Figures 3 and 4 provide a graphical representation of this process. The first shows the steps in the cycle, with some actions in the different steps taking place concurrently. The fifth step in the process provides feedback that begins the next cycle with a new level of problem awareness. The orientation process seeks out mission uncertainties, and as the cycle continues the mission becomes better defined. At some point in the cycle, the mission is sufficiently well-defined for the traditional planning process to begin.

Figure 3. Orientation Process

Step One	Step Two	Step Three	Step Four	Step Five
Problem Awareness	Problem Desciption and Information Gathering	Determine Potential Contributions	Internal Assessment/ Review	Appraisal to Next Higher Authority / Receive Feedback

Step One	Step Two	Step Three	Step Four	Step Five
	Some actions within these steps are concurrent			

Time

Figure 4. Orientation - Planning Spiral

CINC

TIME

JTF

MISSION

MISSION

The second figure indicates the parallel processes at the CINC and JTF levels and their interactions. There must be close coordination between these levels, as discussed below. As they proceed through the orientation and planning processes, they must ensure a common understanding of the mission and the military tasks, required capabilities, and appropriate forces to meet this mission.

Key Planning Considerations

Many working groups identified considerations that must be addressed during mission planning. As discussed in the previous section, planning must address the different phases of an operation and the different objectives, priorities, and participants of each phase. Early transition planning is essential to achieving a smooth exchange of responsibilities and to sustaining the actions and accomplishments of the previous phase. In doing this, the interests of all participating organizations must be reflected.

A number of functional areas were also discussed. As with other types of operations, logistics support plays a critical role in humanitarian assistance and peace operations, and it must receive significant attention in the planning process. Logistics and infrastructure concerns need particular attention during operational assessments. This will support mission planning and an initial arrival of forces that supports both civil and military actions through the appropriate division of access to ports, airfields, warehouses and other facilities, support equipment, major supply routes, and so forth. This must also account for the impact on the host nation and on longer-term rehabilitation/redevelopment efforts.

Contracting can be used to meet some logistics and infrastructure-related requirements. It can also serve as a means of sustaining the efforts of earlier phases. Logistics must also be an important part of transition planning, as this is one of the major categories that a humanitarian response must address. Health was another functional area that received significant attention. As with logistics, assessments are very important to determine requirements and establish a framework for early planning. Preventive medicine should play a significant role in mission planning, and this will be a continuing requirement across all phases. Information collection, management, and dissemination were major topics, as discussed in the next section.

Measures of effectiveness (MOEs) received significant attention as a crisis management tool having a range of applications. These MOEs fell into the same four broad categories identified previously.

1) Security
2) Infrastructure/Logistics
3) Public Health ·
4) Agricultural/Economic

Continued development and refinement of MOEs was recommended, and this effort would have to be a collaborative one, involving representatives of the communities involved in these operations. Appropriate measures can serve as crisis indicators, evaluate the effects of military and civil actions, support decisions on applying a given level of effort, and track progress toward transition and end state. This was viewed as an important area to test in future exercises and operations, and there was also a recommendation to establish a central repository for continued development and testing of MOEs

Information Management

Another general theme that developed during Emerald Express '95 concerned the importance of improving information sharing mechanisms among all participants during humanitarian assistance and peace operations. The focus during the conference centered on three key issues:

1) The need to improve the flow of information among all participants

2) The need to improve the capability to assess and consolidate information

3) The need to improve information dissemination and management

Improving the Flow of Information Among Participants

There was general agreement among those in attendance that a more effective system is required to improve the flow of information among all participants during humanitarian assistance and peace operations   There are a number of reasons why this is important to the success of future operations. First, available information in these operations is often stovepiped. As a result, vital but largely unclassified information can be narrowly channeled and thus denied to those who might need it most   Second, participating organizations are often unfamiliar with each other. Civilian organizations often complain that they do not understand military organizations, missions, and concepts of operation. Military participants make similar complaints about the UN, as well as relief organizations (non-governmental and private voluntary organizations (NGO/PVOs) and international organizations (IOs)).

