

Table ES-1. Policy and Strategy Working Group Results and Recommendation

Category	Specific Results and Recommendations
Training and Preparedness	<p>1) Take steps to improve readiness, compatibility, capability, and coordination of forces by enhancing joint contingency planning, improving interoperability of potential force contributors, enhancing the military capabilities of UNDPKO, and strengthening the coordination role of UNHHA.</p> <p>2) Improve all participants' (military, civilian, UN, and NGOs) understanding of others' capabilities through exercises, exchange and educational programs, and documentation of operating procedures.</p> <p>3) Bolster the U.S. military's areas of comparative advantage by developing and maintaining critical skills, tracking individuals who possess humanitarian and peace operations experience, and developing a handbook that describes U.S. military organization and doctrine relating to these operations.</p> <p>4) Increase access to specialized skills resident in the reserve component, and support the availability and adequacy of equipment by identifying demands placed on dual purpose equipment, following an acquisition strategy that suits flexible, cost-effective deployments; and supporting research and development efforts, such as mine clearing capability improvements.</p>
Coordinating Planning and Implementation	<p>1) Planning must reflect the interests of all participants. Early in the planning process, there must be a high-level review of policy goals, strategic objectives, and associated costs. If there is a decision to respond, goals and objectives must be translated into appropriate, realistic civil and military tasks</p> <p>2) A senior-level, standing U.S. interagency authority should provide national-level guidance; outline options, priorities, and specific objectives; and urge high-level Administration and Congressional attention to plans for humanitarian crises. This interagency authority would support the coordination of humanitarian, military, and political activities.</p> <p>3) Modify the structure and functions of the Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) to improve coordination, by expanding the role of Disaster Assistance Response Teams, assisting in the establishment of a parallel UN-led Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC), and strengthening liaison between CMOC, HOC, and UN coordinating processes. Liaison at all levels, field and headquarters, should be emphasized</p> <p>4) Improve pre-deployment coordination by establishing standardized joint operating procedures and data formats, developing a standardized assessment package, and having all key participants identify agreed-upon measures of effectiveness (MOEs). These MOEs would fall in four general categories: security, infrastructure/logistics, public health, and agricultural/economic.</p>
Information Sharing and Capacity Building	<p>1) Improve all-source collection, analysis and dissemination. Survey users of crisis-relevant information to develop agreed-upon collection requirements and dissemination formats; identify gaps and overlaps, avoid information stove-pipes; and encourage data sharing among wide-ranging sources.</p>

	<p>2) A crisis information system architecture should be designed that supports U.S. civilian and military agencies, links closely with UN and NGO agencies, and ensures crisis-relevant information is readily and widely accessible. A database within this system should indicate agencies' responsibilities, mandates, and representatives.</p> <p>3) Enhance media access to information prior to and during an operation.</p>
Phases of a Humanitarian Crisis Response	<p>1) From the outset, mission planning and military and relief actions must reflect all key phases -- emergency intervention, rehabilitation, and redevelopment -- and ensure a smooth, sustainable transition from one phase to the next. This must include identification of long-term objectives (particularly those that may prevent recurrence of the crisis); early redevelopment of local capabilities and institutions, and transition planning which ensures effective liaison with humanitarian and development initiatives.</p> <p>2) Important considerations crossing these phases include disarmament, demobilization, and demining. Realistic disarmament and demobilization criteria are needed, along with an assessment of required resources. Demining, including training of the local population, will require adequate funding and resources</p>

## Operational and Tactical Phase of Emerald Express '95

Operational and tactical phase speakers included Lieutenant General Zinni, and Bill Lind from the Free Congress Foundation. Additional formal presentations included the multimedia presentation of recent I MEF operations and a demonstration of less lethal technologies. This phase centered on the efforts of 15 working groups.

- 1) Interagency Planning and Coordination
- 2) Mission Planning
- 3) Mission Operations
- 4) Humanitarian Operations
- 5) Coalition Operations
- 6) Military Tactics and Techniques
- 7) Force Preparation and Training
- 8) Mine Clearing, Disarming, Demobilization, and Training of Civilians
- 9) Logistics
- 10) Health Issues
- 11) Legal Aspects
- 12) Media
- 13) JTF Operations
- 14) Information Dissemination
- 15) Information Gathering and Sharing

Key results and recommendations from these working groups have been consolidated into the following six categories. Organizations, Phases and Transitions, Planning, Information Management, Coordination, and Preparedness. These are shown in the following table.

