



Enriching refugees: As war spread, they fled Mozambique with whatever they could carry. Denied land or work for years, most of the million or more refugees going back to Mozambique are almost as poor as when they left. Can the life of refugees, and the way they come home, allow more development amid the emergency relief? Despite massive external assistance, many return as vulnerable to drought and conflict as ever. So where can refugees get rich? Maybe in Zambia, where land and hard work means some return with cars and cattle and cash.

Refugee possessions, Malawi 1989 Eli Reed/Magnum

Mozambique: Back to tough times

For a decade, Mozambicans have been on the move in a disaster affecting all of southern Africa, as civil war engulfed their country and emptied much of the countryside. Millions became refugees, millions more became displaced within Mozambique. In an impressive transformation, peace and elections have now inspired most of those who fled to go home to begin life anew. In less than three years, at least two million and perhaps as many as four million people have returned. Every day, refugees pour forth from other disasters, and 20 million survive in frustrated exile. This chapter will look for lessons within the repatriation, with an emphasis both on the biggest flow, from Malawi, and on the role of international agencies helping Mozambicans to rebuild their lives.

From a very low base after its liberation war, Mozambique made progress in the 1970s in food security, education and health. The externally-supported war of the 1980s uprooted 5.2 million people, created 1.7 million refugees, killed one million, orphaned 250,000 children, destroyed thousands of schools and medical posts, and attracted international condemnation of human rights violations and the use of child soldiers.

Mozambique was already one of the world's least developed countries when war started. Conflict's economic impact was enormous, a cost of perhaps US\$ 15 billion, cutting GNP per capita by 1.1 per

cent annually to just US\$ 80 by 1991, one of the world's lowest, despite at least US\$ 5.9 billion in aid during the 1980s. Average annual inflation is 38 per cent. Neighbouring states suffered major interruptions in trade.

For the 1992 estimated population of 15.8 million, life expectancy was just 45 for men, 48 for women, while the under-five mortality rate was 287 per 1,000. In the 1980s, domestic food production per capita declined 23 per cent and in 1990 food availability was only 77 per cent of per capita calorie requirements. Between 1983 and 1992, Mozambique imported US\$ 423 million of arms. Recovery costs will be high: repairing Mozambique's roads could cost US\$ 600 million, and observers expect it will take at least a decade for the country to climb back even as far as its impoverished state of 1980.

Mozambican refugees were eager to return, and started moving as soon as the peace agreement was signed in Rome on 4 October 1992 between the government of Frente de Libertacao de Mozambique (FRELIMO) led by President Joaquim Chissano and the Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana (RENAMO) movement led by Afonso Dhlakama. Elections in October 1994 accelerated refugee return.

A positive match for many of the world's worst refugee flows, the repatriation was one of the largest population movements in recent times. The return of one in ten of the world's refugees and one-

Figure 8.1 Returning to vulnerability: Mozambique's indicators of poverty. Peace and stability may be on the horizon in Mozambique, but the hill to be climbed is a steep one. The infant mortality rate is one of the highest in the region and average food intake is below even the meagre rations recommended in refugee camps. Long-term indicators such as the illiteracy rate and the ratio of physicians to people served also show an alarming disparity between what is needed and what is available.

Source: UNOHAC

Mozambique, an impoverished country in an impoverished region		
Social Indicator	Mozambique	Sub-Saharan Africa
Illiteracy rate of 15+ population	67.1%	51.1%
Population/Physician	48,000	26,670
Infant mortality rate (per 1000)	140	107
Kilo-calories/day	1,680	2,120

third of Africa's refugees offers the chance of stability and development for Mozambique and renewed opportunities for the entire region. Yet the way refugees lived, and the way they and the millions who were displaced have returned, may have left them – and thus their country – more vulnerable to future disasters, threatening Mozambique's new peace and future prosperity.

Reminders of conflict

As Mozambique's election approached in 1994, driving out of the city of Tete in north-west Mozambique had unsettling echoes of the past. More Mozambicans from Tete province were refugees – because of Malawi's close border and ethnic ties – than any other province. For years, RENAMO troops controlled much of the countryside. Using roads risked armed ambush or mines. As trees grew up close to the tarmac roads, the bush engulfed the dirt tracks and the empty villages to which they led.

