

Preparing Military Forces for Future Humanitarian Crises

This group was asked to address the means and potential costs associated with improving military force preparedness for future humanitarian crises. While it would focus on U.S. force preparation, the group was also asked to address the potential roles and preparedness of UN and international forces. In addressing this, participants were to discuss various means of improving preparedness, through different organization, equipping, education, and training of forces. The group was also to consider the fiscal and opportunity costs associated with pursuing these options.

Coordinated Mission Planning

The intent was for this group to examine coordinated mission planning in formulating a crisis response. This planning must reflect the various U.S. and international organizations -- political, diplomatic, relief, and military -- involved in the response. Ensuring unity of effort requires effective coordination which must begin during mission planning. This planning effort is complicated, however, by organizations' different planning and execution timelines. Relief organizations may be operating before there is a decision, or even the need, to use military forces as part of the mission. Nevertheless, it is essential that the interests of all organizations be considered during mission planning to ensure a common, agreed-upon definition of the mission, its priorities, objectives, and end state. The need for effective, coordinated planning is particularly important when military forces are first introduced into the crisis area, when they transition, and when they redeploy.

Coordinating Military and Relief Actions with Political and Diplomatic Initiatives

This group was asked to address security for relief efforts and the coordination of military and relief actions with initiatives to increase stability and encourage political dialogue. As part of this, the group also discussed disarmament policies. Military forces must provide a secure environment within which the overall mission objectives can be achieved. As part of the security effort, disarmament may or may not be advisable or even viable based on local circumstances. During the mission, military and relief actions must remain consistent with political objectives and diplomatic initiatives, and must support progress toward the desired end state.

Collecting and Sharing Crisis-Relevant Information

The focus area for this group was the collection and sharing of crisis-relevant information among all key institutions, including discussion on the role of the media. Appropriate types of information may provide accurate indicators of a developing crisis, and the media's presentation of this information may shape the nature of the response. Once a response has begun, the collection and analysis of key information become vitally important in determining priorities, tracking the success of the response, and measuring progress toward mission objectives. The sharing of essential information is important to ensure that mission priorities are addressed in a timely fashion and that all organizations are aware of significant changes in the situation.

Urgent Delivery of Medical and Relief Supplies

This group's central purpose was to examine the coordination that must take place between military and civilian agencies to support the urgent delivery of medical and emergency relief supplies, ensuring the timely delivery of the right supplies to the right people. A rapid response to a developing crisis requires close and effective coordination. Military and relief organizations must coordinate the arrival of people and supplies by available logistics routes, make provisions for the transportation of supplies, maintain or expand the logistics throughput capacity, and address potential security requirements. Accurate information will be needed to do a proper assessment, develop the appropriate response, and target the populations at greatest risk.

Curbing Human Rights Abuses and Rebuilding Civil Institutions

The purpose for this group was to address efforts that military and civilian agencies might undertake to curb human rights abuses and rebuild the foundation for a bona fide police force and legal institutions. After dealing with the initial, crisis phase of a complex humanitarian emergency, the challenge of addressing the longer-term rehabilitation remains. This period will continue to require a coordinated response. Having addressed the most urgent humanitarian needs, key objectives during this phase include addressing some of the underlying legal, security, and institutional changes needed to prevent an immediate relapse into the former emergency conditions. Meeting the needs of the rehabilitation phase is likely to be complicated, however, by increasing political pressures. Pressure may result from nations that provided the initial response, which may wish to conclude their involvement, or from the host nation, which must reaffirm its sovereignty.

National Interests and Decisions on Involvement

This working group formed during the conference, and was also termed the "cynics group." Its stated purpose was to address potential national involvement in humanitarian assistance and peace operations from a very pragmatic, realpolitik perspective. This group addressed the subject by considering national interests and evaluating what conditions must exist before national interests are at stake and the use of U.S. forces justified. This group also discussed the translation of national interests to a mission end state to civil and military tasks to required capabilities to appropriate forces.

