

## ANNEX D

## EMERGENCY PUBLIC INFORMATION (EPI)

## D.I. PURPOSE

This annex establishes policies and procedures and assigns responsibilities to ensure the maintenance of a capability to disseminate accurate and timely information on potential and actual large-scale emergencies to the people of Liberty County.

## D.II. SITUATION AND ASSUMPTIONS

A. Situation.

1. Liberty County and several of its municipalities have continuing programs which use various channels of communication, including the mass media, to provide needed and desired information about local government activities and services to the general public.

2. During periods of emergency, the public needs, and generally desires, detailed information regarding protective action to be taken for minimizing loss of life and property. There are times, however, when disaster strikes without warning and the public information system cannot react rapidly enough to properly inform the public about the hazard. For this reason it is important that, prior to the occurrence of an emergency, the public be made aware of potential hazards and the protective measures that can be employed.

3. In major emergency situations, there may be large numbers of media representatives seeking information about the situation and about response actions. It is the policy of Liberty County to cooperate fully with the media, to provide complete and accurate information, and to create an atmosphere conducive to useful and constructive participation by the media in all phases of emergency management. Liberty County officials are developing procedures in cooperation with local news media to disseminate emergency information to the public. However, they recognize that a really large emergency will attract regional and national media representatives not parties to, or knowledgeable of, local media arrangements.

B. Assumptions.

1. During emergency situations, the general public will demand information about the emergency situation and instructions on proper survival/response actions.

2. The media will demand information about emergency situations. The local media, particularly broadcast, will perform an essential role in providing emergency instructions and up-to-date information to the public. Depending on the severity of the emergency, or the media's conception of the severity of the emergency, regional and national media will also cover the story and demand information and comment from local officials.

3. Depending on the severity of the emergency, telephone communication may be sporadic or impossible. Local and regional radio/television stations without emergency power may also be off the air.

4. Demand for information will be overwhelming, if sufficient staff is not provided and if staff is not trained and operating from a media relations plan.

### D.III. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

#### A. Phases of Emergency Management.

1. **Mitigation.** The public information program relating to hazard mitigation is critically important and challenging. Liberty County and its municipalities will carry on a continuing effort in this area coordinated by the governmental public information officers (PIO's) and drawing on the expertise, creativity, and other resources of all appropriate agencies, organizations, and individuals. Hazard mitigation public information is not regarded as "emergency public information." It can and should be approached as a topic of major importance to be covered in the regular public information programs using the best available tools and techniques of public and media relations. An example of this type of activity is the ongoing effort to inform the public and to encourage public participation in Liberty County's floodplain management program. Presentations are frequently made to civic organizations, and information is provided through both the print and broadcast media to maintain awareness of the flood hazard and to stimulate interest in and support for mitigation measures.

2. **Preparedness.** EPI preparedness includes development and maintenance of plans, procedures, checklists, contact lists, and standby public information materials. Staff must be trained to fill positions in the planned EPI organization. In an increased readiness situation, preparedness activities are accelerated; and there may be a need to respond to many inquiries from the media and the public.

3. **Response.** The EPI staff will be directly involved in the warning process. In large-scale disasters or disaster threats, the EPI organizations will be fully mobilized and will disseminate emergency instructions and information to the public in the following order of priority:

- a. Lifesaving/health preservation instructions;
- b. Emergency status information; and
- c. Other useful information, originated by the government or in response to media inquiries.

In both the response and recovery phases, the EPI organization may employ a Joint Information Center (JIC) and On-scene Public Information Teams, as appropriate and possible, depending on the nature of the hazard and the size and other characteristics of the disaster.

4. **Recovery.** During this phase, attention will be focused on restoring channels of communication with the public. Appropriate information will continue to be released, particularly on the restoration of essential services, travel restrictions, and assistance programs available. When time allows, actions taken during the emergency will be assessed; and the EPI Plan and checklist will be revised as necessary.

**B. Direction and Control.** In Liberty County and its municipalities, when the emergency organization is activated, the public information staffs are integral parts of the Direction and Control organizations. The PIO reports directly to the County Manager or equivalent in each municipality. PIO's are available to advise the elected officials, members of the policy group, on communication with the media and public. The Direction and Control Organization makes such decisions as establishment of a JIC and deployment of On-scene Public Information Teams in coordination with other levels of government and private organizations.

**C. Coordination of Public Information.** It is essential that the EPI organization and activity be recognized as a coherent system. In the State of Columbia, the EPI system includes Planning and Operations Zones, Operational Area (county), Mutual Aid Region, State and Federal PIO's, and public information representatives from private agencies. The size and other characteristics of the emergency will

determine how many levels of the system become actively involved and whether a JIC will be employed. For proper coordination in a large-scale emergency, it is essential that EPI be released from a single point to assure consistency and authenticity. The system will avoid having multiple releasing points. If State and Federal officials become involved, Liberty County will cooperate and provide appropriate support for a JIC. The following approach is a typical one for large-scale emergencies:

1. On-the-scene PIO's will coordinate among themselves and will normally release EPI at a single location. It is desirable that the public information representatives of local private agencies, such as the American Red Cross, Salvation Army, and utility companies, join in releasing EPI through the single coordination point.

2. If the State Emergency Management Agency activates an Emergency Public Information Center at the Headquarters in Capital City or the Governor's press secretary serves in that capacity, PIO's of local jurisdictions will coordinate EPI with the State PIO. In an emergency with statewide impact, there may be a State EPI center, and the Governor's press secretary may be a releasing point to the media, in coordination with the single news point or JIC at the scene. The PIO representing the Governor may release information through the JIC instead of the State Capital

3. The State PIO will summarize the disaster situation for the media and report on state agency response activities. The State PIO will also coordinate with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) regional or specific disaster PIO and provide EPI staff support to local jurisdictions on request.

4. The FEMA PIO at the FEMA regional office or at the disaster scene will provide information on Federal response efforts and Federal assistance programs and will coordinate with State and local PIO's. If practicable, Federal information coordinating functions should be integrated into the local or State news releasing facility, if it already exists in a JIC operation.

