For more about the Grant Program, write to the address below, or telephone (202) 429-3842. For information about the Institute's other activities and publications, contact us at the addresses shown below.

Contents

Foreword

n these early years of the post–Cold War era, war and peace are being manifested in wholly new ways. Classic interstate wars are giving way to internal conflicts that pit different regions, ethnic groups, and religions against each other. International organizations and unofficial diplomacy are gaining prominence in managing such conflicts. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are emerging as international actors in their own right, increasingly engaged as conflict managers, but also raising anew questions about their supposed neutrality in the distribution of humanitarian aid. Moreover, these new manifestations of conflict and emerging actors raise even more questions about the international legal principles of sovereignty and nonintervention

Over the past twelve years that the United States Institute of Peace has been making grants to scholars and researchers, the Institute has supported a significant portion of the most important research relating to such war and peace issues as those cited above. Over this period 181 books, 147 book-length manuscripts, and 214 published articles have been produced as products of Institute grants. Many of these have had a major impact on the field of international relations and on both scholarly and public understanding of conflict and peacemaking To provide brief summaries of the books that are products of Institute grants, the Institute has published four editions of Contributions to the Study of Peacemaking: A Summary of Completed Grant Projects The most recent of these appeared in 1996.

The purpose of this report is different. We asked the author political scientist Dr. Anne-Marie Smith, to review most of the grant products that have been published over the last decade and extract from them new insights and learnings. We asked her to convey her conclusions in the form of essays on several major themes, drawing lessons from these grant products Although Dr. Smith did not attempt to include all Institute grants in her essays, all of the nearly 100 works cited in this report are products of Institute grants.

Our hope is that the set of essays contained in this report will be instructive to scholars who may be familiar with many of these works but may not have approached them from this perspective or from the same breadth of coverage. Our greatest hope, however, is that this report will benefit practitioners who usually do not have the time required to read such a wide range of scholarly works.

Dr. Smith has derived insights and drawn lessons on several timely issues confronting practitioners, including.

* new policy approaches to such issues as ethnic conflict and the provision of humanitarian assistance
* the effective use of unofficial diplomacy in such trouble spots as Burundi, Kosovo, Somalia, and the Taiwan Strait
* an analytic perspective on the flux in international institutions, including the second generation of UN peacekeeping
* an overview of ongoing debates on such key issues as sovereignty, intervention, and the democratic peace proposition

If we have succeeded in achieving our goals for this publication, it will enable the reader to learn a good deal about policy-relevant advances in the international relations literature without having to read a vast array of published and unpublished material. On the other hand, we also hope that this analytic review will stimulate readers' interest so that they will want to learn more by turning to the four volumes of Contributions to the Study of Peacemaking or, even better, by reading some or all of the original works To obtain the books and articles cited in this report, please contact the publishers or the authors; the Institute is not the publisher or distributor of most of these works and thus cannot provide copies. Complete citations are given in the bibliography of this report and are also available on the Institute's web site (www.usip.org).

Since its inception in 1986 the Institute's Grant Program has made over one thousand grants to nonprofit institutions and individuals around the world. Grant projects are funded through two approaches, unsolicited and solicited competitions. Unsolicited grants may be awarded for any topic that falls within the Institute's broad mandate, providing financial support for research, education, training, pilot projects in peacemaking, and the dissemination of information on international peace and conflict resolution. The Grant Program conducts two unsolicited grant competitions each year. Solicited grants are awarded annually for special topics identified in advance by the Institute as addressing emerging concerns or urgent priorities within international peace and conflict resolution. Grants in both categories generally fall in the range of $25,000 to $45,000

Although the views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Institute, we are grateful to Dr. Smith for the breadth of coverage achieved in this report and the depth of insight that she offers.

DAVID SMOCK
DIRECTOR, GRANT PROGRAM

Introduction

Over the past twelve years, the Grant Program of the United States Institute of Peace has provided funding for research and analysis on an array of topics in the field of international peacemaking. Sponsoring policy-relevant research and promoting immediate practical applications, the program has enabled policymakers, practitioners, and scholars to explore a wide variety of conflicts and approaches to conflict resolution. Grantees have examined particular conflicts and identified trends in international conflict and have evaluated the successes and shortcomings of efforts at conflict management and peacemaking. In their efforts to build a body of analysis that will help to anticipate, prevent, contain, and resolve international conflict, the Institute's grantees have generated a wealth of historical insight and timely policy guidance.

Underlying much of this research and analysis is an orientation expressed in Beyond Confrontation: Learning Conflict Resolution in the Post–Cold War Era, by John Vasquez, James Johnson, Sanford Jaffe, and Linda Stamato The book, prepared with a grant from the Institute, presents new perspectives on conflict resolution, examining methods and approaches that are becoming appropriate in a post–Cold War world. The authors, all of Rutgers University, observe that people and groups do learn to get along with others, developing a variety of ways to settle disputes and to resolve deep underlying conflicts without resort to the use of collective violence. These methods are varied and some are much more conducive to fair and lasting settlements than others. But if they are learned, Johnson and Vasquez assert in their introduction, they can also be taught, advanced, and refined. The motivation for the study of international conflict management and peacemaking is the conviction that "how differences are settled and peace is made is something that is learned and therefore can be improved."[1] Such a perspective makes it imperative to gather the lessons from recent efforts at peacemaking, so as to be able to identify the improvements, learn when they are applicable, and know how best to apply them

This report gathers some of those lessons, drawing on ten years of research and analysis funded by the Institute. The fruits of this labor have been shared previously through grantees' published books, articles, and monographs, as well as through conferences and training workshops. The Institute's Grant Program has also prepared periodic summaries of the results of its grants, gathered in Contributions to the Study of Peacemaking (volumes 1–4).[2] This volume provides a single overarching frame for these various sources, organizing diverse grant projects thematically across different regions and types of conflicts, and tracing debates that have been furthered and advances that have been achieved through these diverse grant projects.

