

RWANDA

Health Sector Needs and Recommendations for the Transition Phase

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PREFACE

This report addresses issues related to the transition from relief to development, focusing on Rwanda and the health sector. This is an independent report and does only reflect the opinions of the authors.

The conclusions of this study are in large based upon a mission to Rwanda undertaken by the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (University of Louvain la Neuve) at the request of European Commission Humanitarian Office (ECHO-1), which took place between October 25 and November 15, 1997 and consisted of five experts whose names and area of specialisation are attached in Annex 1. The team spent a total of two weeks in Rwanda and visited camps and hospitals in Butare, Gisenyi and rural Kigali. The list of the people met is attached in Annex 2. The mission members wish to thank Mr M. Hiel, Mr H. Lefevre, Mme G. Toussaint of ECHO - 1, Brussels for their briefings and documentation during the preparation of the mission. In the field, Mr A Sullivan not only shared with us his knowledge of the situation, his information sources, but also his office and the facilities therein. The constructive interest and co-operation of Mr I Zabala, acting head of delegation was invaluable in making the mission a success.

The methods used to achieve the objectives were interviews with Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs), governmental bodies, United Nations (UN) agencies and bilateral donors. Site visits were undertaken, as far was opportune and feasible, to gain a first-hand impression of the field conditions. The mission also included a thorough review of documents, both public and for limited circulation, obtained through research in New York, Washington and Geneva.

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ACRONYMS

ASOFERWA	Association des Femmes Rwandaises
AVEGA	Association des Veuves du Génocide
BUFMAR	Bureau des Formations Médicales Agrées au Rwanda
CAMERWA	Centrale d'Achat des Médicaments Essentiels au Rwanda
DGVIII	Direction Générale - Développement (relations extérieures et de coopération au développement avec l'Afrique, les Caraïbes et le Pacifique; convention de Lomé))
ECHO	European Commission Humanitarian Office
EDF	European Development Fund
EU	European Union
GNP	Gross National Product
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internal Displaced Population
MDM	Médecins du Monde
MS	Ministère de la Santé
MSF-B	Médecins Sans Frontières Belgique
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
NTC	National Trauma Centre
OFDA	Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
OPHAR	Office Pharmaceutique du Rwanda
OTI	Office of Transition Initiatives
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WHO	World Health Organisation

1. Introduction

Rwanda is a small, landlocked country. It is one of the most densely populated countries in Africa. Its population is nearly half the size Uganda's but with only a fraction of Uganda's land area. Rwanda is poor and largely dependent on agriculture. Its economic problems grow out of the country's basic realities: lack of capital, lack of technology and far too many people for the available resources.

In 1996, Rwanda had an estimated population of 7.2 million and an estimated rate of natural increase of 2.6 per cent per year¹. By 1998, the population had increased to 7.9 million, a figure considered by the US Committee for Refugees as being higher than the pre-genocide levels. These figures may be the result of a mass influx of returning refugees as well as natural increase.

The outbreak of the war in 1990 severely damaged Rwanda's economy, already weakened by rapid population growth and diminishing per capita food production and GNP. Its per-capita income plummeted from 373 US\$ in 1990 to 179 US\$ in 1996 according to World Bank estimates. Predominantly rural, - 90 per cent of the population engage in agricultural activities - Rwanda was self-sufficient in food until population growth pushed the country into a structural food deficit in the 1980s. By 1997, agriculture had returned to about 80 per cent of pre-war levels, and the small industrial sector to about 62 per cent of pre-war output. International donors finance more than half of the recurrent budget. About 40 per cent of the recurrent budget goes to the military².

1.1 The historical context of Rwanda

Over the last decade tensions have been increasing in Rwanda. In 1990, there was a first escalation of the conflict with incursions from the north of the Ugandan border by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), mainly Rwandan

¹ MSP, WHO, April 1997

² USAID/Rwanda, Integrated Strategic Plan, March 1997

Tutsis in exile from 1959. These tensions finally culminated in April 1994 with the assassination of President Habyarimana of Rwanda, followed by a genocide where Tutsis and moderate Hutus were killed by Hutu extremists.