Table ES-2. Operational and Tactical Working Group Results and Recommendations

Category	Specific Results and Recommendations
Organizations	<p>1) Working groups identified essential characteristics of the Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) and proposed, policy-level organizations having coordination responsibilities: a Washington Coordination Group, an in-country Executive Steering Group, and an Interagency Assessment Team.</p> <p>2) To improve information collection and dissemination, several organizations and their functions were identified. The U.S. Interagency Information Coordination Committee and UN International Information Committee are parallel organizations that should be created to review potential crisis areas, identify and address shortfalls in information products, and ensure broad access to open-source information (including during pre- and post-emergency periods) using an Internet-based system. The Humanitarian Assistance Information Fusion Center would provide support through creation of collection, analysis, and production templates for all phases of an operation.</p> <p>3) Working groups identified and described a number of organizations designed to address specific functions: an Operational Planning Team, Joint "Targeting" Board, Security Coordination Committee, Mine Action Center, Health Committee, Joint Logistics Support Command, and Civil-Military Logistics Center.</p>
Phases and Transitions	<p>1) These operations will occur in multiple phases. While objectives, priorities, and participants may change from phase to phase, a common end state must be pursued. Participants discussed and described a model for characterizing the phases of an operation and requirements for a sustainable transition between phases. This model applied to all key categories -- security, infrastructure/logistics, public health, and agricultural/economic -- and to all organizations involved in the operation.</p> <p>2) Working groups offered several recommendations regarding entrance and exit strategies for the military. Supporting, not supplanting, existing coordination and relief structures was seen as critical to ensuring that efforts and accomplishments would be sustainable. Effective planning and coordination is needed to ensure that infrastructure access and logistics efforts are not disrupted during transitions. Other important considerations were the development of an information strategy supporting entrance and exit, the use of MOEs to monitor progress toward transition, and the identification of continuing responsibilities.</p>
Planning	<p>1) Because mission planning is unlikely to begin with a well-defined mission statement, the military's traditional staff planning process must be preceded by mission orientation. A cyclic, dynamic, continuous process, orientation included five steps: 1) Problem Awareness, 2) Problem Description and Information Gathering, 3) Determining Potential Contributions to the Response, 4) Conducting Internal Assessment/Review of the Problem, and 5) Notifying Higher Headquarters of Problem Appraisal and Receiving Feedback.</p>

	<p>2) To support mission planning, early assessments and policy formulation are needed to translate national interests into a mission and desired end state. This will be used to determine military and humanitarian tasks, a list of required capabilities, and an identification of forces.</p> <p>3) Planning must be coordinated, addressing the different aspects (political, diplomatic, military, and relief) of the operation, different organizations (national and international), and different levels (policy, operational, and tactical).</p> <p>4) A number of key planning considerations were identified. These included measures of effectiveness, intended neutrality posture, and important functional areas (logistics, infrastructure, health, and information)</p>
Information Management	<p>1) Develop an Internet-based, multi-media, information sharing system to enable sharing of unclassified, crisis-relevant information among policy makers, military commanders, international agencies, relief organizations, and the media</p> <p>2) Establish procedures for collecting and sharing information. Potential means include increasing liaison efforts and other direct means of coordination, developing humanitarian assistance information training programs and exercises, and leveraging the capabilities inherent in the CMOC-level partnership.</p> <p>3) Review and improve current information analysis and evaluation capabilities (identifying gaps and overlaps).</p> <p>4) Develop information management campaign plans that support effective information collection, analysis, and dissemination.</p>
Coordination	<p>1) Coordination efforts were emphasized by many working groups as an important area for improving future responses. Because the military is generally involved only in certain phases, it was recommended that the military support rather than supplant coordination structures, making it easier to transition to the next phase while sustaining actions and accomplishments.</p> <p>2) In humanitarian assistance and peace operations, the military term C2 has greater relevance as Coordination and Cooperation, than the traditional Command and Control. Participants offered a number of recommendations regarding appropriate functions for existing coordination organizations and proposed several new organizations with the aim of improving policy-level coordination.</p>
Preparedness	<p>1) Case studies, wargames and situational exercises should be used to improve education on political, military, and humanitarian aspects of these operations . Training opportunities and exercises including governmental, UN, relief and military organizations should test coordination mechanisms, information collection and exchange, national and theater level interagency processes, disaster management tools, and proposed organizations.</p>

2) To increase preparedness, the military should increase emphasis in several areas: military operations in built-up areas, crowd control methods, demining, and negotiating.

3) To prepare for future operations, there should be a database that includes a description of participating organizations, reports and lessons learned from past operations, regional information, and a registry of experienced personnel.

4) These operations may make some use of specialized equipment (such as less lethal technologies). Acquisition strategies must reflect this as well as the usage demands placed on dual-use equipment.

5) During the conduct of a humanitarian assistance or peace operation, some combat skills may be affected, and to limit this, in-theater training opportunities should be provided where possible.