The work on international peacemaking that has been sponsored by the Institute's grants is quite varied in content and approach Some projects have addressed a particular conflict in great depth; others have pursued an issue, method of conflict resolution, or type of conflict in comparative perspective. The range of methodologies employed has included statistical analysis interviews with policymakers, document research, extensive fieldwork in conflict settings, and informed memoirs of key actors who have defined some aspect of the field and reflect upon the lessons of their experiences. Grantees have worked in a variety of disciplines, including diplomacy, law, history, political science, and professional dispute resolution

From these approaches, grantees have formulated and addressed many of the particular questions that challenge contemporary international relations. Should there be new standards for international intervention? How can the design of international peacekeeping operations be improved? What have been the most successful ways of defusing ethnic conflict? Does the spread of democracy imply a new basis for world peace? Why are nonviolent strategies successful in some contexts and not in others? How can humanitarian assistance be delivered so as not to sustain conflict? Grantees have grappled with these questions in many different regional and comparative settings, identifying the insights and lessons to be applied in advancing international peacemaking

Assessing ten years of research, this volume begins with a topic that practically every grantee addresses. the reassessment of national sovereignty and nonintervention. Although the concept of sovereignty is rarely the sole focus of any project, almost all projects relating to international peacemaking confront it directly or indirectly

The management of conflict via international organizations is the second topic, with particular attention to the transformation of UN peacekeeping. Grantees assess these transformations, evaluate weaknesses in current UN practice, and consider ways to improve the design of UN peacekeeping mandates

The third section covers unofficial diplomacy, whether conducted among heads of state or at the grassroots level Nongovernmental organizations have played an important role in fostering peace through unofficial diplomacy.

The fourth topic, managing ethnic conflict, has become a priority in many parts of the world. Careful study of global trends indicates a prolonged rise in ethnic conflict. Recently, "ethnic entrepreneurs" have mobilized ethnic grievances, politicizing ethnic identities and exacerbating ethnic conflicts to serve their own ends. Policies to defuse ethnic conflict often include permitting limited autonomy for communal groups and finding ways to make national sovereignty divisible.

The democratic peace proposition, the fifth topic examined, asserts that since democracies do not fight each other the spread of democracy holds the promise of world peace. Some grantees explore the causal mechanisms embedded within that proposition, and others seek to qualify and challenge it. Some examine intervention by democracies; others study the belligerent behavior of new democracies.

The sixth section reviews research on nonviolence in comparative perspective, with fruitful comparisons of Eastern Europe and China, as well as broader perspectives on the strategies of nonviolence

The final section addresses how humanitarian aid may sustain conflict, directly via the transfer and diversion of material resources, and indirectly through more dispersed impacts on the course of a conflict. Many analysts and practitioners contribute suggestions for improving delivery of aid so as to resolve rather than sustain conflict, particularly by strengthening local communities

Grantees bring skillful analysis and reflection on their experience to all these topics Out of a commitment that peacemaking can be learned and improved on, they have generated both historical insights and policy recommendations for preventing, managing. and resolving a wide variety of international conflicts. Over the twelve years that the United States Institute of Peace has sponsored such projects, grantees have made significant contributions to advance our understanding and indicate ways of achieving international peacemaking.

One

Questions of Sovereignty and Nonintervention

Across the spectrum of policy issues to which the Institute's grantees have given attention, certain underlying themes recur Whether analyzing the role of international organizations, the spread of democracy, various ways of dealing with ethnic conflict, or the most effective methods of delivering humanitarian aid, almost all grantees found themselves compelled to address the concept of national sovereignty and its corollary, the principle of nonintervention. These themes constitute important pieces in the puzzle of contemporary international relations.

Respect for national sovereignty and commitment to nonintervention have long been at the core of international relations. Nonetheless, given the many changes in geopolitics and shifts in state behavior, these concepts are now being reconsidered, as is the commitment to them among various international actors. Current understandings of sovereignty and nonintervention were formulated when challenges to world peace often arose from disrespect for national borders and independence. Recently, however, most nations of the world and the international organizations they have created readily respect the integrity of independent states. Rather than initiating intervention, outside parties are finding themselves drawn into situations in order to manage the consequences of humanitarian disasters and internal warfare. In this different context, the concepts of sovereignty and nonintervention merit renewed attention. Anyone concerned with the management of international conflict—whether the particular context is ethnic strife, border disputes, or humanitarian crises—needs a clear analysis of current perspectives on sovereignty and nonintervention.

The Concept of Sovereignty

The concept of sovereignty has been defined in many different ways. A sovereign state refers to one that is self-governing. Within its territory, the sovereign state has undivided jurisdiction over all persons and property. In principle, there are no external limits placed upon the decisions and actions of the state within its own boundaries. This concept of sovereignty has been closely related to the development of the modern nation-state; it has been a central part of international relations since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, which ended an era of religious warfare and inaugurated the modern European state system. State sovereignty is a long-established norm of international relations—indeed, in Waiting for the Millennium Martin Rochester of the University of Missouri terms it a "cult of sovereignty," so unquestioned is its centrality to the identities of states and the relations between them [1]

The norm of state sovereignty, however, has never been absolute Historically, it has been subject to periodic reinterpretations. Regionally, it has been stronger in some parts of the world than others. And it has always been subject to certain constraints, whether embodied in other norms of international relations or formalized in international law.

Historically, as political scientists Margaret Hermann, Charles Kegley, and Gregory Raymond point out in their essay "The Decay of the Nonintervention Principle," there has been an ebb and flow, a shifting emphasis between sovereignty and interdependence Hermann of Ohio State University, Kegley of the University of South Carolina, and Raymond of Boise State University trace

the evolutions and adaptations from 1815 to the current period. noting different patterns in international assessments of sovereignty. For example, when threats to established monarchies arose from internal rebellions and revolutionary insurrections, the Concert of Europe placed a greater emphasis on interdependence, calling for mutual assistance and tolerating collective intervention. Later, in the period prior to World War I, the predominant threat came from external, cross-border wars With the concern to contain such wars, greater emphasis was placed on sovereignty and a more restrictive interpretation of intervention. Hermann, Kegley, and Raymond found that such shifts in international views of the concept of sovereignty tend to accompany system-transforming wars [2]

Many observers have wondered whether IOs are beginning to acquire an independent power of their own at the expense of member states.