#### D.IV. ORGANIZATION AND ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITIES

##### A. Organization.

1. The EPI organization of Liberty County and of all Planning and Operations Zones within the County are integral parts of the Direction and Control Organizations. Operational relationships for EPI are, therefore, analogous to those for Direction and Control. For most disaster situations, EPI will be handled by a single PIO. For large-scale disasters, however, an EPI staff will be set up with an organization as shown in figure D-1.




Figure D-1. Emergency Public Information Organization

2. The PIO may serve in a dual role as chief public information staff person to the county manager and as the county's representative at the single news point or JIC, coordinating with PIO's in other governmental jurisdictions and private organizations. The PIO of Liberty County may be working in the JIC, in the county EOC, or more likely in both at various times in carrying out these responsibilities.

**B. Assignment of Responsibilities.**

**1. All Liberty County Government Departments.**

a. When the Liberty County emergency organization is activated, provide information concerning operations to the EPI Organization and issue all emergency information to the news media and the public through the EPI Organization to assure proper coordination.

b. Develop and maintain hazard-specific EPI materials, as requested by the county PIO.

**2. Emergency Public Information Organization.**

a. Develop a capability to rapidly release emergency instructions and information to the public through all available means.

b. Receive all calls from the media and the public concerning an emergency situation and respond with official information or relay calls to the EOC staff members, as appropriate.

c. Obtain reports or situation summaries from the EOC representatives of all emergency organization elements to maintain current estimates of the situation.

d. Prepare news releases.

e. Conduct situation briefings for visitors, media, etc., as appropriate.

f. Conduct tours of area affected by the disaster, when and if appropriate.

g. Deploy on-scene public information teams, as appropriate.

h. Establish a field media center, if appropriate, at a location separate from any field command posts. Be prepared to work with State and Federal PIO's in a JIC arrangement, preferably at a single location.

i. Arrange interviews with key personnel, when requested by media if and when possible without interfering with response operations.

Provide task assignments for other departments, agencies, and organizations as required.
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**D.V. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS**

A. As an integral part of the Direction and Control Organization, the EPI Organization is assigned space in the Liberty County EOC; and its needs for communications, supplies, and equipment are covered in the EOC-SOP.

B. If practical in a given emergency situation, public information personnel will continue to work in the office space normally occupied by the County PIO, since more space and better equipment are available there. This space is located in the County Courthouse and is readily accessible to the County EOC.

C. The County Courthouse Press Room is used initially as a media center if the nature of the emergency does not make this impractical. The size of this facility, however, makes it inadequate for almost any situation sufficiently serious to call for activation of the Liberty County Emergency Organization. The decisions on establishment of a larger media center and on its location are made by the Direction and Control Organization. A procedure for establishing a media center including a listing of suitable sites is included as Tab 1 to this annex.

D. A listing of media resources is included as Tab 2 to this annex.

E. A major activity of the Emergency Public Information Organization in nonemergency times is the development and refinement of EPI materials, such as camera ready copy for newspaper supplements and scripts and visual aids for use through the electronic media. Copies of some of these materials along with administrative procedures for their dissemination are included as hazard specific appendixes to this annex.

#### D.VI. PLAN DEVELOPMENT AND MAINTENANCE

This annex is maintained by the Liberty County Public Information Officer. Hazard-specific EPI materials included as appendixes to this annex are maintained by various departments and agencies of local government under coordination with the county PIO.

#### D.VII. AUTHORITIES AND REFERENCES

A. Authorities. Not used. See Section VII of the Basic Plan.

B. References.

Federal Emergency Management Agency. Disaster Operations - A Handbook for Local Governments, CPG 1-6, Washington, D.C.

Federal Emergency Management Agency. When Disaster Strikes - A Handbook for the Media, FEMA 79, Washington, D.C.

Federal Preparedness Circular - 8 of June 22, 1989, Public Affairs in Emergencies.

#### D.VIII. DEFINITION OF TERMS

EBS - Emergency Broadcast System  
EPI - Emergency Public Information  
EOC - Emergency Operations Center  
JIC - Joint Information Center  
PIO - Public Information Officer  
SOP - Standard Operating Procedure

## Tab 1 to Annex D

## Procedure for Establishing A Media Center

Include a thorough procedure for setting up a media center. (If operated jointly by all governmental units and the principal private organizations involved, the facility is called a Joint Information Center.) Cover the criteria for site selection, the physical layout, communications required, needed supplies and equipment, etc.

## MEDIA RESOURCES

Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) stations serving Liberty County:

Common Program Control Station (CPCS-1)

WQID (FM Radio)  
93.7 MHz, 24-hour Operation  
CC & 7th Streets  
Central City  
Ph: 436-8582/436-2242  
Affiliate: ABC Network

Primary Relay Station

WVMI (AM Radio)  
570 kHz, 24-hour Operation  
CC & 7th Streets  
Central City  
Ph: 436-8582/436-2242  
Affiliate: ABC Network

## SUPPLEMENTARY STATIONS

AM Radio

WBND  
1490 kHz, 18-hour Operation  
RR # 02, Central City  
Ph: 374-9825/374-9044  
Affiliate: RKO Network

WGCM  
1240 kHz, 19-hour Operation  
RR # 03, Fisherville  
Ph: 452-9495  
Affiliate: ABC Network

WGUF  
1130 kHz, Daytime Operation  
C & 24th Streets, Fisherville  
Ph: 452-1851/452-1852  
Affiliate: Mutual Network

WROA  
1390 kHz, 24-hour Operation  
M & 17th Streets, Harvest Junction  
Ph: 863-0917  
Affiliate: NBC Network

FM Radio

WOSM  
103.1 MHz, 17-hour Operation  
FF & 6th Streets, Central City  
Ph: 374-2528/374-2529  
Affiliate: AP News Network

WGUF  
96.7 MHz, 18-hour Operation  
J & 11th Streets, Deep River  
Ph: 596-5972  
Affiliate: ABC Network

WTAM  
102.3 MHz, 20-hour Operation  
RR # 05, Kingston  
Ph: 545-2285  
Affiliate: NBN News Network

WZKX  
107.1 MHz, 24-hour Operation  
M & 17th Streets, Harvest Junction  
Ph: 863-0917  
Affiliate: NBC Network

NOTE: Supplementary stations, when instructed by the FCC Emergency Action Notification, will suspend normal operations after notifying the public to tune to the EBS station serving the designated areas.

