

current training. The demonstration highlighted important military capabilities that apply in humanitarian assistance and peace operations and discussed how these capabilities fit in the overall mission context. It also provided opportunities to show operational implications of different policies (or different policy interpretations) and how events on the ground can quickly influence the policy level.

The demonstration was developed and conducted by personnel and units from I Marine Expeditionary Force and its major subordinate commands (1st Marine Division, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, and 1st Force Service Support Group), Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, International Medical Corps (IMC), International Rescue Committee (IRC), Army personnel from the 8th Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Battalion, and Navy personnel from Naval Mobile Construction Battalion One (NMCB 1) and a Patrol Wings Squadron.

Key military capabilities and issues included command and control, force organization, communications, security operations, logistics support, infrastructure improvement, information management and dissemination, and support for direct relief activities. Relief capabilities and issues were demonstrated at medical and food distribution centers and at the civil-military operations center (CMOC).

Command and control, force organization, and communications issues were discussed for a coalition response to a humanitarian crisis. This included discussion of command relationships, coalition interactions, and coordination requirements. The military's combat operations center (COC) demonstrated approaches to these issues.

Security support for the overall response was demonstrated in ground and aerial convoy escort, checkpoint operations, and facility security. Related demonstrations included mine clearing and mine awareness efforts, interactions with relief organizations, tactical information dissemination (PSYOP), and discussions of security policy development. Key issues included security requirements and the relation to rules of engagement, appropriate neutrality posture, graduated response, and the application of military capabilities. There was also a demonstration of less lethal technologies and their potential application in humanitarian assistance and peace operations.

A number of important logistics and infrastructure related capabilities were shown. These included remote refueling operations; water purification, storage, and distribution; helicopter and fixed-wing airlift capabilities; and bridging operations. Important, associated issues included the development of alternate logistics channels, being self-sustaining, and the need for early transition planning to sustain logistics and infrastructure capabilities after military forces depart.

Relief activities were shown at a field medical treatment facility and food distribution center. These events showed direct relief efforts as well as interactions between relief organizations and military forces. The central issue was how to ensure effective coordination of military and relief efforts and the sharing of crisis-relevant information. The issue was addressed at the relief sites and at the CMOC.

Picture 5. Representative of the International Medical Corps (IMC) demonstrating medical issues



Picture 6. Conference participants discussing issues at a field site



## **Luncheon Speakers**

On Monday, 10 April, and Tuesday, 11 April, there were two formal luncheon presentations. The first was given by Phyllis Oakley, the Assistant Secretary of State for Population, Refugees, and Migration, and the second was given by Andrei Kolosozsky, Russia's Ambassador to the United Nations (Geneva).

Assistant Secretary Oakley discussed current U.S. policy initiatives, specifically PRD-50, and corresponding efforts by Western European governments. While seeing the importance of making linkages between humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, and peace making, she believed it was also important to maintain distinctions. In reviewing current policies and looking to the future, Assistant Secretary Oakley felt we should address whether in becoming more proficient in applying immediate-term humanitarian Band-Aids, we might be leaving larger, longer-term wounds untended.

Ambassador Kolosozsky raised several issues during his presentation concerning political aspects of these operations. He began by addressing potential involvement. In examining a crisis, there may be valid reasons for the appropriate response to be "Love to, but can't." In addressing the UN, he stated that it is important to keep in mind that what occurs there is politics, not diplomacy. International sensitivities can be accommodated, but must first be recognized. Regarding the development of a mandate for an operation, he pointed to the friction between the political advantages of an ambiguous mandate and the military's desire for clarity.

## **Policy and Strategy Phase Working Groups**

Seven working groups provided a forum for raising key policy and strategy issues and developing recommendations. This section provides a brief description of the initial outline for each of these groups. The results and recommendations emerging from these groups are described in this report's later sections: Organizational Recommendations, Phases and Transitions, Coordinated Mission Planning, Information Management, Coordination Requirements, and Preparedness and Training. The policy and strategy working groups addressed the following areas:

- 1) Preparing Military Forces for Future Humanitarian Crises
- 2) Coordinated Mission Planning
- 3) Coordinating Military and Relief Actions with Political and Diplomatic Initiatives
- 4) Collecting and Sharing Crisis-Relevant Information
- 5) Urgent Delivery of Medical and Relief Supplies
- 6) Curbing Human Rights Abuses and Rebuilding Civil Institutions
- 7) National Interests and Decisions on Involvement.