Following the genocide, the RPF returned to take power in the country. With the victory of the RPF in Rwanda, Tutsi refugees, who had fled the country in 1959, returned³. As a consequence, more than one million Hutus fled to neighbouring countries such as Tanzania and Zaire, launching one of the biggest humanitarian operations since World War II. For a period of two years (1994-1996), the expelled government and its army (ex-FAR and the Interahamwe) controlled the refugee population in the camps, mainly in the region of the Kivu and posed a threat for the government of Rwanda. The situation was further complicated by the on-going internal conflicts in the Kivu region, where in 1996 the oppressed Banyamulenge pushed the Rwandan refugees out of the camps back to Rwanda.

The mass influx of the refugees from the camps, together with returnees from Tanzania, increased social disruption and insecurity in Rwanda. At present, insecurity remains very acute in certain regions in the north west such as Ruhengeri, Gisenyi and Kibuye, mainly caused by the presence of Interahamwe troops. Moreover, many of the returnees from different periods have not been integrated within the social and political system and remain dependent on external aid.

Since 1994, the international community has provided 1.5 billion US\$ of humanitarian aid, mostly as direct aid through NGOs. While it is generally considered that the emergency period is now over, major institutional problems are delaying the rehabilitation process and development of the country. Furthermore, civic and military insecurity has prevailed in the majority of the prefectures since January 1997 and continues to be quite serious. At the present time, the country requires a complex mix of humanitarian, transitional and developmental actions.

With new leadership in the government actively discouraging ad hoc NGO action, aid programmes are now moving towards a more planned and

³ These numbered around 800,000 and are now referred to as old case-loads.

structural approach. This trend is followed up by the international community.

2. Rwanda: the larger picture

The climate in Rwanda at the end of 1997 could be characterised as an uneasy calm and concerns of various natures preoccupied both the government as well as the international community. The combination of these factors creates up to now a complex and uncertain backdrop to provision of any aid: developmental, humanitarian or transitional. Although many factors play a role in determining humanitarian needs, the major ones are described below.

2.1. War and insecurity

While **insecurity** had been a continuous problem since the genocide in 1994, actually there are indications that it is **increasing in both intensity and scope**. The main region in the grip of the rebel movement are the western provinces and along the shores of Lake Kivu referred to as the Red Zone⁴. Insecurity is also present in the south along the border with Burundi.

At the end of 1997, Phase 3 security conditions for all expatriate UN personnel were in place in the western Provinces of Cyangugu, Gisenyi, Kibuye and Ruhengeri, requiring military escort for all travel to rural areas. Reports from October 1997 indicate increased fighting in Ruhengeri where the security conditions have since deteriorated. Active fighting is reported outside Gisenyi town. In addition, four staff from Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) were killed earlier in 1997 (living in Gisenyi Prefecture on or near the main road to Ruhengeri) and six are reported missing. These casualties were caused by crossfire rather than being singled out for attacks. Recent reports say that incidents are on the increase and have spread further in the country⁵.

⁴ The intransigencies of the situation can be encapsulated in the position of the Tutsi dominated ruling party who feel that without complete control the next genocide will indeed finish them off. The rebel movement clearly perceives the current situation to be temporary with time and numbers on their side.

⁵ 300 people were killed in an incident in Northwest Rwanda on 17.11.97 when Hutu rebels stormed a prison to free prisoners suspected of genocide killings (De Standaard, 22.11.97). Officials in Rwanda say at least 80 people have been killed in a bus ambush near Gisenyi in the country's northwest as they were travelling to work at the town's brewery (Reliefweb 20.01.98).

2.2. Mass displacements in the region

Even if the situation in Rwanda is contained, the threat of an **explosive crisis in neighbouring Burundi** is increasingly real. With continued hostility between Tanzania and Burundi and the insurgency in the north-west of Burundi (Cibitoke, Bubanza, Bujumbura and Burari regions), any conflict in Burundi would push the victims into Rwanda, placing an additional burden on its already fragile structures. Recently, in November 1997, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported fighting in the bordering Burundian province of Cibitoke which has provoked a new exodus of refugees and displaced persons into Rwanda. The security situation in Burundi is not improving, indicating that outflows such as the one reported above are likely to multiply in the recent future.

Further, following the victory of Kabila over Mobutu, **the situation in the Congo and in particular in the Kivu** is far from clear. The original conflict has not been solved but has, in fact, become even more complex. Overall, the situation in the Great Lakes region is far from calm and the three regions (Rwanda, Burundi and the Kivu region) have their own internal conflicts that are mutually related. Intensified conflict in this region could also result in mass displacements of refugees into Rwanda, causing pressure and burdening its infrastructure and social welfare systems.