Tab 2 to Annex D  
(Continued)

## TELEVISION FACILITIES

WLOX-TV  
CH 13, 20-hour Operation  
CC & 7th Streets, Central City  
Ph: 436-3281  
Affiliate: ABC Network

GE Cablevision  
CH 4 (Cable), 24-hour Operation  
F & 29th Streets, Central City  
Ph: 374-4459  
Affiliate: All Major Networks

## LIBERTY COUNTY NEWSPAPERS

<u>Name &amp; Location</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Phone</u>
Central City Publishing, Inc. P & 19th Streets Central City	Daily	436-2776
Fisherville Express F & 17th Streets Fisherville	Daily	425-2020
Junction Guide D & 5th Streets Harvest Junction	Daily	863-5711
Kingston Weekly B & 1st Streets Kingston	Weekly	545-3371
Deep River Sun C & 16th Streets Deep River	Weekly	596-5560



## APPENDIX D.1

## STANDBY EPI MATERIALS FOR THREAT OF NUCLEAR ATTACK

[NOTE: This appendix includes EPI instructions for dissemination during a crisis, and for urgent broadcast upon Attack Warning, concerning the need (1) to put shelterees in the maximum protective posture against fallout and (in risk areas) blast; and (2) to take fire prevention and control actions in risk areas. These actions are essential whether people are sheltered in home basements or in public shelters. Because of the unusual importance of these actions, this appendix is provided as part of the Liberty County example plan. It is urged that all communities prepare to disseminate this type of material both during a crisis and upon receipt of Attack Warning. This appendix should also include copies of the camera-ready copy for EPI newspaper supplements and any other standby materials that have been developed to inform the public about the nuclear attack hazard.]

### EMERGENCY PUBLIC INFORMATION INSTRUCTIONS ON SHELTER PROTECTIVE POSTURE AND FIRE PREVENTION AND CONTROL

This appendix contains EPI materials on the need (1) to place all shelterees in the maximum protective posture against fallout and (in risk areas) blast; and (2) to take fire prevention and control actions.

These materials will be (1) disseminated by all available news media during a period of international crisis; and (2) via EBS station WQID upon receipt of Attack Warning.

*[Note: The following materials should be adapted as necessary by each community depending upon the type of nuclear attack risk assumed, blast or fallout only. The material below is suitable for use in newspapers. It should be adapted by the EPI officer for broadcast during a crisis and upon receipt of attack warning.]*

1. *Home Shelter*--People who plan to seek protection in their own homes should take the following actions:

- *Improve fallout protection* of the home, if it has a basement. If there is no basement, consider construction of an *expedient shelter*. *[Actions to improve fallout protection of homes both with and without basements are discussed and illustrated in FEMA Publication H-20, Planning for Survival, and in the text for FEMA's home study course HS-4, Preparedness Planning for a Nuclear Crisis.]* Note that an expedient shelter can provide good blast as well as fallout protection, possibly permitting survival within two miles or less of a nuclear burst.
- *Gather supplies* that would be needed for up to two weeks' survival if sheltered in the home (food, water, medicines, bedding, clothes, sanitation container, battery-powered radio, etc.).
- If in or near a city of about 50,000 or greater population, or if near an important military base (*that is, if in a possible "risk area"*), take additional actions to prevent fires caused by nuclear weapon explosions:
  - Cover windows with aluminum foil, whitewash, or some other opaque substance (if available) and close window blinds, drapes, or shades. This will help to prevent ignition of interior furnishings by the heat flash of the weapon.
  - Fill tubs or other containers with water for use as auxiliary water supply and self-help firefighting.

- If Attack Warning is received, people in *risk areas* who take shelter in their homes:
  - Take shelter sitting or lying down in the *CORNER of the basement that is farthest belowground*. This provides the best *fallout* protection and also the best protection against *blast*. (Do not stay in the middle of the basement.)
  - If there is no basement, take shelter lying down in the *middle of the house*, surrounded on all sides and overhead by furniture (and boxes or dresser drawers filled with earth) to provide some protection against low-level blast and fallout radiation. Line the protected area with mattresses and blankets.
- If a nuclear weapon explodes and affects the house:
  - *Immediately* go through the house and check for small fires (or ignitions) caused by the explosion (burning drapes, smoldering upholstery, etc.). Stamp out burning drapes, throw smoldering furniture out the windows, etc. People could have 10 or 20 minutes in which to *extinguish ignitions*--before these could grow into a fire that might destroy the house. Fallout (from the weapon that caused the ignitions) would not arrive until about 15 to 30 minutes after the explosion.
  - After checking for ignitions and extinguishing any found, *return to the best fallout-protected part of the house*. Listen for information on the radio concerning the degree of fallout hazard in the area. If the fallout level is high, people may have to stay in sheltered areas for one or up to two weeks. Also, instructions may be given over the radio on where to go after leaving shelter. In areas that receive heavy fallout, it may be necessary for people to move 20 to 40 miles away, *after* leaving shelter, to an area that had much less fallout.
  - If the house received severe damage, it may have been partly collapsed into the middle of the basement or even blown away. Yet many people in basements might have survived. Survivors in basements would need to *improve fallout protection*--by adding as much overhead protection as possible, in the corner of the basement, using planks and other material from the partly-destroyed house.
- If Attack Warning is received, people in *lower-risk areas* who take shelter in their homes should take the same precautions against fallout as risk-area people. That is:
  - They should take shelter in the *corner of the basement farthest belowground*; or if there is no basement, they should develop a shelter area in the middle of the house.
  - They should *stay in the protected part of the house* until advised by radio that they can leave shelter. (In some areas of heavy fallout, people would have to move elsewhere after leaving shelter.)
  - They would not have to extinguish ignitions or fires, or take other actions that would be needed in blast-damage areas.