Operational and Tactical Phase of Emerald Express '95

This phase of the Emerald Express '95 conference was intended to build on the first phase, applying policy-oriented results at the operational and tactical levels and developing additional results and recommendations focused on specific ways to improve responses to future crises. Remaining policy/strategy phase participants were joined by additional participants having specific operational and issue area expertise. The operational/tactical phase included senior participants from key political, diplomatic, military, and relief organizations involved in humanitarian assistance and peace operations.

As in the policy/strategy phase, there was interest in applying the lessons learned in recent operations to improve civil-military coordination. This phase included several formal presentations, but most of the time was invested in a series of issue working groups which focused on the development of meaningful results and recommendations that participants could use to improve their future operations.

This section of the report describes the events of the operational/tactical phase; results and recommendations are presented in the next part of this report.

Formal Presentations

The operational and tactical phase began with introductory remarks by Lieutenant General Anthony C. Zinni. The luncheon speaker on Thursday, April 13 was Bill Lind from the Free Congress Foundation. Additional formal presentations included the multimedia presentation of I MEF's recent involvement in operations other than war and a demonstration of less lethal technologies.

Operational and Tactical Phase Introduction

Lieutenant General Zinni opened this phase of the Emerald Express. He began by outlining a series of objectives. These centered on working group efforts and the desire to focus on producing concrete results that organizations would be able to apply in future operations. He reviewed a number of important lessons learned in previous operations and the need to test and validate these lessons and to develop new recommendations based on valid lessons.

Lieutenant General Zinni then reviewed the earlier policy/strategy phase of the conference. In this he described the key events and the results and recommendations that had been developed. An objective for this phase was to make use of this, refining results and recommendations as appropriate and identifying ways to translate this into something that could be directly applied at the operational and tactical levels.

He then previewed the events to take place, emphasizing the importance placed on the extensive working group sessions. Lieutenant General Zinni concluded this introduction by announcing the operational and tactical phase groups and their leaders. This information is shown in the following table.

Table 3. Operational and Tactical Phase Working Groups and Their Leaders

	Working Group	Working Group Leader
1	Interagency Planning and Coordination	Liz Lukasavich, Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
2	Mission Planning	Major General Paul Van Riper, Headquarters Marine Corps
3	Mission Operations	Colonel John Moffett, Chief of Staff, I MEF
4	Humanitarian Operations	Roy Williams, International Rescue Committee Captain Ed Kelly, Naval Amphibious Base, Coronado
5	Coalition Operations	Colonel John Latimer, U.S. Central Command
6	Military Tactics and Techniques	Colonel Greg Newbold, Headquarters Marine Corps
7	Force Preparation and Training	Colonel Gary Anderson, Marine Corps Combat Development Command
8	Mine Clearing, Disarming, Demobilization, and Training of Civilians	Colonel Pete Dotto, U.S. Southern Command
9	Logistics	Harlan Hale, CARE Colonel Joseph Corcoran, Joint Staff
10	Health Issues	Dr. Claude de Ville de Goyet, Pan American Health Organization
11	Legal Aspects	Colonel Rick Lorenz, Staff Judge Advocate, I MEF
12	Media	Colonel Fred Peck, Headquarters Marine Corps
13	JTF Operations	Colonel Bucky Peterson, G-3, I MEF Lieutenant Colonel Mike Lehnert, Joint Warfighting Center
14	Information Dissemination	Lieutenant Colonel Chris St John, 8th Psychological Operations Battalion
15	Information Gathering and Sharing	Ted Constantine, Defense Intelligence Agency

Presentation of Recent I MEF Involvement in Operations Other Than War

The multimedia presentation of recent I MEF involvement in operations other than war again served as a lead-in to working group sessions. The presentation was the same as in the earlier phase, and the previous section of this report describes it in detail.

Luncheon Presentation

On Thursday, 13 April, Bill Lind, from the Free Congress Foundation, gave a luncheon presentation. He expressed a rather pessimistic world view, within which humanitarian assistance and peace operations were seen as largely inconsistent with our national interests. He addressed this in the historical context of tactical, technical, and operational excellence being unable to overcome strategic mistakes, and he identified three such mistakes that he sees with most current thinking: Wilsonianism, internationalism, and the belief that the nation-state system is and will remain dominant.

