In these circumstances the Police Commissioner's appointment to the State Disaster Committee (as Chairman) or to the S/TES (as Director) makes this possible.

While these roles enable the Commissioner to influence every DRO in times of emergency operations, none are so directly influenced as are the S/TES. Most, if not all of the traditional DROs have other legislative frameworks that can protect them from external interference to some extent. In addition, the roles that these other DROs perform as lead combat authorities often act as a barrier to encroachment by other organisations. Unfortunately for the S/TES, the roles that they have been tasked with are, in many cases, not as specialised as some of their "peer" organisations. Most of their tasks could be undertaken by other organisations. The legislation associated with the S/TES is interpreted as making them a 'support organisation'. With the exception of some S/TES' being given lead combat roles under certain hazard situations, this is probably an appropriate interpretation of their role. However, every DRO that is not assuming a lead combat role at the time is also a support organisation. What is apparent, in the case of the S/TES is that the interpretation given to the type of support that they perform is more a 'secondary support' role, and it may not always be regarded as essential support. In some recent situations in States where the counter-disaster network has been activated, failure to inform the S/TES that disaster operations were in progress until later in the development of the crisis supports this suggestion. With the legislation being interpreted this way, and the influence that senior officials from other organisations have on the content of the legal base, S/TES's do not have much opportunity to exert their capabilities.

2.
POWER BASE

It was only during the 1970's that State and Territory governments actually placed S/TES's under ministerial responsibility (see Wettenhall, 1980). In most cases the minister for this organisation is the Minister for Police, whose title was later expanded to Minister for Police and Emergency Services (to cover all DRO's). The late start in being attached to ministerial liaison has no doubt jeopardised the S/TES access to top-level decision-making processes and resource allocation bids in the formative years of the organisations's life-cycle. This has probably contributed to the 'stunted' development of the organisation. It is possibly a factor associated with the lack of legitimacy afforded the S/TES by other DRO's.

3. RESOURCE ALLOCATION

The S/TES are dependent on external organisations and host communities for many of their essential material resources. Certainly, they are dependent on their host communities for volunteer membership. The dependence on the host community means that many essential items may not be available for some years until the local community is aware that specific hardware is necessary, and which has not been provided by the NDO (which is the source of the majority of standard counter-disaster material resources). Thus, there can be a gap between awareness of the necessity for an item and the eventual procurement of it as the LVES and local government attempt to acquire the monies to purchases the item/s. This often means canvassing the community for sponsors and donors - activities that take the volunteer members of the S/TES away from their tasks of counter disaster training and preparedness. Because of budgeting constraints and limited freedom to procure items other than those available through official channels (i.e. that are on the 'shopping list' primarily made up by NDO), there are limitations placed upon the organisation in its build-up of materiel. Similarly, the human resource allocation is smaller for this organisation than for any other DRO. There are obvious reasons why this should be so in terms of the differences between primarily volunteer-based versus professional organisations; the difference between 24-hour services and 'regular office hours' organisation and the like. However, what should be addressed is whether or not the human resources that are available within the S/TES, especially at the level of permanent officers, is sufficient for the types of operations the organisation is meant to perform, and at a level which is optimal in terms of comunity requirements during crisis periods. It is this perspective which suggests that the number of permanent staff is grossly insufficient. This is acutely evident when a natural disaster or large-scale emergency is in operation for any length of time.

4.ORGANISATIONAL AUTONOMY

The extent to which the S/TES is able to control its own affairs without external interference is significantly curtailed, both in non-emergency and operational phases. At the root of this constraint lie the power-holders within the counter-disaster organisational network. The S/TES has three external 'bosses' to which the Director, if he is not the Police Commissioner or a seconded police officer, is answerable. The Director-General NDO, the Police Commissioner, and the Minister responsible for emergency services are all capable of influencing in a most direct fashion the operations of the S/TES (the exception to this situation is, again, Queensland, whereby the Coordinator-General rather than the Commissioner of Police has influence; however, the degree of control meted out to QSES is less than other states because of its narrower role within emergency management).

