

Unconventional views on education and the disaster context

Foreign agencies whose mission is disaster "relief" necessarily attend to the most urgent needs in education: reconstruction of classrooms, replacement of lost teachers, quick skill training programs. The press is to supply educational "blankets" that cover the variety of disaster situations communities suffer.

But, as Hans Reiff notes in his paper, "education is mainly a domestic affair," worked out over years to fit the cultural idiosyncrasies of a country (although often imposed on marginal communities). Blankets woven outside the country often are not "long" enough. Although they are warming, they also can suffocate fragile endogenous efforts more appropriate to the long-term development needs of a country. There is not much a relief agency can do to relieve this tension — the educational requirements for the short-term restoration and reconstruction of a community are not the same as those for a long-term development process.

The two papers that follow offer some conceptual frameworks for understanding the contradictions between relief and development. Noel McGinn points out that the education that contributes to restoration of a community's social structure may also reproduce the same features that made the community vulnerable to the disaster event. Hans Reiff reviews experiences in Lebanon and Kampuchea to trace out independent cycles of donor intervention and community redevelopment, noting the several points where they are not in synchrony. Both papers point up the need for private voluntary agencies to distinguish between their clients and other groups likely to obstruct efforts to assist the affected population

Educational development, basic human needs and disaster relief: Lessons from a few experiences

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For more than three years I did not go to school. There were no schools to go to. Now I don't like holidays. They make me think of the bad days.

Kum Sakhom, 14 years
Kampuchean Chronicles, 1980

This article summarizes the relative success and major constraints in harmonizing and managing short-term disaster relief work and longer-term educational development programmes in Kampuchea (1980–1981) and Lebanon (1983).

The critical issues are obvious. In a disaster situation both donors and recipients are preoccupied with immediate problems and the need for "crisis management," to make decisions regarding education incrementally, resulting in a discounting of long-term benefits. How can immediate needs be balanced against a long-time horizon? How can *ad hoc* policies which, in the long run, may be self-defeating, be minimized?

What follows is a personal account of my experiences in disaster relief in education, based on memory and on information extracted from national documents, agency reports and old notebooks. The paper tries to outline the major constraints and potentials for effective programming of educational development in a disaster context.

Both the governments and the agencies involved in the two relief operations formulate their co-operative action along the continuum of "emergency relief — rehabilitation — reconstruction — development." In the case of UNICEF and most of the NGO's, the adjective "humanitarian" was added, suggesting a focus on the individual. In view of this, the following general framework and definitions are proposed (see Table 1).

One of the most important methodological lessons learned regarding the ways in which education can have a crucial impact on meeting survival needs in situations of man-made disaster (war, civil war) is that human needs require a mixture of "material relief" and "relief of mind" and that relief (*a feeling of comfort at the ending of anxiety, fear or pain*) cannot be easily reflected in proposals for investment in either physical or human capital. The concept of relief, basic needs and development, as interpreted and

translated into criteria for resource mobilization and utilization by national and international bureaucracies, tends to be in conflict with micro level goals where resources (goods, money, time, knowledge/information, human energy) are conceived differently.

Anecdotal information, collected through interviews with parents, school children and local educational leaders and authorities, illustrates the wealth of human inventiveness and energy in finding original solutions to local problems. This potential can be strengthened and mobilized with relatively modest external inputs. This paper tries to show how such information should be used in guiding disaster relief operations in education and human development with a view to "humanizing" the relatively rigid models of the donors and their technical advisers.

As education is mainly a domestic affair, a mechanism is required to screen the inflow of culturally dominated knowledge about schooling which accompanies aidstreams from industrialized countries (and which risks disrupting fragile internal processes of human and educational rehabilitation) and to revive the use of indigenous intellectual and practical knowledge which is "hidden." The truth of educational reality in periods of disaster cannot be measured by isolated facts (e.g. enrollment statistics) or by relationships among facts (e.g. percentage of over-aged children in grade I), but only in their relationship with human beings, their suffering, values, ambitions, etc. (*"The school is the clinic of the soul."* Headmaster of a primary school, Kampuchea, 1980).