The strength of the concept of sovereignty has also varied regionally around the world. This is one theme of Robert Kaplan's The Ends of the Earth. A Journey at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century. As he traveled around the globe, Kaplan, a journalist and author, encountered many places where international borders are fictitious and state capacities to exercise the customary tasks of sovereignty nonexistent.[3] In some regions, this followed from the arbitrary borders drawn by colonial powers. In other areas, Kaplan found that new states are far from capable of exercising sovereignty effectively; they are challenged less by external powers than by their own internal anarchy. In his travels, Kaplan came to doubt the utility of the concept of sovereignty in many regions, finding insufficient evidence that the sovereign state, "as a governing ideal, can be successfully transported to areas outside the industrialized world "[4]

There are also limits, legal and de facto, to sovereignty, even where and when commitment to it has been strong Outside states and organizations do indeed legally or otherwise circumscribe the domestic policies of others. Steven Ratner of the University of Texas, Austin, points out that current international practice includes a number of constraints upon the internal behavior of sovereign states. The conditionality requirements of the International Monetary Fund, for example, require certain countries to restructure their economies to qualify for international loans. Various international agreements on environmental matters also limit the actions of sovereign states. More controversially, human rights covenants and humanitarian-relief operations are also challenging traditional concepts of sovereignty in new ways [5]

Thus, on the one hand, political scientists Milton Esman, professor emeritus at Cornell University, and Shibley Telhami of the University of Maryland are correct to declare that "State sovereignty is a long-established norm or principle of international law and international relations Within recognized borders the state is formally endowed with absolute sovereignty over its territory and population; any interference by outsiders without the state's consent is regarded as ipso facto illegitimate."[6] On the other hand, that long-established norm has been subject to historical change, regional variation, and legal limitation. It is also currently challenged on several fronts: greatly increased globalization and interdependence, the significant rise of nonstate actors, and the failure of some states to fulfill what are seen as the responsibilities of sovereignty

Interdependence and Permeable Borders

Several grantees have noted the challenge to state sovereignty posed by internationalization in many fields Borders are becoming increasingly permeable owing to an international flow of capital, goods, news, and information, as well as viruses, pollutants, and narcotics No nation can simply choose not to participate in the globalization of the economy, finances, and communication, nor can any decline to suffer from complex problems associated with such globalization

Many of the challenges faced by independent nations require interdependent solutions. From the expansion of international trade, stability of international currency markets, control of

epidemics, management of environmental hazards, prevention of genocide, and control of nuclear weapons, to the standardization of shipping rules, air safety standards, and the free movement of news and cultural works, a wide array of tasks escapes the control or prerogative of any one sovereign nation and often requires joint action.

Increased globalization and interdependence do not necessarily entail a weakening of sovereign states. As Harry Gelber of Boston University argues in Sovereignty through Interdependence. increasing responsibilities of managing international connections may indeed strengthen sovereign states, requiring enhanced administrative capacities and expanding their scope of operation. Current experience, in Gelber's view, "does not suggest that interdependence need represent a loss of power or even independence "7 Clearly, however, emerging forms of interdependence do challenge traditional conceptions and practices of sovereignty. Whether they are weakened or strengthened by interdependence in the long term, sovereign states are finding that they must adapt to operate in a world increasingly characterized by globalization.

Nonstate Actors

Another challenge to state sovereignty comes from the rise of a number of nonstate actors assuming significant roles in contemporary international relations As Terrence Lyons of the Brookings Institution writes, "Nonstate international actors, ranging from Amnesty International, Citibank, scientific organizations, Oxfam, and Cable News Network to the Catholic church, influence different issues globally and will be critical components in the still evolving international order "8

Subnational and cross-border ethnic groups are also becoming more assertive in many regions, challenging states and international stability.9 To take as interlocutors only established nation-states does little to address ethnic conflict when such conflict is typically aimed precisely at the status of those states as sovereign powers and their jurisdiction over all ethnic groups or territories within their borders. This is a very delicate issue, however, as negotiating with an ethnic group risks elevating that group to sovereign status or at least helping to legitimate its claim

Transnational corporations, with operating budgets much larger than the gross national products of many nations, are also significant players in international relations These corporations are in many ways outside the control of the nations in which they operate. As the business arena is increasingly global, much smaller companies are also operating in an international setting. Timothy Sample notes both the increasing importance of international business leaders, compared with government leaders, and the capacities of business leaders to bring substantial pressure upon governments and their economic, social, and foreign policies 10

Supranational organizations, such as the international organizations (IOs) whose members are the governments of nation-states, are also called upon to play an ever larger role in international relations Many observers have wondered whether IOs are beginning to acquire an independent power of their own at the expense of member states. Others, however, do not see a larger role for international organizations as placing limits on states. Jack Donnelly of the University of Denver notes that international organizations, "being creations of states, tend to be solicitous of the sovereign rights of their creators."11 Edward Luck, president emeritus of the United Nations Association of the United States, also suggests that an expanded role for international organizations may actually strengthen state sovereignty "By helping states to address problems that would otherwise be well beyond their control individually, the UN system has actually reinforced the basis for national sovereignty and extended the life of the nation-state era in the expanse of human history."12

International nongovernmental organizations, such as human rights groups, environmental groups, peace groups, and humanitarian-relief organizations, have a growing impact on international relations. The volume Building Peace in the Middle East, edited by Elise Boulding of the

University of Colorado, envisions voluntary people's associations pursuing direct links with similar groups across national boundaries. These links could expand or supersede the peacebuilding capabilities of states.[13]

The Responsibilities of Sovereignty

A third area of challenges to the traditional concept of sovereignty arises from the failures of sovereign states to fulfill their responsibilities. Some states fail to perform effectively such basic functions as providing political stability, economic prosperity, equitable distribution of resources, or social welfare. Other states directly violate the civil liberties and human rights of their own citizens, compromising their health and well-being and generating humanitarian crises. When this occurs, it is generally the responsibility of the populace to hold the state accountable. When that populace, however, has been oppressed and denied participation, its capacity to hold the state accountable is quite limited. In such situations, it is argued, the international community has a corresponding responsibility to help the victims of failed states.