Where the Police Department has daily governance over the
S/TES, for instance, when the Commissioner of Police is
also the Director of S/TES, autonomy for the organisation
is reduced because there is a direct monitoring capability
that can be used to check the activities of the organisation,
and if need by, re-direction can take place immediately.
Furthermore, the ability to control the organisation in a
direct manner because of this dual leadership also means
that there is a ready access for immediate control of the
organisations' resources. An 'external' Director (i.e. the
Commissioner of Police or his delegate) may not see the
necessity for particular resource allocation/acquisition in
the same way that an 'internal' Director may - the 'internal'
Director is probably looking at resource acquisition in
terms of organisational survival as well as utility (all
organisations have multiple goals, and some of these include
methods to ensure organisational survival).

Similarly, the influence of the NDO in its resource allocation
is able to directly influence the capabilities of the state
S/TES HQ as well as the LVES. There are many instances in
a number of States where the type and quantity of material
resources supplied by NDO has been inappropriate to the
requests of the organisation and to the local requirements.
This appears to be exacerbated by the 'one-way' communication
process between NDO and the S/TES.

5.ORGANISATIONAL DOMAIN

In a paper prepared by the Legislative Research Service
section of the Department of the Parliamentary Library, for
the Commonwealth Parliament, Dunn (1983) suggested that
counter-disaster organisational frameworks fell into two
broad types. First, were the networks which had as their
'control groups' the State Disaster Committees and the
S/TES. These would call for support from the DRO'and ERO's
at the appropriate level within the community, and together,
this system would combat the disaster agent and attempt
restoration of the affected impact zone. In the other type,
the State Disaster Committee would be the only 'control'
group, and would nominate a lead combat authority to assume
command of eliminating the disaster threat. Following
this, the State Disaster Committee would organise the
support organisations to restore the community. The S/TES
would be part of this support group.

In practice, however, these two planning frameworks do not
appear in quite the way as Dunn implied. In the first
type the practice appears to be to reduce the involvement
of the S/TES and instead centralize the decision-making (or
'control') within the State Disaster Committee and the
State coordinator. The chairman of the Committee is usually
the Police Commissioner, who can also be the State or
Territory Coordinator. The Police Department then oversees
the coordination of DRO activities. In this arrangement

the S/TES is used as a 'back-up' service when and if the
necessity arises. In the second type of organisational
plan the role of the S/TES is more often than not immersed
within the operations of the traditional DROs. In this
manner, the S/TES has to 'fight it out' as best it can with
its more powerful colleagues. In both cases the difficulties
experienced by the S/TES is tied up with the lack of
understanding about the role the organisation plays. It is
quite astonishing to realise the level of misunderstanding
that has been permitted to continue for so long within the
ranks of the disaster-relevant organisational network; it
is apparent throughout the entire net. This lack of
understanding over the role of the organisation affects
the domain effectiveness of the S/TES. If the domain of
the organisation is not well-known, or is misunderstood, or
if the roles of the organisation have been blurred because
of imprecise role definitions, the organisation is likely
to be neglected because its part within the network is
unclear. This is precisely what is happening to the State
and Territory Emergency Service organisations.

6. RECRUITMENT OF SENIOR STAFF

Until very recently senior officials with the 'independent
S/TES' - those at the level of Director and Deputy Director -
were pre-selected on the basis of their previous association
within the armed services. There was a slight deviation in
some states with the 'second generation' Directors when some
were selected from the Police Department (on secondment), as
well as from the armed services. In some instances, such as
the South Australian State Emergency Service (SA SES) the
directorshop has recently been given to an individual with
occupational experience outside of these two 'traditional'
areas (although the new encumbent had service in the SA Police
previously). Such a narrow recruitment base for the top jobs
within the organisation must have an effect on the direction
the organisation takes. It is difficult to imagine the S/TES
having a 'personality' different from the NDO or the Police
if people are recruited from one to the other with little or
no entry by people with additional necessary skills from
other agencies.

Furthermore, there is no career progression within the S/TES,
nor is there likely to be such a career structure in the
forseeable future. This means that people who have the
skills and knowledge that are necessary for directing a
counter-disaster organisation (and these skills can be
acquired from outside the military and police systems) would
in all likelihood have little interest in joining an
organisation that has no job prospects.

