom two lines) as dependent variables and regresses them over individual elite characteristics and over certain state level characteristics. The variation explained is only 11% for both self-activity and agency activity. The coefficients are unstandardized regression coefficients that represent the increase (or decrease) in the probability of designating oneself (or agency) as active per unit increase in the independent variable. Thus, for each additional year of age, elites are

# Correlates of Cluster Activity Levels

TABLE 8.5 (Continued)

Opposition to Federal Regulations <sup>c</sup>	-.18	-.20	-.14	-.23	.03
Opposition to Federal Flood Insurance <sup>i</sup>	-.08	(-.46)	.03	.17	-.06

<sup>a</sup>Entries in this table are zero-order Pearson correlation coefficients.

<sup>b</sup>Salience is average seriousness rating given to disaster problems (Question 1) on local or state level.

<sup>c</sup>Average endorsement of Questions 48 and 49, asking about Federal policy in response to disaster issues.

<sup>d</sup>Average response to Question S12, asking about endorsement of state regulating land use in high risk areas.

<sup>e</sup>Average responses to Question S14, asking about state stricter building codes to lower disaster damage and injury.

<sup>f</sup>Based on key persons' recall of disasters occurring in state (local area) during period 1967 to 1977.

<sup>g</sup>Dummy variable indicating state was subject to Presidential declaration during period.

<sup>h</sup>Number of disasters during period 1960 to 1970 as recorded in Red Cross Chapter Reports.

<sup>i</sup>Average responses to question asking about endorsement of Federal Flood Insurance Program.

<sup>j</sup>Group/position favorability to land use regulation and stricter building codes weighted by activity level of group and perceived importance, summed over local key person respondents.

1% less likely to designate themselves as active.<sup>3</sup> Persons who believe that disaster problems are relatively unimportant are more likely to consider themselves active. The remainder of the variables relate to state characteristics. State elites were more active in wealthier states (in terms of median household income recorded in 1970) and less active when the climate of opinion was favorable toward nonstructural hazard-mitigation legislation. Agencies are perceived as more active when the climate of opinion favors nonstructural hazard-mitigation measures but the respondent believes the problem is not important.

That there is little variation in activity according to the position of the

<sup>3</sup>Negative coefficients were found for age among local community elites as well. There is no reason to think that the process of aging per se affects activity—most of the members of both community and state elites are well above the median for adult Americans. Rather, the finding suggests a cohort phenomenon in which disaster issues are somehow more attractive to younger members as an activity upon which to exert some influence. It may also be the case that the more important issues are reserved to elder statesmen with younger members "specializing" in newer, emerging ones.

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TABLE 8.6

Regressions of Self and Agency Activity on Respondent Characteristics and State Characteristics (N = 448)

Independent Variables <sup>a</sup>	Dependent Variable			
	Self is Active		Agency is Active	
	<u>b</u>	<u>SE</u>	<u>b</u>	<u>SE</u>
Governor	-.15	.115	-.15	.105
Legislator	.03	.063	.01	.058
Appointed Official	-.06	.068	-.06	.062
Private Sector	.05	.066	.07	.060
Age	-.01**	.002	.00	.002
Education	.01	.014	-.00	.013
Weighted Favorability to Disaster Mitigation	-.07**	.024	-.08***	.022
Recalled Disasters 1967-1977	.01	.010	-.00	.009
Population 1970	.00	.000	.00	.00
Median Household Income (thousands)	.05*	.00	.02	.01
Respondent Salience Ratings	-.02**	.004	-.13**	.004
Respondent Approval of Federal Disaster Mitigation	-.01	.009	.01	.008
Average State Approval Federal Flood Insurance	.09	1.12	-.21	.078
Intercept	1.13***	.296	1.66***	.273
R <sup>2</sup>		.110***		.105***

<sup>a</sup>See Table 8-5 for variable definitions.

respondent is particularly puzzling. Governors, despite the opinions of other elites, as shown in Table 8.1, do not regard their offices as particularly active. Similar "nonfindings" pertain to agency ratings of self-activity, apparently due to modesty.

### PERCEIVED IMPORTANCE OF GROUPS AND POSITIONS

The importance of elected officials to the legislative process is apparent in Table 8.7, which shows elite response, in percentages, to the question, "If you wanted to get some legislation through the state legislature on some issue concerning natural disasters, which of these groups or persons would it be important to have on your side?" All seven groups or positions cited by more than 50% of the elite respondents were elected officials. The most

## Perceived Importance of Groups and Positions

TABLE 8.7

State Level Perceived Importance of Groups/Positions on Disaster Related Legislation (N = 461)

Groups/Positions	Important <sup>a</sup>	Not Important	Not Applicable
Governor	89	10	0
House Democratic Leader	81	16	3
Senate Democratic Leader	77	20	3
Chair, House Committee	76	23	1
Chair, Senate Committee	76	23	1
House Republican Leader	60	32	7
Senate Republican Leader	59	33	7
Civil Defense Director	43	56	0
Conservation Groups	40	60	0
Local Officials in High Risk Areas	39	60	0
State Chamber of Commerce	38	60	1
State Planning Agency	35	64	1
Construction Industry	34	65	0
Leading Industries	30	69	0
Homebuilders Association	30	69	0
Construction Unions	29	70	0
Insurance Firms	27	72	0
Leading Banks	26	73	0
U.S. Corps of Engineers	23	76	0
Red Cross Director	21	79	0
State Real Estate Board	21	78	0
Engineers Associations	18	81	0
FDAA Regional Office	16	83	0
National Guard	14	85	0
U.S. Bureau of Reclamation	12	86	1
Yourself	27	72	0
Your Agency (firm, etc.)	35	63	1

<sup>a</sup>Based on response to "If you wanted to get some legislation through the state legislature on some issue concerning natural disasters, which of these groups or persons would it be important to have on your side?"

important of all are governors, followed by the Democratic party leaders in the two houses of the state legislature, and then by the chairs of the two relevant legislative committees. More importance is accorded to the leaders of the Democratic party than to Republican leaders because the Democrats dominate the legislatures of most of our sample states.

Of the remaining groups and positions, construction firms and leading

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industries appear to be particularly important. Disaster agency officials within the state government and local officials from high-risk areas also appear to be of some importance, although by 33%-40% minorities. The power to affect hazard-mitigation legislation is thus even more firmly in the hands of elected officials on the state level than on the local level (see Chapter 7). The fate of nonstructural hazard-mitigation legislation depends on the legislature and the governor, not on backing from other public agencies or organizations in the private sector.

The clustering of importance shown in Table 8.8, however, does not show a clear separation between the legislature and the private sector. The first cluster shown in Table 8.8 is one in which the chairmen of legislative committees from both houses are grouped with conservation groups, leading industries, and the construction firms (labeled, *committee chairs and industry*). Whether this implies that we have isolated an arena and a set of antagonists or simply that the legislative committees are sensitive to these groups is impossible to determine from our data. However, given that conservation groups and are often at loggerheads with industry, perhaps the first explanation holds; that is, the legislative committees are clustered with these conservation groups because the latter use the committees as forums to air their views and/or because conservation groups know that the support of the committees is critical to their goals.

A second cluster, *legislative leaders*, is composed of the party leaders in both houses. The governors do not participate in any of the clusters; their distinctive factor loading is  $-.82$  with a mysterious cluster consisting of the National Guard and Engineering Associations (labeled *Cluster A*). It should be noted that it would be difficult to find that governors clustered positively with any groups since 89% of our elite respondents agreed that the governor was important to have on their side; this is so high a proportion that almost no variation in importance that can be associated with any other group or position.