Among those who have studied this issue is Francis Deng, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, a Washington-based think tank. Deng is concerned that the traditional concept of sovereignty can serve as a shield for states that are not fulfilling their responsibilities. "The more deficient the performance of a government and the more vulnerable to external scrutiny," Deng writes, "the more likely it is to plead sovereignty as a barricade. This defensive reaction by targeted or targetable governments in turn challenges the determination of the international community to act affirmatively against the abuse of national sovereignty."[14] Donald Rothchild, professor of political science at the University of California, Davis, sees a similar tendency As states engage in the political and military repression of their own people, the claim of sovereignty may become simply a "refuge for scoundrels."[15]

New Bases for Intervention

The debates on the concept of sovereignty, sparked by changes in interdependence, new nonstate actors, and the failures of states to fulfill what are seen as the responsibilities of sovereignty, have their most important practical implications for the principle of nonintervention Nonintervention, the duty to refrain from uninvited involvement in a state's internal affairs, has been a standard corollary of the traditional norm of sovereignty. As stated in Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, "All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat of the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State." Challenges to sovereignty also raise questions for nonintervention. For example, given the tremendous globalization of economies and information, intervention seems to be, as Linton Brooks and Arnold Kanter term it, simply "a fact of life."[16] Furthermore, with all the new nonstate actors, the insistence in international law that no state shall intervene in other states' internal affairs may not provide adequate protection from antagonists And occurrences that would reduce sovereignty to merely a "refuge for scoundrels" also seem to justify new bases for intervention.

Among those who have considered the expansion of criteria for international intervention is Raymond Hopkins, director of the Program in Public Policy and professor of political science at Swarthmore College. Having examined ethnic conflicts, humanitarian crises, and human rights violations, Hopkins concludes that absolute conceptions of sovereignty which do not include states' responsibilities to their citizens "are no longer appropriate for a changed global society " He proposes that state sovereignty be reconceived as a relative and divisible phenomenon, and as a condition that may be sacrificed by state behavior. This yields a very different view of intervention as well As Hopkins writes, "Intervention in a situation where violations of human rights indicate a lack of the

guarantees justifying sovereignty does not violate the basic purposes of sovereignty Once a government, although putatively having a legitimate monopoly of coercive power over a people and territory, fails to fulfill the basic purposes for its independence, to wit, providing safety and fundamental human rights to its population, then the principles that guarantee that state's immunity from intervention (under article 2, paragraph 1, of the UN Charter) are undermined."[17]

Hopkins's analysis leads him to three conclusions: "First, sovereignty is not inviolate; second, violations of human rights (whether defined by local or global standards) provide a basis for intervention, and third, intervention can be considered legitimate only after multilateral consideration of the specific case and a formal resolution through the procedures of that body."[18]

The emphasis on any new type of intervention as having to be multilateral is echoed by Francis Deng In a situation where a state has failed in its responsibilities to its citizens, the first step for the international community should be to regain the cooperation of that state. If the state continues to refuse to honor its responsibilities, the international community "must make it clear that such a result threatens the global order and will not be tolerated," according to Deng [19] The new justifications for intervention are operative not from any particular state's interests, but, rather, from the shared global order. As the criteria that render intervention permissible may be expanding to include ethnic violence, human rights violations, and humanitarian crises, this emphasis on the multilateral nature of such intervention is widely shared Indeed, Margaret Hermann of Ohio State University, Charles Kegley of the University of South Carolina, and Gregory Raymond of Boise State University examine a wide variety of states and conclude that "The behavior of both democracies and nondemocracies suggests growing support for community-sanctioned interventionary behavior."[20]

Cautionary Notes

However, counterpoised to a new interpretation of limited and divisible sovereignty that carries with it responsibilities, and an expanded set of justifications for international interventions, is an insistence that the traditional formulations of these concepts continue to anchor international relations. As political scientist Jack Donnelly writes, "Contemporary international politics, for all the talk of the decline of the nation-state, remains structured around sovereignty."[21] Many also assert that the principle of nonintervention, although it has eroded, remains strong

A very different argument and cautionary note is sounded by political scientists Hermann, Kegley, and Raymond. Their study does not challenge the conclusion that sovereignty has at times served as a "refuge for scoundrels." Their historical research does, however, lead them to question whether intervention would be a solution to this problem. Hermann, Kegley, and Raymond not only question whether intervention can be used to maintain order, but also note the crucial importance of being able "to delineate the boundaries between constructive and destructive military intervention. It is imperative . . . [to] critically evaluate the conditions under which a breach of the principle of nonintervention may be truly medicinal. Caution is warranted because . . . interventionary efforts have had [a] historic tendency to exacerbate the very problems they sought to resolve."[22]

Such, then, are some of the reflections of grantees regarding the concepts of sovereignty and intervention. The new global politics of interdependence, emerging actors, and a concern for state behavior that violates what are understood as the responsibilities of sovereignty generate careful reevaluations. New bases for intervention arise from new understandings of sovereignty, even as old lessons of the pitfalls of intervention are recalled. Ongoing debates on sovereignty and nonintervention inform the research and analyses undertaken by grantees on a variety of particular policy issues.

Two

International Organizations

Armed conflict recurs in and between societies, frequently at the level of organized violence. This does not mean, however, that such violence is endemic, inevitable, or haphazard—akin to natural disasters. To the contrary, Jonathan Dean of the Union of Concerned Scientists argues in Ending Europe's Wars The Continuing Search for Peace and Security, patterns can be discerned and practices identified, such that conflict may be anticipated and prevented. Furthermore, ongoing conflicts can be de-escalated, channeled into negotiation, contained, controlled, and resolved According to Dean, "It is not at all probable that all armed conflict will ever be eliminated. But early preventive action—identification of incipient conflict situations, negotiation, mediation, preventive deployment. even military intervention to require a cease-fire in place at the outset of conflict—can prevent or contain specific conflicts and thus lower the overall level of organized violence in the world."[1] However, Dean is not sanguine about such an endeavor. His volume is a careful analysis of just the sort of institutional strengthening and policy initiatives needed to achieve these goals In this regard, he focuses on the role of international organizations.