This situation is quite different from any of the other DRO's
and both the public and private ERO's where a bureaucratic
model predominates, which provides a clearly recognized
occupational ladder and incremental rewards. Secondment from

established DRO's and occupying senior positions with former
armed services personnel is but one way to fill directorships.

7.   LEGITIMATION

If an organisation is poorly regarded, even in only relative
terms, it will not have the legitimacy it needs to compete
effectively. In such situations goal attainment and long-
term, organisational survival may be in doubt. It is doubtful
whether the S/TES has become an accepted part of the
Australian counter-disaster organisational network in
Australia. The S/TES's were established partly because of
the perceived inability by the traditional organisations to
cope with the emergency management requirements experienced
in a string of disasters that occurred within a narrow time
sequence (1967 to 1975). The S/TES's were established as
part of the counter-disaster re-organisation that followed
this period, and were designed to fill some of the gaps
within the old counter-disaster network to increase the
effectiveness of the entire system. However, in order to
perform any roles within the net, the S/TES were entirely
dependent on the established organisations to create a niche
from which they could operate. In the absence of any niche
being readily available because of the partitioning of
functions amongst the traditional organisations, the S/TES
were reliant on organisations devolving tasks and permitting
the S/TES to 'pick them up' as legitimate domains. The
traditional services were, on the whole, reluctant to do this
because they remained unconvinced of the necessity for another
counter-disaster organisation; none of them wanted to see a
reduction in their level of involvement, which was how the
move was interpreted. It was perceived as having a reduction
in influence for the traditional organisations. The
consequence of this thinking has been the failure of the
traditional, established organisations to offer the S/TES a
legitimate placement within the disaster-relevant
organisational network.

THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE S/TES IN TWO BUSHFIRE SITUATIONS

The 1981-2 and 1982-3 'fire seasons' were unusually severe in
terms of wildfire damage in Australia. Wildfires (or bushfires)
have always been a repetitive feature of the Australian
environment. The greatest potential risk from this natural
hazard type on the Australian continent in terms of property
damage and loss of human life exists around the urban fringes
of Australia's major cities. Areas surrounding Sydney (the
Blue Mountains, in particular), Melbourne (the Dandenong Range),
Adelaide and Hobart with their increasing investment in urban
development, constitute the nation's greatest fire hazards.

In Tasmania the 1981-2 fire season was to become particularly
severe in relation to the State's normal fire seasons. Through
most of January and February fires burnt tracts of land,
consuming pasture and forest land, private dwellings, public

facilities, stock and other primary resources. A preliminary cost estimate for one period in the fire sequence, that of February 12 to February 17, the most intensive period of the four-to-five week threat, sustained $5.4 million damage with 129,000 ha burnt out.

Victoria, along with the French Riviera and California, has been described as amongst the world's most fire-prone areas. Bushfires of the sort that were experienced in South Australia and Victoria in 1983 (the 'Ash Wednesday' fires) achieved a level of destruction and threat to human life in a number of localities that in total makes them comparable with such devastating events as tropical cyclones or extensive floods. Between February 16 and February 18, 118 major fires broke out in various parts of Victoria. On February 16 about 93 fires were burning in different parts of the State. In the period February 16-20, some 30 municipalities suffered severely. About 8,000 people were reported to have been made homeless, and 47 people died in fires that were estimated to have caused a financial loss of between $195-236 million (Oliver, Britton and James, 1984).

In Tasmania, the Tasmania State Emergency Service (TAS SES) was established by an Act of Parliament by the State government in 1976. Under the provisions of the Emergency Services Act 1976 an 'autonomous' Service was created whose responsibility, in the broadest terms, was "for the overall development and maintenance of community preparedness throughout Tasmania". Under provisions laid out in the Act, the Director of TAS SES is also the Director of all the emergency services, a position which permits the encumbent overall control of the establishment and direction of emergency management policy within the entire state. The Director, TAS SES, under the Act, is also the Chairman of the State Disaster Committee, and the Executive Officer of the State Disaster Executive, of which the Police Commissioner is Chairman. The Director has the legal responsibility of producing, disseminating and continually revising the State Disaster Plan, and all regional and municipal plans. Within Tasmania, the directorship of the TAS SES was given to the Commissioner of Police in 1981 when TAS SES was transferred to the Police Department's jurisdiction.