The four-hour drive from Tete towards the Zambian border held strong reminders of war, with rusted tanks by the road, the remains of trucks that had hit mines, RENAMO areas to be pointed out, and – between roadside villages of thatched mud huts – the occasional skull and crossbones sign to indicate where mine-clearing teams believed mines lingered to maim or kill.

But in the villages off the main road, all was digging and building, trading and sowing, as people rushed to reclaim their land and finish planting before October's rain so there would be a crop to harvest in March. Despite mines and other fears, people could not be stopped from coming home, though they came for a mixture of motives.

Question any group of returned Mozambicans and the same themes come up: they feared losing land to those who got back more quickly, they heard rumours about the colonial era Portuguese reclaiming territory and South Africans being granted land rights, they did not believe mines were a big threat, they wanted to get back in time to vote or plant crops, and – more worryingly – they say they were told to leave their refugee camps by international officials because there would be no more food and late leavers would get no help with transport home.

The theory of repatriation assistance was excellent; the reality was rather different. In theory, every refugee, most displaced people and all demobilised fighters – up to half the population – were entitled to food and other supplies for their journey at the point of departure, help with transport to their final destination, and food, tools and seeds from the time they got home until their first harvest. The ex-soldiers were also supposed to get some missing back pay.

The problems are obvious, every family's timetable, needs and destination were

different, they required many thousands of tonnes of food to be delivered into remote regions, yet the World Bank estimated in 1993 that less than ten per cent of the 29,000 km of roads across Mozambique were either well repaired or known to be free of anti-personnel mines.

Becoming a refugee means a massive loss of wealth and security. Repatriation can be just as damaging, unless governments and aid agencies work together with the refugees to protect and enhance their wealth. Refugees going home must be helped to keep their possessions or get a fair price if these have to be sold, assisted so that they avoid using their own resources to travel, and given the means to meet the investment required in restarting farming or trade.

Whatever its cost, outside assistance is small when set against the time, efforts and resources contributed by refugees, whose self reliance, energy and commitment means that after walking hundreds of miles, fields can be cleared in hours, homes built in days and a harvest grown in weeks.

Most refugees got food before they departed – easy in camps with regular supplies – and most displaced people could find transport if they wanted it. Many refugees walked home, and so had to sell possessions at cheap prices before they left, while others reported extortion and thefts at borders or en route.

Delivering food fairly to all who needed it, especially in more remote areas, where problems could be greater and NGOs fewer, was a daunting task. Despite strenuous agency efforts and millions of dollars, plenty went hungry, severe malnutrition could be found, many missed out on essential tools and drought-resistant seeds, and some gave up and went back to camps across the border.

Despite war, refugee flight, switch-back economic policies, massive political change, and the influx of UN and NGO agencies with creative solutions and lots of money, traditional systems have shown impressive resilience. One study in southern Mozambique showed how traditional leaders, from tribal chiefs to village elders, still win respect and help – with other local authorities or in the absence of government – to settle disputes. Most people are making new homes back in the old village areas, not in the post-independence communal villages imposed by the then government. The study suggested that villagers lack information on government and aid agency plans, have little or no input into reconstruction plans and say that the assistance offered – though welcome – can be ad hoc or unreliable.

Asking refugees or displaced Mozambicans where they come from often elicits several answers because they have moved time and again to escape fighting or find good land. They worry whether they will have rights over any land, especially since land tenure is a complex and controversial

issue in Mozambique, where the state "owns" all land. Formal government structures have done their best to stay out of land disputes where traditional leaders could cope. Securing access to land has not been easy for some former refugees, faced with competing commercial enterprises, displaced people and earlier arrivals. Returning families may have to move more than once to find a secure plot, just one reason why many households face tough times.

A "lean season" survey by the Ministry of Agriculture's Food Security Unit in the north-east province of Nampula found 25 per cent of families eating less than 80 per cent of minimum recommended calories. But refugee assistance did make a clear difference; their right to resources and greater opportunity to claim them meant they often had more resources than returning displaced people, something reflected in better nutrition and health.

With many playing little part in off-farm work or trade, it takes time for externally promoted economic reforms – such as deregulation of agricultural markets – to have any impact in rural areas on improving incomes or food security. Growth of entrepreneurs or commercial enterprises to rival previously dominant monopolies is slow, since these depend on far more activity than has yet developed.

Although Mozambique's 1993/94 food production was up 7 per cent on the bumper year of 1992/93 and 45 per cent on drought-hit 1991/92, expansion in planted area has not often been matched by yields because of uncertain rains, and 1995 prospects are uncertain. Everyone assisting Mozambique accepts that one harvest – however good – is not enough to set a family back on a prosperous path, even with the advantage of land fallow for ten years or more.