2. *Public Shelter*--People who plan to seek protection in *larger buildings (that is, in public shelters)* should take the following actions:

- Gather *supplies* that would be needed for up to two weeks' survival in the public shelter (food, water, medicines, bedding, clothes, battery-powered radio, etc.)
- Recognize that while some public shelters would have a Shelter Manager present, others would not. If there is no Shelter Manager, survival of people in the shelter could depend on someone *taking charge and acting as Shelter Manager*--including taking the immediate actions outlined below.

- In *risk areas*, it would be critically important for acting Shelter Managers to take the following actions *as soon as possible after Attack Warning and arrival of people in the shelter*:
  - For *fire prevention*, people should be sent *immediately* to each floor of the building to *close ALL window blinds or curtains*.
  - Put all shelter occupants in the best *blast protection* posture immediately: Sitting back-to-back about two feet from outer walls of basement, or near columns--*not* beneath unsupported parts of basement ceilings. Where necessary to occupy upper floors, shelterees should lie down in the central part of the building, out of line of flying glass and debris, and hold onto each other.
  - If the building is affected by a nuclear explosion, *immediately* send people to each floor of the building to *check for ignitions* caused by the explosion (burning drapes, smoldering upholstery, etc.) Stamp out burning drapes, throw smoldering furniture out the window, etc. People could have 10 to 20 minutes in which to *extinguish ignitions*--before these could grow into a fire that might destroy the building. Fallout (from the weapon that caused the ignitions) would not arrive until about 15 to 30 minutes after the explosion.
  - After checking for ignitions and extinguishing any found, *return to the best fallout-protected part of the building*.
- In *both high-risk and low-risk areas*, it would be urgent for acting Shelter Managers to take the following actions:
  - Place shelter occupants in *maximum fallout-protection posture* promptly upon arrival. In high-risk areas, this will result to a large degree from placing shelterees in the blast-protection posture outlined above. In low-risk areas, acting Shelter Managers should place as many people as possible in basements. Where it is necessary to occupy upper floors, shelterees should be placed in central part of buildings, avoiding areas with windows.
  - Should an attack occur and fallout be deposited in the locality, acting Shelter Managers should take action to *identify locations within shelters providing the best fallout protection, by use of radiological monitoring instruments, if available*. The acting Shelter Manager should look for a set of civil defense radiological monitoring instruments. If a set is located, it should include instructions (printed on a yellow plastic sheet, How to Use Your Radiological Instruments to Find the Best Shelter and to Minimize Your Exposure to Radiation).
  - If instruments are not available, the acting Shelter Manager should still try to locate the best protected areas possible for the shelterees. The best protected areas are generally belowground areas first and the central core areas of larger buildings second (except for the top couple of floors and the first or second floors up from ground level).
  - Acting Shelter Managers should ensure maximum use of best-protected space. This may involve *crowding shelterees in best-protected areas*. Depending upon the weather, this may result in high heat and humidity developing, which can in turn result in dangerous heat exhaustion. If heat and humidity problems develop, acting Shelter Managers must move some shelterees to less well protected parts of the shelter, if possible rotating shelter occupants to and from such areas.
  - The acting Shelter Manager should ensure that some of the shelter occupants listen for information on the radio concerning the fallout hazard in the area. If the fallout level is high, people may have to stay in shelter for one or up to two weeks. Also, instructions may be given over the radio on where to go *after leaving shelter*--possibly to an area 20 to 40 miles away, that received less fallout. The Acting Shelter Manager should organize this movement.

## ANNEX E

### EVACUATION

#### E.I. PURPOSE

This annex provides for the orderly and expeditious evacuation of any part of the population of Liberty County if such action is determined to be the most effective available means for protecting people from the effects of a disaster. The annex provides a planning base for any type of evacuation. Unique factors relating to evacuation on account of contingencies specifically identified in the Liberty County Hazards Analysis are discussed in appendixes to the annex. (Reception and Care operations are covered in a separate annex, and much material crucial to evacuation operations is included in the Direction and Control, Communications, and Shelter annexes. Since it is the policy of Liberty County's governments to avoid unnecessary repetition in emergency plans, this annex must be used in the context of the whole emergency operations plan.)

#### E.II. SITUATION AND ASSUMPTIONS

A. Situation. Evacuating hazardous areas is the most effective action for protecting people in many disaster or disaster-threat situations. Many evacuations are carried out every year, and it is not unusual to hear about large-scale evacuations involving thousands or even tens of thousands of people. Evacuation operations can be accomplished more rapidly and effectively if planning is carried out and systems are developed and tested before they are needed.

B. Assumptions.

1. The number of people initially affected is not a satisfactory criterion for deciding whether or not to activate the emergency management organization. The nature of the threat, the possibility of escalation, the need for expert consultation, etc., must also be considered.
2. People who refuse to follow evacuation instructions of public officials will be left alone until all who are willing to leave have been provided for. Then--time permitting--further efforts will be made to persuade the stay-puts to evacuate.

#### E.III. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

A. General.

1. Evacuation may prove to be the only practical means of protecting people from the effects of some disasters. Simply defined, evacuation is movement of people from a place of danger to a place of relative safety. Problems involved may range from minor to enormous depending on the dimensions, or characteristics, of the hazard and the evacuation.
2. Several hazards identified in the Liberty County Hazards Analysis have the potential for necessitating evacuation of substantial numbers of people. The governments of Liberty County and its municipalities have agreed that it is not possible to define a "large-scale" evacuation. It is entirely possible to evacuate a large number of people without activating the emergency management organization. At the same time, an emergency calling for evacuation of only a few people could escalate or be characterized by secondary effects.
3. The decision to activate the emergency organization for purposes of managing an evacuation is generally left to the discretion of emergency services field commanders. There are, however, provisions for the emergency management organization to be activated and to assume control of emergency operations

other than at the request of field commanders. These provisions are described in "Concept of Operations" in the Direction and Control annex.

