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Unofficial Diplomacy

At the other end of the conflict management spectrum from international organizations and peacekeeping operations is the category of unofficial diplomacy. In contrast to official diplomacy, these initiatives may be less formal or conventional. Unofficial diplomacy promotes and facilitates interaction among the parties to a conflict to improve communication and increase mutual understanding. It is not a substitute for official diplomacy but, rather, a supplemental mechanism by which nonbinding ideas are tested (possibly leading to formal agreements), or by which parties who would never be included in formal peace negotiations may also find their grievances and fears addressed. The U.S. Institute of Peace has funded a number of such initiatives.

Unofficial diplomacy may be conducted on many different levels: elite, mid-level, or grassroots. John Paul Lederach of Eastern Mennonite University reflects on peacemaking at these three levels:

The highest level involves very few people (the well-known leaders and personalities), its processes are usually highly public, and they tend to focus on cease-fires and political solutions. The middle-ranged level involves a larger set of people, who may be well known within a given sector, ethnic group, or by religious affiliation, but they have more room to maneuver, given that they are not directly in the limelight. The most populous is the grassroots level, where people often experience the devastation of the conflict and are concerned primarily with daily survival. A comprehensive approach recognizes that sustainable peace builds across the levels of a society and does not rely exclusively on peace trickling down.¹

Unofficial diplomacy can address all three of these levels.

Frequently, unofficial diplomacy is initiated or facilitated by nongovernmental organizations. Those already active in the field or with established contacts may be in a strong position to provide early warning of a conflict or to de-escalate new hostilities. A report prepared for the World Peace Foundation observes that "As noncombatants on the frontlines, [NGOs] often have unique access to information and close connections to warring groups. If alarm bells can be sounded early, NGOs are well placed to ring them. If community passions can be curbed, NGOs may serve as trusted counselors of calm."²

Robert Rotberg of the World Peace Foundation refers to the efforts of NGOs as "field diplomacy." This involves placing NGO teams in areas of conflict for extended periods "to craft a network of trusted persons to monitor the ongoing conflict and to create a favorable climate for generating solutions."³ In unofficial diplomacy, NGOs may work with governments, encourage government leaders to meet with one another, engage smaller local nongovernmental groups, or work directly with the populace.

One example of unofficial diplomacy coordinating NGOs and policymakers is the Burundi Policy Forum.⁴ This forum was organized in 1995 by four NGOs—the Center for Preventive Action of the Council on Foreign Relations, Search for Common Ground, Refugees International, and the African-American Institute—to address the growing crisis in Burundi. The forum convenes representatives of dozens of humanitarian, advocacy, and conflict resolution organizations working in Burundi,

together with officials of IOs and governments. Participants from the U.S. government have included representatives of the Department of State, Agency for International Development, Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Council, and Department of Defense. Representatives from the Organization of African Unity and the embassies of Burundi, Rwanda, Canada, and France also participate. From the UN, participants in the Burundi Policy Forum include the Secretary General's Special Representative and representatives from the Department of Political Affairs, the

Department of Humanitarian Affairs, the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees, and the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF). Representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross and the many NGOs working in Burundi (providing humanitarian assistance, offering conflict resolution training, and working on democratization) are also regular participants.

Other unofficial initiatives in the Balkans have been undertaken at a lower level, involving religious leaders rather than officials.

The forum functions as a unique mechanism to share information, discuss policy, and coordinate strategies. Through its regular public meetings and closed meetings of special working groups focused on such topics as security and refugee repatriation, the Burundi Policy Forum has provided an unusual venue for interaction between NGOs and officials. The forum is a place outside the regular system to gain information, discuss ideas, and get broader perspectives on the crisis than those fostered in an official or bureaucratic milieu. The forum's main impact comes indirectly, as with much unofficial diplomacy, by influencing the process by which important actors understand and deal with the conflict and coordinate their actions and interventions.

Another example of unofficial diplomacy at the higher levels has been coordinated in Kosovo by the Community of St. Egidio, a Roman Catholic lay society engaged in humanitarian work and peace advocacy.⁵ Since 1991, the Community has been active in the former Yugoslavia, providing humanitarian support particularly in the fields of education and health. It also helped to initiate and guide informal meetings that resulted in a September 1996 agreement between Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic and ethnic Albanians in the Serbian province of Kosovo.⁶

In 1989, President Milosevic stripped Kosovo of its autonomy and established direct rule from Belgrade, taking over all provincial administration. Albanians protested by boycotting state services and establishing alternatives, including a parallel school system and health centers. A tense ethnic confrontation in the province continued, with Serbia insisting the matter was internal and the Albanian majority demanding independence and international recognition. The Community of St. Egidio pursued opportunities to begin a dialogue between the two sides, directing attention to limited questions and incremental steps and focusing on the school system rather than on larger political issues.

Both sides were eventually willing to participate in negotiations under the auspices of St. Egidio. For Serbia, this was acceptable because St. Egidio was perceived as a humanitarian NGO; hence, its mediation did not constitute internationalizing the situation. Serbia was also interested in making progress on this ethnic standoff, because this would affect its own international standing, particularly its desire to have all economic sanctions lifted. For Albanians, the involvement of St. Egidio made negotiations with Serbia possible precisely because St. Egidio gave the situation some international attention and a role for non-Serbian actors. The Albanians had also become weary of the stalemate and the prolonged lack of access to regular state services. The Community of St. Egidio was able to take advantage of these different interests and bring together representatives for meetings in Rome, Belgrade, and Albania. Despite many delays and obstacles, an agreement was signed in September 1996, once again making the official school system available to Albanian students. While that agreement is not yet fully implemented, it constituted the first breakthrough in the

possibility of mutual recognition and dialogue between ethnic opponents in Kosovo. The unofficial diplomacy of the Community of St. Egidio was a key element in achieving that breakthrough.

Other unofficial initiatives in the Balkans have been undertaken at a lower level, involving religious leaders rather than officials. The Center for Strategic and International Studies has organized seminars among religious leaders as a means to foster reconciliation and create a climate for the constructive resolution of conflict. David Steele writes,

The aim of these seminars has not been to end the war. Instead, they have been designed to encourage middle level and grassroots religious leadership to work together to overcome the stranglehold of ethnic division on both the individual and collective spirit. The aim is to encourage the development of a critical mass of support for peacebuilding by rebuilding community and developing constructive ways of handling grievances and differences. Without such efforts to heal the wounds of war and prepare for a collaborative future, any peace proposal stands little chance of lasting success.⁷

With such goals in mind, the Center for Strategic and International Studies organized seminars in Bizovak, Croatia, and Visoko, Bosnia, in 1995. Croatian Baptist pastors, Serbian Orthodox priests, and Muslim leaders were among those who participated in various exercises to build trust and understanding and impart skills in conflict resolution. These religious leaders had an opportunity to express and acknowledge grievances, recognize the basic needs and concerns of others, engage in role playing to address problems of ethnic stereotyping, and generate alternative approaches for resolving particular community disputes.