2.3. Food and malnutrition

It is generally believed that a severe and widespread **shortage of food** could be expected in the short term. Malnutrition has become a chronic problem laying the foundation for appalling famines should major shortages occur.

Although the Rwandan economy is largely based on agriculture (40 per cent of GDP, 80 per cent of exports, 90 per cent of employment), the best years in terms of agricultural production (1985-86), food supply was hardly sufficient. With a population growth of 2.6 and decreasing production growth, food security was already in danger before the conflicts.

By 1995, Rwanda was already producing only 50 per cent of the country's food needs. Part of the reason was a severe shortage of manpower with about 800,000 persons killed in the genocide and many thousands having

fled the country. Moreover, land holdings are often very small and generally inadequate for feeding an average family. On the other hand, areas with the greatest loss of lives such as Butare (in the south) still have a significant share of fertile land that remain uncultivated. In western provinces, some parts of the land remain uncultivated because of insecurity. Further, a drop in production levels in Masisi (Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo), traditionally the breadbasket for the region and a major supplier for Rwanda, has great influence on access to food in Rwanda. More recently, delayed rainfall and mismanaged seed and tool distribution, coupled with increased pressure from the influx of returnees has only aggravated the situation.

At present, food shortages for 1998 are expected. Provinces which will require emergency feeding and food distribution are the south-western provinces (Gikongoro, Butare, Buyumba)⁶ and regions affected by insecurity. Immediate preparations for tools, seeds and fertiliser distribution could avert or minimise a severe food shortage. Some Food for Work programmes have been initiated but often the most malnourished cannot work or at least work regularly enough to compensate for their nutritional deficit.

2.4. Poor human resource base

A severe **shortage of qualified human resources** is crippling the country's ability to get back into a steady developmental track. A major part of the educated or skilled class were affected by the genocide and many others left the country. For example, in the health sector there were 261 medical doctors until 1994. In 1996 there were only 113 for a population of six million. There are no registered midwives although 80 per cent of the women deliver at home. Of these, one in four deliver alone without any help. Schools and training institutions have been partially or totally non-functional for a few years.

A related human resource problem is the lack of motivation to work due to low salaries and a shortage of material resources. This further limits the

⁶ These provinces have always been susceptible to food shortages because of high altitudes, poor soils and high population density. The latest harvest has been very poor due to late and excessive rains. The northern provinces of Burundi, on the other hand, have had better harvests and are selling their production at high prices to Rwandese population.

availability of skilled personnel for public welfare. This problem is further aggravated by a severe distortion of revenue in the country provoked by international aid agencies paying premiums that the government will not be able to maintain in the long-term.

2.5. Groups with special needs

Certain population groups have been severely marginalised since the war and genocide. Among the many needy groups are the handicapped, young ex-combatants, women and child-headed households and abandoned children. Since 1994, there has been a **significant increase in the number of women and child headed households**; they are one of the largest marginalised grouped and represent great social impact today and probably in the future. A recent socio-demographic survey (Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning/UNFPA, July 1997) of nearly 20 000 households (5 per cent of the census cells) showed that about 34 per cent of the households in Rwanda are headed by females, an increase of 13 per cent from 1992. Households are more likely to be headed by females in Gitarama, Butare and rural Kigali.

2.6. Emerging and re-emerging diseases

With a breakdown of surveillance systems, patchy vaccination programmes and incomplete reporting, the **risk of major disease outbreaks** is indisputably high. With a low health and nutrition status and inadequate diagnosis and treatment capacities, outbreaks of cholera, malaria, AIDS, typhus and other fevers can spread beyond the borders of the country, becoming a regional problem. Further, mechanisms for early identification of new or re-emerging diseases is very limited, exposing all communities to disease risk. This issue is discussed in greater detail later in the report (see 6.3).

2.7. Ownership of land and homes

Finally, **scarcity of housing and limited access to land are central issues that remain unsolved and aggravate social tensions**. As far as land is concerned, the high density of population and hilly terrain had always been a fundamental source of tension. Due to the crisis, the juggling of land and home ownership between “old case-loads” and “new case-loads” of returnees are a

source of major discontent and could degenerate into communal violence. Most recently in October 1997, the Prefect of Kigali reiterated the eviction orders given to a group consisting mostly of survivors of the genocide and those from the "old case-load", demanding they move into homes of plastic sheeting.