The family-food equation

In Tete province, any farmer can explain the simple food security equation: in a year of normal rains, with human labour alone, one family can plant, weed and harvest two hectares, three at most. One hectare produces, in a reasonable year, about eight 90-kg bags of maize. One family consumes, in a reasonable year, about one and a half bags of maize a month. Production: 16 to 24 bags; consumption: at least 18 bags; margin: too narrow for comfort. There may be some vegetables, small-scale trading, a little off-farm work, but with plenty of barter needs for clothes, tools, cooking pots, school books and so on, that leaves almost nothing to store against bad years. So how to increase the surplus to make your family less vulnerable to drought, war and other disasters?

Draught animals – if you have the money – make a big difference by raising the amount of land you can cultivate to, say, six or seven hectares. But most people are too poor for that level of livestock. The obvious answer, say farmers, is to marry more wives and have more children who can cultivate more land. Faced with poverty and drought, polygamy and big families are basic survival tools and coping mechanisms for poor Mozambicans.

So, even with a short-term glut of wildlife to sell or eat as bushmeat and plenty of wood for trade or building, today's challenge is to make near-subsistence peasant farming work for former refugees just back from years without farming and then help it bring greater returns. To support all those returning, the World Food Programme (WFP) has a standard individual monthly ration of 13.5 kg of maize, 1.5 kg of beans and some oil. That is less comprehensive than the refugee ration in Malawi, which has included soap, salt and groundnuts.




Figure 8.2 Back from exile: Where did Mozambique's refugees go? Former refugees have been flooding back to Mozambique from all countries of the region. The million or more who went to Malawi are, on average, returning with far fewer resources than those who went to Zambia, where they had the chance to work, farm, save money and reduce their vulnerability. Unfortunately, few refugees ended up in Zambia.

Source: UNOHAC

Other agencies – such as US NGO World Vision – offer survival kits until the next harvest; tools, a bucket, pots, blankets and enough seed to plant three hectares with maize, sorghum or rice, depending on the area and conditions, and some vegetables. Working in Mozambique since 1987 and spending far more than any other NGO, World Vision has established farms for seed testing and multiplication under realistic low-input conditions for its “Ag-pack”. Despite its aim of reviving the commercial seeds market, World Vision’s free distribution has faced World Bank criticism for offering too much for too long.

Time to go home

The train is old and crowded but most of the refugees look happy as they wave and shout goodbye to the friends and relatives they are leaving behind in one of Malawi’s fast contracting camps close to the border. The train is only going a few dozen miles before the refugees transfer to buses or boats. Some may stay overnight in a transit camp, others will heave their sacks on their backs for a long walk home.

As the refugees loaded themselves and their possessions on board, the meagre results of exile are obvious: sacks of aid grain, the odd chicken, a few pots and stools, sleeping mats. Some have relatives ahead who carried back the basics, others have family who will follow with more, most when questioned admit to having sold up cheap or given away possessions, and few have much cash, despite the challenges to come. After ten years, these are refugees leaving with little more than they arrived with.

The full mix of motives for leaving is present, though many emphasise the claim that they were warned by UNHCR international officials that it was time to move because all camps will be closed and food rations cut off soon. Rui Antonio, aged 26, is on his way back to Sofala with his wife Maria and son Manuel. He says they have only food and some cooking pots to take home, “nothing else”. Why leave now? “We were told there will be no more food.” Luzina Joao, aged 30, agrees. Her husband, Mario Dasa, heard the warning and went back a week ago, and now has sent word for her to come with their son, Dimingu, 8, and daughters, Nyaruakazi, 4, and Chintehya, not yet one. What is she taking back? “Food and some furniture; I couldn’t carry any more.”

If they had any choice when fleeing into exile, their mistake was to head for Malawi, a country almost as poor as Mozambique. In Zambia, for example, they would have been able to farm, keep cattle, engage in trade, but in Malawi the land shortage prevented refugees from farming and kept them in camps or open settlements alongside villages. Refugees made up 10 per cent of Malawi’s ten million population and lived in 13 of country’s 24

districts; in some, they outnumbered local inhabitants.