Third, there was a generally recognized need to ensure coordinated responses among all participants in order to relay a unified message to the media, as well as to ensure all participants are working collectively toward the same goal.   A final reason was to ensure a clear understanding of the mission and the roles of each organization in accomplishing that mission. Conference participants identified five key methods for improving the flow of information:

- Establish new information systems

- Establish new information-related organizations

- Establish new procedures for collecting and sharing information

- Develop humanitarian assistance information training programs and exercises

- Leverage the capabilities inherent in the CMOC-level partnership

Establish New Information Systems

One way to improve information flow would be to design a more effective humanitarian information architecture. The first step would be to establish an Internet-based, multi-media information sharing system. This system would be designed to enable sharing of unclassified, crisis-relevant information that can be readily and widely accessed, and would be primarily designed for U.S. Government civil and military agencies involved in humanitarian missions. Users would include all relevant policy-makers, military commanders, international agencies, NGOs/PVOs, and the media, as appropriate. One key element of this system would be the creation of a database focused on identifying and explaining what agencies are responsible for particular relief functions internationally as well as in a given country. This system would also identify NGO/PVO key representatives, phone numbers, business addresses, and field sites. The second step would be to establish a similar coordinated system incorporating classified information for appropriate users.

Establish New Information-Related Organizations

Another method for improving information flow would be to establish new information organizations. Conference participants identified three new organizations that might facilitate a more effective flow of information: 1) a U.S -based Interagency Information Coordination Committee; 2) a UN-based International Information Committee; and 3) a Humanitarian Assistance Information Fusion Center.

The U S -based Interagency Information Coordination Committee would be a policy-level organization led by the Department of State (DOS) at the Assistant Secretary level. Interagency membership would include the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Agency for International Development (AID), Department of Defense (DOD)/Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)/Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Commerce/National Oceanographic and Atmospherics Agency (NOAA), Interior/U.S. Geologic Survey (USGS), Defense Mapping Agency (DMA), Director Central Intelligence (DCI), U.S. Information Agency (USIA), and U.S.-based PVO representation. The main functions of this organization would include establishing an Internet-based open information exchange network (described in the previous section), periodically reviewing countries for potential humanitarian emergencies, and reviewing agencies' humanitarian information products in order to identify existing capabilities and shortfalls.

The UN-based International Information Committee would be a parallel UN-based organization to the US Interagency Information Coordination Committee described above. Representation in this committee would include DOS, other governments, and NGO groups such as InterAction, with the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (UNDHA) as the lead agent. The functions of this committee would be similar to those for the US-based committee.

Finally, conference participants also discussed the idea of standing up a <u>Humanitarian Assistance Information Fusion Center</u> This operational-level, in-country organization would be focused on improving information flow between military and civilian participants.

Establish New Procedures for Collecting and Sharing Information

A third method for improving information flow would be to establish new procedures for collecting and sharing information. Conference participants identified three methods for accomplishing this goal. Increasing liaison efforts was one such method. Ideas discussed during the conference included establishing a permanent liaison position on each geographic CINC staff (similar to the political advisor (POLAD) position, with representation provided through the auspices of the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) or a U.S. PVO umbrella organization such as InterAction), establishing on-call NGO/PVO liaison positions for designated C/JTF commanders, developing databases at each CINC detailing NGO/PVO activities by country within their areas of responsibility, and ensuring early liaison with coalition forces to determine their information requirements.

Improving coordination among participants was another procedure discussed during the conference. Some ideas here included having the CINCs arrange for JTF commanders to have ready access to Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) databases, and doing a better job of planning coordination efforts to deconflict humanitarian and military operations. A third procedure would be to increase efforts to better understand military and civilian organization missions and capabilities. For example, during the early phases of an operation, a military handout could be prepared for the relief community that would describe in detail the mission intent, as well as what in-country missions are appropriate for the military to undertake.

