Part III:
Summary of Results and Recommendations

Organizations

Many of the working groups, in both the policy/strategy and operational/tactical phases of the conference, offered recommendations concerning the organizations that address humanitarian assistance and peace operations. Their efforts took the form of examining existing organizations to identify perceived shortfalls, proposing new organizations to meet these shortfalls, and describing the key characteristics of current and proposed organizations They identified certain organizations and functional assignments that they thought should be institutionalized and others that should be modified. They also identified several new organizations and proposed the membership and responsibilities for these organizations. This section discusses organizational issues and presents an overview of the working groups' proposals. This is a consolidation of working group outputs to address the overlap among proposals.

Tables 4-6 show the consolidated lists of recommendations regarding organizations and their functions For each current or proposed organization, the tables indicate the organization's level, representation, functions, location, the phases during which it operates, and other key organizations with which it interacts.

In examining current approaches to planning and executing humanitarian assistance and peace operations, many participants identified coordination as an area that should be improved for future responses. Appropriate coordination structures must be in place to address interactions between different levels (policy, operational, and tactical), parallel efforts in different communities (political, diplomatic, military, and relief), and different functional areas (health, logistics, security, and so forth). Ensuring representation of the relief community was considered essential, but this also posed the question of who would provide this representation in these coordination-related organizations.

Table 4 shows four organizations having significant coordination responsibilities. The civil-military operations center (CMOC) is a familiar one and was the subject of significant discussion. There were differences in opinion regarding the roles that the CMOC has fulfilled in past operations and what roles it should assume in the future. There was agreement that the CMOC should be not only a very important coordination organization but also as a site for crisis-relevant information exchange. The discussions of the CMOC centered on the appropriate functions which it should address and on other organizations with which the CMOC would interact There was some concern about the number and type of functions being assigned to the CMOC. There were two principal concerns: first, the CMOC might become overloaded, and second, some of the functions assigned to it in the past were policy-oriented in nature.

The groups identified a number of key functions for the CMOC to address, as shown in the table A study was recommended to balance desires to add functions with an assessment of CMOC's ability to support them A point of emphasis regarding the CMOC's operations and functions was that during an operation, the establishment of the CMOC should support not supplant existing coordination structures. While there were recommendations for the development of CMOC standard operating procedures, variations from operation to operation would require significant flexibility, making SOP development more difficult

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Table 4. Recommended Coordination Organizations and Their Key Characteristics

Organization	Level	Representation	Function	Location	Phase	Interaction
Washington Coordination Group (WCG)	• Policy	• DOD, NSC, NGO/PVO, USAID, DOS, USLNOs, Others	• HQ-level coordination	• Executive Steering Group; Participating organizations' headquarters	• Immediately - during US military planning and execution	• HQ organizations • ESG
Executive Steering Group (ESG)	• Policy	• Senior military commander, C/JTF, SRSG, UN Resident Coordinator, USAID, IOs, US Ambassador or special envoy, Host Nation govt rep, Coalition reps, NGO consortium, Others • Chaired by SRSG, US ambassador, UN coord	• Policy-level coordination in country • Reconciles roles of orgs • Determines priorities - log access & roles • Address Pol/Mil/Hum issues in theater • Identify issues to be resolved out of theater	• In- country	• During military involvement • Possibly remains during rehabilitation and develop	• WCG • C/JTF • UN agencies in country • HNG • Coalition embassies in country
Interagency Assessment Team	• Policy	• Lead - NSC/DoS • Core members DOS, USAID/OFDA, OSD/JCS • Augmentation: interagency and international (CIA, DIA, DOJ, UN, NGO/PVO, regional org • Remain flexible	• Early assessment • Help shape USG response	• From DC	• Early planning	• USG • UN • CINC
Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC)	• Operational	• C/JTF, NGO/PVO, IO, preventive medicine physician, operations, intelligence, legal, civil affairs, host nation, UN agencies	• Day-to-day execution/coordination of support requests • Don't supplant other coordination groups • Integrate with existing coordination system • C/JTF may place logistics function with CMOC if there is no CMLC • Information exchange • JTB-like prioritization of targets (hum & nonhum) by ESG or CMOC	• Field sites, C/JTF level, local subunit level	• During C/JTF operations	• JTF J3 • NGO/PVO • IO • CMLC (if one exists) • Public affairs • ESG

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Field-level coordination was seen as good and getting better, while there was still much room for improvement at the policy level. To address policy-oriented issues, two organizations, and their proposed responsibilities, were identified. These groups were intended to provide a policy-level analogue to the CMOC. The Washington Coordination Group would provide headquarters-level coordination, supporting coordinated policy development and providing policy interpretations to support the implementation of policy at the operational level. An Executive Steering Group would provide policy coordination in-country. Its key functions would be to establish priorities and to reconcile different organizations' roles.