International organizations (IOs), whose members are nation-states, create forums for addressing and taking action on a wide variety of international concerns. They formulate agreements, treaties, and sanctions; they undertake interventions, adjudication, negotiations, and research. Some are organized around functional fields, such as security (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO), health (World Health Organization, WHO), or finance (the International Monetary Fund, IMF). Others are organized regionally, such as the Organization of American States (OAS), the Organization of African Unity (OAU), or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The role of IOs is currently in flux. Their involvement is in great demand in a wide variety of conflicts and potential conflicts. According to Raymond Hopkins, director of the Program in Public Policy and professor of political science at Swarthmore College, this increased demand can be traced to the end of the Cold War. The bipolar confrontation of the Cold War provided structured antagonisms and international norms. In the absence of these, there is increased anomie. States find it difficult to recognize their interests and to pursue them, either unilaterally or through joint state-level action. "The result," writes Hopkins, "is that more states expect IO intervention to solve problems related to international public goods."[2]

IOs, however, are not necessarily equipped to handle this burden. They may be particularly ill-suited to deal with ethnic conflicts, which challenge the concepts of statehood, sovereignty, and territorial integrity on which IO members are traditionally based. Many lack the financial resources and personnel to undertake the tasks with which they are charged. There are also many questions regarding the legitimacy of IO action, particularly on issues traditionally considered to be domestic concerns, such as human rights. Thus the role of IOs is being carefully reevaluated

Of all the IOs, none has received greater scrutiny than the United Nations On the occasion of its fiftieth anniversary, it was the subject of many careful retrospective studies, with a full measure of both accolades and criticism. Scholars, analysts, and practitioners have offered a wide variety of

suggestions for reforming and improving this preeminent world body. Several observers propose organizational reforms, such as enlarging the Security Council, or making it more representative of the distribution of power in the world today. Some see a need to integrate further the various tasks of the UN. Felice Gaer of the Jacob Blaustein Institute for the Advancement of Human Rights suggests giving the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights greater power to inject a human rights agenda into all UN functions. Others, however, advocate decentralization, deconstructing the organization into its functional units. Arguing that no single organization can accommodate the multilateral complexities of a post–Cold War world, Donald Puchala, of the University of South Carolina, suggests maintaining the General Assembly as a forum for international debate but distributing all UN functions into specific separate agencies and doing away with the UN as such.[3] The military capability of the UN is also subject to debate, with some proposing the creation of a "legion," a standing UN military force available to the Security Council. This proposal has attracted its share of criticism over its potential for abuse, with the UN deploying such a supranational armed force too willingly.[4] UN finances have also received careful scrutiny. In the search for larger and more secure, stable funding, some suggest fundamental changes in the way assessments for peacekeeping operations are made. Currently, assessments are calculated as a percentage of a country's gross national product. It has been suggested that assessments should be based on each nation's defense budget instead.[5] Another proposal is a tax on all international financial transactions.[6]

The transformation from "first-generation peacekeeping" to "second-generation peacekeeping" has many bewildering aspects.

For all this attention to varied aspects of the UN operation, probably no aspect of UN activity has been subject to greater scrutiny than its peacekeeping operations. In-depth case studies and broad historical assessments of the UN have identified, analyzed, and evaluated the marked transformations that have occurred in the practice of UN peacekeeping operations. These changes have been adopted as lessons from previous engagements, adaptations to altered contexts, and responses to new challenges. Changes over time in the UN practice of peacekeeping are now considered to have accumulated into a "generational" divide, connoting not merely some minor adjustments or a new phase, but an entirely different set of premises, techniques, responsibilities, and goals.

The transformation from "first-generation peacekeeping" to "second-generation peacekeeping" has many bewildering aspects. Edward Luck, president emeritus of the United Nations Association of the United States, has reviewed the origins of UN peacekeeping and observes that no one would have

> suggested then that the United Nations should be conducting elections, writing constitutions, or encouraging more democratic governments, especially since the term "democracy" was not used even once in the UN Charter or its eloquent Preamble. . . Peacekeeping by and large was seen as a step to give diplomacy a chance to work or to reinforce the status quo, not as the security midwife to a political and social metamorphosis within troubled nations.[7]

As Luck's remarks suggest, the scope, complexity, frequency, and goals of some contemporary peacekeeping operations were not foreseen and require careful analysis. In the literature discussed below, Institute-supported researchers and analysts identify the key characteristics and shortcomings of first-generation peacekeeping and some of the conditions of the shift toward, and the broad content of, the second generation. They also examine some of the particular policy problems raised by second-generation peacekeeping, such as how best to shape these dynamic agreements, which Michael Doyle has called "obsolescing bargains." Finally, they offer some assessments as to whether this is the best way to go about managing international conflict.

First-Generation Peacekeeping

As originally conceived, UN peacekeeping was in itself a novel form of conflict resolution. Peacekeeping is not specifically mentioned in the UN charter. Joseph Baratta explains that "In concept, it falls between the techniques for pacific settlements of disputes (Chapter VI) and collective action against threats and breaches of the peace (Chapter VII) . . . Hence, as [Secretary General Dag] Hammarskjold once explained, peacekeeping really belongs to 'Chapter VI ½.'"[8]

In what is now referred to as first-generation peacekeeping, the UN would deploy unarmed or lightly armed military observers between two or more opposing armies, with their consent, pending a political settlement of the conflict. The immediate goal was the termination of armed hostilities. As a means of managing international conflict, such operations were used to monitor truces, cease-fire agreements, troop withdrawals, and buffer zones while political negotiations were pursued. These were provisional military-centered arrangements.