Without land and unable to take formal employment, refugees were entirely dependent on food aid. Delivery of 180,000 tonnes of aid a year damaged roads and bridges, while the refugees scoured the countryside – including national parks – for wood and competed with local people for education, health care, water supplies and informal work. Having first welcomed the refugees, Malawi later claimed they were a major burden. The resentment was fuelled after 1992, when a new refugee influx coincided with drought and Malawi’s worst harvest in 20 years.

In fact, the refugees had both a positive and negative impact on Malawi. On one side was the employment and income from the logistics of external aid, profits from the diversion of food aid, via false refugee numbers, into the local economy and the international respectability of helping so many refugees. On the other was the long-term impact of diverted food aid undermining local production, especially now the refugees are all but gone and Malawi is suffering the impact of another major drought.

When the refugees started to move, they moved fast and often faster than the agencies which intended to assist them. While agencies already working in Mozambique and refugee host countries geared up, repatriation prospects prompted others to set up operations. By late 1994, UNHCR had 40 major implementing partners among the 200 national and international NGOs in Maputo.

As agencies scrambled to keep up with the flow, there was debate about encouraging refugees to return too early when their home areas were not well served with resources, or when the risks of mines had not been eliminated or assessed. Refugees ignored this and kept coming. Coping in these circumstances implies certain qualities and capabilities among agencies wanting to do good work, including:

- fast response to evolving needs with skilled people, adequate finance and other appropriate resources without delays for appeals or grant applications;
- experience of similar refugee flows and resettlement;
- multi-national task force capable of working in all countries affected, and switching funding, staff, vehicles, equipment and supplies between them;
- good intelligence about refugees’ real intentions and conditions in returnee areas;
- commitment to continuity of assistance over time from refugee camp to sustainable recovery;
- consultation and sharing of information with beneficiaries, including good communication tools for mass audiences; and
- either specialist skills to deliver high quality work in one geographic area or a single humanitarian sector, or the scale to

deliver a more comprehensive horizontal programme across a very wide area.

Agencies in Mozambique and refugee host countries have two obvious problems. First, a complex patchwork quilt of agencies handle health, education, food, water, etc., across a range of districts or provinces. This was in part due to slow reintegration of RENAMO-controlled areas, where ICRC, working with the Mozambique Red Cross, was for years usually the only functioning agency. With the diversity of agency products and systems, the patchwork approach offers few economies of scale or opportunities for effective integration while risking specific needs or problems being missed.

Second, few agencies offer the continuity of assistance across borders that would be of great value in repatriation programmes dealing with a single population, such as providing services for refugees from their camps in Malawi to their homes in Mozambique. This would maintain the expertise built up in Malawi-based teams, including local staff and volunteers with close understanding of refugee problems and opportunities in Mozambique and good contacts among both traditional and government leaders.

For Mozambicans, the logic of continuity of assistance is strongest for communities moving in the greatest concentrations over comparatively short distances. The areas they left will have been the most

devastated, and will be the most under pressure from repatriation, while the costs of continuity will be the lowest.

This could even include maintaining offices in Malawi – several hundred miles closer to most returning refugees than Maputo. UNHCR estimated in 1993 that 69 per cent of all refugees in Malawi were from Tete province, 20 per cent from Zambezia and 8 per cent from Niassa. The most obvious case is Angonia district of Tete province, on the Malawi border, where the 13,000 people there in October 1992 have been joined by 230,000 former refugees, almost a quarter of all Mozambique's refugees.

Cross-border beneficiaries

The experience of one US NGO, the American Refugee Committee (ARC), shows how even a comparatively small agency operation can offer cross-border continuity, and the problems that may occur when that care is not possible. Within its activities, ARC offered a health education programme in Malawi refugee camps using both local and Mozambican staff and volunteers. As the camps closed, it transferred staff of both nationalities into Mozambique to continue their health education work, using sanitation as an entry point. While there have been some complaints about employing Malawian staff in Mozambique, ARC's American field staff

Box 8.1 Good news on mines and demobilisation

It is a quiet afternoon in Milange, near the Malawi border in Mozambique's Zambezia province. Not too many people on the main street, the hotel bar empty, and just a sense that this is not normal. The problem is easily explained: just outside town are 250 ex-FRELIMO troops who have been waiting for demobilisation for eight months.

The troops have been causing trouble. Shots have been fired, people beaten up, vehicles stolen and attempts made to break into the Mozambique Red Cross Society warehouse, which is full of food for refugees and displaced people. No one has been killed but it will be several days before forces under government control – busy fighting other rebellious soldiers – arrive to restore order.