Develop Humanitarian Assistance Information Training Programs and Exercises

Another method for improving information flow would be to develop tailored training programs and exercises for humanitarian assistance and peace operations. Some ideas here include developing formal training programs at service and interagency schools supplemented by Mobile Training Teams (MTTs), video training packages, and bibliographic references; conducting at least one national level exercise per year that includes senior policy-maker participation; and focusing on an Internet-based information network and an Information Fusion Center (discussed below) to satisfy consumer requirements.

Leverage Capabilities Inherent in the CMOC-Level Partnership

A final method for improving information flow includes leveraging the capabilities inherent in the military-civilian CMOC-level partnership to optimize the exchange of information between military and civilian organizations. Key information areas would include field security issues, public health indicators, and political factors

Need to Improve Information Assessment Capability

Conference participants also agreed that a need existed to improve the capability to analyze and evaluate information in a more effective manner. A number of reasons were identified that highlight the importance of such an effort. First, there is a real concern that information overload can become a significant problem during these humanitarian operations. Second, there is a requirement to be able to synthesize information from disparate sources, and to identify conflicting information and resolve conflicting assessments. In addition, participants in humanitarian assistance and peace operations need information in a form that supports staff assessments at both the political/strategy and operational/tactical levels. These include security, infrastructure, public health, and political assessments, among others.

Two methods were identified for improving information assessment capabilities:

- Conduct a detailed review of current information assessment capabilities
- Establish a new organization to facilitate more effective information assessments

Conduct a Detailed Review of Current Information Assessment Capabilities

One of the methods identified for improving information assessment capabilities was to conduct a detailed review of current capabilities in this area. This review would be comprised of four steps: (1) review who is charged with producing analysis and evaluation of information at different stages of these operations; (2) review what they are currently producing; (3) identify deficiencies; and (4) establish priorities and assign resources to address these analytic shortfalls.

The key step in the above process is to identify deficiencies. Conference participants suggested that this be accomplished by surveying users of crisis-relevant information, identifying crisis information collection gaps and overlaps, recommending additions/deletions to ensure efficient, comprehensive coverage, and recommending improvements in crisis information substance and distribution. Participants also emphasized the special importance of cultural intelligence, and its role in the information assessment process.

Establish a New Organization to Facilitate More Effective Information Assessments

Another method identified for improving information assessment capabilities was the proposed Humanitarian Assistance Information Fusion Center. This would be a standing organization that would operate at both the policy and operational level. Representation would be similar to that for the US Interagency Information Coordination Committee, discussed previously. Functions for this organization would include: 1) creating collection, analysis, and production templates for key phases of a humanitarian operation; 2) analyzing and fusing open-source information, and disseminating products over the Internet; 3) integrating classified information with the open-source product, and disseminating to appropriate U.S. consumers; and 4) producing contingency support-type products guided by the National Intelligence Estimate for Humanitarian Emergencies and the U.S. Interagency Information Coordination Committee.

Need to Improve Information Dissemination and Assessment

A final key information-related issue identified during the conference addressed the need to improve information dissemination and management. This developed as a key issue for a number of reasons. First, there was the general feeling that NGOs and other civilian organizations do not understand the intent of military psychological operations (PSYOP) operations. Second, the role of the media in these operations is often critical to the success of the mission. The media plays a pivotal role in determining how the public perceives the mission. The media can also influence policy, which in turn influences the concept of operations. In addition, media disinterest can be just as damaging as intense media scrutiny. Third, there was a recognized need to maintain a close linkage between the mission and the media-based perception of the mission. In addition, participants recognized the need to provide a consistent presentation of information to the media, as well as a need to better integrate news media into the operation.