Unfortunately, as the various actors involved in educational development almost always hold competing views about the social reality of a specific educational environment, and as relief workers do not have time to discuss their experiences, in a structured way, conceptualization and a common language hardly ever emerge. This vacuum often provides the external adviser an alibi with which to assume the role of "advocacy planner," identifying

himself with population group(s) which, from his perspective, are most vulnerable. There is nothing wrong with this, as long as the adviser clearly identifies and states the time/place of his observation and his sources of information.

The following framework is a tool for structuring subjective reflections on what was learned through past relief and development action in education; it is not sufficiently comprehensive to be a model for analysis/planning.

GEOLOGICAL FORCES

External (donor-recipient dialogue)

In both Kampuchea and Lebanon, aid streams for emergency relief in education were a function of the behaviour among donors and recipients which cannot be captured through a classical demand-supply model (see Fig. 1).

Between 1979—1984, both Lebanon and Kampuchea passed through different phases of international "trust levels" and power relationships which can explain to a large extent the direction and intensity of the co-operation/aid dialogue. In extreme language (reality is more "subtle"):

Lebanon receives large amounts of material aid in school (re)construction (1982 to date); just before this period the country passed through a time of relative international indifference about human resources development (1980/1981) contrasted with a newly emerging phase (1983 onwards) in which the free mechanism of international economic (banking) elites in "harmony" with the aspirations of intellectual elites manoeuvre development initiatives mainly in the direction of economic growth (ignoring aspects of distribution change). The translation of these growth priorities into criteria for human

Table 1. Problems of method

| Focus Action | | |
|------------------------------|------------------------------|--|
| | National | Individual children/adults (humanitarian) |
| Educational emergency relief | — | Comfort at the ending of anxiety |
| Educational rehabilitation | Put back in good condition | Make able to live an ordinary life again |
| Educational reconstruction | Rebuild after destruction | Reorganization of human action |
| Educational development | Growth; distribution; change | — |

resources development emphasizes middle level technical training to facilitate technology transfer (role of transnationals) at the relative cost of introducing a "culture technique" in primary education for all.

Kampuchea passed from an emergency relief period (1979/1981) of marginal charity (pencil/notebooks, etc.), carefully preserving cultural identity (buddhist learning) and ideological preferences (Vietnamese curriculum advisers), to one of international moral support and sympathy in matters of relief (1982/1983) and stagnation/conflict in educational development assistance (1983/1984).

Internal (decentralization; participation)

Lebanon. Given the fact that about 32% of students at primary level and 50% of students at secondary level attend fee-paying private schools and a further 31% of all students at the primary level attend non-fee-paying private schools, there is a great amount of freedom of initiative at

institutional levels. But private schools were not included in the relief operations which focused on public schools (although some of the private-aided schools are among the "poorest").

As the Central Government exercised only a relatively modest control over public education in the country, initiatives of Government officials at the grass-root level (e.g. teachers) had a fair chance of being supported by external aid, even if, officially, no decentralization policy in educational management was forthcoming. While historically and traditionally the Centre has translated the goal of "National Unity" into a policy of educational centralization, there is now an increasing recognition that real unity can only be achieved through a gradual decrease in educational disparities.

We can observe that, partly because of the hostilities and the urgent needs of the most victimized population groups, a certain degree of decentralization of education authority is taking place (especially in matters of budgeting), although still with a focus on strengthening the implementation capacity of educational projects at the regional and local levels. The "South Lebanon Educational Reconstruction

Table 2. Tool for structuring subjective reflections

| Unit of analysis/learning \ Type of intervention | | Educational emergency relief | Educational development co-operation |
|---|--|--|---|
| <div style="display: flex; flex-direction: column; align-items: center;"> <div>Society</div> <div>↕</div> <div>Education</div> </div> | Historical perspective | Undoing (shock, fear, anger, etc.) | Creating (confidence, hope, knowledge, etc.) |
| | Geo-political forces | Mainly <i>external</i> : donor-recipient dialogue | Mainly <i>internal</i> : degrees of decentralization, participation, etc. |
| | Socio-cultural forces | Cohesion at family and community levels | National identity, freedom, sovereignty, etc. |
| | Population dynamics | Target groups focus: children, family, orphans, etc. | Demographic trends, human resources, adult literacy, etc. |
| | Economic and technological forces | Technician training for reconstruction | Education; work; productivity; income; welfare |
| Educational Process | National objectives | Rather simple targets (visibility) | Rather complex goals: endogeneity and non-intervention |
| | Individual needs and aspirations | Food, shelter, health, security, understanding | Quality of life, happiness, literacy, etc. |
| | Staff, content, technology | Focus on teachers | Beyond a production function |
| | Organizational structures and management | Intersectoral tactics | Capacity building and programming |
| | Physical infrastructure | Repair/construction of schools and classroom furniture | Schoolmapping; local workshops; etc. |