# Contents

## Executive Summary

<b>Part I: Introduction</b>	1
Introduction	3
Emerald Express '95 Design and Purpose	3
Desired End Products	4
Organization of this Conference Report	5
 <b>Part II: Conference Overview</b>	 7
<b>Policy and Strategy Phase of Emerald Express '95</b>	9
Formal Presentations	9
Conference Introduction	9
Keynote Address	10
Opening Remarks and Introduction to Conference Events	12
Presentation of Recent I MEF Involvement in Operations	
Other than War	13
Field Demonstration of Capabilities and Issues	14
Luncheon Speakers	18
Policy and Strategy Phase Working Groups	18
Preparing Military Forces for Future Humanitarian Crises	20
Coordinated Mission Planning	20
Coordinating Military and Relief Actions with Political and Diplomatic Initiatives	20
Collecting and Sharing Crisis-Relevant Information	20
Urgent Delivery of Medical and Relief Supplies	21
Curbing Human Rights Abuses and Rebuilding Civil Institutions	21
National Interests and Decisions on Involvement	21
<b>Operational and Tactical Phase of Emerald Express '95</b>	22
Formal Presentations	22
Operational and Tactical Phase Introduction	22
Presentation of Recent I MEF Involvement in Operations	
Other than War	23
Luncheon Presentation	24

Operational and Tactical Phase Working Groups . . . . .	25
Interagency Planning and Coordination . . . . .	25
Mission Planning . . . . .	25
Mission Operations . . . . .	25
Humanitarian Operations . . . . .	25
Coalition Operations . . . . .	26
Military Tactics and Techniques . . . . .	26
Force Preparation and Training . . . . .	26
Mine Clearing, Disarming, Demobilization, and Training of Civilians . . . . .	26
Logistics . . . . .	27
Health Issues . . . . .	27
Legal Aspects . . . . .	27
Media . . . . .	27
JTF Operations . . . . .	28
Information Dissemination . . . . .	28
Information Gathering and Sharing . . . . .	28

## **Part III: Summary of Results and Recommendations** 29

### **Organizations** . . . . . 31

### **Mission Phases and Transitions.** . . . . 36

Phases of Humanitarian Assistance and Peace Operations . . . . .	36
Entrance and Exit Strategies . . . . .	38
Initial Introduction of Military Forces. . . . .	38
Transition and Exit Strategy . . . . .	39

### **Coordinated Mission Planning** . . . . . 40

Coordinated Planning . . . . .	40
The Planning Process for Humanitarian Assistance and Peace Operations . . . . .	41
Key Planning Considerations . . . . .	43

### **Information Management** . . . . . 44

Improving the Flow of Information Among Participants . . . . .	44
Establish New Information Systems . . . . .	45
Establish New Information-Related Organizations . . . . .	45
Establish New Procedures for Collecting and Sharing Information . . . . .	46
Develop Humanitarian Assistance Information Training Programs and Exercises. . . . .	46
Leverage Capabilities Inherent in the CMOC-Level Partnership . . . . .	46

Need to Improve Information Assessment Capability . . . . .	47
Conduct a Detailed Review of Current Information Assessment Capabilities . . . . .	47
Establish a New Organization to Facilitate More Effective Information Assessments . . . . .	47
Need to Improve Information Dissemination and Assessment . . . . .	48
Develop an Information Strategy Plan . . . . .	48
Focus on Developing More Effective Military Information Programs . . . . .	48
Embrace Media Participation in the Operation . . . . .	49
Develop and Implement Information Management Campaign Plan . . . . .	49
Recognize and Plan for Unique Information-Related Aspects of Humanitarian Assistance and Peace Operations . . . . .	49
<b>Coordination Requirements . . . . .</b>	<b>50</b>
Military Coordination with NGOs/PVOs . . . . .	50
Coordination with UN Agencies . . . . .	51
<b>Preparedness and Training . . . . .</b>	<b>52</b>
Improving Professional Military Education . . . . .	52
Areas for Improving Training . . . . .	53
Operations Other than War and Their Effects on Combat Preparedness . . . . .	53
Do Humanitarian Assistance Operations Require Specialized Equipment for the Military? . . . . .	54
How Can the Military Better Institutionalize and Preserve Expertise in Humanitarian Assistance Operations . . . . .	54

## Appendix A: Phase I Participants

## Appendix B: Phase II Participants



# **Part I:**

# **Introduction**



## **Introduction**

The end of the Cold War did not herald the immediate onset of a peaceful, stable New World Order. Instead, the past few years have seen numerous conflicts, many based on previously repressed ethnic or tribal hatreds. These conflicts, and crises resulting from social and environmental pressures, have caused dramatic human suffering. Events in these complex, humanitarian emergencies have been made very visible and immediate through the coverage of international news media.