The federal agencies on the list form their own importance cluster (labeled, *federal agencies*). Apparently, in some states, they are relatively important in legislative matters and when they act, they apparently act together. The remaining clusters, including the one of the National Guard and Engineering Association (Cluster A), are puzzling. In Cluster B, the Chamber of Commerce is associated with such strange bedfellows as the construction unions and the Homebuilders' Association. This might be interpreted as a real estate cluster except that the state Real Estate Board participates in the *Cluster C*, which is composed of two of the state disaster positions—the Red Cross director and the Civil Defense director—as well as the insurance industry. A final cluster, *Cluster D*, is composed of the state planning agency and local officials from high-risk areas. Clusters A-D are so named

Factors and Factor Loading State Level Group/Position Importance Ratings (N = 20)

Position/Group	Comm. Chairs & Industry	Legis. Leaders	Federal Agencies	Cluster A	Cluster B	Cluster C	Cluster D
Chair, House Comm.	.91	.08	.17	-.04	.07	.18	-.08
Chair, Senate Comm.	.86	.20	.14	.07	.19	.21	-.12
Banks	.68	.03	.15	.36	.19	.41	.13
Conservation Groups	.68	.42	-.06	-.03	.35	.24	.21
Leading Industries	.59	-.06	.05	.49	.15	.06	.32
Construction Industry	.59	-.01	.29	.12	.59	-.01	.09
House Rep. Leader	.07	.94	.06	.12	.02	-.03	-.03
Senate Rep. Leader	.18	.93	-.07	.07	.13	-.06	.14
House Dem. Leader	.46	.56	-.28	.11	.26	.04	-.46
Senate Dem. Leader	.37	.53	-.14	.28	.17	.02	-.57
U.S. Reclamation Bureau	.13	.29	.89	.08	.13	-.00	.05
U.S. Corps of Engineers	.07	-.12	.86	.04	-.00	.21	.05
FDA	.27	-.37	.71	-.06	.11	.17	.16
Governor	-.16	-.18	.16	-.82	.07	-.06	-.04
National Guard	-.09	-.15	.43	.65	.15	.31	.07
Engineers Association	.05	.22	.26	.64	.46	.07	-.15
Chamber of Commerce	-.05	.42	.10	-.01	.76	.16	-.15
Construction Unions	.39	.03	-.04	.08	.74	.08	.15
Homebuilders Association	.18	-.03	.10	.12	.72	.20	-.10
Civil Defense Director	.22	-.16	.12	.09	.05	.84	.04
Red Cross	.26	.06	.33	.01	.26	.79	-.15
Real Estate Board	.15	.21	-.10	.49	.28	.64	.08
Insurance Firms	.45	-.48	.22	.26	.07	.53	-.20
State Planning Agency	.05	.39	.25	.13	-.19	-.09	.70
Local Officials in High Risk Area	.22	-.08	-.05	.12	.50	.06	.62

Computed by principal components method with varimax

because they are so heterogeneous in content that any set of names would tend to be either a catalog of cluster members or misleading.

In sum, the clustering of importance on state hazard-mitigation legislation is not clearcut either arithmetically or substantively. Three of the factors can be clearly identified, but the remainder are quite heterogeneous, so much so that they remain largely uninterpretable.

Some of the conditions under which the better defined clusters are regarded as important are shown in Table 8.9. We have computed an importance score for each of the clusters by summing the percentages in Table 8.7 (perceived importance) over the groups and positions in Table 8.8 and correlated the resulting scores with selected characteristics of the states. In the top panel of Table 8.9, we present the correlations of the cluster importance scores with state level variables formed by averaging over state elites or documentary sources. In the bottom panel are variables formed by averaging over the local elites.

On the state level, 21 of the 66 coefficients are statistically significant (circled) at the .05 level of statistical significance. The score for "total clusters," a summation over all the groups and positions, may be regarded as the extent to which all groups in the state participate in the decision-making process. The "total cluster score" correlates positively with population size and density, negatively with median household income. In short, many groups are important in the decision-making process in the large, urbanized, but not very wealthy states. In addition, the absence of opposition to nonstructural hazard-mitigation measures is also conducive to high total cluster scores. Perhaps controversy lowers the importance of groups in general, since pairs of antagonists may cancel each other out.

The *committee chairs/industry* cluster is important in heavily populated states and where there is little opposition to nonstructural hazard-mitigation measures. As discussed earlier, the nature of the bond between industry and the legislative committee chairman is a matter of speculation. This pattern may mean that industry can more readily obtain the ears of committee chairmen in the absence of opposition.<sup>4</sup>

Legislators are likely to be regarded as important in states that have not been the subject of a Presidential Disaster Declaration, where population density and median household income are high, where disaster salience is low, where there is little opposition to nonstructural hazard-mitigation measures, and where elites recall few hazard events over the past decade. This

<sup>4</sup>Since leading industries are not likely to be in favor of such legislation (see Table 8.11), this may mean that industrial spokesmen make a special effort to become important to legislative committee chairmen in order to forestall such legislation.

suggests that party leaders in the two houses are important in deciding on legislation when the issues involved are at low level of importance.

Nothing on the state level appears to be related to the perceived importance of federal agencies or the groups and positions in *Cluster C*. In contrast, those in *Cluster B* appear to be important under certain specific circumstances. *Cluster B* is made up of a combination of the disaster agencies (Civil Defense and Red Cross) and portions of the real estate industry (the state Real Estate Board and insurance firms) that are important in densely populated, relatively high-income, and highly urbanized states in which there is little opposition to nonstructural hazard-mitigation measures on the state level.

The bottom panel of Table 8.9 correlates importance ratings with state and local community characteristics. Only two of the correlations in this panel survive the threshold conditions: that state legislative leaders tend to be perceived as important (a) when the problems of disasters are unimportant to local elites and (b) when the local communities of a state have actually experienced few such disasters.

The total story that emerges from Table 8.9 is difficult to summarize. State legislative leaders appear to be important when the problem is not important and when there is little opposition to nonstructural hazard-mitigation measures. Somewhat the same tendency shows for the remaining clusters, except that the disaster agencies are most important in highly urbanized, prosperous states and legislative committee chairmen are important in large states, but not necessarily the highly urbanized ones.

Since the elites' self-ratings and ratings of their agencies refer to the individual respondent, it is appropriate that we relate them to individual characteristics and to state characteristics. Table 8.10 presents two regression equations involving self- and agency ratings as dependent variables. The regression coefficients represent increments (or decrements) in the percentage of respondents rating themselves or their agency as important to hazard-mitigation legislation. The results show clearly that position has more of an effect on self-ratings than anything else. Governors, state legislators, and state appointed officials are considerably more likely to regard themselves as important. Other things held constant, elites in states where general opinion is in favor of nonstructural hazard-mitigation legislation and elites who think that disasters are important problems for their states are also more likely to rate themselves as important. In contrast, few of the characteristics on our list relate to whether or not elites regard their agency or firm as important. Elites in states favorable toward nonstructural hazard-mitigation legislation are more likely to rate their agencies as important.