Demobilising troops is never easy, but trying to lock away thousands of men for months at a time with nothing to do was Mozambique's recipe for trouble. The troops – whichever army or militia they were from – wanted out, and out fast.

But from the start, demobilisation was treated as a politico-military issue and subject to delays, because it was part of the bigger bargaining between the government and RENAMO.

In fact, successful demobilisation is far less about military issues than employment, agriculture, health and education, because it is about men being able to return to civilian life without being tempted to take up freelance banditry.

The soldiers had survived years of fighting, often on short rations and low pay. Most patiently sat in their garrisons and assembly points for months, during which time RENAMO surprised many observers with the discipline of its forces. Finally, garrison after garrison began mutinying as the only way – as they saw it – of getting pay, food and transport home so they could start farming.

The original plan had been for the total of more than 100,000 soldiers to be demobilised (plus almost 300,000 dependents) and a 30,000-

strong unified army to be created. For several months, the reluctance of existing troops to volunteer for the new force offered the interesting prospect of an African country without an army. The new force is mainly being recruited afresh.

Fears about a massive toll from mines laid by the troops have proved unfounded. A comprehensive survey of most of the country by the expert UK NGO, the Halo Trust, found 1,000 potential "danger areas". While a few strategic sites contained hundreds or thousands of mines, most sites contained probably five mines or less. Thus the total number may be tens of thousands, but not the two million figure widely quoted.

With 10,000 mine victims in Mozambique already, the need for mine awareness does not disappear. The impact of mines – through unused land or roads, injuries and deaths – is significant and will be felt throughout Mozambique for many years. ■

say the advantages outweigh the problems.

Another ARC programme in Malawi was supplementary feeding. They saw groups of refugees returning to Mozambique only to face food shortages. The refugees came back to Malawi, received sufficient supplementary feeding from ARC for their malnourished children to be discharged and then returned to Mozambique. At that point, the ARC operation was closing down and not transferring across the border, so no supplementary feeding would be available if refugees returned once more. Because of the lack of direct communication systems, rather than tenuous links via Lilongwe and Maputo, it was impractical for ARC to warn any agency in Mozambique about these groups of vulnerable people going back to areas of food shortages.

The multi-national task force working cross border should face no particular legal hindrance: in theory, UNHCR's tripartite agreements with Mozambique and all refugee host countries – Malawi, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe – came close to allowing staff, and those of its 40 or more implementing partners, little constraint in crossing borders.

With those legal agreements and a multi-million dollar budget, UNHCR has the pivotal role for agencies and their work with refugees, far more than the Mozambique government's specialised agencies, from the official/governmental counterpart of UNHCR, NAR (Núcleo de Apoio aos Refugiados), the national agency responsible for refugees and returnees, to the DPCCN (Office for Prevention and Combat of Natural Disasters).

The Norwegian Refugee Council investigated issues of UNHCR-NGO co-operation and found many points on which UNHCR needed to increase its openness, if refugee interests were to be served in Mozambique or other refugee situations. These included sharing far more information with NGOs and refugees about the repatriation timetable, stages of the peace process, demobilisation, UNHCR's own criteria for safe return, and the practical and legal implications of host countries' repatriation strategies.

Implicit in the results of its investigation was the potential for far greater effectiveness if UNHCR would work in open partnership with NGOs, whether implementing agencies or not, and address the constraints of its legalistic approach to repatriation, slow response to mass voluntary repatriation, and significant problems in communications between UNHCR's Malawi and Mozambique management.

One agency analysis suggested that "as in Cambodia, the main problem characterising the Mozambique repatriation exercise is the UNHCR's preoccupation with numbers, i.e. getting as many refugees as possible back to Mozambique in time for the... elections and planting sea-

son, paying relatively little attention to the returnees' medium- and long-term needs. In terms of durable solutions, reintegration, security and protection, etc., the UNHCR operation did not offer any satisfactory answers." It added that agencies with "serious ethical concerns with UNHCR's approach" found they had "limited influence, mainly because the UN organisations succeeded in 'dividing and conquering'" other groups.

Given the lack of cross-border communication about refugees returning every day, the tripartite commission also bluntly warned UNHCR that "in order to facilitate the smooth reception of refugees, the Commission recommended that UNHCR Malawi should endeavour to notify in advance the parties concerned in Mozambique of the arrival of returnees under assisted spontaneous repatriation".