One working group developed a coordination matrix having three dimensions. The three dimensions were organizations (NGO/PVO, military, UN agencies, etc.), functions (humanitarian, security, logistics, etc.), and geographic responsibilities (theater, regional, local, etc.). This was an effort to describe responsibilities and coordination between levels, functions, and locations.

Another important area where coordination could be improved is assessments. While a single, integrated assessment was viewed as infeasible for a number of reasons, there was general agreement that coordinated assessments and sharing the results of assessments was important. The Interagency Assessment Team described in Table 4 would support this. It would help shape the U.S. government response and provide essential information for early mission planning.

The information-oriented working groups identified several organizations that would promote better information collection, management, and dissemination. Two of these were policy-oriented, and the other addressed policy and operational level functions. These three organizations are shown in Table 5. The proposed U.S. Interagency Information Coordination Committee (IICC) and UN International Information Committee are parallel organizations designed to review at-risk areas, identify and address shortfalls in information products, and ensure broad access to open-source information using an Internet-based system. The Humanitarian Assistance Information Fusion Center would fall under the IICC and provide policy- and operation-level support through creation of collection, analysis, and production templates for all phases of an operation.

The organizations shown in Table 6 address specific functions. The Operational Planning Team conducts Combined Task Force or Joint Task Force (C/JTF) mission planning with representation as broad as possible. An analogue to the Joint Targeting Board could make use of existing processes to identify and evaluate both humanitarian and non-humanitarian targets. The purpose of the Security Coordination Committee is to ensure in-country understanding of C/JTF security policies and expectations.

The Mine Action Center was proposed because the mine threat and mine operations are often difficult challenges to be addressed in humanitarian assistance and peace operations. The Health Committee would be led by the UN Health Coordinator. Its principal functions would be to set overall health policy and identify priorities for resource allocation. The final two proposed organizations addressed logistics support operations. The first, Joint Logistics Support Command, would have theater logistics responsibilities. The second, Civil-Military Logistics Center, would coordinate and prioritize logistics requirements.

Table 5. Information-Related Organizations and Their Characteristics

Organization	Level	Representation	Function	Location	Phase	Interaction
US Interagency Information Coordination Committee	• Policy	• Lead - DOS at A/S level • EA - DIA • USAID, DOD/OSD/JCS • FEMA, Commerce/ NOAA, Interior/USGS, DMA, DCI, USIA, Us-based NGO rep	• Establish Internet-based open information exchange network • Review at risk countries/areas • Review information products and identify capabilities and shortfalls • Establish Info Fusion Ctr	• DC-based	• Standing organization	• WCG • UN International Information Committee • USG
UN International Information Committee	• Policy	• Lead - UN/DHA • DOS, Other govts, NGO groups (InterAction, ICVA, etc.)	• Parallel organization to previous	• UN-based	• Standing organization	• IICC • UN • IO • NGO/PVO • Governments
HA Information Fusion Center	• Policy/Operational	• Same representation as those for US Interagency Information Coordination Committee (IICC), but at a more operational level	• Create collection, analysis, production templates for mission phases • Analyze and fuse open-source information • Disseminate products over Internet • Integrate classified and open source - disseminate to appropriate US consumers • Produce contingency support type products - emphasize cultural intel and unclassified format • Make all products available via electronic means	• DC-based	• Standing organization	• IICC

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Table 6. Functional Organizations and Their Characteristics