Conference participants identified five potential methods for improving information dissemination and management. These included the following:

- Develop an information strategy plan
- Focus on developing more effective military information programs
- Embrace media participation in the operation
- Develop and implement an information management campaign plan
- Recognize and plan for unique information-related aspects of humanitarian assistance and peace operations

Develop an Information Strategy Plan

One way to improve information dissemination and management would be to develop a comprehensive information strategy plan. This plan would ensure coordination and integration of effort among traditionally stovepiped functions, such as media relations, PSYOP, and force information. Critical to the success of this plan would be its development early in the mission planning phase

Focus on Developing More Effective Military Information Programs

Conference participants also felt that more attention needs to be focused on developing effective military information programs, or PSYOP programs. Methods for ensuring these programs are effective include establishing them as a core mission in humanitarian assistance and peace operations, integrating the program early in the mission planning process, ensuring the programs are centrally controlled, establishing clearly-defined objectives, and coordinating with NGOs/PVOs and IOs prior to the operation.

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Embrace Media Participation in the Operation

Participants also stressed the need to embrace media participation in the operation Taking time to do this will go a long way to ensuring a close linkage is maintained between the actual mission and the media-based perception of the mission. Methods for ensuring full media participation in the operation include enhancing media access to information prior to and during HAOs/POs, giving authority to the local commanding military officer to determine the extent of media access to operational plans, encouraging media participation in the Internet-based humanitarian assistance information network discussed previously, and thinking of the media as an integral part of the campaign.

Develop and Implement Information Management Campaign Plan

Another method for improving information dissemination and management is to develop and implement an information management campaign plan. This plan should be written to ensure that public affairs is considered an integral part of operational planning. The plan should integrate public affairs with PSYOP, intelligence, current and future operations, CMOC, civil affairs, and coalition forces. The plan should ensure that public affairs assets are frontloaded. This might mean putting a public affairs representative in the advance party or the humanitarian assistance survey team, or HAST The plan should stress the importance of developing information objectives that will assist in preparing those in the area of operations to be more receptive to the arrival of military forces And finally, the plan should be developed to ensure not only close liaison with the CMOC, but also to ensure feedback mechanisms to measure effectiveness or success and to modify plans accordingly

Recognize and Plan for Unique Information-Related Aspects of Humanitarian Assistance and Peace Operations

The final method identified for improving information dissemination and management was to recognize and plan for unique aspects of these operations having information management implications. Some of these unique aspects identified during the conference include the reality of the military operating in a supporting role, generally unrestricted access for media representatives, the appearance of multiple actors on stage with multiple (and sometimes conflicting or competing) agendas, and the perception that casualties (ours and theirs) are less acceptable.

Coordination Requirements

Coordination was an important theme common to all the working groups. Developing appropriate coordination structures and organizations, enhancing understanding of the roles and capabilities of other participating organizations, and establishing effective liaison received significant discussion. The underlying goal in all this is to improve future responses by ensuring a more unified approach that encompasses the concerns of the overall operation and its different participants and phases

The military was seen as bringing many important capabilities, but as discussed previously, there was a concern that the military may establish structures that can't be sustained when their involvement reaches an end. C2 is one important aspect of the military's involvement. To the military, C2 refers to Command and Control, which covers the command structures and required communications capabilities necessary to conduct the operation. In humanitarian assistance and peace operations, the military is just one player involved in conducting the operation, and in this environment, participants identified the essential C2 as Coordination and Cooperation. In recent operations, the CMOC has been the principal civil-military link. Because of this, participants discussed the most appropriate functions of the CMOC and means for integrating it into the existing coordination system. Participants recommended additional study of the CMOC as a way to institutionalize it, noting that it must still retain the flexibility to accommodate very different environments.

This section places coordination issues, results, and recommendations into two categories: military coordination with NGO/PVOs and military coordination with UN agencies.

Military Coordination with NGOs/PVOs

In general, there is a requirement for closer coordination between military forces and the NGO/PVO community both at the policy/strategy and operational/tactical levels. This should be done through mutual education, greater access to capabilities, improved information flow, and efforts to coordinate planning. One way to enhance coordination between the military and NGOs/PVOs at the policy level would be to establish a permanent liaison position on the geographic CINCs staffs, as has just occurred on CINCPAC's staff

This liaison would be similar to the POLAD position and would be filled by a representative provided through the auspices of OFDA with assistance from InterAction. For example, the NGO/PVO liaison could help the geographic CINC develop a data base detailing NGO/PVO activities by country within their area of responsibility (AOR). The Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) may also play a role in representing the interests of relief organizations.