The guiding principles of these first-generation peacekeeping operations have been specified by Sir Brian Urquhart, who served in the UN Secretariat for four decades, working with the first five secretaries general on peace and security matters, especially peacekeeping. Urquhart identifies six principles for this form of peacekeeping:

1. consent of the parties involved in the conflict to the establishment of the operation, to its mandate, to its composition and to its appointed commanding officer;

2. continuing and strong support of the operation by the mandating authority, the Security Council;

3. clear and achievable mandate;

4. non-use of force except in last resort in self-defense (including attempts by forceful means to prevent peacekeepers from discharging their duties);

5. willingness of troop-providing countries to provide adequate personnel and accept risk;

6. willingness of member states to make available financial and logistical support [9]

The earliest first-generation peacekeeping operations were deployed in the Middle East in 1948 and in Kashmir in 1949. The 1960–64 operation in the Congo included some features now identified as second-generation activities. The peacekeeping force sent to Cyprus in 1964 still remains. Other operations have monitored troop withdrawals in Afghanistan in 1988–90, and the Iran-Iraq truce in 1988–91. While first-generation operations have not been the predominant form of peacekeeping since 1989, they continue to be conducted, such as the mission to observe the cease-fire in Georgia in 1993.

First-generation peacekeeping missions have been credited with significant achievements. As identified by Michael Doyle, these missions "provided transparency—an impartial assurance that the other party was not violating the truce. They also raised the costs of defecting from and the benefits of abiding with the agreement by the threat of exposure, the potential resistance of the peacekeeping force (if it were attacked), and the legitimacy of the UN mandates."[10] Above all, as Joseph Baratta writes, they are acknowledged as having stabilized conflicts "in order to gain time for diplomacy to negotiate a permanent settlement."[11]

Yet what appear as strong points could also be drawbacks of first-generation peacekeeping operations. They have been criticized for simply delaying the most difficult tasks, creating sanctioned holding patterns for conflicts that were too large, too intrinsically intractable, or too politically sensitive to be addressed directly in a Cold War context. Thus, while praising first-generation peacekeeping as a technique of conflict management, Baratta also notes that "the hard work of building understanding, finding terms for a settlement, and accepting some kind of local political

authority for the establishment of law and order remains even while the peacekeeping forces are in place. All that is gained is time."[12] In The New UN Peacekeeping· Building Peace in Lands of Conflict after the Cold War, Steven Ratner of the University of Texas, Austin, goes further, questioning whether such operations may have contributed to perpetuating certain conflicts:

> Apart from some unusual operations in the Congo and New Guinea . none succeeded in doing more than freezing conflicts in place, although that itself represented an accomplishment given the tensions between the belligerents. And rather than "keeping" that peace, they limited their role to observing it. Perhaps peacekeeping was supposed to create the conditions for peace, but rarely did this appear to happen. Indeed. the UN's presence may well have prolonged the underlying conflict by removing any incentives to settle it.[13]

Michael Doyle, professor of politics at Princeton University, concurs with these assessments. He notes that while "The virtues [of first generation peacekeeping missions] were obvious· their costs, as in the long Cyprus operation, were often paid in conflicts delayed rather than resolved."[14]

Changes in the International Context of Peacekeeping

Changes in the mode of peacekeeping have followed not only from careful assessments and decisions about the operations themselves, but also from changes in the types of conflicts and in the international context in which management of conflict is attempted The end of the Cold War contributed to many such changes. While this provides a watershed for many aspects of international relations, Steven Ratner spells out exactly the implications for UN peacekeeping operations. He identifies three features of the post—Cold War world that have compelled the emergence of the second generation of UN peacekeeping.

First, according to Ratner, there is a new potential to settle seemingly insoluble wars. The end of the Cold War made it possible to resolve conflicts that had been waged as "proxy wars" between the superpowers (in Cambodia, Central America, Angola, Mozambique) and removed the distortion of East-West rivalry from other conflicts (the decolonization of Namibia and the Western Sahara, and the shift to majority rule in South Africa). A second feature of the post—Cold War world Ratner identifies is the increase of a different type of conflict intrastate violence, frequently ethnically based With the end of the Cold War, there was also an end to U.S. and Soviet support that had buttressed governments and suppressed internal divisions This has contributed to the breakup or severe destabilization of several states (Yugoslavia, Somalia, Georgia). The third relevant characteristic Ratner sees in post—Cold War relations is the new international attention to domestic governance issues and a greater willingness to intervene in sovereign states over such issues as human rights and fair, open elections This may also be attributed in part to the end of the Cold War, as Western states became freer to assert in a more balanced way their commitment to political and civil rights.[15]

These and other changes in the international context, as well as dissatisfaction with the drawbacks of first-generation peacekeeping, have contributed to a series of adjustments and new initiatives in peacekeeping operations. These changes are now acknowledged as constituting the second generation of this mode of conflict management

Second-Generation Peacekeeping

The UN's second generation of peacekeeping is generally dated from the 1989—91 mission in Namibia. Subsequent peacekeeping missions in El Salvador and Cambodia are other examples of this form of UN peacekeeping. Other second-generation operations include missions in Haiti, Somalia, Mozambique, Liberia, Rwanda, and Guatemala, all since 1990. These missions are

distinguished by new techniques and goals, scope and content, and range of conflicts in which they are applied; these features set them apart from first-generation peacekeeping missions.

Second-generation operations have marked a clear shift in the purpose of peacekeeping missions from provisional to permanent peace. Rather than avoid the aggravation of disputes, these operations attempt to address the underlying causes of those disputes. In pursuit of permanent peace, second-generation operations are far more comprehensive than their predecessors.

Second-generation operations are undertaken according to complex agreements, parts of which may be renegotiated as the operation unfolds. The content of these complex agreements varies according to the character of the conflict at hand, but all are very broad The tasks include not only monitoring and observing, but also administering, managing, mediating, supervising, and training. In their diversity, breadth, and depth, these responsibilities are unprecedented for UN peacekeeping operations.

The very wide range of other activities that may be part of second-generation operations includes many tasks that involve the UN in the domestic affairs of a nation.