The general impression these data give is one of confusion. Clear-cut,



TABLE 8.9

Cluster Importance Scores Correlated with State and Local Community Variables (N = 20)<sup>a</sup>

## I. STATE LEVEL VARIABLES:

Variables <sup>b</sup>	Total Clusters	Comm. Chairs/ Industry	Legis- lators	Federal Agencies	Cluster B <sup>c</sup>	Cluster C <sup>c</sup>
Presidential Disaster Declaration	-.13	.05	-.43	-.01	.04	.03
Population 1970	.38	.49	-.00	-.04	.45	.13
Density 1970	.39	.24	.41	.26	.44	.16
% Urban	.34	.15	.31	-.04	.54	-.10
Disaster Salience	-.26	-.24	-.48	.05	.13	-.10
Opposition to Federal Regulation	-.32	-.22	.41	.05	-.25	-.01
Opposition to Federal Flood Insurance	-.37	-.39	-.27	.04	-.21	-.01
Opposition to Land Use Regulation	-.47	-.36	-.53	-.01	-.38	.10
Opposition to State Building Codes	-.44	-.46	-.17	-.17	-.55	-.03
Median Income 1970	-.45	.23	.67	-.30	.44	-.09
Recalled Disasters 1967-1977	-.26	-.27	-.42	-.15	.04	.22

## II. LOCAL LEVEL VARIABLES:

Variables	Total Clusters	Comm. Chairs/ Industry	Legis- lators	Federal Agencies	Cluster B <sup>c</sup>	Cluster C <sup>c</sup>
Disaster Salience	-.32	-.30	-.43	-.15	.04	.08
Opposition to Federal Regulations	-.19	-.16	-.22	.19	-.24	-.06
Opposition to Federal Flood Insurance	.07	.05	-.02	.33	-.01	.12
Weighted Favorability to Disaster Legislation	-.13	-.16	.08	-.19	-.12	-.17
Number Disasters 1960-1970	-.13	.05	-.50	.22	-.05	.32
Recalled Disasters 1967-1977	.03	-.18	-.28	.19	.06	.18

<sup>a</sup>Entries in this table are zero order correlation coefficients.<sup>b</sup>See footnotes in Table 8-5 for definition of variables.<sup>c</sup>Cluster B consists of Chamber of Commerce, construction unions, and the Homebuilders Association. Cluster C contains the Civil Defense Director, Red Cross Director, Real Estate Board, and Insurance firms.

## 8. Patterns of Group Activity and Power in State Hazard-Mitigation Legislation

**TABLE 8.10**

Regressions of Self and Agency Importance on Selected Individual and State Characteristics (N = 449)

Independent Variable	Dependent Variable			
	Self Rating		Agency Rating	
	b	SE	b	SE
Governor	.35**	.110	.147	.121
Legislator	.26***	.060	.04	.066
Appointed Official	.22**	.065	.10	.071
Private Sector	.10	.063	-.06	.069
Age	.00	.002	-.02	.002
Education	-.02	.014	-.02	.015
Weighted Favorability to Disaster Mitigation	.06**	.023	.09***	.025
Recalled Disasters 1967-1977	-.01	.010	-.01	.011
Population 1970	.00	.000	.00	.000
Median Household Income	.00	.000	.00	.000
Respondent Salience Ratings	.01*	.004	.00	.005
Respondent Approval of Disaster Mitigation	-.00	.009	.00	.010
Average State Approval of Federal Flood Insurance	.09	.081	.19*	.089
Intercept	-.32	.284	-.28	.312
R <sup>2</sup>	.127***		.092***	

\*p < .05

\*\*p < .10

\*\*\*p < .001

interpretable patterns do not emerge. To begin with, the groups and positions we have selected for study do not cluster as neatly as one might expect. Some of the clusters that do appear contain groups that seem to have very different interests (e.g., the Civil Defense director and the state Real Estate Board). Finally, the circumstances under which clusters emerge as important are not clearly delineated.

### FAVORABILITY TOWARD NONSTRUCTURAL HAZARD-MITIGATION LEGISLATION

As with local communities (see Chapter 7), state elites show no overwhelming sentiment in favor of nonstructural hazard-mitigation Table 8.11,

### Favorability Toward Nonstructural Hazard-Mitigation Legislation

which shows which of our groups and positions are perceived as favoring such legislation, indicates that none are cited by a majority of elite respondents. Furthermore, only 4 of the 25 groups and positions were cited by 33% or more of our respondents (conservation groups, the state planning agency, governors, and Civil Defense directors). Fewer than 10% perceive industries and the state Real Estate Board as in favor of nonstructural measures.

**TABLE 8.11**

State Level Perceived Favorability of Groups to Land Use and Building Codes (N = 461)

Position/Group	Favors	Does Not Favor	Don't Know	Not Applicable
Conservation Groups	45	50	5	0
State Planning Agency	41	53	5	1
Governor	41	54	5	0
Civil Defense Director	34	60	5	0
House Democratic Leader	28	64	5	3
U.S. Corps of Engineers	27	67	5	0
Senate Democratic Leader	27	65	5	3
Local Officials in High Risk Area	26	69	5	0
Insurance Firms	24	70	5	0
Chair, Senate Committee	23	71	5	1
Chair, House Committee	22	71	4	2
Red Cross Director	20	74	5	0
House Republican Leader	20	68	5	8
Senate Republican Leader	19	69	5	7
FDAA Regional Office	18	76	5	1
U.S. Bur. of Reclamation	16	77	5	1
State Chamber of Commerce	12	81	5	1
Homebuilders Association	12	82	5	1
Engineers Association	12	82	5	0
Leading State Banks	12	83	5	0
Construction Industry	11	83	5	0
Construction Union	10	85	5	0
National Guard	8	86	5	1
State Real Estate Board	8	86	5	0
Leading Industries	7	87	5	0
Yourself	24	70	5	0
Your Agency (firm, etc.)	27	67	5	1

<sup>a</sup>Based on responses to "Which ... groups ... do you see as generally favoring legislation regulating land use or tightening up building codes to lower the risk from natural disasters?"

By and large, the government groups and positions are seen as more favorable than those in the private sector. Indeed, in the private sector, only the Red Cross director and insurance firms appear to favor nonstructural hazard-mitigation measures.

The clusters the 25 groups form are shown in Table 8.12. The pattern of the clusters is even less clear than for our previous analyses. First, there are many groups and positions that participate in several clusters, as indicated by the overlapping rectangle and the circled factor loadings shown in Table 8.12. Second, the factor loadings within a cluster tend to be smaller than previously, indicating that the individual group's attachment to the clusters is not very strong. Yet, those clusters that are distinct have a familiar compositional makeup. The elected officials form a cluster, as they did with respect to activity. However, legislative committee chairmen participate in both the first and second clusters (as indicated by the horizontal rectangle), in which they are joined by the banks, state planning agency, the construction industry, and conservation groups, a motley collection.

Of the remaining clusters, only the *business* cluster seems to have a fairly homogeneous membership, composed of insurance firms, leading industries, the Chamber of Commerce, and the National Guard. The remaining four clusters are dominated by one or two groups or positions and are not very easily named in a distinctive fashion.

The clusters in Table 8.12 represent coalitions defined by their degree of favorability to nonstructural hazard-mitigation legislation, but a particular cluster defining a coalition need not be either active or particularly important in affecting the course of legislative decision making. A more realistic portrait of coalitions can be obtained by weighting the favorability levels of the groups and positions by their importance and activity; in other words, by the data we have considered in earlier sections of this chapter—a direct parallel of the procedures employed in the previous chapter. Table 8.13 shows the means, standard deviations, and ranges of the weighted favorability variable for each group or position. The governor appears at the top of the list, undoubtedly because of the high importance accorded that position. Next highest on weighted favorability are the conservation groups, followed by the house Democratic leader, the Civil Defense director, senate Democratic leader, the state planning agency, and the rest of the elected officials. At the bottom are the Real Estate Board, National Guard, U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Construction workers union, and Engineering Association.