UNHCR sees its repatriation operation as a major success, pointing to the numbers involved without crowded transit centres, the lack of hunger and the lack of disease. The lack of cooperation between two parts of the same organisation was obvious on the ground however, as UNHCR Malawi staff tallied up daily records of ever more thousands of refugees being sent back while agencies on the other side of the border claimed that neither they nor UNHCR Mozambique had enough warning of refugee numbers.

Into the development gap

Part of UNHCR's problem is structural. UNHCR itself identifies what it calls the "development gap". Discussing repatriation, its *State of the World's Refugees Report* warns: "There is a yawning gap between the repatriation assistance made available to returning refugees and the enormous development needs of the areas to which they return... Unless return is accompanied by development programmes that address people's immediate needs as well as longer-term goals, it may undermine rather than reinforce the prospects for reconciliation and recovery."

Discussing the poor fit of refugee and development agencies' mandates, it suggests that development timetables are not what ex-refugees require, and talks of quick development projects as stop-gap measures, given that the experience of development agencies suggests that short-term speed is a good guarantee of long-term failure.

The return of refugees from camps where health care and education were available and relocation of displaced people from urban areas with better services suggests the potential for plenty of pressure for change in rural areas, yet government plans are under enormous constraints.

The structural adjustment programme will not allow an expansion in numbers of government employees, be they civil serv-

ants or health workers. In broad terms, the health and education systems aim to climb back to the level of services available before the civil war. Given a fast expanding population, this means far less provision than in the past, against growing post-war expectations – a recipe for discontent.

The only option for communities will be to build their own facilities and employ their own staff; both of which would have been far easier if their refugee years had focused on education and training in anything from health care to brick-laying. In Zimbabwe, Mozambican refugees obtained basic training in health care, complete with a recognised certificate, from the Zimbabwe Red Cross Society; if training standards can be set, refugees may come back from exile with a better chance of rebuilding their own country.

Mozambique has seen many agencies involved in what some call the new relief “fashions” of tracing and unaccompanied children. In repatriations after war, these are important areas for work, which is why ICRC and many National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies have long experience in these fields. Despite the lure of funding, these are not ideal new activities for international agencies without strong local partners which can continue the work using only local resources when international staff depart.

Because of local knowledge and long-term commitment, indigenous agencies such as National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies are ideal for preparing refugees mentally, physically and materially for repatriation, through everything from mine awareness and medical checks to reconciliation.

Meanwhile, the country hosts 200 NGOs and every UN organisation from

the UN Office for Humanitarian Assistance Coordination to the UNOMOZ (UN Operation in Mozambique) military forces. Mozambique is the most aid-dependent nation on earth, with overseas assistance contributing 70 per cent of its GDP or US\$ 57 for every man, woman and child. This figure will almost certainly decline, so the government faces the task of changing the relationship between itself and its aid partners to better serve the needs of citizens.

Even with peace and the long-term possibility of prosperity, including tourism, mining, fishing and transportation, Mozambique's immediate future will be decided by the weather and thus how much its farmers can grow, but the weather is offering little help: in January 1995, FAO warned of prolonged dry weather and predicted possible serious shortfalls, notably in Gaza, Inhambane, Manica, Sofala and Tete provinces. This could force earlier estimates of more than 1.1 million people depending on emergency food assistance this year to be raised and relief operations to be stepped up.

Returning refugees could have been a big part of a better future but most lacked the land, jobs or credit essential to contribute to their own solutions. More than 20,000 refugees are returning from Zambia, where they have prospered with land, cattle and trade. As well as all personal property – some have cars and dozens of cows – UNHCR and the two governments involved have set a rule that each refugee can bring back US\$ 250 in cash and US\$ 3,750 in travellers' cheques. If every Mozambican refugee had been able to work as hard as those in Zambia and bring back the rewards, many of Mozambique's problems would be easily solved. ■

Figure 8.3 War on civilians: Who is injured by landmines? Landmines, designed as weapons of war, kill and injure far more civilians than soldiers. Less than ten per cent of those injured in Mozambique by mines are military personnel. Landmines, costing a few dollars to manufacture, lie in waiting for years. Washed out from their original placings, they turn up in agricultural land, riverbeds and forest tracks. They blow the hands and feet off children, women and anyone who comes in contact with them. They are truly an inhumane weapon.

Source: Halo Trust