Fig. 1. Demand-supply model. A₁ = Internal situation of the "rich" (stagflation/unemployment but also information explosion on Lebanon/Kampuchea through mass media). A₂ = Internal situation of the "poor" (material disaster, human suffering but also complex "policies" in both cases). B = Behaviour of the "rich" towards the "poor": people are anxious to help people; States are sometimes either reluctant to give (*Kampuchea*; "international/regional politics") or to let their people receive (*Lebanon*; no interference allowed in the equity/distributive repercussions of powerful market economy forces accompanying aid). Especially in the area of education which is mainly an affair of the State (*Kampuchea*) or of State and Church (*Lebanon*), direct help from people to people, through NGO's, remains marginal. C = Conclusions, as expressed in the behaviour of the "poor" in redirecting aid streams and their internal distribution and in utilizing scarce national human and material resources. *Lebanon*: teachers expressed need for schoolbuilding repairs and simple, traditional school furniture; State invested in design/production of sophisticated ("modern") school furniture and large school construction contracts; *Kampuchea*: people expressed need for slates/chalk ("Paper is like rice; when we have some for one day we need more for the next", primary school teacher, Phnom Pehn); State invested national and external resources in paper, printing and transport of textbooks.

Programme," supported with aid from UNICEF (±8 million U.S. dollars) and from the "Tunis Pledge" (±30 million U.S. dollars over five years, executed by UNICEF) thus had authority of the Saida Education Department, in close co-operation with the Council of Development of the South. Such community participation in education is not a "natural" phenomenon in a competitive free market economy, and has only succeeded when sufficient financial incentives have been provided by public authorities to which the community added its own resources (land, time, work). Local educational authorities felt that increased community participation would be required not so much for income generating purposes but to enhance self-management and self-reliance of the population and counterbalance its natural tendency to "receive and continue to make some small private business as usual" (Social Affairs Officer, Saida, 25th March 1983).

Kampuchea. There is a large degree of decentralization to the provincial levels where all political and sectoral forces are represented. In the field of education, a Provincial Committee for Education and Social Action executes educational programmes in co-operation with other sectoral committees (e.g. Production Units under the Ministry of Commerce and Industry) under the general supervision of the Central Committee (a Revolutionary Council) and the FUNSK (Political Party).

The community, village, and family are seen as basic units of participatory development, based on the principle of self-help and the search for a new identity. This has resulted in solidarity among people regarding matters of education (e.g. voluntary part-time teachers).

This form of social organization has facilitated emergency relief efforts in terms of food distribution and

co-operation among educational donors in delivering "packages" of educational aid to the schools. These schools sometimes served also as a central point for community help in the villages (e.g. nutrition/health services).

Comparison. The experiences in Lebanon and Kampuchea regarding the impact of decentralization and participation on the effectiveness of emergency relief and development co-operation in education were almost completely the opposite. The practical model that emerged from out action research in this area is illustrated in Fig. 2.

The links are self-explanatory: Emergency relief in education reaches the target (pupil) most effectively through strengthening the capacity of the local education/development officer in mobilizing the participation of the community and the family by a "package" of basic needs/educational inputs. Development co-operation in education reaches the pupil through material and technical support of decentralized institutions, involving the teacher (in-service training) and reform of content. The two approaches are not mutually exclusive and can be overlapping (e.g. teacher as community leader in the case of Kampuchea); however, the difference is a concentration on *people* in the relief effort and on *programmes/institutions* in the development effort, requiring different "mixes" of external inputs.