The clustering of weighted favorability scores is shown in Table 8.14, whose clusters represent the sets of groups who are active, important, and favorable toward nonstructural hazard-mitigation measures. The clusters are considerably clearer than those shown in Table 8.12. The elected public

TABLE 8.12

Factors and Factor Loadings State Level Group/Position Favorability to Disaster Mitigation Legislation (N = 20)

Position/Group	Elected Official	Comm. Chairs & Int. Groups	Cluster A	Business	Cluster B	Cluster C	Cluster D
Senate Dem. Leader	.90	.36	.06	.04	.09	.03	-.02
House Dem. Leader	.85	.43	-.10	.16	.10	.03	.03
House Rep. Leader	.82	.09	.15	.26	-.09	.39	.14
Senate Rep. Leader	.78	.07	.17	.17	-.12	.43	.12
Governor	.76	.15	.19	.21	-.02	.09	.14
Chair, Senate Comm.	.68	.53	-.05	.07	.07	.28	.28
Chair, House Comm.	.55	.64	-.19	.08	.17	.28	.25
State Leading Banks	.30	.59	.10	.47	.48	-.10	-.07
Conservation Groups	.47	.73	.12	-.03	-.01	.28	.11
State Planning Agency	.25	.83	.05	.25	-.10	-.11	.14
Construction Industry	.32	.56	.28	.65	.17	.32	-.17
Engineers Association	.42	.17	.52	.32	.28	-.15	-.14
Local Officials in High Risk Area	.36	.32	.50	.04	-.11	.52	-.04
Bureau of Reclamation	.27	-.11	-.62	-.04	-.36	-.28	-.24
FDAA	-.15	.09	-.95	.02	.01	.02	-.04
Insurance Industry	-.05	.23	-.02	.87	-.14	.17	.04

(Continued)

TABLE 8.12 (Continued)

Position/Group	Elected Official	Comm. Chairs & Int. Groups	Cluster A	Business	Cluster B	Cluster C	Cluster D
Leading Industries	.43	-.01	-.08	.81	.20	-.19	.08
National Guard	.47	.14	.27	.61	.24	.26	.08
Chamber of Commerce	.44	.05	.25	.52	-.16	-.08	.44
Real Estate Board	-.11	.40	-.10	.40	.65	.15	.11
U.S. Corps of Engineers	-.07	.12	-.15	.10	-.92	-.01	.04
Construction Unions	.36	.06	-.01	.06	.14	.85	.06
Civil Defense Director	.26	.07	-.05	.02	.01	.02	.91
Homebuilders Assoc.	.46	.27	.29	.46	.12	.28	-.31

<sup>a</sup>Computed by principal factor method with varimax rotation.

## Favorability Toward Nonstructural Hazard-Mitigation Legislation

TABLE 8.13

Means, Standard Deviations and Ranges of Favorability Weighted by Activity and Importance for State Groups/Positions (N = 20)

Group/Position	Mean	s.d.	Range
Governor	39.5	22.2	4.5 - 87.5
Conservation Groups	27.3	13.4	13.3 - 57.9
House Democratic Leader	26.6	15.3	5.0 - 54.5
Civil Defense Director	24.5	10.7	5.0 - 47.6
Senate Democratic Leader	24.1	14.7	0 - 50.0
State Planning Agency	22.0	10.2	4.8 - 39.1
Chair, Senate Comm.	21.3	2.9	0 - 45.5
Chair, House Comm.	21.3	15.6	0 - 59.1
House Rep. Leader	17.4	13.6	0 - 47.4
Senate Rep. Leader	17.4	12.8	0 - 47.4
Local Officials in High Risk Area	15.7	7.4	0 - 25.0
Insurance	13.6	7.4	0 - 29.2
U.S. Corps of Engineers	10.7	7.0	0 - 26.3
Red Cross Director	10.4	7.3	0 - 25.0
FDAA	10.2	6.9	0 - 27.3
State Chamber of Commerce	6.2	5.5	0 - 16.7
Engineers	5.9	4.7	0 - 16.7
Construction Industry	5.8	5.3	0 - 15.8
Construction Unions	5.4	6.2	0 - 20.0
Banks	5.2	5.9	0 - 21.1
Bureau of Reclamation	5.2	6.4	0 - 21.7
Homebuilders Association	5.0	3.4	0 - 11.1
Leading Industry	3.8	4.5	0 - 15.0
National Guard	3.2	3.3	0 - 11.1
Real Estate	2.8	3.4	0 - 11.1

officials form a distinct cluster by themselves, dominated by the party leaders in the legislature. The state Chamber of Commerce, leading industries, and the U.S. Homebuilders' Association also participate in the *public officials* cluster, although the two last do so weakly. The only elected official who does not belong to this cluster is the chairman of the house committee, who is a member of *Cluster A*, which also includes the state planning agency and the leading banks. Note also that the house Democratic leader, the chairman of the senate committee also participate, somewhat weakly, in *Cluster A*. The *public officials* cluster and *Cluster A*, strongly suggest that committees that deal with hazard-mitigation legislation are connected with the general

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TABLE 8.14

Factors and Factor Loadings State Groups/Positions Favorability Weighted by Activity and Importance (N = 20)

Group/Position	Public Officials	Real Estate	Business	Disaster Agencies	Cluster A	Cluster B
Senate Rep. Leader	.92	.08	.01	-.01	.22	-.08
House Rep. Leader	.89	.23	.02	-.18	.12	.16
Senate Dem. Leader	.79	.28	.00	-.13	.40	.11
Chamber of Commerce	.79	-.05	.23	.15	-.09	-.10
Governor	.74	.18	.04	-.00	.02	.44
House Dem. Leader	.71	.26	.07	.11	.57	.16
Chair, Senate Comm.	.60	.38	.02	.39	.52	-.09
Construction Unions	.29	.82	.07	.25	.16	-.01
Engineers Assoc.	.13	.80	.15	-.24	.07	.26
Construction Ind.	.22	.70	.25	.07	.56	.15
Red Cross	-.02	.66	.25	.58	.03	-.09
Conservation Grps.	.49	.60	.01	.30	.42	-.09
Homebuilders Assoc.	.51	.54	.47	-.14	.09	-.21
Real Estate Board	-.06	.52	.43	.27	.30	-.11
Insurance Firms	-.09	.25	.86	.14	.02	-.08
National Guard	.27	.33	.72	-.12	.01	-.09
Leading Industries	.53	.03	.70	.11	.24	.07
U.S. Corps of Engineers	-.05	-.10	.60	.15	.06	.45
Civil Defense Dir.	.03	.05	.04	.91	.08	-.02
FDAA	.37	.14	.29	.53	.39	.41
Planning Agency	.18	-.01	-.03	-.02	.86	.24
Leading Banks	.05	.48	.29	.08	.73	.04
Chair, House Comm.	.41	.37	.06	.43	.65	.00
Bur. of Reclamation	.20	.05	-.08	-.07	.18	.91
Local Officials in High Risk Areas	.39	.47	.16	.24	.44	-.10

<sup>a</sup> Computed by principal component method using varimax rotation.

business interests of their states as they are expressed by the leading financial institutions of the state and the state Chamber of Commerce.

A second clear cluster, *real estate*, contains not only real-estate interests but also the Red Cross and conservation groups. The Red Cross director participates in the *disaster agencies* cluster as well. A *business* cluster dominated by the insurance firms and leading industries also includes, for unknown reasons, the National Guard and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.

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The *disaster agencies* cluster includes the Civil Defense director, the FDAA regional office and, as we mentioned earlier, the Red Cross director. *Cluster B* consists of the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, an agency that appears to stand by itself with almost no ties to any of the other positions or groups.

The weighted favorability ratings allow us to compare state groups and positions with regard to their favorability toward nonstructural hazard-mitigation legislation. By summing the scores for the 25 groups and positions, we can obtain a measure that indicates how favorable the total constellation of groups and positions is to such legislation, taking into account how important and active they are in matters dealing with such legislation. This state favorability measure has been correlated with state characteristics, and the resulting correlation coefficients are shown in Table 8.15. These are zero-order correlation coefficients that show the gross effects of the state characteristics on state favorability. Since the number of states is too small for more sophisticated measures in which several characteristics are seen simultaneously, these gross measures will have to suffice as first approximations. The coefficients that achieve statistical significance are circled.

The pattern of relationships shown in Table 8.15 is quite clear. Large, densely populated, highly urbanized, or relatively prosperous states have active and influential elites that are more favorable toward the nonstructural hazard-mitigation approach. Our elite respondents in these states are also relatively favorable toward the NFIP and do not oppose their states' regulations. The state's experience with disasters appears to be quite irrelevant.

Overall, it appears that there is little strong sentiment for nonstructural hazard-mitigation measures, either among our elites or among the groups and positions we asked about. The clusterings of groups and positions indicate that the legislative committees concerned with nonstructural hazard-mitigation are closely connected with financial and industrial groups within their states. Whether this means that the legislatures are easily swayed by these special interests or that the committees are simply the arena in which these interests choose to lobby is difficult to discern from our analyses. It appears that these interests receive attention, and the idea of the legislative committee being an arena of conflict is undermined by the absence of their opponents.