Having identified the major problems that cripple the country and threaten international aid, a few words on some of the positive elements are warranted.

First, **a major part of the country is recovering from the crisis, rebuilding public infrastructures and systems.** Many provinces of the country are stable and reconstruction has begun. In particular, most of the health infrastructure (which was relatively good prior to the war) has been reconstructed and is more or less operational (see Table 2, Chapter 6). Second, **the international community** (including most of the EU member states), each within its own context, has **generally adopted a policy of support for the government** with consensus on the importance of having a functioning government in place⁷. The government of Rwanda is actively working on clear policies for sustainable development and is finalising development plans and a macro-economic framework in the major sectors with the World Bank, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and other bi-lateral donors.

Unfortunately, very recently, there are some indications that the even-handedness of the government is breaking down, as possible precursors to renewed problems⁸. A growing number of Rwandese are beginning to question the government's policies and management practices citing corruption and mismanagement at high levels.

⁷ However, the international community is watching closely the tensions in the western part of Rwanda, which is not officially recognised by the government of Rwanda at this time (November 1997).

⁸ Helping the Government to maintain a stable presence, providing services to its population and dispense justice would be the most effective conflict prevention action at this time.


3. Effects of international humanitarian aid on development

The impact of massive international emergency aid on the local economy is a very complex issue and warrants a separate discussion for Rwanda. Meanwhile, it is still worthwhile to look at two specific effects that are of immediate relevance. The first will address issues related to food security and distribution. The second section discusses the more indirect but critical impact of international humanitarian aid on labour market distortions.

3.1 Food security and distribution

The arrival of large quantities of food aid and an enormous number of NGOs delayed the recovery of agricultural production after the war in 1994. The needs were so dire and the food supplies so abundant, that NGOs could 'flood' the Great Lakes Region with food aid (see Figure 1). But this strategy of flooding, which normally ensures a trickle down effect to reach the poor, requires such a high level of supplies that it cannot be maintained for long.

Figure 1: Food Aid Deliveries to Rwanda for 1990 to 1997(Actual Tons)



Source: World Food Programme, Interfais Group, 1998


Along with the international press, food aid also turned its focus away from Rwanda in 1996. Meanwhile, the situation was not improving due to chaotic distribution mechanisms that excluded the really needy in some areas and farmers were unable to earn enough because of the collapse in agricultural

prices in some regions. The fall in prices dampened production for next season. Only those merchants who owned means of transport took advantage of the situation and set up trade between regions of food surplus and regions of food shortages where prices were higher.

With the shrinking of funds in 1996, better targeting of the food beneficiaries became necessary. Co-ordination structures by World Food Programme were already created in 1995 in order to improve efficiency of food aid. But apart from institutional channels, such as schools, hospitals, nutrition centres, targeting population groups in a country like Rwanda is a very difficult task since most of the population lives dispersed over the hills in single detached homes (rugos). For example, by the end of 1997, despite committed resources, the system was unable to procure and distribute seeds to many of the needy families. Targeting and distribution systems remain two major unresolved problems of the Rwandan food situation.

By the end of 1997, nearly 1.3 million returnees arrived from the neighbouring countries and along with a natural increase of nearly 200,000 births that year, the demand for food increased significantly. This sudden growth in the population along with poor harvests for the staple foods early 1997 and insecurity problems resulted in searing staple food prices throughout the country (eg. At the end of 1997, bean and Irish potato prices are at such elevated levels that only high-income households can afford to purchase these commodities, see also Figure 2).

Figure 2: Rwanda : Food Prices



Source: FEWS/USAID Rwanda vulnerability update, November 1997

In the short and medium term future, Rwanda will still be facing major food shortages due to mass return of refugees, natural increase of the population on one hand and unforeseen agricultural shortcomings and climatic irregularities on the other. Even in an optimistic scenario with successful agricultural recovery and fewer returnees, food shortages are expected to be significant in 1998⁹.

In conclusion, there is no doubt that generous food aid has met partially the immediate needs of returning refugees earlier this year and is currently helping to reduce the psychological and actual vulnerability of rural households. Distribution of farm implements, fertilisers, seed grain and other such inputs as medium term interventions will still be required¹⁰. Nonetheless, it is not a solution for sustained food security in Rwanda. Although, both donors and the Rwandan government recognise that food security cannot be sustained only through food aid, serious efforts are required to design and implement realistic food security mechanisms in the country.