4. This annex treats evacuation in the generic sense, i.e., the annex and its tabs are applicable to any evacuation situation. Special hazard-specific appendixes address factors unique to evacuation for particular disasters. These appendixes are especially important for this annex, because the places of safety, the destinations for evacuees, differ from hazard to hazard. The potential danger from the environment through which the people must move is a critical matter to be considered, and this too varies greatly depending on the hazard.

5. Jurisdictional interrelationships are a matter of great concern in an evacuation situation. Geographical areas and divisions--State, Mutual Aid Regions, Operational Areas, and Planning and Operations Zones--are described in the basic plan. Proper coordination among divisions in an evacuation situation is critical to successful operations and can be accomplished only through carefully planned and executed Direction and Control.

#### B. Direction and Control

1. Direction and Control as a function is covered in a separate annex to this plan.

2. Direction and Control of evacuation operations will normally be carried on by the jurisdiction nearest to the disaster site that has sufficient scope of control to manage all required operations. An evacuation entirely within one P&O Zone will be managed by the emergency organization of that zone unless and until higher authority assumes control. If more than one zone is affected, as when people from one zone evacuate into another, the Operational Area (County) emergency management organization will ordinarily assume control. P&O Zone organizations will continue to function under the direction of the OA policy group.

3. Mutual Aid Region (MAR) organizations normally function only in a coordination role with respect to affected OA's. Unaffected OA's will provide support to those directly involved only at the direction of the MAR. MAR's may assume control of operations in an OA, if that jurisdiction's emergency management organization is destroyed or otherwise unable to function. Such assumption of control by a MAR would occur only at the direction of State authorities.

C. Continuity of Government. COG must be maintained in an emergency evacuation situation. Detailed procedures for accomplishing this are included in the Direction and Control annex and in the appendixes to this annex. Essentially, COG will be maintained by relocating government operations, as necessary, to alternate EOC's or to mobile EOC's with temporary transfers of authority to higher or lower emergency management organizations. Lines of succession to all key positions will be clearly established, and all essential records will be protected from destruction or loss.

### E.IV. ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES

A. Organization. Jurisdictional and organizational relationships in evacuation operations vary depending on the scale of the movement. The chart in Tab 1 to this annex depicts these relationships for a very large evacuation involving several OA's. Liberty County could play any of the roles indicated in this chart. The emergency organization at the county level is as described in Section IV of the basic plan.

B. Responsibilities. This section concerns evacuation operations in the general case. Additional information relating to particular hazards is included in appendixes to this annex. In situations involving evacuation of a number of people sufficient to cause mobilization of the emergency management organization, the following assignments will be carried out to the extent permitted by time and circumstances:

1. Emergency Program Manager

- (a) Assembles an analysis team to support the coordination group in the EOC.
- (b) Coordinates environmental monitoring activities.

2. Analysis Team

- (a) Obtains full information on evacuation operations initiated by first responders.
- (b) Obtains information on characteristics of the disaster agent involved.
- (c) Obtains meteorological data and any other relevant information
- (d) Prepares recommendations on the area to be evacuated and continues to monitor the situation and recommend changes as indicated.

3. Law Enforcement

- (a) Provides security for the evacuated area.
- (b) Participates in the warning process by sweeping assigned areas, reinforcing information provided through mass media.
- (c) Provides traffic control to facilitate evacuation and return movement.
- (d) Assists in evacuation of prisoners, as required

Lists of task assignments similar to those above should be included for all pertinent public and private entities that would have some responsibilities in an evacuation situation.

E.V. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

This plan contains an annex on Resource Management, which provides detailed information on many topics related to Administration and Logistics. The policy of the Liberty County Government on this subject as applied to emergency situations is, in general, as follows:

- A. Administration and logistics will be controlled by the Liberty County manager.
- B. Normal practices and procedures will be continued under emergency conditions to the extent practicable.
- C. During emergency operations, every effort will be made to document each transaction sufficiently so that complete records can be reconstructed and claims properly verified after the emergency period has passed
- D. No administrative process will be permitted to interfere with operations essential to preventing injury, loss of life, and significant property damage.

## E.VI. PLAN DEVELOPMENT AND MAINTENANCE

This annex is developed and maintained by the Liberty County Department of Emergency Management. The County emergency program manager will determine requirements for implementing plans and procedures to support evacuation operations and will provide guidance to officials of P&O Zones and other organizations, public and private, where the need for such plans and procedures exists.

## E.VII. AUTHORITIES AND REFERENCES

A. Authorities. See Section VII, Part A, of the Basic Plan. An opinion of the County Attorney issued in 1980 held, in effect, that Liberty County officials may compel individuals to evacuate, if a local emergency is proclaimed by the Board of Supervisors and an order is promulgated specifically authorizing such action. Alternatively, people can be forced to evacuate on the authority of a court order, if such an order can be obtained from a judge of the County Superior Court.

B. References.

Federal Emergency Management Agency, Disaster Operations--A Handbook for Local Governments, CPG 1-6. Washington, D.C.

Perry, Ronald W. Citizen Evacuation in Response to Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Threats. Seattle, Washington: Battelle Human Affairs Research Centers.


Perry, Ronald W.; Lindell, Michael K.; and Green, Marjorie R. Evacuation Planning in Emergency Management. Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company, Lexington Books, Battelle Human Affairs Research Centers.

## E.VIII. DEFINITION

Evacuation. As an emergency management function, evacuation is a protective action--moving people from a place of danger to a place of relative safety. As a phenomenon, it is a temporary mass movement of people that collectively emerges in coping with community threats, damages, or disruptions.

Tab 1 to Annex E

**GENERAL ORGANIZATION FOR EVACUATION**



\_\_\_\_\_ Indicates command authority

----- Indicates coordination



## APPENDIX E.1

## EVACUATION IN RESPONSE TO THREAT OF NUCLEAR ATTACK

## E.1.I. PURPOSE

This appendix provides information and procedures relating to the unique aspects of evacuation operations undertaken to remove the population from areas considered more likely than others to be affected directly by blast overpressure, heat, or initial nuclear radiation, if there should ever be a large-scale nuclear attack.