A similar initiative in unofficial diplomacy was undertaken in Somalia by the Centre for the Strategic Initiative of Women (CSIW), a program of the Washington-based organization Fund for Peace.⁸ CSIW organized four conflict management training workshops for Somali women in 1996. These workshops were designed to expand Somali women's participation in local and national peacebuilding, and to strengthen their skills, confidence, and responsibility for their role in making peace. The five- to seven-day workshops addressed strategies for conflict management within the context of current clashes in Somalia and Somaliland, focusing on techniques of negotiating, mediating, implementing solutions, developing personal leadership skills, and also training other women in these same skills.

Following the workshops, participants undertook a number of actions demonstrating such skills. They successfully negotiated the release of a Swedish woman who had been kidnapped by a clan gang, mediated the resolution of a conflict among neighbors following the injury of a child, placed themselves physically between clashing clan members to stop their fighting, induced local authorities and elders to begin their own negotiation processes and served as trusted "shuttle diplomats" among opposing clan elders, organized local peace marches, and held a "peace feast" for women from both sides of the Green Line (the divide in Mogadishu between warring clans) after having negotiated an end to fighting between two clans. Such actions not only demonstrated the women's acquired skills, but also publicly reaffirmed their important role as peacebuilders and their dedication to the resolution of conflict. Both were strengthened through the efforts of unofficial diplomacy fostered by CSIW.

At the level of grassroots peacemaking, the Mennonites have been among the most active organizations around the world. They have been present in many regions in conflict, including South Africa, Northern Ireland, Central America, the Middle East, Somalia, Liberia, Haiti, and Colombia. The book *From the Ground Up: Mennonite Contributions to International Peacebuilding* reflects on the evolution of their approach and varied experience.⁹

Unofficial diplomacy, in these many guises, offers strengths in areas traditionally outside the reach of official diplomacy.

The key characteristics of the Mennonite approach to unofficial peacebuilding are to work at a grassroots level, maintain a long-term presence, and seek to respect and strengthen indigenous approaches to conflict resolution. The Mennonite approach, as it has developed, eschews the roles of international experts or professional mediators. Much of the Mennonite work is focused on listening, empowering, encouraging, and providing space for peacemaking approaches to emerge from within the setting. Mennonite peacemakers insist on empowering rather than replacing local peacemakers, and gain credibility for their role from their long-term presence in communities. As

Ron Kraybill writes, "Healing of course is the hoped for result, but if our vision is to introduce a new way of living and being in the world, which for me it is, we must focus on setting in motion processes that do not depend on external peacebuilders in order to be sustained."¹⁰ Mennonite peacemakers focus on long-term relationships, rather than institutions or techniques, and the opportunities that flow from them.

The Mennonite Conciliation Service holds skill-based workshops, for example, offering mediation training to police and prison officials in Northern Ireland. They have also performed particular tasks within peace negotiations, such as providing communication links and delivering messages and documents in Central America, where communication services are unreliable and the media are politicized. For the most part, however, their task is one of accompanying and encouraging the local process, supporting indigenous approaches to peacemaking. Their preference is to empower people from within the conflictive setting to act as transforming agents of that setting.

A final example of unofficial diplomacy is explored by Ralph Clough of Johns Hopkins University's School for Advanced International Studies.¹¹ In *Reaching across the Taiwan Strait: People to People Diplomacy*, Clough recounts that for decades the governments of mainland China and Taiwan have had no official contact. Both governments are in favor of reunification, but on very different terms. The People's Republic of China would like Taiwan to be incorporated as a "special administrative region," purportedly entailing a high degree of autonomy for Taiwan, which would nonetheless be subordinate to Beijing. Taiwan, however, can envision unification occurring only after mainland China has become a democratic society with a free-market economy. The People's Republic of China has refused to negotiate with Taiwan as an equal government, although Taiwan functions in the international community as a de facto sovereign state. Taiwan insists that China cease its efforts to isolate the island's government internationally and wants recognition as a political entity. Official relations between the two governments show no sign of improving.

Unofficial contacts are another story. For decades, unofficial contact was forbidden, with Taiwan imposing a ban on trade or travel across the Taiwan Strait. The ban was lifted in 1987, permitting for the first time indirect travel, mail and telephone service, transportation, and trade and investment. According to Clough, residents of Taiwan have made over three million visits to mainland China, and some twenty thousand mainland residents have visited Taiwan. Trade between the two nations reached \$5.8 billion, and Taiwanese businesses invested \$3 billion in mainland China by the end of 1991. There has also been an immense increase in cultural, academic, media, and sports exchanges. Actors, singers, scholars, scientists, journalists, athletes, and tourists from Taiwan have visited the mainland. The reverse flow has been kept small by the government in Taiwan, but it is growing. Both governments have established quasi-official agencies to handle negotiations on practical problems. This has not formalized their relations or changed Taiwan's overall policy of no negotiation, but it has made it possible to handle such practical matters as smuggling, piracy, and the repatriation of persons accused of crimes.

None of this informal contact has brought the two governments any closer on the matter of reunification. While the diplomatic impasse remains, "people-to-people diplomacy" has improved

the political climate across the Taiwan Strait. According to Clough, hostility and distrust have diminished, not only helping to reduce the risk of military conflict, but possibly creating a conducive context and appropriate opportunities for formal diplomatic negotiations in the future.

Unofficial diplomacy, in these many guises, offers strengths in areas traditionally outside the reach of official diplomacy. It may bring together traditional actors in entirely new forums, or it may widen the scope of those involved in peacemaking activities. It may include participants from the highest levels of government to the grassroots level, and often involves some role for NGOs. As efforts to achieve breakthroughs in conflict management and resolution and to build a sustainable peace, initiatives in unofficial diplomacy may make important contributions to international peacemaking.

Four

Managing Ethnic Conflict

Ethnic conflict is often seen as intractable and enduring, one of the most difficult forms of conflict to manage and to resolve. No region of the world is free of such conflict, and many ethnic conflicts that were thought to have been settled are reemerging or escalating. Ethnic conflicts may also become entwined with border disputes and geopolitical rivalries, further complicating their resolution. Yet research, experience, and analysis yield many insights into managing ethnic conflict. While there are grave difficulties in approaching such conflicts, there are also ample policy guidelines to work with and some success stories to learn from and build upon. No route to the resolution of ethnic conflicts is assured, but some have proven to be more promising than others.

Trends in Ethnic Conflict

Conflicts involving communal groups are the subject of a landmark study by Ted Robert Gurr, *Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts*.¹ Communal groups may define themselves by many attributes, including ethnicity, religious beliefs, language, region of origin, or historical experiences. Gurr, professor of political science at the University of Maryland, notes that "The key to identifying communal groups is not the presence of a particular trait or combination of traits, but rather the shared perception that the defining traits, whatever they are, set the group apart."² Gurr's study examines data from 233 communal groups around the world, incorporating one-sixth of the global population, from 1945 to 1989. In addition to providing a wealth of detailed information and analysis of local and regional ethnic conflicts, Gurr's study also identifies the major patterns and global trends in ethnic conflict.