SOCIO-CULTURAL FORCES AND THE EFFECT OF POPULATION DYNAMICS

In both Lebanon and Kampuchea, the location of dispersed population groups (still very much on the move) as well as the identification of their age-structures and of their basic needs profiles in relation to past and present hardship and degrees of dependency, was among the most difficult

tasks of joint donor-recipient action. In the area of health, mobile clinics (Lebanon) succeeded in following population movements, and the portable saw-mill project (Australian NGO in Kampuchea) flexibility assisted in the repairs of orphanages and village dispensaries.

But schools had to be firmly assisted as they serve as centres of security and social cohesion in communities which gradually emerged from periods of collective stress and complete social disorganization ("The school serves as a spiritual clinic for children. It is the only place where hope can be injected in addition to medical care and food aid. *The school is where one can be of service to the child, where his physical and moral health can be cared for; education is part of the survival operation,*" school teacher, Kampuchea).

In relief operations, donor agencies in education work with limited field staffs since education is always under suspicion of being a tool of ideology. Thus relatively large inputs are made of standard supplies, materials, equipment and school construction or repair contracts. Donors and central governments cannot be overly concerned with whether these reach the most deprived target population groups. The immediate concern is to spread educational supplies as widely as possible so that children and illiterate youths are stimulated to come to school and the donor or central authority becomes clearly identifiable with the emergency aid. The NGO's and private organizations (working on the principle "small is beautiful") usually fill the gaps left by the above macro approach and sometimes succeed in convincing the major educational donors to modify the contents of their emergency aid "packages."

Whether the combination of supply or infrastructure inputs provides an adequate response to the diversified learning needs of the target group (children of various ages, illiterate parents, orphans, etc.) and to the existing socio-cultural forces working towards community cohesion, often remains uncertain. But errors made in the timing and mixes of pedagogical/basic needs supplies usually met with a great inventiveness of recipients at the local levels, who ensured their close-to-perfect allocation and utilization. Donor agencies which attempted to shift, prematurely, the emphasis of their co-operation from individual or

community relief to national educational development concerns (e.g. human resources development, national independence/endogeneity, New Socio-Cultural Order, etc.) were in general allowed to formulate their views and present their scenarios (received with scepticism in Lebanon and with polite smiles in Kampuchea) but these had very little noticeable effect on the direction of the relief efforts.

Lebanon. The process of rapid socio-economic and political change is characterized by continuous population movements, resulting in new social and individual needs and aspirations and multiple private initiatives, to which public institutions and traditional structures (e.g. family) are reacting in unforeseen ways.

In the absence of census or demographic surveys, donors were dependent on little or scattered information for project formulation (e.g. requests from headmasters of individual schools backed up with irrelevant statistics and "high level" recommendations) which they had difficulty in verifying and absorbing. As a consequence, the donor agency's approach had to remain flexible: to "move in" where villages and suburbs were opened up to Government control and educational needs were identified (often by construction engineers who happened to make a road survey in the area). Socio-political constraints, however, prevented emergency support reaching some of the neediest population groups: Palestinian children in private (non-fee/subsidized) schools in Greater Beirut and in refugee camp schools (a responsibility of UNWRA).

The impact of educational emergency support was mainly measured by the influx of people who came to settle in villages where schools were repaired and became operational. This influx was taken as a sign of increased confidence and security in which learning could take place effectively if basic facilities and supplies were provided.

But mistakes were also made, especially because of a lack of insight into socio-cultural reality. For example, the Social Services Project, including many learning components and partly supported by UNICEF, faced many problems of implementation: "Culturally, the village people perceived the project mainly as receiving philanthropic and second-




Fig. 2.

rate services designed for the poor. It did not wish to be associated with this effort, let alone participate as volunteers. Programmes such as the non-formal pre-vocational courses, based on principles of quality and relevance, income-generation and production/profit, had a greater chance of success." (Director, Office of Social Development for the South, Said, 26th March 1983).

At the macro level, the World Bank project of school-mapping and clustering, aimed at creating "aggregate" schools and based on rational cost-benefit criteria of increasing class size and pupil-teacher ratios had problems in being implemented as both teachers and parents preferred to support village schools for reasons of security and community cohesion.