In terms of power, the Police Department is the dominant factor within TAS SES, and indeed, within the entire disaster management network. As Director, the Police Commissioner is instrumental in a number of areas that have direct influence on the running of the Service. With the change of directorship in 1981 to the Police Commissioner, the role of the Deputy-Director was expanded to handle many of the day-to-day administrative concerns of the Service. The Deputy-Directorship, however, is scheduled to be given to a senior police officer, which further consolidates the police hold on the organisation.

The Commissioner/Director has the function of interpreting how the Service will prepare for "the overall development and

maintenance of counter-disaster preparedness", as specified within the Act; because TAS SES is within the jurisdiction of the Police, the Commissioner has the authority to determine how the service will undertake this task.

During the 1982 bushfire threat TAS SES was primarily tasked with the role of information collection and distribution, although this role was never formally placed upon it. It is unclear what role TAS SES saw itself as performing in the early stages of the threat period; it was more unclear what the other DRO's considered its task was. Much of the early tasks of TAS SES appeared to be related to trying to identify an organisational mission and to establish a meaningful placement within the network that would not encroach on existing tasks undertaken by other DROs. This non-specific activity was partially the result of an unclear situation with regard to the extent of the hazard threat, and was accentuated by the organisation not being provided with regular information from lead combat and other support organisations. Eventually, the function of collecting and distributing information was associated with TAS SES, and this function predominated throughout the remainder of the bushfire event.

Communications is a legitimate task for TAS SES. Under the 1976 Act TAS SES has the responsibility for developing a counterdisaster communications system, and within the State Disaster Plan, chairmanship of the Communication Committee is vested within the office of the TAS SES Senior Operations Officer. Compared to its inter-state counterparts, TAS SES has probably the best physical communications facilities. Unfortunately, however, there appears to be some resentment by other organisational personnel over this fact. The effectiveness of the network has been compromised because other organisations were reluctant to utilise TASES equipment, even though TASES officials made it perfectly clear that it was there to be used by any DRO should the need arise. The reluctance of these organisations to legitimise a TAS SES service in this way can be interpreted as the organisations trying to prevent TAS SES from performing an effective part within the emergency management network.

The Tasmania State Emergency Service still suffers from the problems brought about by senior officials in other organisations not fully accepting or understanding the role TAS SES plays. One can still validly ask the question: Does every person in Tasmania DRO network know and understand the functions and the purpose of the State Emergency Service? The short answer is still "no"; not all of them do. Some of those who are aware of the role do not accept the necessity for the organisation to perform within the counter-disaster system. Rather, they would prefer TAS SES did not exist at all. This attitude helps to explain why on the occasion of the bushfires both the domain consensus (that is, the agreement by all involved-organisations that the action undertaken by a specific organisation is appropriate and thus a legitimate disaster task

for the organisation in question) and task competence (implying that the organisation undertaking a specific activity or task is proficient in that task, with other organisations acknowledging the competence of that organisation to perform the task) was lower than anticipated. The lowered domain consensus and its corollary – a lowered boundary specification is illustrated by:

(1)   the lack of information being provided to TASES regional headquarters;
(2)   the lack of requests for the organisation to be used other than as a 'grocery shop' whereby DROs would 'pick up' their orders (i.e. material resources) to augment their own supplies; and
(3)   not employing the coordination capabilities of the organisation or not using their purpose-designed operations rooms during the bushfire threat.

It did appear that in some instances the effectiveness and the efficiency of TAS SES had more to do with the individuals employed, rather than the organisation or its structure; that is, the interpersonal structure rather than the normative structure predominated. This has problems in the long-term, although in the short-run it may achieve the required results. The effectiveness of the organisation may change if personnel changes are introduced, as they must be over time. It should be remembered, however, that it is the 'system' which should be the basis for effective operations, not the actors in spite of the system.