Another way of approaching the issue of favorability is to examine the patterning that appears among the 20 states. The cluster analyses that we have presented suggest that states differ from one another in the number of groups who are favorable to such legislation and in the pattern of support as distributed among such groups. Table 8.16 is the result of our attempt to determine if there are types of states, each type characterized by a particular pattern of group support for nonstructural hazard-mitigation measures across the 25 groups and positions. To achieve this end, we correlated the pattern

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TABLE 8.15

Correlates of State Overall Favorability to Disaster Mitigating Legislation Weighted by Importance and Activity (N = 20)

Correlate	Correlation Coefficients With Weighted Favorability
Presidential Disaster Declaration	-.03
Population 1970	.46
Density 1970	.57
Percent Urban 1970	.55
State Level Disaster Salience	.07
State Level Opposition to Federal Disaster Regulations	-.18
State Level Opposition to Federal Flood Insurance	-.60
Opposition to State Regulation of Land Use	-.72
Opposition to State Stricter Building Codes	-.76
Recalled Disasters (1967-1977)	-.40
Local Level Disaster Salience	-.34
Local Level Disasters (1960-1970)	-.13
Recalled Disasters Local Level (1967-1977)	-.26
Local Level Opposition to Flood Insurance Program	-.35
Local Level Opposition to Federal Disaster Regulations	-.12
Local Level Weighted Favorability to Disaster Mitigation Legislation	.11
Median Household Income 1970	.54

of support in one state with the patterns of support in each of the remaining 19. These correlations express the extent to which the states are similar in such support. Thus, a state in which the legislators had high scores of support would show a high correlation with a state that showed the same pattern, but a low or negative correlation with a state that had a different pattern

A factor analysis of such patterns, shown in Table 8.16, produced four

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clusters of states; the states within each cluster are similar to each other in group support patterns. *Cluster A* is composed largely of states whose groups and positions were perceived as more favorable, on average, to nonstructural hazard-mitigation measures. It includes mostly large, densely populated states (e.g., New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, California), with some exceptions (e.g., New Hampshire). *Cluster B* is composed of Colorado, Utah, Florida, Delaware, and North Carolina. *Cluster C* contains most of our sample's southern states and Missouri. The fourth consists of Oklahoma and Illinois.

With the data shown in Table 8.6, we then constructed four new variables for each state, based on the factor loadings from that factor analysis. The new variables measure each state's participation in each of the patterns of

TABLE 8.16

Clustering of States According to Weighted Favorability\* (N = 25)

	Cluster A	Cluster B	Cluster C	Cluster D
New Hampshire	.84	.24	.18	-.01
Texas	.84	.25	.03	.04
Massachusetts	.80	.28	.16	.45
New York	.79	.29	.41	.18
New Jersey	.77	.44	.01	.24
Pennsylvania	.76	.46	-.02	.31
California	.75	.48	.63	.08
Connecticut	.69	.47	.11	.36
Colorado	.52	.81	.02	.12
Utah	.55	.71	.19	.26
Florida	.44	.71	.35	.06
Delaware	.42	.62	.15	.51
North Carolina	.37	.59	.51	.26
Missouri	-.05	-.03	.77	.16
Alabama	.38	.48	.63	.08
Louisiana	.04	.41	.58	.30
South Carolina	.28	.00	.53	.53
Virginia	.44	.37	.52	.26
Oklahoma	.10	.18	.20	.75
Illinois	.35	.21	.51	.74

\* Computed by correlating the states across the 25 weighted favorability scores for each group or position. Correlations therefore represent similarity between states in relative favorability of the 25 groups/positions in the states. Factor analysis computed by principal component method with varimax rotation

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power-weighted approval of nonstructural hazard-mitigation legislation. Using these derived measures, we can relate the clusters of states shown in Table 8.16 to the already familiar demographic, disaster experience, and climate of opinion variables. Those correlations are shown in the first panel of Table 8.17. The second panel of Table 8.17 correlates the factor loadings with the power weighted favorability of each of the 25 groups and positions. Thus, each of the factors can be conceptualized as a cluster of states characterized by similarities in patterns of power-weighted approval of nonstructural hazard-mitigation legislation.

The first two types of states are mirror images of each other: Type A

TABLE 8.17

Correlates of State Factor Loadings\* (N = 20)

### I. Correlations with State Characteristics:

	Factor A	Factor B	Factor C	Factor D
Population 1970	.25	-.16	.36	.37
Density	.42	-.37	.34	-.09
Percent Urban	.37	-.41	.19	-.13
Median Household Income (1970)	.54	-.46	.41	-.08
Importance of Disaster	-.19	.01	-.16	.08
Disapprove Federal Regulation of Land Use and Building	-.11	.12	-.25	-.38
Disapprove Federal Flood Insurance Program	-.43	.37	-.23	-.32
Disapprove State Regulation of Land Use	-.65	.41	.16	.18
Disapprove State Building Code	-.52	.41	.12	.04
Recalled Disasters (1967-77)	-.50	.52	.12	.01
Average Local Salience of Disaster Problems	-.47	.38	.03	-.20
Disasters (1960-1970)	-.27	.23	-.17	-.02
Recalled Disasters (Local)	-.41	.32	.08	-.19
Local Disapproval of Federal Flood Insurance	-.38	.37	-.06	.26
Local Disapproval of Federal Regulation of Land Use and Building Codes	-.02	.01	-.22	.13

## Favorability Toward Nonstructural Hazard-Mitigation Legislation

TABLE 8.17 (Continued)

### II. Correlations with Power Weighted Favorability of

	Factor A	Factor B	Factor C	Factor D
Governor	.69	-.62	-.48	-.23
House Dem. Leader	.65	-.68	.12	.06
House Republican Leader	.56	-.72	.06	-.14
Senate Dem. Leader	.75	-.83	.09	-.09
Senate Republican Leader	.56	-.78	.20	-.03
Chair, House Committee	.59	-.58	.14	.37
Chair, Senate Committee	.67	-.71	.07	.35
Civil Defense Director	.49	.01	-.17	.38
Red Cross Director	.40	-.20	.07	-.01
U.S. Corps of Engineers	-.06	.09	-.47	.15
U.S. Bureau of Reclamation	-.00	-.02	-.48	-.16
State Planning Agency	.60	-.20	-.08	-.33
National Guard	.28	-.43	-.00	.23
FDAA Regional Office	-.07	.14	-.25	.43
State Chamber of Commerce	-.04	-.28	-.31	-.05
Leading Industries	.34	-.30	.08	-.20
Homebuilders Association	.25	-.29	-.11	.24
State Banks	.21	-.24	.18	.26
Construction Industry	.24	-.20	.05	-.03
Real Estate Board	-.02	.01	.36	.08
Construction Unions	.19	-.22	.10	.07
Conservation Groups	.41	-.19	.60	-.11
Local Officials High Risk Area	.30	-.31	-.00	-.15
Insurance Firms	.13	.07	-.15	.25
Engineer Associations	.13	.07	-.15	.25

\* The values of Factors A through D are shown on Table 8-16: for each state, a factor score was constructed based on the loadings from that factor analysis, characterizing the patterns of power-weighted approval of disaster mitigation.

consists of dense, urban, and prosperous states in which there is much elite approval for nonstructural hazard-mitigation measures or states that have little experience with natural disasters. Elected public officials in those states exhibit high weighted-approval levels. Type B states are the exact opposite of Type A states: They are thinly populated and rural; average household income is below the median. Elected officials in Type B states show low weighted approval levels. Type C states are high-population, high-income states with powerful real estate boards and conservation groups

that favor nonstructural hazard-mitigation measures. They have weak, governors, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and U.S. Bureaus of Reclamation that are low in weighted approval. Type D states have important FDAA officers, Civil Defense directors, and house committee chairmen. Their elites favor the NFIP.