3.2 Labour market distortions

As mentioned in Section 2, there is a severe shortage of skilled Rwandan personnel which is a major debilitating factor in the future development of Rwanda. In this context, international humanitarian aid (which is often an important source of employment) over long periods of time can further aggravate the situation by provoking labour market disturbance through salary distortions.

As a consequence of limited state revenue, public sector salaries are very low. Although the consumer price index increased by a factor 17 since 1966, salaries increased only three fold¹¹. For most of the levels this is below the living wage. Given the small number of educated labour, high competition on this market raised wages paid by other institutions and created serious

⁹ Maton J., Van Bauwel A. Parole des chiffres, étude sur la sécurité alimentaire du Rwanda, aspects économiques et sociaux. Université Gent, Juillet 1996, annex C.

¹⁰ FAO, Note d'information, Septembre, Octobre, Novembre 1997; for criteria see FAO, Note d'information, 22 Septembre 1997.

¹¹ GOR - MINIFOP, La question des salaires des agents de l'état, Commission spéciale des salaires, Kigali, Février 1997, p. 1.

distortion. NGOs and international agencies easily surpass the salaries offered by the state. (see Table 1). This distortion not only fuels inflation on Kigali's markets but results in a brain drain from the ministries to aid agencies, where top function were mostly occupied by expatriate labour force.

Table 1: Comparative Remuneration Levels in RWFrancs in 1996

Function	Government	NGOs	Per cent Difference
Project Officer	37.950	110.000	190
Office manager	33.270	80.000	140
Secretary	17.940	50.000	178
Doctor	29.475	100.000	239
Nurse	22.494	41.000	82
Nurse aid	12.096	32.500	168
Driver	12.960	50.000	285
Secretary	17.280	50.000	189
Cleaner	6.750	30.000	344
Guard	5.250	30.000	471
Cook	12.000	37.000	208
Technician/radio operator	12.960	50.000	285
Store keeper	11.250	45.000	300

Source: Sunter A., *A Living Wage and the Government Salary Structure: Rwanda.*, DDSMS/UNDP, Kigali, February 1996.

The shortage of qualified human resources in the country and the brain drain from the ministries resulted in a collapse of the professional capacity within the civil service. To fill the gap, ministries recruited non-qualified personnel who were paid very low wages. Donors, therefore, began to give bonuses as a supplement to these low salaries to motivate the civil servants and to strengthen the capacity of the ministries, of which health ministry was one of the main "beneficiaries". This type of ad hoc salary support by donors reflects partly the government's own incoherent remuneration system which provides a wide variety of salary supplements in the form of "*primes, indemnités et avantages*"¹². This further complicates the distortion in revenue since there is

¹² SUNTER A., Formulation of a Salary Policy and Unified Incentives System for the Public Service of Rwanda., GOR Mission Report, March 1997

no rational public remuneration policy.

In the past year, two bodies are being created to address this problem. First, an inter-ministry group, *Commission Special des Salaires*, is developing a new salary policy and an unified incentives system, which should motivate donors to finance a part of the income increase. The Ministry of Health has already set salary standards for the health sector at the district level, the operational management unit of the future. Secondly, a fund to re-adjust salaries, called '*Fonds National de Consolidation des Salaires du Secteur Public*' based on state and donor contributions will be established¹³. Unfortunately, its success depends on the continued support of the donor community.

Although salary support to civil and social sector employees has become commonplace in post conflict countries like Rwanda, this type of action should not be a continued responsibility for donors. The Rwandan government should shift its spending priority from defence, which absorbs a third of its national budget, towards a higher and more coherent salary structure.

¹³ GOR - MINIFOP, La question des salaires des agents de l'état, Commission speciale des salaires, Kigali, Février 1997

4. Humanitarian relief and development: How and when could transition begin?

4.1 Should humanitarian aid continue in Rwanda?

In autumn 1997, the government of Rwanda presented a very clear position on humanitarian aid and the operation of foreign NGOs on Rwandan soil. This can be summarised as follows. First, the country is no longer in an emergency situation requiring humanitarian aid similar to the conditions the country faced in 1994. The government of Rwanda is preparing a long-term development plan, a budgetary and accounting framework with the UNDP and the World Bank. Second, all NGO operations, humanitarian and developmental, are required to receive governmental approval with respect to their areas of operation and their personnel recruitment¹⁴.