IN VICTORIA, the Victoria State Emergency Service (VIC SES) is a branch of the Ministry of Police and Emergency Services, and operates under the provisions of a government charter which states that the role of VIC SES is "to plan, organise, coordinate and implement measures that are necessary or desirable in respect of the safety of the public and are designed to guard against, prevent, reduce or overcome the effect of emergencies inimical to life, health or property within Victoria". In terms of the State's Disaster Plan (DISPLAN), VIC SES's role is to supplement the combating agencies in their task, relative to natural and other disasters. In case of floods and windstorms, in particular, VIC SES assumes lead responsibility. It is also responsible for assisting municipalities with the establishment and training of LVES. Under DISPLAN the task of integrating the activities of the statutory and voluntary organisations associated with welfare is also the responsibility of VIC SES in conjunction with the Department of Community Welfare Services (DCWS). This responsibility is elaborated in more detail in the DISPLAN sub-plan related to welfare actions (the Disaster Welfare Plan). This Welfare Plan recognises three stages of a disaster event: impact, post-impact, and rehabilitation. Chairmanship of the committee which oversees disaster welfare planning remains with the Director of VIC SES during 'preimpact' states (although these stages do not appear within the frame of reference of the plan), and during the impact stage. Following impact, responsibility for welfare coordination and chairmanship

is transferred to the Dir. General DCWS. The transition of res-
ponsibility from one organisation to the other is not elaborated
in the plan, nor has it been rehearsed in simulation exercises.

VIC SES suffers within the counter-disaster arrangements by not
being able to carry out tasks to completion. Welfare planning
commitments stipulate that VIC SES is to be the main activator
following disaster intervention. This, however, is usually a
time when organisational disruption is probably at its highest.
By the time the organisation has become accustomed to its new
role within a disaster context, the task which it has activated
is suddenly whisked away from it and given to another
organisation for completion. VIC SES is left to adapt to a
secondary support role, which is largely unspecified in terms
of planning arrangements.

Another difficulty encountered by VIC SES in the present
structural arrangements is the command structure inherent
within the plan. In DISPLAN there are four controlling - or
command - systems that become operationalized in an 'Ash
Wednesday' magnitude disaster. Each of these four systems
influence the operations of VIC SES. In the Ash Wednesday
event the controlling networks were the Police Department,
which has responsibility of operating the State Disaster HQ;
the lead combat authority, which was the Country Fire Authority
and the Forests Commission of Victoria, both charged with
eliminating the threat agent; the NDO, which has control of
resources external to the State; and, in the post-impact phase
of the disaster operations, the DCWS was in control of relief
and welfare matters. Probably the most significant difficulty
encountered by this arrangement for VIC SES was the flow of
information from these sources. The effectiveness of the
information channels amongst the organisations caused some
concern. VIC SES was not formally advised of the bushfire
threat, or of the operations being undertaken by the other DROs
in the early phases of the situation. It was only the
foresight and dedication of senior officers that VIC SES was
opened and manned ready for operationalization on the night of
February 16. Later in the disaster sequence the failure of the
lead combat authority of the Police Department to establish a
Media Liaison Officer, as DISPLAN specifies, contributed to VIC
SES having difficulty with public donations. Misleading radio
station messages to the public urging it to assist with clothing
and other resources led to a flood of material being donated.
VIC SES, the organisation in charge of welfare matters at the
time, had to divert resources away from attending to the needs
of immediate victims to tackling the problem of transporting,
sorting and storing the donations. Later again, the Director-
General of DCWS, after calling a meeting of all welfare
organisational personnel, failed to invite the Director of VIC
SES. In addition, a large number of requests submitted by VIC
SES officers to the Police for NDO assistance were delayed for
considerable periods because the police (which is charged under
DISPLAN to be the responsible agent for establishing liaison
between State and Federal assistance) failed to realize the
significance of the requests.