In addition to the general requirement to improve coordination between the military and NGOs/PVOs, there is a requirement to communicate with external organizations to keep them

informed of policy decisions and interpretations and stay focused on end state. In order to achieve this (according to one recommendation), the U S. should formally consult with the PVO/NGO community when considering responses to emerging crises-as part of the U.S. interagency planning process.

The Organization section of this conference report describes the various existing and proposed organizations that would support coordination of the political, humanitarian, and military aspects of these operations. These include the CMOC, policy-level analogues (the Washington Coordination Group and the in-country Executive Steering Group), and an Interagency Assessment Team. All of these organizations would support military coordination with NGOs/PVOs. Coordination at the operational level, i e. CMOC-level, was seen as good and getting better Participants believed that policy-level coordination needed increased attention.

Additional means for improving coordination include liaisons and exchange programs to promote a better awareness of functions and capabilities, conducting training exercises and contingency planning together, and developing education programs to better prepare participants for future operations.

Coordination with UN Agencies

There were three areas in which coordination with UN agencies were important at the policy level: planning, medical, and organizational. In the planning area, it was recommended that a process for strategic planning be developed which would involve, political, military and humanitarian dimensions. This process would become standard procedure in both the U.S. and UN contexts for their respective operations One way to bring in the UN perspective would be to support the UN Resident Coordinator as initial in-country focal point for humanitarian, rehabilitation and related tasks. NGO data on emerging crises would be channeled into the system through the resident coordinator. On the U S. Government side, the comparable focal point should be the in-country State Department team, augmented as circumstances require Another recommendation designed to support mission planning was to make UN Resolutions as clear as the political situation will allow.

In the medical area, a requirement to determine what can be done prior to operations to coordinate the efforts of medical relief organizations and the military was identified. One recommendation was to establish an interservice workshop on military public health intervention to be co-sponsored by the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO)/World Health Organization (WHO) and the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences (USUHS). Participation of medical professionals from allied armed forces should be encouraged. During the early part of an operation, consultation should begin with the UN Health Coordinator. The UN Health Coordinator should be a principal point of contact for the initial assessment, and the CMOC should maintain contact with the UN Health Coordinator during the operation. The organizational recommendations are mentioned above and described in greater detail in the Organization section.

Preparedness and Training

One of the major issue areas addressed during Emerald Express '95 was means and costs associated with military training for humanitarian assistance operations and peace operations. The recommendations related to military training and preparedness fell into five basic areas:

1) Improving professional military education in humanitarian assistance and peace operations

2) Improving military training for these operations

3) Determining whether this training has costs in terms of readiness for warfighting

4) Equipment requirements

5) Preserving military expertise and experience based on previous operations

Improving Professional Military Education

Humanitarian assistance and peace operations require new ways of thinking and planning. Identifying an enemy, finding centers of gravity, and applying overwhelming force do not translate directly, and so, do not necessarily fit neatly into traditional operational planning. There may not be a direct military threat. In order to prepare military officers for future humanitarian operations, professional military education should increase emphasis on:

- Operations Other Than War case studies
- Humanitarian assistance operation wargaming and situational exercises
- Role-playing scenarios

During these operations, planning can't be completed in isolation, but instead must support and coordinate with the planning of civilian agencies. Accomplishing this may require military personnel to work with many non-military organizations and foreign militaries with which they may be unfamiliar. To improve familiarity among different organizations involved in humanitarian assistance and peace operations, the military can invite foreign military representatives, UN, NGOs etc., to participate in contingency planning and command post exercises. Exchange programs and liaisons also offer opportunity to increase awareness of other organizations capabilities, limitations, procedures, and so forth.