There was general agreement from all major donors that aid activities should no longer operate outside the overall national plans or in an uncoordinated way¹⁵. In the light of this, the co-operation programmes of both of EU member states and others, therefore were in favour of a continuing humanitarian support but within a national co-ordination framework.

4.2 Approaches to Transition

Transition issues are very much in the forefront of the concerns of major international aid partners in Rwanda. Some donors have initiated new approaches towards an integrated and coherent programme linking humanitarian and development projects. But most still suffer from institutional and conceptual disjunction between relief and development. Most organisations are trying to come to terms with a 'post-conflict situation' which is a complex mixture of instability and growth. In Rwanda, three major international aid agencies (The World Bank, UNDP, USAID) have been

¹⁴ Large amounts of funds have been brought in and spent in the country without any accounting or planning.

¹⁵ Uncontrolled and massive humanitarian aid can cripple the country in many ways. NGOs have built clinics or dispensaries that they have left behind for the government of Rwanda to operate, widespread donation of cars and equipment absorbs a significant proportion of the budget in just running costs. Furthermore the country is unable to generate revenue because most of the fuel, supplies and other equipment are imported tax free into the country as humanitarian goods.

developing clear approaches to phase the transition from relief to development.

The World Bank has initiated a post-crisis component in its overall development package plan for Rwanda. The two elements contained in this component are demobilisation and post-conflict community rebuilding, using a grass roots participatory approach¹⁶. These projects are seen as typical for the transitional phase and fit in the "*framework for World Bank involvement in post-conflict reconstruction*"¹⁷. Administratively, the financing procedures in this transitional phase are much more flexible than the usual World Bank loans. The credits are called *Emergency Credits* and the main characteristics are that these credits have fewer conditions and are more quickly disbursed.

The *United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)* has gone through several adaptations to work within this situation of emergency and development. In the transition phase, UNDP has chosen to work more through NGOs with smaller projects than by direct intervention¹⁸. In addition, UNDP foresees an adaptation of the standard procedures for project formulation and approval which will allow more flexible interventions in a crisis and post-crisis situation¹⁹. Further, to enhance a quicker recovery of the Ministries, and to restore a minimum of order and co-ordination in the rehabilitation process, UNDP has invested in capacity building by providing Technical Assistants and support for the preparation of the Round Table Conference.

An initiative has been undertaken by *UNHCR and UNDP* to work together for a coherent transition strategy. A Joint Programming Unit has been created which has as its mandate the planning from relief to development. This represents a rare marriage of emergency and development agencies working together in Rwanda.

¹⁶ This consists of providing small grants to villages and communes for them develop their own plans and priorities for development aid. United States Agency for International Development (USAID), United Nations Development Fund (UNDP) and the government of the Netherlands, among others, are also supporting similar community based actions in order to stimulate solidarity and reconciliation.

¹⁷ WORLD BANK, *A framework for World Bank involvement in post-conflict reconstruction*, April 1997.

¹⁸ The involvement of NGOs has helped to allow more flexibility in the structures of UN - system in the transition phase while guaranteeing a certain degree of co-ordination and coherence of all the micro-projects.

¹⁹ UNDP, Advisory Note, Draft, 6th Rwanda/UNDP programme, September 1997, p 6.

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) - active through both their humanitarian (Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance) and development divisions - created the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) in 1994. OTI has started up projects with the aim of facilitating the shift from emergency to development. In Rwanda, the major activities supported by OTI are assistance to the justice system, security activities and activities encouraging democratic participation such as support to women in decision making. Moreover, the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) of USAID currently funds also several humanitarian projects of which some include preventive measures or actions focused on longer term impact.

4.3 Options for transition actions

Which types of action can be considered transition remains a debated issue. For all practical purposes, transition activities would be those which require a rapid jump - start (essentially a quick input of resources) and without which development programmes cannot function. They are also activities that prevent backsliding of communities into destitution or renewed conflict. Prevention of income erosion, prevention of "whole family" migration, maintenance of stable food consumption by emergency short - term measures, rapid employment opportunities, even temporary or seasonal; "disaster-proofing" vulnerable groups by direct targeting; on-the-job-training in humanitarian projects are all examples of transition actions.