Ethnic conflict has received a great deal of attention recently, since there is often presumed to be a rise in such conflict as a result of the end of the Cold War. Central state power that had been used to suppress ethnic conflicts is no longer being applied. New transitional states are emerging, lacking the institutional capacity to manage ethnic politics and avoid outbreaks of ensuing conflict. Gurr's research, however, reveals trends that predate the end of the Cold War. Indeed, having examined data from around the world from 1945 to 1989, Gurr finds that all forms of ethnic conflict have increased sharply since the 1950s. During the 1949–89 period, nonviolent protest more than doubled in magnitude while violent protest and rebellion increased fourfold.³ These trajectories suggest longer trends.

Gurr identifies two ongoing global processes that intensify ethnic grievances: the development of the global economic system and the growth of the modern state system. The drive to expand industrialization and trade has involved the absorption of the labor and resources of communal groups into national and international networks, often on disadvantageous terms. Economic and administrative decisions have alienated these groups from the lands, forests, and natural resources on which they are culturally as well as materially dependent, involving loss of access, control, use, or possession. Such actions have provoked considerable conflict.

The establishment of modern states around the world has been accompanied by a commitment to consolidate and expand state power. This commitment has included the subordination of special

interests and the denial of autonomy to many ethnic groups. State-building policies aim to assimilate communal group members, restrain their historical autonomy, and extract their resources, revenues, and labor for use by the state. In pursuing such objectives, central state power exacerbates ethnic grievances.

Other observers also note the centrality of state expansion to current trends in ethnic conflict. Donald Horowitz, professor of law and political science at Duke University, identifies this as a hallmark of modern ethnic conflict. He notes that ethnic groups frame their grievances in terms of access to, recomposition of, or secession from the state. According to Horowitz, "This particular uniformity is a remarkable tribute to the rapid worldwide spread of the modern state and its acknowledged power in conferring recognition of ethnic status and other satisfaction that ethnic groups seek."⁴ States exacerbate conflicts by destroying the autonomy of communal groups; control of the state also becomes one of the prizes fought for in ethnic conflicts. As Julio Tresierra observes, "When the twentieth century began, the world was an assemblage of imperialistic, nationalistic states competing over rights and powers to rule people. As it draws to a close, it has become an assemblage of peoples struggling over rights and powers to rule states."⁵

Mobilizing Ethnic Grievance

While the global expansion of industrialization and the consolidation of the state are the macro trends that frame the rise of ethnic conflict, there are many more immediate catalysts. Not all instances of ethnic distinctiveness generate grievances; many different ethnic groups do coexist peacefully. And not all ethnic grievances become conflictual. Disadvantaged people do not necessarily deem inequalities to be unjust, nor do their perceptions of injustice necessarily lead to political movements demanding redress. Often there is a process whereby grievances become mobilized and unequal treatment becomes salient.

Communal identities are transactional; they change over time as a result of interactions within the group and between groups. The relevance of such communal identities also varies over time. A primary factor in the salience of communal identification is unequal treatment of the group by the larger society or national government. If an ethnic group is treated differently, whether by suffering denial or benefiting from privilege, its members become more aware of their shared identity and interests. Being set apart is not, however, a sufficient basis for conflict. A further step in the mobilization of grievance often occurs before conflict. Such mobilization can take many forms. For any group, there are often many factors that affect whether and how their objective disadvantages result in the mobilization of grievance and the forging of particular demands.

One factor in the mobilization of grievance is what Gurr terms the "demonstration effect." Communal groups gain inspiration as well as practical guidance from watching and copying the platforms and strategies pursued in other contexts. For example, Gurr sees the U.S. civil rights movement of the 1960s as pivotal, providing a model for many other movements around the world. The current wave of ethnopolitics, according to Gurr, draws "much of its inspiration from the propagation of ideas of intergroup equity and strategies of political action that came to prominence in Western Europe and North America during the 1960s."⁶ The demonstration effect operates only where there is a long-standing ethnic distinction. As such, it may be one factor in transforming disadvantage to grievance and action.

Another factor in the mobilization of ethnic grievance may be the relaxation of suppression, such as that following the end of the Cold War. Many ethnic conflicts in the Soviet successor states, in Eastern Europe, and in peripheral states that served as superpower proxies are attributed in part to the weakening or disappearance of repression. Ethnic nationalism in these states was never

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completely extinguished in command societies. It is resurgent now, some observers have argued, because pressure from a central government to control and contain such conflicts has disappeared. Robert Rotberg of the World Peace Foundation, for example, suggests that "The end of the Cold War unleashed long-suppressed rivalries and hatreds."⁷

A further factor currently perceived as pivotal in many ethnic conflicts is the role of the "ethnic entrepreneurs," political opportunists who take advantage of ethnic identities and differences, channeling them toward conflicts or alliances that will serve their own interests. Milton Esman,

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professor emeritus of government at Cornell University, and Shibley Telhami, professor of political science at the University of Maryland, assert that ethnic entrepreneurs may be motivated "partly by genuine concern for their people and partly by the desire to build a constituency in pursuit of their political ambitions. Ethnic entrepreneurs precipitate conflicts by politicizing collective identity, that is, by dramatizing grievances or threats to common interests or by pointing out opportunities to promote and further such interests by organized action."⁸

As with the demonstration effect, ethnic entrepreneurs cannot operate where there are no preexisting ethnic identities available for them to politicize. They cannot create ethnic conflicts out of whole cloth, but they may play an important role in politicizing and exacerbating such conflicts. In Yugoslavia, for example, V. P. Gagnon concludes that conservative communist bureaucrats who had everything to lose in market-oriented reforms intentionally played the ethnic card. As their economic program had no popular support, they mobilized those most threatened by the reforms and re-articulated their platform in terms of ethnicity and nationalism—which were not the paramount or original issues. "To win the conflict and prevent radical change, parts of the elite have shifted the focus toward ethnic claims and have purposely undertaken strategies that created first the image and then the reality of an ethnic or national conflict."⁹

In this interpretation of events in Yugoslavia, ethnic entrepreneurs manipulated ethnic identities to secure their own political dominance domestically. Ethnic identities may also be emphasized within foreign policies. Martha Brill Olcott of Colgate University and the Foreign Policy Research Institute observed this among the new states in Central Asia as they approached potential allies and trading partners. In *Central Asia's New States: Independence, Foreign Policy, and Regional Security*, Olcott notes that an emphasis of ethnic ties was among the early strategies used by the governments of these former Soviet republics in their efforts to gain foreign aid and investment. Turkey, for example, was approached by the new states on the basis of pan-Turkish cultural heritage. The Islamic nations were addressed with reference to common religious identity. Relations with the Asian countries were undertaken with appeals to shared "Asianness."¹⁰

International intervention may also play a role in mobilizing ethnic conflict. This has many components, including the communal groups themselves or foreign states and international organizations. Many ethnic groups span international borders, thus an ethnic population acting in concert sometimes constitutes cross-border action, affecting the interests, security, and stability of several states. Diaspora communities may also be very active in ethnic conflicts, sending resources, weapons, funds, and personnel back to a home community in conflict, or helping to orchestrate diplomatic pressure or media attention. Kemal Kirişçi and Gareth Winrow of Bogaziçi University in Istanbul examine a conflict with many international components in their study *The Kurdish Question and Turkey: An Example of a Trans-State Ethnic Conflict*. While this conflict appears centered in Turkey, it involves a group that also partly resides in Iran, Iraq, Syria, Armenia, and Azerbaijan.¹¹ Many states will be involved in its resolution.