Organization	Level	Representation	Function	Location	Phase	Interaction
Operational Planning Team (OPT)	• Operational	• CINC, UN rep, PSYOP, NGOs/PVOs, other service, coalition, and non-military personnel	• C/JTF mission planning	• C/JTF	• C/JTF mission planning	• C/JTF • Components • CINC
Joint Targeting Board for Humanitarian Assistance and Peace Operations	• Operational/Tactical	• C/JTF	• Identify and evaluate humanitarian and non-humanitarian "targets" • Support ESG/CMOC in development of prioritized "target" list	• C/JTF	• During C/JTF operations	• C/JTF • ESG/CMOC • Components
Security Coordination Committee (SCC)	• Operational/Tactical	• C/JTF • Coalition • HNG • Armed factions	• Clearly indicate C/JTF security policies/intent • Indicate C/JTF expectations	• In country	• During military involvement	• C/JTF • Coalition • AMEMB • NGO/PVO • IOs
Mine Action Center (MAC)	• Operational/Tactical	• Not defined	• Intelligence • Location/marking • Information dissemination • Mine awareness programs • Training teams • Operations	• C/JTF	• C/JTF involvement plus?	• NGO/PVOs • IOs • C/JTF • HNG • Security Coordination Committee
Health Committee	• Operational/Tactical	• Lead - UN Health Coordinator • NGO/PVOs • All agencies active in the health sector	• Set overall policy in health field • Formulate proposed priorities for allocation of task force resources	• In country	• All phases	• UN • C/JTF • NGO/PVOs • IOs
Joint Logistics Support Command (JLSC)	• Operational	• C/JTF • stovepipe agency rep (DMA, DLA) • Components/coalition forces • Civil (HNG/adjacent)?	• Functional component of C/JTF • Responsible for theater-level logistics support	• In-country	• Military execution • C/JTF dependent	• C/JTF J4 • CMLC • HNG/adjacent?
Civil Military Logistics Center (CMLC)	• Operational	• CMOC rep • JLSC • J4	• Coordination of civil-military log requirements • Prioritization of rqmts	• In-country	• JLSC-dependent	• JLSC • CMOC

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Mission Phases and Transitions

From the outset, mission planning and operations must reflect the various phases of these operations. Planning and coordination efforts must account for the fact that organizations involved in the response will vary from phase to phase and that objectives and priorities will also vary. Relief organizations may be operating in a humanitarian crisis before there is a decision, or even the need, to involve military forces. Other relief efforts, such as longer-term development projects, may continue well beyond the involvement of other organizations. The principal phases of a response were identified by participants as emergency intervention, rehabilitation, and redevelopment These phases may have different objectives and priorities, and it is important that these be connected and supportive of the end state

Transitioning smoothly from one phase to the next is a key challenge that must be addressed. It is important that the actions and accomplishments of each phase support the overall objectives of the operation. Further, to avoid gaps between requirements and capabilities and to prevent a relapse to prior emergency conditions, efforts must be sustained from one phase to the next. This requires early transition planning and close coordination with follow-on organizations. This section discusses the phases of humanitarian assistance and peace operations as well as entrance and exit strategies to support smooth, effective transitions.

## Phases of Humanitarian Assistance And Peace Operations

During Emerald Express, participants discussed and described a model for characterizing the phases of an operation and requirements for a sustainable transition. Figures 1 and 2 provide a graphical representation. Complex, humanitarian emergencies are characterized by significant gaps between requirements and indigenous capabilities, these gaps falling in one or more of the following categories:

  1) Security
  2) Infrastructure/Logistics
  3) Public Health
  4) Agricultural/Economic

The figures show external organizations responding during the emergency intervention phase, providing sufficient augmentation to indigenous capabilities to reduce, and then eliminate, the gaps. After this initial response and the closure of these gaps, the operation continues and begins to move toward the rehabilitation phase. Having addressed the emergency intervention, some organizations will have completed their part of the response and must begin the transition to follow-on organizations involved in longer-term rehabilitation and redevelopment efforts. As efforts continue, indigenous capabilities must be expanded to eventually meet requirements. This will complete the operation and allow other external organizations to depart.