Second-generation peacekeeping does include traditional military components, such as monitoring cease-fires and the withdrawal of foreign forces. It can also include a mandate to restructure and reform armies, oversee the termination of foreign military assistance, demobilize and disarm combatants, gain custody of weapons, and de-mine territories. Such military activities, however, are the prerequisites to many other aspects of these operations, rather than their main focus.

The very wide range of other activities that may be part of second-generation operations includes many tasks that involve the UN in the domestic affairs of a nation. Steven Ratner comments that "As instruments for settling conflicts, second-generation peacekeeping operations are intertwined with the domestic political situation and do not stand apart from it as would the typical first-generation mission."[16] Among peacekeeping activities are organizing, conducting, and overseeing elections for constituent assemblies or new governments, or referenda on the status of disputed territories, as well as monitoring the fair and effective functioning of the civilian apparatus. In the field of law and order, second-generation operations may assume the responsibility of maintaining civil peace, improving the conduct of police forces, disbanding death squads and vigilante groups, creating new police forces, and overseeing the reform of the judiciary. There are also tasks in national reconciliation, including arranging cooperation and power sharing among rival factions and interest groups Improving and promoting respect for human rights is another important component of second-generation operations, including seeing to the appropriate disposition of past offenders. These operations may also undertake humanitarian relief, such as the receipt and distribution of food, medicine, clothing, and shelter. The repatriation and resettlement of refugees is another important task in second-generation operations. Economic reconstruction can be yet another part of their mandate, including reestablishing food cultivation and public infrastructure, campaigns for and subsequent use of foreign assistance, and land reform The UN also helps to generate new relationships with outside actors, including both foreign states and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Even political culture and values are part of these operations, enlisting UN efforts in promoting democratic education, a free press, and independent radio stations.

To achieve a permanent peace, second-generation peacekeeping operations aim at comprehensive transformations. If they are to result in viable, legitimate, and independent polities, these operations must grapple with the structures, institutions, and practices of government, as well as the identities, values, and behavior of citizens As Michael Doyle comments, second-generation peacekeeping "must help transform the political landscape by building a new basis for democratic peace. . . . More than reforming play in an old game, it changes the game "[17]

Second-generation peacekeeping operations are distinctive in the breadth, depth, and complexity of the tasks they take on, bringing international involvement into areas long considered to be the exclusive domain of domestic jurisdiction Such operations are apt to be deployed not only in what are traditionally considered international conflicts, but in domestic conflicts as well, such as the fighting between different state factions in Haiti and Liberia. According to Steven Ratner, in responding to ostensibly internal conflicts as well as interstate conflicts, second-generation peace-keeping "reflects the realization that separation of and distinction between the two is anachronistic, as most civil wars are both fueled by foreign supporters and have ramifications beyond state borders."[18]

Because they are involved with the domestic affairs of a country—its governance, economy, civil administration and political culture, as well as its military security—and because they may address internal conflicts among different groups or factions, second-generation peacekeeping operations raise many questions about sovereignty. As Michael Doyle affirms, "The parties to these agreements. in effect, consent to limitation of their sovereignty for the life of the UN-sponsored peace process."[19] Clearly, second-generation peacekeeping is one important element in the reconsideration of sovereignty, and the idea that sovereignty can be limited or divisible by consent is part of a new interpretation. This new understanding of sovereignty in light of second-generation peacekeeping operations raises many other questions, particularly regarding consent.

Traditional documents of international law may not be applicable in dealing with warring clans or ethnic groups.

Consent: Some Practical Questions

Second-generation peacekeeping operations (as distinct from "peace-enforcing" missions) are based on consent But that simple statement raises many secondary questions. Who, in the highly conflictive situations in which the UN becomes involved, is to give consent? Which warring parties and factions are to be included in agreements? Who are to be considered representatives of those factions? Do these representatives have effective control of their factions, or are there rogue elements with the capacity to sabotage agreements made by the supposed representatives? Are there other groups, not included in the negotiating process, whose interests are being ignored? Since the goal of the operation is a permanent peace, excluding important groups will undercut the entire enterprise Further, as the warring parties are not sovereign states, what form will an agreement take? Traditional documents of international law may not be applicable in dealing with warring clans or ethnic groups. And what is the quality of the consent—temporary, grudging, with a tendency to resist or at least evade the agreement? There may be unforeseen gaps. matters that the agreement did not include There may be differences in interpretations. The consent may have been false and deceptive from the start, masking an intent to manipulate and undermine the agreement. Or the consent granted may be authentic, promising the political will necessary to abide by the agreement—and yet that consent may decay over time as the situation changes. And what should the UN do in the face of such eroding consent? Must it withdraw, should it renegotiate, can it muddle through or perhaps ignore the withheld cooperation if it is not essential for achieving a particular objective?

The agreements that are the basis for second-generation operations are multifaceted and complex, and the operations themselves change and evolve over time. Many aspects of the parties, their relations, and the context shift. Something as tenuous as consent itself, particularly the consent to limit sovereignty, made among warring parties cannot be simple. As Michael Doyle observes, "Consent is not a 'bright line' demarcating the safe and acceptable from the dangerous and illegitimate."[20] But the UN must work with this, it cannot ignore such situations. The UN cannot simply refuse to continue in the absence of perfect consent. In some situations the UN may

proceed with the implementation, although it may incorporate a greater degree of coercion and at some point become peace enforcement. In other instances the UN will have to abandon parts of an operation that are unachievable without cooperation of the parties. In many instances the UN may have to muddle through, making adjustments as the operations evolve and contexts change

Consent and cooperation in a second-generation peacekeeping operation are highly dynamic Constantine Menges of George Washington University and Peter Clark see direct manipulation as the basis of the decay of consent. In their estimation, the UN is susceptible to such manipulation and must foresee and prevent it. They charge that in its peacekeeping operations thus far,

> the UN was simply not prepared to deal with the realities of internal power politics. . . [T]he UN was not prepared for political-military situations whereby participants would actively seek to manipulate and undermine the accords in their own interest and was not prepared to work through the political realities as they evolved in each country The operating assumption in these kinds of international political settlements must be that some of the participants will use deception, cunning, and violence to manipulate the accords. The UN needs to consider in advance how it might deal with this—what resources and incentives or sanctions it can use to counter such manipulation.[21]

Michael Doyle also points to this kind of dynamism in second-generation peacekeeping operations and acknowledges as well the need to foresee and address it. However, he sees such dynamism arising from the nature of the agreements themselves rather than from intentional manipulation. Drawing a parallel between the complex agreements that are the basis of second-generation peacekeeping operations and contracts for natural resource exploration, Doyle notes that both types of agreements share many characteristics of "obsolescing bargains."[22] He explains by using oil exploration as an example When a country is negotiating with an oil company for exploration within its territory, the company has all the advantages The existence of oil is only a possibility, and the costs of exploration are high. At this stage of the risk contract, the country will often cede generous terms. Once oil is found, however, the situation changes Discovered oil is relatively easy to pump and many companies can compete for the contract. The original bargain has thus "obsolesced."