Similarly, many states will be affected by the evolving external relations of the new states in Central Asia. As Graham Fuller of the Rand Corporation discusses in "New States, New Geopolitics: Central Asia and Its Neighbors," Turkey, Iran, and China are all very interested in this region. Turkey and Iran compete in emphasizing linguistic, cultural, ethnic, and religious ties as bases for establishing special relationships; and each wants to forestall the success of the other. China, whose economic strength in the region is likely to grow, is particularly concerned at the prospect of some form of pan-Turkism. As a separatist movement emerges among the Muslim Uighur Turks in the western province of Xinjiang, China is wary of the potential for assistance or solidarity with that movement from among the Central Asian states.¹² The trajectories of these larger regional geopolitics will affect the political content and salience of ethnicity in Central Asia.

Sometimes ethnic conflicts also become entangled with pre-existing international disputes. The border dispute between India and Pakistan, for example, has gained a new dimension with the emergence of a Muslim separatist movement within the portion of Kashmir controlled by India. As Robert Wirsing of the University of South Carolina explains in *India, Pakistan, and the Kashmir: On Regional Conflict and Its Resolution*, this adds issues of self-determination and Kashmiri political rights to what had been just a dispute between two states. The new ethnic component adds to the complexity of the border dispute. In turn, the border dispute will be one factor framing the development of this ethnic group and its pursuit of political identity.¹³

International organizations seeking to de-escalate ethnic conflicts also become part of the larger equation, shaping how ethnic grievances are mobilized. The effects of such involvement are not always as intended. Regarding Yugoslavia, for example, Susan Woodward argues that international organizations exacerbated ethnic conflict and foreclosed other routes to dealing with difficult problems of reform and transition. According to Woodward, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, international organizations (themselves composed of nation-states) were willing to recognize only national leaders as interlocutors. International organizations, concerned with traditional sovereignty, territorial integrity, and inviolability of borders, too hastily recognized incipient republics and accepted their borders as international. Non-nationalist voices, civic groups, and other organizations not based on ethnicity were not given a hearing because they did not fit into this nation-state structure. A conflict that in Woodward's view could have taken another course and perhaps have been handled domestically within the Yugoslav federation became more ethnicized and internationalized because of the involvement of international organizations.¹⁴

Of all the factors involved in transforming ethnic distinctiveness into advantage or disadvantage, mobilizing disadvantage into grievance, and then shaping how grievance is channeled into conflict, none may be more important than the role, policies, and responses of the state. It is the state's political institutions and capabilities that define the context and opportunity structures within which communal choices occur. Once a state is thoroughly consolidated—achieving stable institutions, political legitimacy, and broad popular support—rebellions against it become more costly, while assimilating to it may provide greater payoffs. Consolidated states are more apt to have sufficient power and resources to respond to pluralist interests, whether by making concessions to protesters or suppressing rebellions. In such contexts, Gurr perceives a pattern of nonviolent protest, limited in scope, as various available channels for expressing ethnic grievance are pursued. Weaker or unconsolidated states, by contrast, while they may command substantial military might, lack the stability and legitimacy that would provide them with the political resources or institutional means to accommodate the demands of different ethnic groups. Among such weaker states, protracted

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communal conflict appears more feasible and promising, and may take the form of violent protest or rebellion.¹⁵

The impact of differences in state capacity for dealing with ethnic conflict is particularly relevant in new states. "Communally based political movements," writes Gurr, "pose a far greater challenge to the newer and poorer countries of the Third World than to states in the developed West, because they have mobilized larger groups, with greater intensity of commitment, against regimes that have fewer political and material resources with which to respond."¹⁶ Such patterns in contemporary state capacity, rather than prior suppression, may help explain why states in transition (such as the postcommunist states in the former Eastern Bloc or postauthoritarian nations in the Third World) are now succumbing to ethnic conflict. What is crucial is not the length of time during which such conflicts were "frozen" by autocratic governments, but, rather, the process by which these ethnic grievances subsequently entered the political arena. If a state is already strong and established, it will be better able to handle such challenges. Transitional states, however, do not have that capacity. They lack the ability to channel or respond effectively to ethnic grievance, and are then faced with escalation and entrenchment of grievances. Aizat Aklaev of the Russian Academy of Sciences sees this pattern in the former Soviet Union. Aklaev asserts that ethnic identification in the Soviet Union became more politicized because political associations remained illegal at the beginning of liberalization, and oppositional mobilization was channeled through cultural—often ethnically identified—organizations. Processes of ethnic identification and political legitimization thus became related, and their interplay now influences the prospects for establishing democracy in successor states.¹⁷ Gurr concurs: "The Soviet and Eastern European regimes relaxed coercive restraints on nationalism and intergroup hostilities at a time when the institutionalized means for their expression and accommodation did not yet exist, or were fragile and distrusted. . . . The result has been a resurgence of communal activism, both protest and rebellion."¹⁸

The process, then, of moving from ethnic disadvantage to grievance to protest may involve many different steps. Among the factors observed to mobilize grievance are demonstration effects, the cessation of suppression, the role of ethnic entrepreneurs in shaping both domestic politics and external relations, international intervention, the role of international organizations, and, perhaps most important, the response of the state. Once mobilized, ethnic grievances raise many questions for policymakers. Some analysts consider underlying questions of collective rights and the place of ethnicity in politics, others address immediate policy questions of how to channel and respond to political demands from ethnic groups.

States and Collective Rights

Ethnic conflicts not only challenge particular states, they also raise questions about the nature of states themselves and about sovereignty. Does sovereignty include the power to strip ethnic groups of their autonomy? Is it possible to guarantee autonomy for a communal group while also preserving state autonomy? Must territorial integrity and domestic jurisdiction be coextensive? Could sovereignty be shared without threatening the state? Which subgroups have a "right" to self-determination? Some of these larger questions must be addressed to formulate specific policy responses to ethnic conflicts.