Public awareness of the operation, as communicated through the media, and the military's roles and actions is an important component to perceptions of mission success. And, cultural awareness and sensitivities, as well as interactions with the local populace directly affect the mission. As a result, media, cultural, and regional education play an important role during traditional training and have particular importance during the pre-deployment and deployment phases of an operation.

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Many in the military believe, or are perceived to believe, that humanitarian assistance and peace operations are inappropriate or lesser missions that the military grudgingly performs. This attitude can hinder effective training and preparation. To counter this perception, the military should stress during training and education that this is a legitimate, challenging, and probable mission area. Legitimizing the mission from above should improve training and preparation at all levels

Areas for Improving Training

During these operations, troops can expect to perform jobs outside of their particular military specialty. For example, an artillery specialist may play a role in a humanitarian assistance coordination role. In addition, because these operations are so varied, it is impossible to train troops for all possible missions. However, because they are well-disciplined and adaptable, military troops are well suited to meet the demands of most missions.

Humanitarian assistance and peace operations require certain skills that justify increased training emphasis. Although the military currently trains in most of these areas, some skills occur in enough missions that the working groups felt the military should increase training in these areas. In particular, the military should bolster skills in: 1) Military operations in built-up (urban) areas (MOBA), 2) Crowd control methods, and 3) Negotiating (all ranks)

Because small units often play an important role in these operations, small unit training should include situational exercises and scenarios, and functioning under restrictive ROE The types of scenarios included in this training could resemble situations that small units faced in Haiti or Somalia where troops faced crowds containing a mixture of civilians and hostile forces.

Military personnel specializing in security functions normally suffer few casualties in Operations Other Than War. Military personnel most at risk tend to be support personnel least familiar with security matters, for example: engineers, truck drivers, cooks, etc.. The working groups recommended improving force protection skills for these support personnel.

Operations Other Than War And Their Effects on Combat Preparedness

Without appropriate training opportunities, certain combat skills will degrade over time. Ways to limit this during a humanitarian assistance or peace operation include:

- Establishing in-theater training programs where possible.

- Limiting the length and frequency of missions when possible

- Establishing timely troop rotations in and out of theater.

In general there was no reliable estimate of what skills troops would lose during HAOs and how long it would take to retrain units and individuals after missions Participants recommended

commissioning a study on the retraining time for different military skills and military units involved in past operations.

Real-world operations provide good military training in certain areas. In particular, small units and small-unit leaders can gain valuable field experience, and planners and logistics personnel directly exercise their skills.

Do Humanitarian Assistance Operations Require Specialized Equipment for the Military?

Generally the equipment required in these operations is not new to the military. One exception is in the area of specialized crowd control gear. The military should continue to promote research and development of less-lethal technologies. Such weaponry, which was demonstrated during the conference, includes pepper spray, sticky foam and rubber bullets. Additionally, this gear must be made readily available to deploying units. Although not specifically a training issue, a consistent policy must still be worked out for using less-lethal weaponry in-theater.

Another area in which military equipment was insufficient came up in discussions of domestic operations, such as the Los Angeles riots. In domestic operations, commercial maps are often more useful than military maps. In addition, cellular telephones and commercial fax machines tended to be more useful than traditional military communications equipment and radios

It was pointed out during the conference that humanitarian assistance missions place significant wear and tear on certain dual-purpose military assets, such as reverse osmosis, water purification units (ROWPUs). In order to ensure the military is adequately equipped for all potential operations, the military must have an acquisition strategy that reflects their participation in humanitarian assistance missions.

How Can the Military Better Institutionalize And Preserve Expertise in Humanitarian Assistance Operations?

Participants expressed concern that valuable experience in past humanitarian assistance operations not be lost as personnel are reassigned after missions. Suggestions for capturing past experience included creating an HAO database using the Internet. This database would include reports from past operations, lessons learned from past missions, regional information, and could include as well descriptions of relief organizations, their sizes, and areas of operation.

Working groups also felt it important to create an HAO field handbook which could include various commander's checklists