Figure 1. Mission phases: Emergency Intervention, Rehabilitation, Redevelopment -- No gaps
during transition periods

NOTES:
- CATEGORIES – SECURITY, INFRASTRUCTURE / LOG, PUBLIC HEALTH,
AGRICULTURAL / ECONOMIC
- A COMPLEX HUMANITARIAN EMERGENCY IS EVIDENCED BY GAPS FOR
THESE CATEGORIES
- FOR ACCOMPLISHMENTS TO BE SUSTAINABLE, INDIGENOUS AND
EXTERNALLY PROVIDED CAPABILITIES MUST CONTINUE TO MEET
REQUIREMENTS

Figure 2. Mission phases -- Gaps between requirements and capabilities redevelop during
transition periods

NOTE:
- THE WHITE AREAS IN THE FIGURE INDICATE A GAP BETWEEN REQUIREMENTS
AND (INDIGENOUS & EXTERNALLY PROVIDED) CAPABILITIES.

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There are several important transitions shown in the figures. The initial introduction of external organizations during the emergency intervention is one; the transfer of responsibilities to follow-on organizations early in the rehabilitation phase and the transfer to strengthened indigenous organizations in the redevelopment phase are the others

As a concrete example, consider the area of security. Security problems beyond what local forces are able to address constitute a gap between requirements and capabilities. The initial introduction of external military forces would begin to address this gap. Both figures show this as a rising curve in the emergency intervention phase. As the force deployment continues and capabilities increase, the gap can eventually be closed. After addressing the demands of the emergency intervention, these forces have accomplished their security-related tasks

A comparison of Figures 1 and 2 demonstrates the need for early transition planning and development of a follow-on force. Figure 1 shows the introduction of follow-on capabilities beginning late in the emergency intervention phase. As these capabilities are established, the emergency intervention force can begin a drawdown without the reemergence of a gap between security requirements and capabilities. Figure 2 shows an alternative case where a gap reemerges because the introduction of follow-on capabilities does not match the drawdown, either in timing or level. Later in the rehabilitation and redevelopment process, there is an analogous transition. Figure 1 shows redeveloped indigenous capabilities supporting the drawdown of external forces without a gap, while Figure 2 shows the reemergence of a gap.

This same model would also apply for the other identified categories (Infrastructure/ Logistics, Public Health, and Agricultural/Economic), and to the involvement of all organizations involved in the response.

Entrance and Exit Strategies

Initial Introduction of Military Forces

Because the initial introduction of military forces and their later drawdown are particularly challenging periods, a number of working groups addressed appropriate entrance and exit strategies.

There were several recommendations regarding an entrance strategy Because the initial introduction of military forces may significantly affect the situation in-country and the other organizations involved in the response, Emerald Express participants identified a number of key planning considerations. One recommendation was for the military to support existing coordination and relief structures rather than supplant them. This was expressed by several working groups. It was based on a concern that the military's size and capabilities would allow for the development of structures that would support efforts during the military's involvement, but these structures would be difficult to transition to follow-on organizations. Therefore, sustaining accomplishments would be difficult.

Additional considerations for an entrance strategy related to actual and perceived effects that the introduction of military forces would have on others. The military's arrival would directly affect ongoing logistics efforts Force deployment plans must account for continued civil access to ports, airfields, major supply routes, etc. Without effective coordination, there may also be unintended competition in contracting. Another consideration had to do with the effects that the military may have on the perceived neutrality posture of relief organizations, and consequently, the security situation for these organizations. Participants also recommended the development of an information strategy that would support the overall entrance strategy. Its purpose would be to ensure a clear understanding of the military's role in the overall operation. The information strategy would also review information requirements and responsibilities. There was a specific recommendation to develop collection, analysis, and production templates for each phase of the operation, these could be based on the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity's Generic Intelligence Requirements Handbook and on the RELIEF.NET checklist currently being developed.

Transition and Exit Strategy

The military's exit strategy must be designed to support continuing operations and to sustain previous accomplishments As discussed above, there must be early planning and preparations for the transition to prevent the reemergence of capability gaps. Transition planning must address how ongoing actions support longer-term objectives, required capabilities that will remain in-place, the readiness of the follow-on force, and the hand-off of specific responsibilities. Appropriate measures of effectiveness (in the areas of Security, Infrastructure/Logistics, Public Health, and Agricultural/Economic) can be used as transition criteria.

Working groups identified several longer-term efforts that would require continued attention These efforts included demining, demobilization, and reintegration The steps associated with demobilization and reintegration were identified as 1) Motivate voluntary hand-over of weapons, 2) Disband organized fighting units, and 3) See demobilized personnel returned to civilian life. While the military could begin efforts in the emergency intervention phase, follow-on organizations would have to continue them The military could support this by training a core contingent who could continue to train others. Other areas where this type of training would offer continuing benefits were seen as public health and preventive medicine, legal and policing responsibilities, and infrastructure repair.