Many analysts reject the notion that all claims to self-determination should be honored with separate statehood. In his essay "Making Sense of the Spectrum of Rights," John Maresca laments the influence that the current conflict in Bosnia has had over this issue. Maresca, former U.S. ambassador to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (now the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe), sees a growing assumption on the part of both ethnic communities and outside observers that the proper result of efforts toward self-determination "must and

can only be the establishment of a state which consists solely of members of their own ethnic group—preferably all the members of that group.” He sees such a position as morally indefensible because of its presumption of racial superiority. “On the contrary,” Maresca writes, “one of the criteria for the success of a society must be the degree to which it enables people of many ethnic groups to live together in harmony.”¹⁹ Maresca would qualify the collective right to self-determination as a basis for pursuing some form of autonomy, but not secession and separate statehood.

Steven Burg of Brandeis University addresses ethnic conflicts by affirming the superiority of individual rights over collective rights. According to Burg, the protection of individual rights would make possible the expression of collective identities, whereas satisfying the demands for national self-determination would not guarantee individual freedom. The international community should therefore give priority to individual rights and not to ethnic self-determination in efforts to resolve ethnic conflict. Rather than ethnic affinity, Burg suggests democracy, which he defines as the political order that results from the institutionalization of individual human rights, as the “basis for sustaining claims of political regimes to sovereignty.”²⁰

A very different perspective emerges from analysts writing in an African context. Harvey Glickman of Haverford College argues that since ethnicity is a powerful part of people’s identity and will not disappear, it should be treated as a legitimate basis for mobilization. Rather than wishing ethnicity and collective identity away by acknowledging only individual rights, the challenge is creating political structures and institutions that can accommodate and channel ethnicity nonviolently. According to Glickman, “ethnic conflict, when it is openly competitive, is not always and need not always be deadly or violent, but can become a politically acceptable manifestation of the assertion and recognition of group rights.”²¹ The aim is to reduce ethnic tension, not to do away with ethnicity and its expression.

Writing on Zimbabwe, Masipula Sithole suggests that “Ethnic conflict, like any social conflict, is healthy in that it tests our commitment to democratic values. We can learn the art of managing ethnic conflict. To legitimize ethnicity by deliberately creating political structures and other social institutions and processes that are calculated to moderate and diffuse ethnic tensions and conflicts is where to start.”²² In this context, Sithole discusses the aim of achieving “ethnic balance” among those holding positions in government, meaning not merely equal numbers of appointees from different ethnic groups, but equal shares of actual power in government decision making.

Similarly, ethnicity may be seen as a legitimate basis for political mobilization in a Latin American context. In many Latin American nations, indigenous populations have organized as communal groups not to splinter from the state, but rather to seek inclusion in it. The effort is not necessarily to assert distinctive indigenous rights, but to have the basic rights of all citizens respected. From this perspective, ethnic politics becomes a route to strengthening and deepening democracy.²³ As Glickman suggests, “The point is that perhaps ethnic strife is part of the process of solving the problem rather than the problem itself, when it comes to the establishment of democratic government.”²⁴

In many cases the larger political questions of ethnicity as a basis for collective rights or political mobilization do not result in affirmation or rejection, but in many careful qualifications. Milton Esman and Shibley Telhami consider some of the gradations of the question of autonomy. They note that most IOs, while acknowledging minority rights, have rejected any claim to territorial separation as a valid human right and have rejected minority rights as a basis for revising international borders. But this leaves many other collective rights for IOs to puzzle over and perhaps recognize and vindicate. “Are the human rights of ethnic minorities,” Esman and Telhami ask, “limited to immunity from oppression and to nondiscrimination? Or do they include such collective rights as regional autonomy/self-determination, separate representation in parliaments, separate schools in the ethnic language, or ‘affirmative action’ for members of historically disadvantaged ethnic

communities? Which collective rights of ethnic communities should IOs recognize and attempt to vindicate?"²⁵ Such questions begin to shift the discussion from the nature of rights to the quality of policy.

Policy Options

For entirely practical reasons, many policy analysts reject self-determination (if defined as one state per communal group) as generally unworkable. Ethnic conflicts tend to arise where different ethnic groups live within the confines of one territorial border. Separating these groups in order to create separate states with new borders would be unfeasible and would lead to irredentist claims, with efforts to retrieve people left on the other side of the border, or to reclaim lost land and rectify disputed borders. As Maresca writes, "Many people would have to be uprooted in order to create clear dividing lines among peoples, and a large number of the resulting states would be politically and economically unsustainable."²⁶ In his essay

"Ethnic Conflict Management for Policymakers," Donald Horowitz of Duke University also warns that such divisions would be more apt to internationalize conflicts. "Partition, because it puts an international boundary between the contenders, converts what was a domestic ethnic conflict into often more dangerous international ethnic conflict."²⁷ Horowitz mentions India and Pakistan as telling historical cases; Woodward's remarks on Yugoslavia, cited earlier, provide a contemporary example

Other than secession, what are the policy options for dealing with ethnic conflict and the demand for autonomy? What policies have been proposed and which have been successfully implemented thus far? Grantees have identified innovative proposals, specific policy guidelines, some notable successes, and several cautionary tales from around the world

Several analysts suggest that rethinking the principle of sovereignty is a crucial first step to developing effective policies for dealing with ethnic conflict. Traditional conceptions of sovereignty which insist upon its indivisibility and absoluteness are a stumbling block around which the international community should maneuver to come up with innovative ways to address ethnic conflict. Raymond Hopkins, professor of political science at Swarthmore College, challenges the international community to abandon the "parochial elements" of the concept of sovereignty. According to Hopkins, "An intractable conflict becomes tractable once claims over divisible goods, such as land, become negotiable. This redefining of sovereignty issues could relieve the frustration of external brokers in dealing with people who hold fairly deep, irrational animosities. Once sovereignty is seen as a relative, less absolute condition, IOs have a resource for driving bargains."²⁸

A principle of limited sovereignty, as suggested by many analysts, would lead to several policy proposals. Components would include accommodation on such issues as a group's use of its own language, practice of its religion, and expressions of its culture free from assimilationist pressures. Related to these concerns are a group's access to or control of its own education and news media. Another set of issues addresses myriad forms of power sharing, with the guarantee of political rights, proportionality in political representation, public service appointments, independent judicial review, and participation in state decisions affecting the group. Allocation of state funding for education, health, and welfare is a further area in which policy decisions could help manage ethnic conflict. A group's control of its own territory and natural resources, as well as the authority to permit resource and commercial development in accordance with its preferences, are other useful policy options to be considered. The protection of the rights of the group's members living outside the region is also a policy concern to be addressed. If sovereignty does not have to be absolute and indivisible, many policy options for dealing with ethnic conflict become more feasible. Any of these

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policy options might be part of a larger agreement taking the form of federalism, regional autonomy, regional administrative decentralization, or community autonomy.