## E.1.II. SITUATION AND ASSUMPTIONS

A. Situation.

1. A nuclear attack on the United States would most likely be preceded by a period of international tension and crisis. Sufficient time might be available for protective actions to be taken, including temporary relocation of residents of possible target areas to areas of lower risk.

2. By agreement between the State Division of Emergency Services and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), part of Liberty County has been designated a nuclear attack high-risk area for which population relocation should be planned. The area to be evacuated when directed is shown in the map at Tab 1. The map at Tab 2 shows the areas FEMA designates as likely to receive blast overpressure of two pounds per square inch (psi) or more.

3. In addition to the designated part of Liberty County, the Capital City area, the Metropolis area, and the immediate vicinity of the General Patton Military Base in Lober County are scheduled for evacuation under similar circumstances. For this reason, travel beyond the Liberty County boundary to the north or to the southeast on Interstate 101 will not be practicable.

4. The State emergency plan has established lower-risk host areas for each of the areas to be evacuated. Areas reserved for people from the Liberty County risk area are the less hazardous parts of Liberty County, Stramford County, and parts of Apple and Green Counties. The locations of these areas, resident populations, and number of evacuees assigned are shown in a table at Tab 5.

5. Destination counties are preparing plans for the reception and care of relocated residents of Liberty County. The State is preparing plans providing for the redirection of supply channels for food, fuel, and other essential consumer goods to these counties.

6. Certain vital facilities and activities must be continued in the evacuated high-risk area to preserve the integrity of the vacant city, to assist in the provision of essential goods and services to the relocated population and their hosts, or to continue industrial production important to national defense. These critical activities are summarized in Tab 6.

B. Assumptions.

1. Evacuation of the population of the high-risk area will occur only at the direction of the Governor of the State of Columbia, most likely at the request of the President of the United States. Measures preparatory to such evacuation may be undertaken during a crisis at local option.

2. Evacuation of the high-risk area population will be directed by the Governor, not voluntary, and in general accordance with this plan.

3. Evacuation will be primarily in family groups using private vehicles over a period not to exceed 3 days.

4. About 15,000 residents not having automobiles available to them must be provided with other transportation to their destinations.

5. Some portion of the high-risk area population, estimated at 10 percent or more, can be expected to leave the area in advance of a directed evacuation. These spontaneous evacuees are expected to consist mainly of families whose members do not have public or emergency responsibilities and who have a vacation home or relatives in mind as a destination. The location, identification, and destination of this group will not be known.

6. Once evacuation of the high-risk area population has been directed, the minimum duration of the relocation will be 7 days. The maximum duration of the relocation is uncertain but could be several weeks.

7. Under certain circumstances, such as a protracted relocation period, the State or Federal government may require the resumption of certain critical production and service activities in the high-risk area in addition to the essential activities shown in Part A of the table at Tab 6 without a general return of the population. Organizations likely to be affected are shown in Part B of the table.

8. Return of the relocated population to their homes following evacuation will occur only at the direction of the Governor, most likely at the request of the President of the United States

### E.1.III. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

A. Time Phases of a Nuclear Attack Threat Evacuation. The time phases applicable to nuclear attack threat evacuation correspond to those recognized for any disaster. It may be helpful to identify them in somewhat different terms, as follows:

predisaster	=	precrisis
preimpact	=	escalating international crisis
impact	=	movement
emergency	=	sustaining
recovery	=	return.

1. Precrisis. The precrisis period is normal readiness during peacetime.

2. Crisis. The crisis phase includes increased readiness and mobilization of emergency services to prepare for movement, if and when ordered by the Governor.

3. Movement. The movement phase begins when the Governor of Columbia directs evacuation of nuclear attack high-risk areas.

4. Sustaining. The sustaining period begins with arrival of evacuees in the reception areas and principally involves support and care of evacuees and the indigenous population as described in the Reception and Care annex and the In-place Protective Shelter annex. The sustaining period also includes maintenance and support of critical production and service activities by essential personnel commuting to and from the high-risk area, as provided in this appendix.

5. Return. The return period begins when ordered by the Governor of Columbia and covers the time necessary to safely move the population back to their homes.

**B. Overall Concept of Nuclear Attack Evacuation Operations.** Evacuation would not be implemented unless there were a threat of nuclear attack of unprecedented seriousness. It should be understood that nuclear attack could occur at any time during the crisis, movement, or sustaining phases. Since there is no assurance that evacuation would be directed, readiness to implement the County's In-place Protective Shelter Plans must be emphasized during the crisis period. If attack warning is received, everyone must take shelter in the best available nearby facilities. While the development and use of protective shelters is not covered in this annex, evacuation planning must not lose sight of the fact that, fundamentally, evacuation in response to the nuclear attack threat is movement to SHELTER; it is movement to a place where shelter is likely to provide a more realistic prospect of survival.

1. **High-Risk Population.** The population of Liberty County is 276,000, of which 218,000 reside in the census tracts designated as parts of the nuclear attack high-risk area. This is described in the maps and tables included in the Tabs to this appendix.

2. **Organizational Relocation.** Approximately 30 percent of the Liberty County high-risk population are employees or dependents of employees of the key organizations listed in Tab 6. Every effort will be made to encourage these businesses and agencies to relocate organizationally to host areas reserved for them. In many cases, this is necessary so that the organization will be able to maintain continuity of essential functions. In all cases, organizational relocation is an effective way to use the existing framework of the community to respond to the demands of a major crisis. It attempts to hold together units that have significant problem-solving abilities and preserves the identity of valuable community resources.

This point-by-point presentation of the overall concept of evacuation operations should be continued, providing enough detail to convey a clear picture of the scope and complexity of such operations in a nuclear-attack threat situation.