He took issue with each of these, seeing Wilsonianism as having been largely ineffective even when the West's relative position was stronger, and Wilsonianism no longer holding currency after three great Western "Civil Wars," the loss of conviction on the part of the West's elites, and the rise of cultures in conflict. He also identified trends that are adverse to the nation-state and to a model of internationalism based on interactions among nation-states. In outlining his position, Mr. Lind described increasing establishment vs. anti-establishment tensions, growing international relationships outside of governmental channels, the rising influence of non-bureaucratic states, and having to address non-State actors capable of waging war

Picture 9. Bill Lind, Free Congress Foundation



Operational and Tactical Phase Working Groups

This phase had fifteen working groups addressing issues and developing results and recommendations aimed at the operational and tactical levels. This section provides a brief description of the initial outline for each of these groups.

Interagency Planning and Coordination

Developing the nature and objectives of a humanitarian assistance or peace operation must include the perspectives of all organizations involved in the response to achieve unity of effort. The mission objectives must then be communicated effectively to the forces and agencies conducting the operation to ensure that military and relief actions are in concert with political and diplomatic objectives. This working group's focus was to address how interagency planning and coordination can support this by ensuring a clear delineation of authority and accountability. The group also addressed requirements for communicating with external organizations to keep them informed of policy decisions, aware of policy interpretations, and focused on the mission's end state.

Mission Planning

A common understanding of the overall mission from inception to conclusion is vital to an effective, coordinated response. This must include a clear statement of the mission's phases, objectives, priorities, and end state which all the participants can accept. This provides a basis for ensuring military and relief actions remain consistent with the desired end state. This working group's purpose was to address means for ensuring effective, coordinated mission planning. This group was also asked to address measures of effectiveness and other means of tracking progress toward the next phase and the end state.

Mission Operations

The military must provide a secure environment in which the overall mission can be conducted. This group was asked to address security measures which are appropriate to a humanitarian assistance or peace operation, including a discussion of policies governing the use of less lethal technologies. Force neutrality and interactions with the host nation will be major considerations. This group was to emphasize what must be done during operations to ensure that results and accomplishments from a given phase are sustainable upon reaching transition and end state.

Humanitarian Operations

This working group's focus was direct coordination during the conduct of the operation. The appropriate division of responsibilities between the Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC), the Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC), and proposed Washington/New York/Geneva analogues

is an important area for consideration. The group was also asked to offer recommendations regarding the appropriate structure and authority of these organizations.

Coalition Operations

Responses to complex humanitarian emergencies will generally be international. Effective procedures for forming and organizing a coalition force are needed to ensure unity of effort during the mission. This working group's purpose was to address the primary factors governing coalition formation and to offer recommendations regarding the best way to balance political and military concerns to ensure a cohesive, capable force. As part of this effort, the group would discuss the roles which must be filled in a humanitarian assistance or peace operation and the best use of coalition forces in these roles. Coalition command relationships, coordination, and training requirements will also be addressed.

Military Tactics and Techniques

Humanitarian assistance and peace operations benefit from many traditional military capabilities. Because these operations are noncombative by their nature, however, they represent a significant departure from traditional military interventions and past force preparation efforts. The intent for this working group was to address military tactics and techniques appropriate to these operation. Included in this would be recommendations regarding mission assessments, threat assessment, and the organization, training, and equipping of forces at the operational and tactical levels.

Force Preparation and Training

Preparing forces for humanitarian assistance and peace operations differs in several ways from traditional operations. This working group was asked to address specific requirements for units and individuals. Forces must be prepared to operate in a coalition environment, interact with relief organizations and other civilian agencies, and adapt to the specific challenges of humanitarian assistance and peace operations. The group was also to discuss the competing force preparation requirements of other missions.