Increased humanitarian assistance and peace operations demands have posed strong challenges to the international community. Responses have grown in number and scope, but reaching a satisfying conclusion has often proved elusive. This is due in part to the nature of these operations. A complex, humanitarian emergency may have significant political and military dimensions in addition to the humanitarian one. Addressing these problems may require the close coordination of relief and security efforts, and a connection between these direct efforts and ongoing political and diplomatic initiatives. Moreover, achieving a successful, and sustainable, conclusion may require addressing not only the immediate crisis environment but also some of the underlying conditions which gave rise to the crisis.

An effective response requires the carefully coordinated efforts of numerous political, diplomatic, military, and relief organizations. This coordination must begin during mission planning and be maintained throughout the operation, even as the operation's phase, participants, and priorities change. Achieving effective coordination is complicated by the fact that many of the participating organizations have different planning and execution timelines and may have different conceptions of the mission's nature, end state, objectives and priorities. The challenges inherent in coordinating and conducting these operations must be addressed because the pressures that have caused these problems remain strong and are likely to persist.

## **Emerald Express '95 Design and Purpose**

I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) has responsibilities as U.S. Central Command's prospective Joint Task Force (JTF) for humanitarian assistance and peace operations. In light of these responsibilities, I MEF annually conducts an Emerald Express exercise to maintain its proficiency and readiness for these operations. This year's Emerald Express includes several phases, with a one-week, two-phase conference preceding a JTF-oriented staff exercise. Emerald Express '95 was delayed as a result of I MEF's recent responsibilities as Commander, Combined Task Force UNITED SHIELD. This operation, which involved all U.S. military services as well as several coalition partners, supported the final withdrawal of United Nations forces from Somalia.

The Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, Toby Gati, and the Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force, Lieutenant General Anthony Zinni

sponsored the Emerald Express '95 Conference. This conference took place at Camp Pendleton, California the week of 9-14 April. The intent for this conference was to bring together senior participants from the key organizations involved in humanitarian assistance and peace operations to address a broad range of issues that arise in these operations, focusing on the improvement of civil-military coordination during mission planning and execution. The conference had two separate phases. The first phase, 9-11 April, focused on policy and strategy level issues, and the second, 11-14 April, addressed issues at the operational and tactical levels. Each phase of the conference is described in greater detail below

The next phase of Emerald Express, an exercise scheduled for 22-25 May, will focus on specific applications for JTF operations. This exercise offers an opportunity to test and evaluate certain conference results and recommendations in a scenario-based environment. The Emerald Express exercise will focus on Joint Task Force operations and the best means for a JTF to implement these recommendations.

## **Desired End Products**

Throughout the development of Emerald Express, there was an emphasis on ensuring that the conference and exercise would have continuing impact by supporting the development of meaningful end products. During the conference itself, this took the form of providing a series of questions and issues for working groups to address, with a structure designed to lead to the production of concrete results and recommendations.

Emerald Express '95 will support a number of longer-term efforts. This conference report is the first of a number of documents that will be developed. This report provides a description of the conference and its key findings. Following the May staff exercise, there will be a final Emerald Express report. The final report will provide a more comprehensive review of the conference and exercise. Follow-on articles will address a number of key issues raised during Emerald Express.

Certain results from the conference and exercise will support the development of a Commanders Handbook for Humanitarian Assistance and Peace Operations. This Commanders Handbook will be developed by members of the I MEF staff and will address commanders at several levels, together with their associated issues and considerations. Through Emerald Express and the development of this handbook, I MEF will review its approach to these operations and directly apply those recommendations that offer potential for improving future responses.

Emerald Express will also provide important inputs into ongoing studies and doctrine development efforts. This includes the Humanitarian Assistance Operations Study (which I MEF and the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) are co-sponsoring) being conducted by the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA). Emerald Express inputs will also be available to support the ongoing efforts of MCCDC and other military doctrine development organizations.

## Organization of this Conference Report

This report provides an overview of Emerald Express and an initial description of the results and recommendations that emerged from conference working groups. A final Emerald Express report, addressing both the conference and exercise in detail, will be published following the conclusion of the Emerald Express '95 exercise. The final report will examine results and recommendations in light of recent and ongoing studies, develop themes cutting across working groups, and address recommendations from the conference that are tested in the exercise.

The next part of this report provides a **Conference Overview**. It includes two sections, describing the events of the:

- 1) Policy and Strategy Phase of Emerald Express '95
- 2) Operational and Tactical Phase of Emerald Express '95

The last part of the report provides a **Summary of Results and Recommendations**. These results and recommendations are derived from the conference's formal presentations and from the deliberations of seven policy/strategy working groups and fifteen operational/tactical working groups (identified and discussed in the Conference Overview). This part of the report includes the following six sections:

- 1) Organizations
- 2) Mission Phases and Transitions
- 3) Coordinated Mission Planning
- 4) Information Management
- 5) Coordination Requirements
- 6) Preparedness and Training

Appendix A lists Phase I participants and their addresses and phone numbers. Appendix B provides this same information for Phase II participants.