The aftermath of the events of Ash Wednesday may also be significant for VIC SES. Two consequences worth noting in particular are the revision of the State Disaster Plan, and the creation of a Victorian Fire and Emergency Services Board. The special legislation introduced on 22 November 1983, entitled the State Disaster Act 1983, makes provision that the coordination of functions of all government agencies and officers relating to disaster combat are to be the direct responsibility of the Minister for Police and Emergency Services. In periods of declared disaster the Minister assumes the responsibility for the coordination of all DRO's, and is made "Coordinator-in-Chief". In this role he can implement and control all counter-disaster actions and allocate State government resources without reference to the decisions of his senior professional disaster management staff, if he so pleases. In particular, the Minister as Coordinator-in-Chief may take whatever steps he thinks appropriate for the coordination of all welfare measures in and following a state of disaster. He may also convene and preside over any meeting relating to welfare relief. He has the power to delegate any of these responsibilities should he wish. In addition, under this new policy, the Minister is responsible for the formulation of all policy related to the provision of welfare measures following disaster.

In essence, this new legislation reduces the function of VIC SES quite dramatically. It affects this organisation more than it does the DCWS, the other welfare organisation responsible for disaster welfare relief. Because VIC SES activities are determined only within the context of a disaster situation, any reduction in this area will automatically have a consequence in the role VIC SES will ultimately play. The new legislation further reduces VIC SES access to, and involvement within decisionmaking processes and may, as a consequence, result in an alteration of tasks assigned to this organisation in future declared disasters. This problem is exacerbated by the proposals put forward within the Public Service Board's management consultancy team's recommended Victorian Fire and Emergency Services Board.

The effect that the creation of the Board will have on Victorian disaster management procedures has yet to be realised. However, it is assumed that one possibility is that the present VIC SES headquarters will eventually be incorporated into the Fire and Emergency Services Coordination Division, which would be responsible for planning and support, and operations liaison. Under this recommendation the operational structure at the regional and local level of VIC SES activities should remain the same, but decision-making and task assignment at State level (which, it should be pointed out, directs lower-level operations) would be given to another organisation. Retention of organisational autonomy, already a problem for VIC SES, may be further affected. Organisational domain may be readjusted, but how this may be altered is not yet known. There are still some areas of policy adjustment which need to be worked out that may yet work to the advantage of VIC SES.

A NEW TAXONOMY

The seven variables that we looked at which related to organisational effectiveness, and the discovery that these factors were not operating advantageously for the State and Territory Emergency Service organisations, together with the two wildfire case-studies we have presented (we could just as easily have presented tropical cyclones or floods as the natural hazard agent in question and concentrated on other specific S/TES's to illustrate the points made), suggest that the effectiveness of the S/TES within the Australian counter-disaster management system has been compromised. The evidence also suggests that the predicament of the S/TES is a result of influences that stem from within the disaster-relevant organisational network (we are not dismissing the influence that external variables may have - such as the paucity of public understanding of the role S/TES play. These influences, however, are considered to be relatively minor in comparison with the variables we have discussed above). How can we formulate the statements that have been written in a way that illustrates what we believe is occurring?

One perspective which has been found to be most useful for understanding the findings, as has already been spelled out in the introduction, was to focus on how power, in the form of control and influence, was shared amongst the organisations that formed the network. Specifically, the powers of each organisation were considered on the basis of (i) the ability of the organisation to determine the role it would perform within the counter-disaster network, and (ii) the organisation's ability to influence how the network itself would operate. Four types of "organisations" are distinguishable: Cardinal organisations; Conditional organisations; Controlled organisations; and Constrained orgainzations. The relationship between these different types, and their association with the distribution of power is best illustrated in the form of a diagram:

POTENTIAL TO INFLUENCE DIRECTION OF ORGANISATIONAL NETWORK

Figure 4: ORGANISATIONAL TYPES WITHIN THE AUSTRALIAN
COUNTER-DISASTER NETWORK

By far the most powerful organisational type within the counter-disaster network are those organisations which have the capabilities for their senior officials to determine the role that the organisation will perform during all aspects of the organisation's functions, including a disaster situation. This capacity is achieved either through the acquisition of power and authority bestowed on the organisation by specific legislation; or by the role they perform within the social structure as it relates to emergency management, which is transferred through the process of legitimation to the disaster situation; or because they have skills and material resources appropriate to the amelioration of the threat situation. These organisations also have the power, either by virtue of legislation or their standing within the network, to influence the direction that the network will take. Such organisations are called Cardinal organisations because of their central position within the network and the centralization of power they can muster within the net. The tasks these organisations perform are commensurate with the societal value of preserving or saving life and property.