Many specific policies have been proposed and implemented along these lines. The 1990 Copenhagen Document of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) adopted such policies for handling the protection of minorities in Europe. Its provisions include the right to preserve and develop ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious identity and to protect such identity against involuntary assimilation; the right to use the minority language in official transactions; the right to establish educational, cultural, and religious organizations, both on a voluntary basis and through public support "in accordance with the national legal system"; the right of individuals to develop contacts inside and outside their borders with members of their own ethnic group; and the right to distribute and have access to information in their own language. While these policies imply a somewhat limited notion of sovereignty, it is notable that none threatens the territorial integrity of the state. All OSCE member-states have committed themselves to maintaining the provisions of this document.²⁹

Should there be ethnic groups that insist on a greater degree of autonomy, the OSCE prescribes a series of steps and commitments that the group must undertake to receive further consideration. These steps would include, among others, two or more referenda, conducted five years apart, demonstrating the desire for changed status and greater autonomy by a qualified majority (75 percent) of adults in the ethnic group concerned and a majority of at least 60 percent of the entire adult population of the region in question; an explicit detailed code of protection for other minorities living inside the region; and clear evidence on the part of the petitioning minority to pay a fair share of the economic costs of autonomy. All the various steps and negotiations, supervised by the OSCE, would culminate in regional autonomy within national borders and some form of power sharing at the center (such as participation in national parliaments, assured representation in coalition governments, or some form of federalism). The "categorical requirement" of the entire process, Jonathan Dean of the Union of Concerned Scientists notes, is the complete renunciation of violence as a means to pursue autonomy. The OSCE would, in turn, seek to limit pressure tactics or violence against the minority by the national government.³⁰

As Dean suggests, the principles in the Copenhagen Document might seem to "stress the concept of sovereignty even further than it has been weakened in recent years."³¹ However, they do suggest an institutionalized path to defusing ethnic tensions before they reach the stage of organized violence, and without resorting to the fragmentation of existing states.

Advocating limitations on sovereignty is problematic if those suggestions come from states or organizations that do not themselves practice such limitations. In Africa, Sam Amoo notes that the OAU has been hampered in its efforts to address internal conflicts and secessionist movements by its own insistence on the primacy of sovereignty. Amoo, a staff member at the United Nations, observes that the OAU supports its members' governments, which often renders it of little use in mediating between those governments and their internal opponents.³² Having studied peacemaking initiatives by African heads of state, independent of the OAU, Gilbert M. Khadiagala notes a similar lack of credibility on the issue of limited sovereignty. Khadiagala, of Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies, concludes that heads of state who do not practice limited sovereignty do not succeed in advocating it for others.³³

Writing about a different area of the world, Kemal Kirişçi and Gareth Winrow generate a number of specific policy proposals involving limitations on sovereignty as a means for protecting minorities and defusing ethnic conflict. Their study concerns the situation of the Kurds in Turkey and neighboring states. The situation is particularly complex because the Kurds are a disadvantaged ethnic group that spans several political boundaries, living not only in Turkey but also in Iran, Iraq,

Syria, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. Turkey is especially concerned with preventing secession of its Kurdish minority and is skeptical of moves toward federalism or home rule. Among the possible steps that Kirişçi and Winrow consider is the provision of special rights and autonomy on cultural issues to the Kurds, such as permitting Kurdish-language schools, Kurdish radio and television stations, or special relations with Kurdish groups in neighboring states. Any such steps would qualify the strict sovereignty of Turkey; yet, Kirişçi and Winrow argue, such policies would provide the greatest benefit at the least cost.³⁴

Waldemar Hummer's suggestions for addressing ethnic conflict are based on the situation of Austrians in Italy's Tyrol region and the autonomy pact adopted in 1971. Austrians are a minority within Italy but a majority in the Tyrol region. The statute guarantees equal rights to citizens, regardless of linguistic group, and includes specific provisions on such matters as education and local administration. For example, instruction must be conducted in students' native language, and local administration is regulated by rules ensuring the proportional representation of linguistic groups in administrative bodies. Such measures, according to Hummer, have provided a means of attenuating conflict between different ethnic groups within the boundaries of the nation, without territorial secession.³⁵

In another assessment, however, Gurr expresses some reservations about the situation in Tyrol. He notes that the Italian minority has given its support to the neofascist party in recent provincial elections as an expression of its resentment of preferential treatment given to ethnic Austrians in the region. Gurr observes that "This kind of conservative reaction to concessions for minorities has many parallels in other western democracies: support in Britain for the racial exclusion policies advocated by renegade Conservative Member of Parliament Enoch Powell in the 1960s, French electoral support for the xenophobic National Party in the 1980s, and white Louisianans' enthusiasm for ex-Klansman David Duke's political career in the early 1990s."³⁶

Gurr notes that Western democracies and Japan have been particularly adept at devising strategies that have led to the substantial decline of ethnic conflict. They have guaranteed the civil and political rights of ethnic groups, implemented programs designed to alleviate their poverty, recognized and provided resources for minority cultures and languages, and permitted greater autonomy and state subsidies for indigenous peoples. Many factors have contributed to the relative lack of ethnic conflict in Western societies. One is that, as democracies, these societies provide the same civil and political rights and the same social and economic programs for all their citizens. Ethnic minorities are seldom subject to the severe forms of formal discrimination and repression exercised elsewhere. Another factor, also resulting from the democratic governance of these societies, is that ethnic groups have both the right and the opportunities to undertake collective action, and that the surrounding society has a political culture that values the accommodation of contending interests. Thus potential ethnic conflict is more apt to be channeled into protest and to be accommodated than to result in rebellion or violence. (Other factors that have contributed to dampen ethnic conflict in Western societies do not follow from their being democracies. In comparison with other regions, the percentage of ethnic minorities within the population is quite small. Minorities in Western democracies and Japan are also more geographically dispersed. Both of these factors help to lessen the intensity of ethnic grievances.)³⁷

Democracy itself, however, is no guarantee of ethnic harmony and justice. As Horowitz cautions, ethnically divided democracies, even those that protect individual human rights, may be characterized by permanent electoral majorities that in effect disenfranchise and disempower minorities.³⁸ Considering "bifurcated regimes," in which elections simply reproduce the divisions apparent in society, Glickman also argues that "even electoral democratic institutions can produce exclusionist results."³⁹ He cites Burundi, with its Tutsi and Hutu divisions, where democratic elections in 1993

reproduced divisions maintained in the previous military regime, which practiced ethnic exclusion. In such situations, elections become yet another means of ethnic exclusion.