Kampuchea. Population movement within the country and abroad is a dynamic force difficult to follow and predict as it is dependent on the availability of food (supplies and agricultural productivity) and on rapid shift in the location of war. The population structure is characterized by an unequal age-group distribution (fewer male adults in the productive age-group; fewer children born in the period 1975–1979) and an unequal sex distribution (many widows). The combined impact of these *demographic* forces on the social demand for education and on the needs for training in productive skills and work of future occupational structures is still largely unknown. The *socio-cultural* forces in society are difficult to measure at a macro level and can only be illustrated by examples from institutions and families.

The socio-cultural needs felt by the population were expressed through a "hunger" for books, information, recreational opportunities and different forms of cultural expression with a view to rebuilding a sense of confidence, solidarity and cultural identity. The Government, in response to this social demand for restoring a rich cultural heritage reinforced the information and communication channels with the local communities by distributing literature, audio-visual equipment and national flags (symbol of Angkor Wat) and by organizing, around the school, manifestations of national dance/theatre, music/folklore, handicraft production, etc. The organization and management of these activities was shared by the responsible authorities and by a number of mass movements such as the Women's and the Youth Association.

Originally, the international donor community did not support this type of activity, mainly out of respect for local customs and cultural and spiritual values which were basically unknown, but also because some of them had a dominantly ideological character. However, the Government increasingly requested their international support: "To merge a rich cultural heritage with all components of a modern educational system is a difficult process which can only be enriched by information and lessons of experience available universally and should not be limited by those generated by recent colonial and neo-colonial experiences." (High Official, Ministry of Education, 27th February 1980).

ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL FORCES

The experiences in Lebanon and Kampuchea in this area were almost totally the opposite. In Lebanon, the forces of work and technology dominated the educational and human resources processes and tended, indirectly, to influence international donor support in the area of training. In Kampuchea, education and training were seen as incentives to productive and socially useful work mainly in the form of community self-help activities; donors responded in terms of the supply of simple tools, workshop facilities, etc., in order to support the harmonization of work and learning.

Lebanon. The reconstruction programme focused on destroyed or badly damaged housing and schools, implementing a planned network of new public schools and renovating and expanding physical infrastructures. This, logically, resulted in an emphasis on vocational training to replace migrant workers who were previously employed in the building construction and industrial sectors. The preparation of trained manpower for the massive reconstruction tasks in various sectors also required an expansion and modernization of technical education programmes to compensate for the large emigration of well-qualified technicians (major donor: World Bank). In addition, an estimated 200,000 persons (UN estimate) may be in need of some form of vocational rehabilitation for the disabled.

Major constraints encountered in programme implementation are: lack of decentralization; cultural or historical preference for academic types of education (rational, if one considers the education/income profiles); role of private sector (transnationals) in structuring the labour market; etc. Much more modest resources are directed towards the problems of unemployed youth; however, the problem for the public sector is "how to create a demand for functional literacy training in a community characterized by a free market mechanism which provides the most motivated youth with income-generating skills on the job."

Kampuchea. In 1970/1980 the economy was characterized by food searching by families; a mixed mechanism of commodity exchange (no currency) on the market and government controlled food supplies; payment of government workers in rice rations; teachers partly paid by mutual assistance farm groups; agricultural production units; small repair shops, family handicrafts, market vendors; etc. Children, traditionally involved in family work or forced labour participated in the above survival operations; unemployment was close to zero in those days.

Food distribution was partly guided by work-points earned by adults (children received food in schools or orphanages and special measures were taken for the aged). When the children started to come to school (also attracted by the nutritional/health services provided there), the introduction of a "work spirit" and of practical activities in educational programmes was immediate. At the primary

schools, this included handicrafts and school gardening as well as wood and metal work. The donors (NGO's plus UNICEF) responded with tools for gardening, woodwork, etc., but in insufficient quantities and sometimes of the wrong quality/size. At the post-primary, teacher training and adult education levels, workshop equipment and tools were provided not only because of their pedagogical significance ("learning by doing") but also because of the urgency for repairing schoolbuildings and furniture and for producing pedagogical tools (blackboards, slates). Girls' schools received sewing machines, cloth and kitchen equipment to allow the students to make dresses and prepare food "brought" by the community in exchange for free labour.