**C. Direction and Control.** In a national security emergency that requires evacuation of nuclear attack high-risk areas, a State of War Emergency is presumed to exist. Under these circumstances, all levels of the emergency management organization are fully mobilized and activated. Direct lines of authority exist from the Governor of Columbia to the chairperson of the Liberty County Board of Supervisors and from the chairperson to the elected officials designated in the Direction and Control annex of this plan as chiefs of the P&O Zones.

**D. Continuity of Government.** When it becomes necessary to evacuate the Liberty County nuclear attack high-risk area, the government agencies of Liberty County, Central City, and Harvest Junction will move their bases of operation and continue performing duties assigned under this plan. The Liberty County and Central City Direction and Control Organization will move to the Fisherville EOC. Continuity of control will be maintained by verifying that an adequate Direction and Control operation is active at the Fisherville EOC and by transferring authority before closing down the principal county EOC. The chairperson and the heads of key emergency service agencies will maintain contact via mobile radio units while in transit to the alternate EOC.

#### **E.1.IV. ORGANIZATION AND ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITIES**

**A. Organization.** In a national security emergency involving a threat of nuclear attack, the total emergency management organization at the OA (county) and P&O Zone levels will be activated.

### B. Responsibilities.

1. All elements of the emergency organization will review and improve evacuation plans and procedures to the extent possible in the time available. Responsibilities are generally the same as those shown in the Evacuation annex, Section E.IV.B. Chiefs of agencies and organizations are responsible for reviewing their procedures, for verifying that resources identified are available and in satisfactory condition, and for ensuring that all personnel--including any recently hired--are familiar with their duties in a large-scale evacuation.

2. Each organization listed at Tab 6 is expected to have a plan to relocate as a group to the reception area specified. Larger organizations and those with special needs--such as responsibility for institutionalized persons--have been assigned to specific facilities in host areas. Chiefs of organizations are responsible for coordinating with the managers of the facilities to which they are assigned.

### E.1.V. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

The administrative and logistical problems associated with evacuation of the nuclear-attack high-risk area are covered in appendixes to the Resource Management annex. These problems are extremely complex and in many cases, are multijurisdictional in nature. Mobilization of private-sector resources and capabilities is fully covered in the Resource Management annex.


E.1.VI. See E.VI. To summarize, the planning process that has resulted in this appendix has focused on the movement of people out of and back to the nuclear attack high-risk area and includes commuting of key workers to carry on essential operations in the high-risk area during the sustaining phase of evacuation. This appendix identifies the destination host areas and reception centers for all evacuees. The Reception and Care function, however, is covered in a separate annex.

E.1.VII. Not used. See E.VII


### E.1.VIII. DEFINITION

Host Area (Attack Preparedness Evacuation). An area determined by careful hazard/vulnerability analysis to be subject to relatively less serious weapons effects in a large-scale nuclear attack and, therefore, considered suitable for receiving evacuees from higher risk areas and providing the necessary protection to sustain life and reduce incidence of illness from radiation and other attack-related causes.

Tab 1 to Appendix E.1




Tab 2 to Appendix E 1




**MAP 2. AREAS ASSUMED LIKELY TO RECEIVE  
TWO P.S.I. OR GREATER BLAST OVERPRESSURE**

Tab 3 to Appendix E.1



**MAP 3. NUCLEAR ATTACK HIGH-RISK  
AREA EVACUATION DIVISIONS**

Tab 4 to Appendix E.1



MAP 4. HIGH-RISK AREA DIVISIONS IN CENTRAL CITY



Tab 5 to Appendix E.1

TABLE 1						
RECEPTION AREAS						
Host Counties and Principal Towns	Resident Population	Organizational Relocates	Relocates By Bus	Relocates By Auto	Relocates Total	
Stramford County	35,000	23,997	4,800	40,203	69,000	
Orangeville	18,000	23,997		32,000		
Raymond	3,000		4,800	5,000		
Fallbrook	2,000			3,000		
Liberty County	55,000	35,727	7,600	64,573	108,000	
Fisherville	22,000	19,537	5,400	42,000		
Apple Valley	4,000	4,989	1,000	8,000		
Deep River	3,000	3,266		5,000		
Gold Mine	5,000	1,935	1,200	10,000		
Apple County*	15,000	4,109	2,100	22,491	29,000	
Strathmore		4,109	2,100	19,000		
Levering				4,000		
Green County*	6,000	2,015	760	9,225	12,000	
Pinewood		2,015	760	9,225		
Totals	111,000	65,848	15,260	136,892	218,000	

\* Parts assigned to receive Liberty County evacuees.

Tab 6 to Appendix E.1

TABLE 2

## RELOCATION OF ORGANIZATIONS

## A. Necessary High-Risk Area Operations

<u>Organization</u>	<u>Key Workers</u>	<u>Total Employees</u>	<u>Employees &amp; Dependents</u>	<u>Host Area</u>
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## B. Possible Additional High-Risk Area Operations, if Evacuation Period is Protracted

<u>Organization</u>	<u>Key Workers</u>	<u>Total Employees</u>	<u>Employees &amp; Dependents</u>	<u>Host Area</u>
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## C. Host Area Support Organizations

<u>Organization</u>	<u>Key Workers</u>	<u>Total Employees</u>	<u>Employees &amp; Dependents</u>	<u>Host Area</u>
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Tab 7 to Appendix E 1

TABLE 3					
EVACUEES ANALYSIS					
Risk Area Division	Total Population	Organization Evacuees	Evacuees By Bus	Evacuees By Auto	Number of Autos
1	6,000	3,208	420	2,372	818
2	500	148	35	317	109
3	3,000	886	210	1,904	657
4	1,000	296	70	634	219
5	6,200	1,832	434	3,934	1,357
6	7,000	2,068	490	4,442	1,532
7	7,800	2,305	546	4,949	1,707
8	8,600	2,541	602	5,457	1,882
9	7,300	2,157	511	4,632	1,597
10	6,600	1,950	462	4,188	1,444
11	8,000	2,364	560	5,076	1,750
12	7,000	2,068	490	4,442	1,532
13	22,104	6,531	1,547	14,026	4,837
14	12,014	3,550	841	7,623	2,629
15	15,678	4,632	1,098	7,948	3,430
16	20,499	6,057	1,435	13,007	4,485
17	20,689	6,113	1,448	13,128	4,527
18	23,711	7,065	1,674	15,172	5,532
19	19,509	5,764	1,366	12,379	4,269
20	14,596	4,313	1,021	7,262	3,194
Totals	218,000	65,848	15,260	136,892	47,207