Thus while democracies have been adept at defusing ethnic conflict, they are not necessarily intrinsically better equipped to deal with it than authoritarian regimes. Policies that encourage ethnic accommodation are available to any type of regime and may serve the interests not only of the communal groups, but also of the states. States have an interest in maintaining their own integrity and authority, and in ensuring support and revenues. These state interests are paramount to both democracies and authoritarian regimes; either will make concessions to minorities only if these basic interests are not jeopardized. Thus, Gurr writes, "It cannot be assumed that officials in multi-party democracies will respond democratically by attempting to accommodate minority demands, if the cost to continuity and legitimacy of the state is too high. Nor is it surprising that authoritarian leaders sometimes make concessions to minorities: they may calculate that meeting some demands is less costly than investing scarce resources in fighting popular resistance."⁴⁰

The challenge of managing ethnic conflict, through whatever policy proposals, is to find ways to redirect interethnic conflict into institutionalized and constructive channels while also protecting basic minority rights, preserving the fundamental interests of the state, and avoiding popular backlash against minority groups. This would appear to be a delicate balance, difficult to achieve. It is further complicated in that these conflicts rarely occur in isolation, but emerge simultaneously with border disputes, geopolitical rivalries, and democratic transitions. Rather than lament such difficulties, Glickman has articulated the challenge to see ethnic conflict as "part of the process of solving the problem rather than the problem itself."⁴¹ And Gurr, following his comprehensive study of ethnic conflicts around the globe, finds promise. He insists ethnic conflict is not intrinsically intractable or zero-sum. Furthermore, Gurr writes, "for each example of protracted communal conflict . . . one can point to neighboring states where similar conflicts have been managed more effectively."⁴²

Five

Democratic Peace Proposition

The contention that democracies do not wage wars against other democracies has been receiving increased attention. James Lee Ray of Vanderbilt University offers this formulation: "The democratic peace proposition asserts that, because they are democratic, democratic states will not fight (or initiate) international wars against each other."¹ This proposition, identified earlier with Immanuel Kant and Woodrow Wilson, re-emerges periodically as a focus of serious political and scholarly attention. The proposition generates both a broad research program and policy prescriptions.

Several researchers have explored the historical validity of the democratic peace proposition, examining patterns and possible exceptions in the relations between democracies from the ancient world through the contemporary state system. Looking over the historical record, some see a clear pattern of democracies avoiding war with each other, implying something akin to natural law in international relations. Others see historical coincidence and suggest that the incidence of both democracies and wars is so low (statistically speaking) that the pattern may have no further relevance for interpreting or predicting international relations.

Many analysts have sought to dissect the proposition, searching for the causal mechanisms embedded within it. They have designed research so as to identify a range of possible causal mechanisms, from democratic institutions and structures to political culture to the character of leadership within democracies, that might explain the outcome of the "democratic peace."

A further field of exploration concerns the margins of the proposition. Does it hold, for example, regarding limited interventions rather than full-fledged wars between democracies? Does it hold for any other types of republics? Does it hold for new as well as established democracies? Answers to these questions inform the policy analysis, suggesting what range of behavior may be expected from democracies, and whether promoting new democracies is the surest route to peace.

Clearly this is an intriguing proposition, offering great promise. As Ray writes, "If relationships among democratic states are fundamentally different from those among combinations of democratic and undemocratic states, as well as those among uniformly undemocratic states, then a significant trend toward democracy, even if it is restricted to the most powerful states in the international system, could transform international politics."² The promise within the proposition appears particularly timely now, with democratic transitions and new states establishing themselves around the world. Bruce Russett of Yale University asks, "Does the post-Cold War era represent merely the passing of a particular adversarial relationship, or does it offer a chance for fundamentally changed relations among nations?"³ That possibility has compelled a body of careful research to clarify the validity, scope, and mechanisms of the proposition and to formulate policy proposals based on an understanding of its limits.

Causal Mechanisms

Despite an observed historical pattern of democracies and peace, many analysts do not credit the implicit causal inference that democracies are peaceful in their relations toward each other simply because they are democratic. This causal connection requires further explication. Some have

proposed that it is the institutional or structural characteristics of democracies that constrain their bellicose behavior. Common institutional features of democracies include divided authority, routine elections, political party competition, and constitutional limits on the scope of rulers' decision-making powers. At each stage or level at which a decision to go to war might be made, the system includes internal checks. The very structure of the system includes opportunities to challenge and counter such a decision. Ultimately, the ballot box also provides a check on the entire system. Electoral accountability, it is argued, will always constrain leaders from waging foreign wars, as it is the mass public that will have to provide the soldiers and tax revenues for conducting such wars.

Such an argument, however, is not entirely convincing. Regardless of institutional checks, policymakers have often been either inattentive or impervious to public opinion in the short run, or quite adept at manipulating it. Mass hysteria may also encourage democratic states to wage foreign wars. In their review of the literature, Charles Kegley of the University of South Carolina and Margaret Hermann of Ohio State University conclude that "many studies have failed to establish a direct correlation between mass opinion and foreign policy choice."⁴ Furthermore, democracies are not the only regimes to have constitutional checks. As Spencer Weart points out, oligarchic republics "have usually had an array of formal structural checks on grave decisions. Yet that did not keep them from war with democracies."⁵

A different approach to specifying a causal mechanism for the democratic peace proposition focuses on political culture. This approach argues that a democratic culture fosters attitudes of tolerance and compromise and promotes practices of peaceful conflict resolution. Within a democracy there will be a normative culture of debate, living with differences, and pursuing nonviolent means to resolve disputes. Such norms and practices will affect not only domestic relations, but also how other democratic states are perceived and treated. As Bruce Russett of Yale University writes in *Grasping the Democratic Peace*, "the culture, perceptions, and practices that permit compromise and the peaceful resolution of conflicts without the threat of violence within countries come to apply across national boundaries toward other democratic countries. In short, if people in a democracy perceive themselves as autonomous, self-governing people who share norms of live-and-let-live, they will respect the rights of others to self-determination if those others are also perceived as self-governing and hence not led into aggressive foreign policies by a self-serving elite."⁶

The role of democratic culture as an explanation for the observed absence of wars between democracies is further explored in joint research by Carol Ember, Melvin Ember, and Bruce Russett. In order to examine democratic culture and to isolate this variable from democratic institutions and structures, they turn to the ethnographic record rather than to modern states. Could democratic culture help to explain the variation in warfare among all types of societies, not just among modern nation-states? These authors looked particularly at the role of participation, using degree of political participation as the indicator of democratic culture. They explored whether "political units with wider political participation engage in less warfare with one another than do less participatory political units."⁷ Their data base included 237 mostly preindustrial societies. The results of their analysis, published in *World Politics*, support the importance of democratic culture

Participatory institutions contribute to reducing the frequency of internal warfare, but in many of these cases the institutions as such are weak. More important, therefore, may be a culture wherein people perceive that they and others have the opportunity to participate widely in political decision making. If we can characterize these institutions as "democratic" . . . we have one more piece of evidence to support the proposition that democratically governed peoples are less likely to fight one another than are autocratically governed peoples . . . [W]hen people learn to agree to disagree and have some control over the political process, they may learn that

conflicts with other people who share similar ideas about the political process can also be resolved in peaceful ways.⁸

Democratic culture as the causal mechanism connecting democratic states and their peaceful behavior toward other states has also been explored by Gregory Raymond of Boise State University. Those who live and govern within a democratic culture are more apt to be amenable to third-party mediation and to accept binding judgments in disputes. According to Raymond, then, "one implication of a norm-based political culture explanation of the lack of bellicosity between democracies is that their disputes are more likely to be referred to arbitration than are disputes between either democratic and nondemocratic states or disputes between nondemocratic states."⁹ Raymond put this hypothesis to the test by examining 206 dyadic disputes that occurred from 1816 to 1965. He indeed found that pairs of democratic states had a greater propensity to refer their disagreements to binding arbitration than did dyads containing one or more nondemocracies.