Table 8.18 returns to the more straightforward measure of the overall power weighted favorability scores calculated for each state; it shows the mean aggregate scores for each state. In addition, Table 8.18 also shows the state clusters that resulted from the factor analysis used for Table 8.16. With some exceptions, it appears that the clusters of states reflect a rough ordering of states in terms of their 'elites' favorability toward nonstructural hazard-mitigation legislation.

TABLE 8.18

Rank Order of States on Overall Favorability to Disaster Mitigation Legislation Weighted by Importance and Activity and Each State's Location in the Clusters\*

	Mean Aggregate Weighted Favorability	Factors			
		A	B	C	D
California	58.2	X			
New Jersey	55.8	X			
Massachusetts	54.1	X			
Colorado	48.3	X	X		
New York	47.9	X			
Pennsylvania	46.5	X			
Connecticut	45.6	X			
Florida	40.6		X		
Vermont	35.9	X	X		
North Carolina	33.6		X	X	
Alabama	32.2			X	
Louisiana	28.8			X	
New Hampshire	27.8	X			
Virginia	23.9			X	
Texas	23.5	X		X	
Illinois	21.5				X
South Carolina	18.9			X	
Delaware	17.6		X		
Missouri	14.4			X	
Oklahoma	13.6				X
All States	$\bar{X} = 34.4$ s.d. = 14.4 range = 13.6-58.2 (N = 461)				

\* See Tables 8-15 and 8-16.

## ELITE CONTACTS WITH GROUPS AND POSITIONS

Another dimension of the structure of power and influence is contact among groups and positions on a more or less regular basis. Of course, contact is in part a function of position and in part a function of interests: Some positions by definition involve contact with certain segments of the state institutional arrangements. State legislators must certainly be in regular contact with their colleagues in the legislature and with other offices in the state government, for example.

Indeed, state elected officials appear to be the target of a great deal of the regular contact of our elites, a finding that reflects in part that many of them are elected officials. Table 8.19 shows the percentages of elites claiming contact with each of the 25 groups and positions. All 5 of those claimed by majorities are elected officials; the governor received the most mentions (65%). At the other extreme, relatively isolated groups include the National Guard (17%), the FDAA Regional official (17%), the Red Cross director (12%), and the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (10%).

A factor analysis of these contact measures is shown in Table 8.20. The clusters are composed of groups or positions that have greater contact with the other groups or positions in that cluster than with those in other clusters. The contact clusters also appear to be familiar ones, since their composition is comparable to many of the other clustering analyses that have been presented. Moreover, the contact clusters are much more distinct and clear than most of the other cluster analyses presented.

As usual, there is an *elected official* cluster (including the governor). A second factor, *business industry* includes all business and industry groups without any distinction between those that are concerned with the buying and selling of land, construction, industrial production, or finance. A *disaster agencies* cluster contains all disaster agencies and the National Guard. The remaining two clusters appear to be more heterogeneous: *Cluster A* is composed of the state planning agency, conservation groups, and local officials from high-risk areas; *Cluster B* consist of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, and engineers associations.

There is little overlap among the clusters, that is, groups or positions have relatively large factor loadings in clusters other than the ones into which they were classified. This strong separation indicates our elites are discriminable into quite distinct patterns of regular contact.

Table 8.21 shows which characteristics of individual elites and of the 20 states correlate with regular contact. There is no state characteristic that carries any weight across all the clusters, and only the respondent's position and activity in other business, professional, or civic associations shows consistent effects. The total amount of contact—a measure formed by summing



## 8. Patterns of Group Activity and Power in State Hazard-Mitigation Legislation

TABLE 8.19

State Levels of Contacts with Groups/Positions (N = 461)

Group/Position	Regular <sup>a</sup> Contact	No Regular Contact	NA
Governor	65	35	0
House Democratic Leader	54	43	3
Senate Democratic Leader	53	44	3
Chair, House Committee	50	49	1
Chair, Senate Committee	50	49	1
Conservation Groups	47	53	0
House Republican Leader	44	48	7
Senate Republican Leader	44	49	7
State Planning Agency	44	55	1
Local Officials High Risk	43	56	0
State Chamber of Commerce	38	61	1
Leading Industries	38	62	0
Construction Industry	35	64	0
State Leading Banks	33	67	0
Civil Defense Director	27	73	0
U.S. Homebuilders Assoc.	27	73	0
U.S. Corps of Engineers	25	74	0
Insurance Firms	25	74	0
Construction Unions	22	77	0
Engineers Associations	21	78	0
State Real Estate Board	20	80	0
National Guard	17	83	0
FDAA Regional Office	17	83	0
Red Cross Director	12	87	0
U.S. Bureau of Reclamation	10	89	1

<sup>a</sup>Based on responses to, "In your present position, with which ... groups are you in contact on a more or less regular basis?"

the amount of contact across all five clusters—is higher for governors and legislators and for respondents who have been active in associations. High contact with elected officials is characteristic of all positions indexed by the dummy variables in the model and for respondents active in civic associations. Legislators, private officials, and those active in professional or business associations exhibit more regular contact with the business sector. Regular contact with the disaster agency cluster, on the other hand, is predicted for governors, but not for the other positions (as evidenced by the negative coefficients). Respondents appear to have more regular contact with disaster agencies when they perceive hazard problems to be more

## Influences on Respondents

salient than does the aggregate of respondents in that state. The regressions for the remaining two contact clusters do not add new information, perhaps reflecting the lack of clarity of the clusters themselves.

## INFLUENCES ON RESPONDENTS

A final issue is how elites are affected by the positions and groups we have been studying. The groups and positions vary in their activity, importance, and contact, all characteristics that might bear on the influence they wield

TABLE 8.20

Factors and Factor Loadings Individual Ratings of Regular Contact with State Position/Group (N = 461)

Position/Group	Elected Officials	Business Industry	Disaster Agencies	Factor A	Factor B
Senate Dem. Leader	.89	.14	-.02	-.02	.01
House Dem. Leader	.88	.15	-.04	-.08	.03
Senate Rep. Leader	.88	.17	.02	-.07	-.00
House Rep. Leader	.85	.19	.02	-.10	-.03
Chair House Comm.	.81	.12	-.07	.20	.00
Chair Senate Comm.	.80	.14	-.04	.22	.06
Governor	.59	.04	.19	.15	.04
Construction Firms	.13	.75	-.11	.19	.11
Real Estate Board	.12	.72	.13	.04	.10
Homebuilder Assoc.	.07	.71	-.06	-.07	.18
Leading Industries	.16	.64	.04	.37	-.02
Construction Unions	.18	.62	-.06	.26	.13
Chamber of Commerce	.23	.61	.06	.12	-.02
Leading Banks	.08	.60	.29	-.06	-.03
Insurance Firms	.06	.55	.24	-.11	.01
FDAA	-.08	.09	.78	.04	.07
Red Cross Director	.00	.08	.77	-.04	.23
National Guard	.16	.16	.71	.11	.12
Civil Defense Director	-.04	-.06	.59	.36	.15
State Planning Agency	.05	.02	.21	.68	.22
Conservation Groups	.13	.21	-.10	.65	.26
Local Officials High Risk	-.00	.18	.42	.60	-.10
U.S. Corps of Engineers	-.01	-.03	.37	.28	.72
U.S. Bureau of Reclam.	.12	.11	.24	.01	.76
Engineers Association	-.08	.35	.03	.26	.64

<sup>a</sup>Computed using principal component method with varimax rotation.