Tab 8 to Appendix E.1

TABLE 4					
ROUTE ANALYSIS					
Route	Lanes (Narrowest)	Capacity (Veh/Hr/Lane)	Risk Area Divisions	Number of Cars	Hours Required
SR 5 west	2 westbound	1,200	1,3,6,13,14	10,473	4.4
I-107 south	4 southbound	1,500	16,19,20,7,12, 15,17,18	28,376	4.7
I-101 east to SR 76 north	1 northbound	850	10,11	3,194	3.8
SR 68 north	1 northbound	850	2,4,5,8	3,567	4.2
SR 68 south and west	1 southbound	850	9	1,597	3.2

## APPENDIX E.2

EVACUATION IN RESPONSE TO AN INCIDENT/ACCIDENT AT  
BLUE WATER NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

This appendix shows how provisions dealing with the unique evacuation requirements of potential and real disasters caused by various hazards can be integrated into the multihazard plan. Planning and preparedness for the offsite effects of a radiological emergency associated with a commercial nuclear power facility must be carried out in accordance with 44 CFR parts 350, 351, and 352 and the documents referenced in paragraph E.2.VII.B.

## E.2.I. PURPOSE

This appendix provides information concerning the area in Liberty County for which evacuation should be considered in case of an incident/accident at the Blue Water Nuclear Power Plant (BWNPP) with potential or actual release of nuclear material. Evacuation planning for this hazard focuses on the 10-mile radius plume emergency planning zone (EPZ) which is shown in the map at Tab 1 to this appendix.

## E.2.II. SITUATION AND ASSUMPTIONS

A. Situation. Evacuation may be the best available strategy for protecting the residents of the threatened area in case of a release, or the possibility of a release, of radioactive material from the Blue Water facility.

B. Assumptions.

1. One of the most serious problems involved in evacuation of the 10-mile (radius) EPZ is the possible necessity of evacuating Columbia State Prison. The prison has been designated a separate and distinct Planning and Operations (P&O) Zone. Operations relating to it are the responsibility of the prison authorities and other State officials. Operations, including movement of the prison inmates, will be fully coordinated with the local governments involved, and local governments will provide all possible support.

2. Mandatory evacuation is possible under laws of the State of Columbia. Whether or not these laws need to be invoked will be decided based on prevailing conditions in the particular emergency situation.

## E.2.III. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

A. Establishment of Controlled Area. In the event of a Site Emergency or a General Emergency at the Bluewater Plant, a controlled area will be established around the existing or projected location of contamination, identified by sector and distance, to control access to the area and to control evacuation of the population if that becomes necessary.

1. Traffic Control Points (TCP's) will be established by law enforcement personnel at road intersections immediately outside the existing or projected contaminated area.

2. All vehicles approaching the controlled area will be stopped and will be advised of the hazard or denied access to the area depending on the severity of the emergency as determined by the Direction and Control organization. The only authorized access points to the controlled area will be designated by the on-scene control point, and emergency response forces will be directed to those locations.

3. Traffic on main arteries will be rerouted to avoid a controlled area and to prevent interference with emergency response forces and evacuation routes.

B. Evacuation. If an evacuation is ordered, the TCP's will mark the controlled area boundary. The on-scene control point will establish evacuation routes, direct evacuees to the designated reception areas and centers, and coordinate all evacuation activities. The evacuation areas in the Liberty County portion of the 10-mile EPZ, the evacuation routes available for each, and the destination relocation centers are shown in the map at tab 2 to this appendix. A table showing the populations of evacuation areas is included at tab 3 to this appendix.

1. Evacuation instructions and orders will be made in accordance with the procedures established in the Warning annex.

2. A roster of people with special needs who desire assistance in a potential or actual disaster situation is maintained by the Liberty County Department of Emergency Management. If an evacuation is required, the emergency program manager will coordinate the provision of assistance to any persons in the evacuation area whose mobility is impaired by disability or other causes.

3. The primary means of evacuation will be by private automobile. Persons without private automobiles will be assisted, as necessary, by law enforcement and fire and rescue personnel to reach staging areas designated by the county EOC. From there, they will be evacuated by buses to reception centers in safe areas of the county. A table showing evacuation routes, capacities, and estimates of the time required to clear the 10-mile EPZ is included as tab 4 to this appendix.

4. All vehicles leaving the controlled area will be stopped and inspected for possible radioactive contamination. Vehicles contaminated in excess of 220 DPM per 100 square centimeters will be impounded at the TCP on the evacuation route to prevent spreading the contamination.

5. All persons leaving the controlled area will be registered for possible future reentry clearance to assist in the control of farm animals, etc.

6. At the same time, all persons leaving the controlled area will be checked for possible radioactive contamination, as discussed in the Radiological Protection annex.

E.2.IV. Not used.

E.2.V. Not used.

E.2.VI. Not used.

## E.2.VII. AUTHORITIES AND REFERENCES

A. Authorities. Not used.


**B. Reference.**

Federal Emergency Management Agency and U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Criteria For Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Washington, D.C., 1980, and NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Supplement 1, Washington, D.C., 1988.

**E.2.VIII DEFINITION**

Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ). A generic area defined about a nuclear facility to facilitate offsite emergency planning and develop a significant response base. It is defined for the plume and ingestion exposure pathways. During an emergency response, best efforts are made making use of plan action criteria without regard to whether particular areas are inside or outside EPZ's.

Tab 1 to Appendix E.2





Tab 2 to Appendix E.2

Include a map showing evacuation areas, evacuation routes, and reception centers.

Tab 3 to Appendix E.2

Include a table showing the populations of evacuation areas.

Tab 4 to Appendix E.2

Include a table showing the results of a traffic analysis for emergency evacuation.