With the exception of a few "failures" (e.g. the production of milk at schools for free distribution to pupils was discontinued because of lack of good quality water, irregular supplies of milk powder and, most seriously, sickness due to culturally different eating habits at home), the donors were generally successful in this type of relief operation linking education, training and work to basic needs. However, little progress was made in enhancing technical and vocational education and training, a priority development objective of a Government eager to link human resources development to the productive sectors. Traditionally and culturally the population continued to show a preference for liberal arts courses at the post-primary levels.

EDUCATIONAL PROCESSES: OBJECTIVES/NEEDS AND ASPIRATIONS; STAFF, CONTENT AND TECHNOLOGY; ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES AND MANAGEMENT; PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURES

This section attempts to deal with the issue: "*Where were the points of entry for external intervention in education relief or development wrongly identified and what went wrong with the criteria underlying such mistaken choices?*"

National objectives versus individual needs and aspirations

In general it was observed that, in earlier periods of disaster relief, the distance between immediate educational targets set by the State and the "education-to-facilitate-survival" needs of the people tended to be narrow, but would gradually widen again as relief efforts took the form of reconstruction and development. External donors tended to prolong educational relief assistance even when recipients had already reached educational reconstruction/development stages. Scarce national human and material resources were thus misallocated.

The example of support to orphanages versus family welfare in Kampuchea is a classical one. NGO's, under continuous pressures to please their home constituencies, over-supplied classes organized in orphanages, thus attracting children who could have been enrolled in regular primary schools if foster parents could have been supported. This happened in spite of the official Government policy: "The school is the main place in the community where all

types of deprived population groups will benefit from educational and basic services under the guidance of the teachers, the intellectual and ideological leaders of the people." Donor agencies in Lebanon could have attempted to bridge the gap between the relief phase and the development phase if they had allocated a modest share of their inputs to construct teachers' houses in the villages and to supplement scarce recurrent funds available for in-service training of teachers at the provincial levels.

Processes of learning and of aid have both their own dynamics which are difficult to harmonize. Especially in the sensitive area of education, donors do not like to be labeled "supply agencies" while governments resist being forced into a role of dependent recipient. The degrees of difficulty in phases of relief, reconstruction or development vary only slightly. The concept which satisfies all parties is "co-operation," the interpretation of which can range from constructing a schoolbuilding to subsidizing university research.

Extreme examples at both ends of this continuum could be found in both Kampuchea and Lebanon. In general terms, the *Kampuchean* strategy was: to "fill-up" the country with supplies (food, agricultural seeds, medicine, notebooks/pencils, etc.) as quickly as possible, to ensure rapid distribution to the remotest areas as long as donors, with a well-known short "disaster memory," were still prepared to donate and the authorities were still prepared to receive.

Education fared well in this approach as the Ministry of Education was better organized and intellectually equipped for crisis management than most of the other sectors.

At the other extreme, in *Lebanon*, scarce resources were allocated by donors to the Institute for Women's Studies in the Arab World (University College, Beirut) to finance academic research on "socialization processes to Lebanese pre-school children; moral judgements of Lebanese children; etc." with little or no relevance to the learning needs of the most deprived.




Fig. 3.

Both governments and donors were eager to formulate a type of "production function" which could accommodate newly defined educational objectives i.e. long-term: co-operation for educational development; medium-term: typically a five-year plan period; and short-term: the best point of entry of external educational relief efforts.

Different tactics were used in the allocation on means. In *Kampuchea* the focus was on intersectoral co-operation and on the strengthening of local educational capacity in which the role of the teacher was central. In *Lebanon* a greater emphasis was put on physical infrastructure and on the strengthening of central educational capacity with a focus on administrators/managers. Both countries expressed a desire for relief and co-operation to support, in order of priority, educational growth (school construction) --> distribution (transport) --> change (programmes).

Within this common desire, the *Kampuchean* authorities favoured international support to such educational functions as custodial care and the introduction of productive, socio-cultural and political values to children and their parents while *Lebanese* educators favoured external support to functions like skill development for economic growth, curriculum development, examinations/testing, etc.

THE IMPACT OF AID PROCESSES ON EDUCATIONAL PROCESSES; AN ILLUSTRATION FROM LEBANON

The impact of aid processes on educational processes can be best illustrated in Fig. 3, which compares the original intentions of the donors (all sources combined) with the actual programmes being executed.