The group of organisations that has a relatively high degree of determinability to specify the role which it will undertake, yet does not have as much influence within the organisational network, has been labelled Conditional organisations. These organisations are usually autonomous during non-emergency circumstances. Contained within this group are those organisations which have specific skills or resources (or legal bases) that more-or-less predetermine their functions within the counterdisaster structure. However, they do not possess a continual or a significant degree of influence within the organisational network to determine the direction of the entire network. They may, under certain circumstances, be capable of determining the roles performed by some organisations whose functions are similar to their own in an emergency period. Legitimacy and functional performance is conditional upon the acceptance of these specific organisatious by the controlling Cardinal organisations, through which it gets approval from the majority of organisations within the overall network. Although the tasks these organisations perform are essential, they are secondary to the tasks performed by cardinal organisations. In Figure 2 these organisations are located within the ERO category, rather than the DRO group.

A further organisational type is characterised by its ability to influence the direction of the organisational network, and to dictate its own role within the counter-disaster organisational framework. However, this organisational type is restrained from doing so by legislation and political considerations. They are high-status organisations but keep a low profile during a disaster event unless called upon by the cardinal organisations or the organisations charged with liaising with external organisations. These organisations can

influence the organisational network in a forthright manner through their control of resources that may be required in disaster situation, and also indirectly by having control over resources that are made available to some network organisations during non-operational periods. These are called Controlled organisations.

Their task is primarily to act as a support net for the Cardinal organisations.

The last type of organisation usually appears to be 'younger' than the more established organisations discussed above. Whereas the other types of organisations have quite a long 'track record' of involvement within emergency management and counter-disaster operations, Constrained organisations are relative newcomers. Consequently, their role within the network is less rigidly defined, and the organisation's functions are not as entrenched as some of the other types can be. The role of this organisation is more-or-less determined externally, by members of the organisational network, either in a direct manner or indirectly; in some cases both approaches may be used. Its placement within the network is determined in varying degrees by its organisational set rather than characteristics of the organisation itself or the personnel within it. The task of this organisation is very similar to that of the Cardinal organisations and Conditional organisations during disaster, at least in terms of official documentation.

It is also possible to regard these organisational types as having different positions along a continuum of "power potency". The continuum is related to whether the organisational network has control over the organisation (indicating little power potency), or whether the organisation has control over the network (suggesting great power potency).

CONTINUUM OF POWER WITHIN THE COUNTER-DISASTER ORGANISATIONAL NETWORK

CARDINAL   CONDITIONAL

              CONTROLLED   CONSTRAINED

ORGANISATION HAS   ORGANISATIONAL NETWORK
TOTAL CONTROL OVER   HAS TOTAL CONTROL OVER
ORGANISATIONAL NETWORK   ORGANISATION

FIGURE 5

As Figure 5 suggests, at the highest level is the Cardinal organisation because it has the greatest real and potential power to control the orientation of the entire disaster management network. It has more power vested in it than the other organisational types. The next organisation in terms of power is the Controlled organisation. It has a significant amount of potential power, yet does not wield it all at any one time during civil crisis periods. It can nevertheless exert significant influence on the organisations within the network both directly and indirectly. The next level of organisational power is the Conditional organisation. They do not usually wield a significant amount of power within the disaster situation in terms of network influence, but they may be powerful within areas that are designated as being in their jurisdiction. The final organisation with the least amount of power potential and with the least possibility of influencing the network is the Constrained organisation. It does not appear capable of exerting much control over the network decision-makers.