An agreement for a UN peacekeeping operation follows a similar pattern. The authority of the UN is greatest at the initiation of the agreement, when the agreement itself is an exalted achievement. All the parties are counting on the UN to realize their diverse hopes For its part, the UN has used some of its diplomatic weight to achieve the agreement but has not yet invested any of its material resources; it is in the strongest position. Over time, however, with the deployment of personnel, equipment, and funds, as well as institutional prestige, the UN cannot afford not to succeed The larger the UN's investment, the greater its interest in success. Hence, the influence of the parties becomes stronger, bargaining positions have shifted. The operation cannot be successful without the cooperation of the parties, and their bargaining power rises rapidly

In these situations, the parties have been in violent conflict, are disinclined to trust one another, and often lack clear lines of internal authority. The immediate situation is changing due to the implementation of the agreement itself. The international context is also adjusting to the situations resulting from the agreement. In such complex and dynamic undertakings as second-generation peacekeeping operations, it is never possible to foresee every contingency, and yet the agreements must anticipate and be designed to address a great deal of flux. It becomes the responsibility of policymakers to build this into UN mandates.

Michael Doyle offers several suggestion for dealing with the shortcomings of agreements that arise from their being obsolescing bargains. Rather than trying to prevent any erosion of consent and cooperation, the agreement would foresee such erosion as an inevitable characteristic of this

type of bargaining process and build options and flexibility into the agreement itself A first step is to design the agreement with as many different routes to peace as the parties will tolerate. This type of agreement would contain initiatives in many directions, such as institutional reform, elections, international monitoring, and economic reconstruction The aim is to spread the risk along as many dimensions as possible

Another suggestion is to try to maximize and diversify the UN's bargaining advantages. The UN needs to maintain as many means of influence as possible over the parties. In Cambodia, for example, the UN relied excessively on the financial needs of the different factions to ensure their cooperation. When the Khmer Rouge gained access to illicit trade, the UN could no longer depend upon financial pressure to keep the rebel group in line. "Even seemingly extraneous bargaining chips," Doyle writes, "will become useful as the spirit of cooperation erodes under the pressure of misunderstandings and separating interests."[23]

As the approaches to designing the mandates are evolving, so are the means of evaluating them.

A final strategy to coping with the obsolescing-bargain aspect of peacekeeping agreements is to design the mandate so that its parts may be implemented separately. Failure in one part of the mandate—elections, police reform, repatriation of refugees—will not then completely jeopardize other objectives. With separate spheres of authority and organizational capacity, each part of the mandate can be at least somewhat insulated from a lack of cooperation in another part Separate implementation still requires some overall coordination, however, so that the components do not work at cross purposes [24]

In sum, second generation peacekeeping operations aim at permanent peace, are multifaceted, involve far more than military components, and include many realms of activity that were once considered domestic. They may even become involved in intrastate conflicts. They are based upon consent, but given the complex and dynamic nature of these operations, consent can be difficult to gain, gauge, and keep. Acknowledging that these agreements are, in effect, obsolescing bargains, the UN needs to design the agreements to retain a maximum amount of flexibility for itself and to allow the components of the operation to be carried out independently.

Evaluations of Second-Generation Peacekeeping

While the second generation of UN peacekeeping operations is still young, there are concerns over how to evaluate their performance. Not only is it unclear what time frame or criteria would be most appropriate to their evaluation but because second-generation peacekeeping operations aim at permanent peace, it can be harder to determine the operation's end point This criterion is much more difficult to assess than just the cessation of hostilities, as in first-generation operations. Because of the multidimensional complexity of second-generation operations, it is also very difficult to determine the standards and criteria of success Peace is the stated final goal, but the separate objectives that make up the entire mandate may include achievements in such diverse realms as justice, popular participation, administrative efficiency, public health, and economic prosperity Thus it is impossible to evaluate second-generation peacekeeping operations along one dimension. As the approaches to designing the mandates are evolving, so are the means of evaluating them.

One particular outcome of a peacekeeping operation is easy to assess· failure. The resumption of violence, violations of agreements, refusal to participate in elections, or the inadequacy of reforms are all signs of such failure. But failure, whether partial or extensive, of these huge missions is not the only concern. Success, Steven Ratner suggests, may also itself constitute a problem. "Enhanced UN involvement," Ratner writes, "may also represent unsound policy for solving conflicts. Multifaceted operations... deflect accountability off of the immediate antagonists and onto the United Nations This ultimately inhibits long-term prospects of nation-building. Moreover, opponents of

international intervention in domestic crises will assert that it merely prolongs civil conflict that is best resolved through decisive victory of one side "[25]

Thus the questions concerning second-generation operations include not only how to identify their scope, how to make them more effective, and how to evaluate their performance. In addition to the immediate tasks of designing more flexible mandates that are capable of handling the decay of consent among multiple parties within obsolescing agreements, there are also some underlying reservations Do second-generation peacekeeping operations constitute an advance in the management of international conflict? Particularly in a context of evolving views on sovereignty, what is the trajectory established by such operations? The analysis of current missions has helped to identify the nature of these operations and to suggest methods of improving their effectiveness The debate on their contributions to and implications for long-term international peacemaking continues.