Who is learning: here the donors' intentions and the recipients' wishes coincided. The focus was on *deprived children and their families*. Inter-agency co-operation generally worked well in identifying and mobilizing the target population: e.g. the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) assisted UNICEF in the South in the identification of priority community needs, provision of community health services and distribution of furniture to schools. But some gaps were left in education in refugee camps; private poor schools in Beirut slums; and children in the Bekaa Valley.

Where: Here the focus was almost entirely on *schools*. "Overemphasis" here means that the donors could have diversified their inputs: e.g. non-pedagogical (basic needs) supplies, support to teacher training, non-formal training for unemployed youths, etc. On some occasions, the "eager" civil engineers, under contractual pressures to construct, actually over built low quality schools (sometimes in still empty villages) with the expectations that future population movements could thus be attracted or that schoolbuildings would be used by adults for non-formal education and social activities.

How: Here the central point was the *teacher* in classroom instruction with few linkages to work activities or out-of-school learning. The donors supported the quantitative

capacity of teacher training facilities without concern for the relevance of programmes and the introduction of new teaching/learning technologies. It must, however, be said that donors had few points of entry in this area, because of the large influence of the private sector and the absence of non-formal, participatory learning practices in the community.

When: Here the main question is the age of the target groups served. Adults and youths received very little attention. The needs are large. It is estimated that about 38% of the people of 10 years and over are illiterate (women 52%). Young people between the ages of 12 and 20, who have missed out on formal schooling during the war, have few productive skills for entering the labour market and the percentage of un(der)-employment is high, especially in the villages. However, as the needs may be felt but hardly ever expressed by the community, only few *literacy* programmes are in operation, mainly organized by religious groups and supported by international NGO's and private organizations.

What: The reference is to the content or type of education. Decades of international and regional co-operation with the specialized agencies in programme development have resulted in little change, mainly because of cultural reasons (advice is often ignored by foreign-trained national experts) but also because of the powers of the private sector (programmes in technical and vocational training are rather successful).

In summary, a more intensive dialogue between the donor agencies and decentralized educational authorities as well as with representatives from the private educational sector might have resulted in bringing the curve and dotted line in Fig. 3 more in harmony, and in overcoming some of the constraints which, up to now, have forced international aid for educational reconstruction to concentrate on school construction in greater Beirut and the South.

CONCLUSION

It is clear from the above personal account that the lessons learned from experiments in *Kampuchea* and *Lebanon* in the area of disaster relief and education are, and can only be, tentative. The visual presentations suggested in the text provide an illustration of ways in which a balance in rational and ethical perspectives can, in situations of disaster, become an important incentive for joint inter-sectoral action by government authorities as well as national and international non-government groups who generally work with flexible resource inputs from multilateral and bilateral donor agencies.

The key issue which the paper has tried to clarify is: "How can we identify and mobilize those national and international *forces* which can transform conviction into commitment and commitment into innovative educational action producing relatively quick results, measurable in terms of basic needs' satisfaction of the populations hardest hit by a disaster?"

EDUCATION FOR DEVELOPMENT IN DISASTERS

Educational planners and development specialists can learn a lot from working in a disaster situation. They will observe that disasters tend to result in a shift in paradigms regarding both the concepts of development and of education. A disaster, defined as a set of acute events that outstrip a society's ability to cope with them, is only marginally different from an extreme situation of under-development, now re-defined as the absence of a life support system for reducing the vulnerability of communities/people and for minimizing suffering.

Responses to a disaster are therefore more than emergency relief. They include elements of mitigation (to lessen the seriousness of the disaster's impact) and recuperation or recovery (e.g. self-help/solidarity programmes). "Education" in a situation of disaster means both "learning how to survive" and "using the school as shelter and a place of security and peace."

In view of the above considerations and findings, a tentative answer to the earlier questions would thus go more or less as follows:

Disasters, while hurting people, do not leave the victims helpless. They are capable of making rational decisions if confronted with well-informed alternative choices. When provided with the necessary (critical) resources, they will mobilize energy for participating in post-disaster relief activities. As disasters often high light the inherent weaknesses of social organization at the national and community levels, forcing all parties concerned to reappraise societal goals and to re-design action programmes for implementation, we can observe the emergence of a greater focus on human resources development, including innovative educational and training responses to urgent problems of survival.