In terms of specific organisations, we suggest that the Police Department, the lead combat authorities and the State/Territory Disaster Committees are examples of Cardinal organisations. Senior officials within this central organisational type form the 'dominant coalition' within the disaster management network. The dominant coalition may be expanded at times to include representatives of Conditional organisations with the onset of post-impact operations. In this group of organisations, government welfare or social security departments, voluntary agencies (that is, most of the support organisations), and other combat authorities would be placed. Examples of a Controlled organisation would be the Natural Disasters Organisation (NDO) and its parent organisation, the federal Department of Defence. The State and Territory Emergency Service (S/TES) would be the example provided for the Constrained organisation.

POTENTIAL TO INFLUENCE DIRECTION OF ORGANISATIONAL NETWORK

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       │   C A R D I N A L        │   C O N D I T I O N A L   │
T      │                          │                          │
O      │   O R G A N I S A T I O N│   O R G A N I S A T I O N │
       │                          │                          │
D      │                          │                          │
E      │                          │                          │
T      │  -Police Departments     │  - Other Combat Authorities│
E      │  -(s/t) Disaster committees│ - Voluntary Agencies   │
R      │  -Lead Combat Authorities│  - Govt. Welfare Dept's   │
M      │                          │                          │
I      │                       1  │  2                       │
N      │                          │                          │
E      ├──────────────────────────┼──────────────────────────┤
       │                          │                          │
O      │                          │                          │
R      │                          │                          │
G      │                          │                          │
A      │                          │                          │
N      │   C O N T R O L L E D    │   C O N S T R A I N E D   │
I      │                          │                          │
S      │   O R G A N I S A T I O N│   O R G A N I S A T I O N │
A      │                          │                          │
T      │                          │                          │
I      │  - Natural Disaster Orgn.│  - State & Territory      │
O      │  - Federal Dept. Defence │    Emergency Service      │
N      │                          │    organisations          │
A      │                          │                          │
L    L └──────────────────────────┴──────────────────────────┘ L
       H                                                    L
R
O      H                                                    L
L
E
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
FIGURE 6: <u>EXAMPLES AND TYPES OF ORGANISATIONS WITHIN THE
AUSTRALIAN COUNTER-DISASTER NETWORK</u>

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The basic findings presented in this paper suggest that the
State and Territory Emergency Service organisations do have a
number of constraints placed upon them; and that these
constraints are imposed by factors external to the organisation
but internal to the network. Restrictions placed on the

functions of this organisation during operationalisation appear to be a deliberate attempt by traditional disaster-relevant organisations (DRO's) to exclude the S/TES from actively engaging in the full potential it can offer within the counter-disaster organisational network. In particular, the dominant organisations within the network seem to employ two types of method to reduce the involvement of the S/TES, which have serious repercussions on the effectiveness of that organisation.

In the first category, formal constraining methods are used to control the functions of the organisation. These are manifested by devices such as:

- having the position of Director placed within the role-set of a senior encumbent in another counter-disaster organisation; or
- having organisational policy determined by officials outside the organisation; or
- by defining the roles of the organisations on the basis of nebulous legislation that is open to wide interpretation and possible manipulation by officials who have the capabilities to influence the organisation in question.

Formalized prescriptions such as those found within the Acts of Parliament and the various State Disaster Plans determine the parameters that the S/TES must work within. These boundary specifications, however, have a certain degree of flexibility contained within them. It is the second category of limiting devices employed by the traditional DROs that further reduces the choices available to the S/TES. These are the informal methods.

Informal methods can be more constraining than formal prescriptions. It is the application of informal practices that determine the amount of flexibility available within the official boundary specifications. Informal mechanisms that restrict the performance of the S/TES are:

- delaying to inform the S/TES officials that the network has become operationalized;
- refusal to share information that is essential for continual and effective participation;
- negative attitudes that question the effectiveness and the role of the organisation; and
- not attempting to be cognizant of the roles the organisation plays within the disaster context.

All of these have been employed at some stage by DROs within the Australian counter-disaster organisational network in their relation to the S/TES. Unfortunately, it is not only the S/TES that suffers. The effectiveness of the entire counter-disaster network must also be reduced by these practices.

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