TABLE 8.21

Regression of Cluster Contact Measures on State and Individual Characteristics (N = 450)

Variables	Total Contact	Elected Officials	Business Agencies	Disaster Agencies	Cluster A	Cluster B
Governor	.16** (2.76)	.17*** (3.64)	.02 (.38)	-.17*** (3.64)	.07 (1.45)	-.02 (.41)
Legislators	.21*** (3.23)	.45*** (7.46)	.15* (2.30)	-.27*** (4.62)	.03 (.55)	-.16** (2.62)
Appointed Officials	.10 (1.69)	.17** (3.06)	-.09 (1.56)	-.02 (.38)	.15** (2.64)	.20*** (3.49)
Private Sector	.02 (.34)	.25*** (4.38)	.14* (2.26)	-.36*** (6.39)	-.31*** (5.53)	-.19*** (3.22)
Age	.03 (.53)	.07 (1.49)	-.03 (.58)	.08 (1.87)	-.11* (2.47)	.05 (1.14)
Education	-.01 (.26)	-.03 (.59)	.03 (.59)	-.10* (2.27)	.04 (.83)	.01 (.28)
Ever Officer Business or Professional Assoc.	.13** (2.61)	.07 (1.41)	.12* (2.34)	.04 (.86)	.11* (2.22)	.12* (2.44)
Ever Officer Civic Assoc.	.11* (2.19)	.14** (2.91)	.05 (.94)	.04 (.89)	.07 (1.47)	-.01 (.13)
Population 1970	-.04 (.68)	-.07 (1.12)	-.01 (.15)	-.01 (.16)	.05 (.77)	-.08 (1.28)
Median Household Income	.11 (1.67)	.06 (.93)	.10 (1.53)	.08 (1.20)	.06 (.92)	.07 (1.11)
Disasters (1960-1970)	-.03 (.36)	-.06 (.88)	.00 (.01)	.05 (.70)	-.06 (.87)	.04 (.50)
Disaster Salience	-.10 (1.26)	-.11 (1.42)	.03 (.42)	-.15* (1.99)	-.10 (1.40)	-.08 (1.06)
Opposition to Federal Flood Insurance	-.05 (.66)	-.07 (.94)	-.02 (.27)	-.02 (.33)	-.08 (.99)	.07 (.88)
Recalled Disasters (1967-1977)	.16 (1.77)	.15 (1.69)	.12 (1.28)	.10 (1.16)	.04 (.50)	.07 (.74)
Perceived Dis. Salience	-.05 (.88)	-.08 (1.56)	-.11 (2.05)	.13* (2.50)	.06 (1.26)	.02 (.45)
Disapproval Federal Regulations	.08 (1.04)	.06 (.88)	.06 (.76)	-.04 (.59)	.10 (1.50)	.06 (.87)
State Favorability (Weighted) to Dis. Mitigation Measures	.05 (.63)	.05 (.56)	.08 (.95)	-.09 (1.10)	.01 (.07)	.08 (.99)
$R^2 =$						
	.109***	.205***	.110***	.231***	.225***	.169***

\*p &lt; .05

\*\*p &lt; .10

\*\*\*p &lt; .001

## 8. Patterns of Group Activity and Power in State Hazard-Mitigation Legislation

with our respondents. Table 8.22 lists the groups according to their influence in shaping their views in any direction on issues involving natural hazards.

Conservation groups are the only groups to be regarded as influential by a majority of elites, and then only barely (51%). A close second are the governors, who are so regarded as influential by 47%. Other groups receiving mention from 33% or more of the elite respondents are local officials from high-risk areas, the state planning agency, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. It is of some interest that only one of the elected officials appears to be important in influencing the respondents, although, as we have seen,

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legislators play a key role in almost every other respect. Close to the bottom of the list are the Red Cross director, the National Guard, and the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation. The remainder are regarded as influential by minorities ranging from 18% to 31%.

The groups and positions that are influential with the elites are not necessarily either powerful or very active. It is particularly striking to see that the legislators, who are generally regarded as both active and important, exert little influence on this issue. Perhaps the proper role of the legislator is as a decision maker, not as an opinion leader. In contrast, the state planning agency, is neither important nor particularly noteworthy in other areas, but is regarded as influential in shaping elites' views. It seems likely that the state planning agency is a *negative* influence, since most of the respondents are not ardent supporters of nonstructural hazard-mitigation legislation and the state planning agency is seen as one of the staunch advocates of such measures.

The results of clustering groups and positions by influence is shown in Table 8.23. It is based on a factor analysis of these groups and positions that elite respondents cite as influencing them personally. The clustering therefore should be interpreted as representing types of elites, some of whom claim to be influenced by the groups that comprise each of the clusters.

The clusters in Table 8.23 is among the clearest we have seen in this chapter. Apparently, there are some elites who are oriented—positively or negatively—to *elected officials* (legislators and governors), some to *business and industry*; others to *disaster agencies* (both federal and state); and still others primarily to the heterogeneous set of groups and positions that we have given the neutral title of *Cluster A*.

To identify the kinds of respondents who are influenced by the groups or positions in each of the identifiable clusters, we regressed the groups within each cluster on a set of individual and state characteristics. The results are reported in Table 8.24. Two characteristics stand out: first, governors acknowledge being influenced (positively or negatively) by every cluster, and especially by the disaster agencies. Second, elites in high-risk communities (as indexed by disaster experience) are more likely to be influenced by every group or cluster. There are also some surprises: Legislators are no more influenced by the views of interest groups and agencies than are others. Nor are appointed officials or persons drawn from the private sector influenced by interest groups.

About the only other finding of note in Table 8.24 is that when state elites perceive disaster problems to be salient, they are more willing to be influenced by elected officials. In addition, respondents from states with high levels of approval of the NFIP are more likely to be influenced by elected officials. We must admit that these patterns do not fall into some neat overall explanation. Clearly, governors are attentive to a wide set of constituencies

TABLE 8.22

State Level Perceived Influentiality of Groups/Positions (N = 461)

Group/Position	Influential <sup>a</sup>	Not Influential	DK	NA
Conservation Groups	51	48	1	0
Governor	47	51	2	0
Local Officials, High Risk	37	61	1	0
State Planning Agency	36	62	1	1
Civil Defense Director	33	66	1	0
US Corps of Engineers	33	66	1	0
State Chamber of Commerce	31	67	1	1
Senate Dem. Leader	30	66	2	3
House Dem. Leader	30	66	2	3
Leading Industries	30	69	1	0
Chair, Senate Committee	30	68	2	1
Chair, House Committee	29	69	2	1
Construction Industry	28	70	1	0
Senate Rep. Leader	26	66	2	7
House Rep. Leader	25	66	2	7
US Homebuilders Assoc.	22	77	1	0
Leading State Banks	20	78	1	0
Construction Unions	20	79	1	0
Insurance Firms	20	79	1	0
Engineering Assoc.	20	78	1	0
State Real Estate Board	18	80	1	0
FDAA Regional Office	18	81	1	0
Red Cross Director	17	72	1	0
Bureau of Reclamation	16	82	1	1
National Guard	13	85	1	0

<sup>a</sup>Based on responses to, "... which ... groups ... are influential - positively or negatively - in shaping your own views on issues that involve natural hazards?"

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TABLE 8.23

Factors and Factor Loadings Individual Ratings of Influence of Positions/Groups (N = 461)

Positions/Groups	Elected Officials	Business Industry	Disaster Agencies	Cluster A
House Dem. Leader	.88	.17	.20	.37
House Rep. Leader	.88	.23	.16	.09
Senate Dem. Leader	.87	.24	.18	.05
Senate Rep. Leader	.88	.20	.21	.06
Chair, House Comm.	.83	.19	.14	.26
Chair, Senate Comm.	.81	.22	.21	.23
Governor	.57	.17	.20	.37
Construction Industry	.18	.76	.08	.20
Construction Unions	.26	.71	.11	.16
Real Estate Board	.18	.71	.30	.07
Homebuilder Assoc.	.22	.70	.21	.17
Leading Industries	.20	.67	.15	.28
Leading Banks	.22	.64	.38	-.10
Chamber of Commerce	.23	.63	.12	.29
Insurance Firms	.23	.55	.48	-.05
Engineers Assoc.	.06	.54	.32	.27
FDAA	.21	.16	.74	.11
Red Cross Director	.18	.28	.72	.14
National Guard	.21	.39	.70	.00
Civil Defense Director	.17	.07	.63	.35
US Corps of Engineers	.09	.11	.56	.47
US Bureau of Reclam.	.18	.38	.57	.16
Conservation Groups	.12	.25	.05	.76
State Planning Agency	.22	.15	.25	.65
Local Office High Risk	.24	.36	.25	.50

<sup>a</sup>Computed using principal component method with varimax rotation.

and to the hazard specialists. Attention is also apparently heightened when there is some degree of hazard risk in the state. Finally, the influence of elected officials is most clearly felt when all these factors come together.

## SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

At state level, activity in hazard-mitigation measures is dominated by elected officials: the governor, house and senate leaders, and chairmen of

## Summary and Conclusions

relevant committees. Government agencies regarded as active by the majority of the key persons in the sample include the Civil Defense director, the state planning agency, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and the National Guard. In the private sector, the active groups are insurance firms, the construction industry, conservation groups, and the Red Cross director. These positions and groups cluster in terms of activity levels as follows: There is a clear cluster of elected officials, another of major business interests, a third of disaster agencies, and a fourth of real-estate-connected groups. In con-

TABLE 8.24

Regression of Cluster Influence on Respondents (N = 450)

Independent Variable	Total Clusters	Elected Officials	Business	Disaster Agencies
Governor	.13** (2.62)	.09* (1.91)	.12* (2.45)	.15** (2.99)
Legislators	.01 (.232)	.08 (1.30)	.00 (.056)	-.06 (.783)
Appointed Officials	.05 (.848)	.07 (1.25)	.01 (.173)	.06 (.963)
Private Sector	.00 (.057)	.05 (.789)	-.00 (.026)	-.07 (1.09)
Population 1970	-.01 (.102)	.09 (1.43)	-.06 (.903)	-.05 (.808)
Median Income 1970	.01 (.177)	-.03 (.415)	.03 (.505)	.02 (.236)
Age	-.04 (.718)	-.01 (.241)	.06 (1.17)	.05 (.919)
Education	-.07 (1.39)	-.06 (1.17)	-.07 (1.31)	-.09 (1.81)
Disasters (1960-1970)	.17* (2.26)	.14* (1.95)	.16* (2.16)	.16* (2.21)
Disasters (1967-1977)	-.05 (.520)	-.22* (2.48)	.05 (.527)	.06 (.601)
Disaster Salience	.04 (.451)	.32*** (4.13)	-.11 (1.29)	-.14 (1.79)
Perceived Salience	.09 (1.58)	.06 (1.05)	.08 (1.34)	.10 (1.78)
Disapproval Federal Disaster Regulation	.08 (1.08)	-.11 (1.52)	-.05 (.616)	-.06 (.783)
Favorability to Disaster Legislation	.09 (1.10)	.01 (.071)	.14 (1.61)	.11 (1.28)
Approval of Federal Flood Insurance Program	.16* (1.96)	.32*** (4.05)	.06 (.771)	.03 (.400)
R <sup>2</sup> = .072**				
.134***				
.057*				
.081**				

\*p < .05

\*\*p < .10

\*\*\*p < .001

trast, activity levels and group clusters of patterns of activity with regard to legislation dealing with environmental issues are distinctively different (as was the case at the local level). Thus, the structure of activity on natural hazards issues does appear to be unique to that area.

State public officials appear to be active when the preponderance of both state and local opinion favors nonstructural hazard-mitigation measures and when the NFIP is endorsed by the state elites. Public officials are also more active in urbanized, more heavily populated states. However, they are apparently not responding to hazards risk in their state. On the other hand, the business and the real estate clusters are more active in states with greater disaster experience. The business cluster is also more active in less prosperous states, as defined by median household income. Finally, disaster agencies are active when there is some opposition to nonstructural hazard-mitigation measures.

The power to affect the fate of nonstructural hazard-mitigation legislation is even more firmly in the hands of elected officials on the state level, as compared to local communities. The important actors are the governor, the party leaders in the two houses of the state legislatures, and the two relevant legislative committees. Backing from other public agencies or organizations in the private sector is not regarded as important by the majority of elites. The clustering of groups and positions in terms of importance, however, is not clearcut. Only three of seven clusters can be identified substantively: Committee chairpersons, industry, and conservation groups form the first cluster, legislative leaders the second, federal agencies the third. The remainder are heterogeneous and not easily interpreted. The correlates of the clustering of importance scores suggest that state legislative leaders are regarded as more important when hazard problems are not salient and when opposition to nonstructural hazard-mitigation measures has not formed. The same relationships hold for the remaining clusters, except that the disaster agencies are important in highly urbanized, prosperous states and legislative committee chairpersons are important in large states, but not necessarily the highly urbanized ones. The structures of importance in hazard-mitigation legislation activity are not clear or straightforward.

The majority of state elites apparently do not favor nonstructural hazard-mitigation measures. Conservation groups, state planning agencies, governors, and Civil Defense directors are the only ones seen as favoring such measures by more than 33% of the respondents.

Paralleling the analysis performed on local elites, a favorability score weighted by activity and importance was calculated for each group or position. The resulting patterns represent the sets of groups who become active, are important, and are favorable toward nonstructural hazard-mitigation measures. The elected public officials, particularly the legislative commit-

tees that deal with nonstructural hazard-mitigation legislation, may be connected with the general business interests of their states, as expressed by the leading financial institutions and the state Chamber of Commerce. Three other identifiable clusters are real estate groups, business, and disaster agencies, although other nonobvious groups or positions are also apparently involved in the clusters.

An overall weighted favorability measure indicates the extent to which the total constellation of actors is perceived in terms of activity level, importance, and favorability. The correlates of such an index show that the densely populated, highly urbanized, and prosperous states have active and influential elites who are favorable to nonstructural hazard-mitigation measures. Interestingly, the state's experience with disasters appears to be quite irrelevant.

A different approach to the issue of favorability examined the patterns of support for nonstructural hazard-mitigation measures by active and influential elites in the 20 states, in order to identify the states in which patterns of support are similar for the various groups and positions. Four clusters of states can be identified. The correlates of the first cluster suggest that these tend to be either large, densely populated, urban, and prosperous states that have high levels of approval of nonstructural hazard-mitigation measures or states that have little experience with natural disasters. A second cluster of states is characterized by the exact opposite characteristics. A third cluster contains most of the southern states and Missouri, are also well populated and relatively prosperous, and apparently contain powerful and favorable conservation groups and real estate boards. The final cluster is made up of Oklahoma and Illinois. Apparently, the clusters of states are also arranged in order of weighted overall favorability, from high to low.

The other major dimension of the structure of power and influence in states is the contact levels among groups and key persons. Unsurprisingly, respondents report high regular contact with state elected officials. Again, the clear clusters of contact are in terms of elected officials, business and industry (including real estate interests), and disaster agencies. The only predictors of regular contact with these clusters are the respondent's position and past activity in other business, professional, or civic associations. None of the characteristics of the state show consistent effects.

One last issue concerns how elites are influenced by others on issues involving natural hazards. Conservation groups are the only groups or positions regarded as influential by a majority of elites. Other influential groups are the governor, local officials, the state planning agency, the Civil Defense director, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. As we have already seen, however, these are not necessarily the powerful or active groups and positions in the states. The clustering of such patterns of influence is very clear. Appar-

#### **8. Patterns of Group Activity and Power in State Hazard-Mitigation Legislation**

ently, some elites are oriented (either positively or negatively) to the elected officials, others to the business and industry interests, and others to the disaster agencies. Finally, our data suggest that governors acknowledge being influenced by every one of the clusters, which represent a wide set of constituencies, and by the hazard specialists. Elites are more readily influenced when there is some degree of hazard risk present.