Mine Clearing, Disarming, Demobilization, and Training of Civilians

The detection and clearing of mines is essential to the protection of all participants conducting humanitarian assistance and peace operations. Disarming and demobilization of local civilian organizations may aid in force protection however, these actions could widen the military involvement in host nation affairs. This may include a requirement to assume some local police functions. Weapons control policies and the decision to train local civilian forces to accept police responsibility is influenced by US policy and host nation sovereignty issues. The training of a civilian police force is also not a traditional task of the U.S. military and one in which expertise is undeveloped. The detection and clearing of mines is also a long term problem which impacts on all participants.

Logistics

Logistics support for humanitarian assistance and peace operations differs from traditional military operations in requirements, basing concepts, distribution techniques and funding sources. This working group's central purpose was to address these issues as well as required logistics coordination between military and relief organizations. Procedures must be established to coordinate the transportation of supplies and people by available logistics routes, provide for the maintenance or expansion of logistics throughput capacity, and satisfy military and civilian contracting requirements. The group was also to discuss how their crisis response actions might affect longer-term rehabilitation and development, and what information is needed for proper logistics and development assessments.

Health Issues

A key to successful humanitarian operations is the mitigation of suffering and the saving of lives. Rapid accomplishment of this goal requires early health assessments and the initiation of a program to improve health conditions. This working group was asked to address the assessment process and discuss objective measures of effectiveness which are critical in guiding the overall effort. Military medical assets can support medical and health efforts, but their capabilities and limitations must be understood by mission planners. Standardized protocols and joint training are also essential to a unified medical effort.

Legal Aspects

The legitimacy and credibility of humanitarian assistance and peace operations must be established by UN resolution, host nation request, or other legal bases. This is necessary to develop the legal status of forces, a key factor in force accountability and protection. This working group's focus was on addressing a series of issues regarding the legal status and responsibilities of forces and organizations conducting the operation. The force commander has significant legal responsibilities toward the civilian population, and these responsibilities may impact on or conflict with host nation sovereignty. Rules of engagement (ROE) must strike the correct balance between force restraint, force security, and mission accomplishment.

Media

The media can affect national and international support of the mission, mission priorities, rules of engagement, and any evaluation of the mission's success. In discussing the role and impact of the media, this working group was asked to offer recommendations regarding the best means of incorporating the media during mission planning and execution to provide an accurate view of events. A key element is identifying the appropriate balance between media information requirements and mission security.

JTF Operations

This working group's focus was the requirements faced by a Joint Task Force (JTF) during humanitarian assistance and peace operations and their implications for force structure. One element of this concerns the significant coordination requirements between the JTF and components, coalition forces, and numerous civilian agencies. The JTF must accomplish this coordination with effective means of communications and appropriate liaison elements. It must also operate in an environment in which military actions support a larger mission and where its actions may address certain aspects of the end state only indirectly. This group was asked to recommend policies, procedures, and techniques for ensuring that the JTF has an effective force that is fully integrated into the overall mission.

Information Dissemination

Communicating the nature of the operation and its objectives to the local population is a key element in mission accomplishment. The military possesses psychological operations (PSYOP) assets which can be used to broadcast and distribute important information, enhance perceptions of the mission, and counter information that may be negative or even threatening to the various organizations conducting the mission. Host nation sensitivities must play a major part in the information dissemination effort. This working group's role was to address the important role that information dissemination plays in humanitarian and peace operations and to recommend means for effectively coordinating the information dissemination requirements of all organizations while ensuring the message that is disseminated is consistent with media reporting.

Information Gathering and Sharing

Integrating the intelligence efforts of all civilian and military agencies is essential for producing the full, accurate perspective required for force protection and mission accomplishment. Information requirements go well beyond security aspects. Cultural, economic, health, and infrastructure information becomes much more important in humanitarian assistance and peace operations. Traditional means of collecting and analyzing information may not lead to an adequate representation of key factors, necessitating new means of analysis. Making use of all available information sources will be key to the collection effort, and host nation coordination will be required. This working group's purpose was to address these issues and develop policies and procedures for collecting and sharing the critical information which supports the overall mission.