Coordinated Mission Planning

Mission planning for humanitarian assistance and peace operations must reflect the various U.S. and international organizations -- political, diplomatic, relief, and military -- involved in the response. Ensuring unity of effort requires effective coordination, and this must begin during mission planning. This planning effort is complicated, however, by organizations' different planning and execution timelines. Nevertheless, it is essential that the interests of all organizations be considered during mission planning to ensure a common, agreed-upon definition of the mission, its priorities, objectives, and end state.

Several Emerald Express '95 working groups addressed planning issues. There was general agreement that planning efforts must include broad political, humanitarian, and military representation and that there must be effective coordination among these communities and between different levels -- policy, operational, and tactical. This must begin during the assessment process and continue throughout the operation. This section describes key results and recommendations, grouping these into three categories: coordinated planning, the planning process, and key planning considerations.

Coordinated Planning

Planning for humanitarian assistance and peace operations poses several coordination challenges. There must be effective coordination among the numerous political, diplomatic, military, and relief organizations involved in the operation. There must also be coordination of efforts taking place at policy/strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

These coordination efforts must assure a common understanding of the mission's objectives, priorities, and end state. They must also support an accurate translation of national interests, to a statement of the mission, to an identification of civil and military tasks, to an assessment of required capabilities, to a determination of appropriate forces. While some organizations may be unable to participate directly in coordination and planning efforts, it is still important to ensure their interests are reflected in these efforts.

The interagency process must support coordinated planning and unity of effort during the operation. It was recommended that the U.S. government institutionalize an interagency process for developing and implementing a Political-Military Plan. This would provide a well-understood process for clearly delineating lines of authority, maintaining accountability, and determining resource requirements of U.S agencies. The process must also ensure the clear communication of policies and specific policy interpretations to those who must implement them. This process should facilitate early high-level attention to emerging crises. Finally, the interagency process must also support active involvement and communications with external organizations. This is essential to addressing all aspects of these operations and agreements on broad approaches to conducting the mission. This is affected, however, by relationships that are not well defined and

by the challenges of finding representatives who can address the interests of the full range of non-governmental and private voluntary organizations (NGO/PVOs) involved in an operation.

Assessments are another area where coordination was seen as important. An early exchange of reliable, crisis-relevant information is important to mission planning. These assessments would support a determination of requirements, indigenous capabilities, and civil and military actions required to meet gaps between requirements and capabilities. To improve coordination of these assessments will require an understanding of all participants' information requirements. This is an area that the proposed Interagency Assessment Team would directly address.

There must also be effective coordination between levels, and several recommendations were offered regarding CINC-JTF interactions. One recommendation was to make JTF organization more common from operation to operation. This would facilitate introduction of the JTF into existing organizations and coordination structures, and it would also make it easier for external organizations to interact with the JTF. Another recommendation directly related to the planning phase. To keep JTF forces consistent with identified military tasks and required capabilities, the JTF needs greater input with the CINC regarding the assignment of forces.

The Planning Process for Humanitarian Assistance and Peace Operations

A fundamental question raised during discussions of mission planning was whether the military's traditional planning process needed to be modified to address humanitarian assistance and peace operations. While there was agreement that the traditional staff planning process was a good one, participants came to the conclusion that there must be a period of orientation that precedes this. The underlying reason for this was the view that the traditional planning process begins with receipt of a mission statement and that for humanitarian assistance and peace operations, such a mission statement wouldn't be received, it would have to be developed as part of the orientation process.

The orientation process was viewed as a cyclic, dynamic, and continuous process. Five steps were identified for this process; many actions within these steps would be concurrent not sequential. The CINC and JTF staffs were viewed as going through the orientation process in parallel, with close coordination required between these levels. The five steps, are as follows.

Step One: Problem Awareness (Orientation Commences)
Step Two: Problem Description and Information Gathering
Step Three   Determine Potential Contributions to the Response (Own and Others)
Step Four·   Conduct Internal Assessment/Review of the Problem
Step Five: Notify Next Higher Authority of Problem Appraisal/Receive Feedback