Limitations of the Democratic Peace Proposition

While some have explored the internal causal mechanisms that may be embedded within the democratic peace proposition, others have sought to specify just when it might—or might not—apply. Researchers have looked for similar historical patterns of peace among nondemocracies, examined aggressive behavior other than war-making among democracies, and have assessed differences in democracies to discern whether the proposition is more applicable in some circumstances than others. These efforts to refine and challenge the proposition generate both a further research agenda and specific policy proposals.

Spencer Weart's historical research addresses peaceful relations between republics—whether democratic or oligarchic. Weart, of the American Institute of Physics, examines significant military confrontations between republics from ancient Greece through the 1990s and discerns several patterns. He finds that well-established democracies do not make war against other democracies. He also finds, however, that well-established oligarchies do not make war against other oligarchies. Both democracies and oligarchies are republics, that is, governed by a body of citizens with equal rights. In democracies, this body (historically, mostly male) will include most of the population, while in oligarchies political rights are restricted to a much narrower circle. In either type of republic, Weart argues that leaders will deal with potential foreign adversaries as they deal with domestic adversaries within that portion of the population enjoying equal rights. Thus, Weart writes, "The republican custom of accommodation applies only within a group which recognize one another as equals. . . . The leaders of a state will not necessarily be accommodating to foreign leaders unless they see them as people who are due equal treatment, in the same sense as domestic citizens." Perusing the historical record, Weart finds ample instances of oligarchic regimes refusing to deal peacefully with democracies: "they have sent troops against foreign democrats as easily as against commoners at home." Likewise, democratic leaders have been "equally belligerent against elites that tried to suppress common people, whether at home or abroad."¹⁰ Oligarchies do keep the peace with other oligarchies, however, as democracies keep the peace with other democracies. Weart's historical research both broadens attention to republics rather than just democracies and sharpens the focus on leaders.

Another area of research concerns aggression short of full-fledged wars between democracies. While wars (generally defined as institutionally organized lethal violence involving at least one thousand battle fatalities) may seldom occur between democracies, interventions are another matter. The historical record on this matter calls for much further analysis. As Kegley and Hermann note, "Cross-national studies of democracies' postulated pacificity have largely neglected their use

of force below the threshold of full-scale aggression; in particular, their reliance on military intervention to coerce changes in other states' foreign and domestic policies through overt or covert activities."¹¹

Their primary body of data is the U.S. use of force in covert intervention against sovereign elected governments in the 1980s. In this period, Kegley and Hermann note, "the globe's preeminent democracy actively pursued a policy of military activism abroad toward countries striving to be democratic. . . . While not at war officially, the U.S. government was at war unofficially, creating, funding, and training anti-communist mercenaries."¹² During the Reagan administration, there were four overt and seventeen covert military interventions undertaken in the name of fostering democracy. According to two standard data sets, from Freedom House and Polity II, 41 and 49 percent, respectively, of the targets of U.S. covert intervention were governments that were either "free" or "partly free."¹³ They conclude, then, that the democratic peace proposition is substantially challenged by this period of U.S. diplomatic history.

These observations lead Kegley and Hermann to consider certain qualifications to the democratic peace proposition. While it may be the case that democracies demonstrably do not engage in full-fledged wars against each other, smaller interventions are another matter. To whatever degree the democratic peace proposition holds in the case of wars, the history of military interventions by one democracy against another requires independent analysis. As Kegley and Hermann phrase it, "Ballots may deter the use of bombs, but not bullets, against perceived foreign adversaries."¹⁴

Their study of interventions between democracies has brought Kegley and Hermann, like Weart, to direct further attention to the orientation and behavior of leaders. They note that during real or imagined threats from abroad, democracies tend to concentrate decision-making powers in the hands of a small governing elite, often circumventing many democratic institutions and structures. It should not then be assumed that this elite leadership will necessarily behave according to democratic culture, seeking to resolve disputes with foreign governments. This is an empirical question, and Kegley and Hermann's examination of the historical record does not provide evidence that leaders of democracies necessarily behave democratically. Democratic regimes can act more like nondemocratic regimes when their leaders show little sensitivity to democratic values. Conversely, nondemocratic regimes can exhibit the kind of behavior expected of democratic regimes when their leaders are committed to certain liberal values.

Exploring this further in an article in *International Studies Quarterly*, Hermann and Kegley note that more responsive leaders are normally elected in democracies, while more ideologically driven leaders rise to power in autocracies. Nonetheless, the relationship is not categorical. Exceptions to a strong positive correlation between democracies and war or intervention occur when relatively responsive leaders come to power in closed systems (such as Leonid Brezhnev in the Soviet Union, with his concern for a more consensual style of leadership) or when relatively ideologically driven leaders come to power in open systems (such as Ronald Reagan in the United States, with his strong reliance on executive power to confront communism). In conclusion, Hermann and Kegley write, "How leaders define who are enemies and friends, their perception of the constraints under which they must operate, and their different views of the expected utilities of possible choices under such constraints give meaning to how governments are likely to respond to crises that could escalate to war. While the type of political system undoubtedly plays a role in specifying limiting conditions on foreign action . . . such restraints must be perceived and accepted to be effective."¹⁵

A further area of the democratic peace proposition that has received significant analytical consideration concerns the time frame. If some version of the democratic peace proposition holds for

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well-established democracies, this is not necessarily the case for new democracies just emerging from political transitions. A current research project undertaken by Edward Mansfield of Ohio State University, "Democratic Transitions, Institutional Capacity, and War," suggests that states may be especially war-prone during transitions to democracy.¹⁶

According to Mansfield, new democracies lack the institutional capacity to integrate contending interests and views. Political parties are weak and lack mass loyalty. Institutions of public political participation are new and often subject to manipulation by elites. Political coalitions are difficult to maintain. Former elites, particularly military elites with entrenched interests in protecting their own bureaucracies and budgets, compete for mass support. The pressures of these domestic conditions create incentives for elites to mobilize populations around belligerent nationalist platforms. Such use of nationalism has the advantage of positing a community of interest uniting elites and masses and distracting attention away from class cleavages and other divisions. In the historical patterns that Mansfield observes emerging from his research on democratizing states from 1816 to 1992, democratizing states with weak institutions become vulnerable to belligerent nationalism pushed by authoritarian elites, and are therefore prone to provocative foreign policies and war.

The research suggests particular policy directions. Clearly, promoting democratic transitions will not necessarily promote peace, and may engender conditions that lead to war. Mansfield emphasizes, therefore, the importance of developing policies that can smooth transitions to democracy, minimizing the risks of elite manipulation of and mobilization around the issue of nationalism. A key aspect of this policy approach is creating a safe and easy exit for the elites of the earlier authoritarian regime. Another factor is helping to establish effective institutions in the new democracy. In the range of new democracies Mansfield examines, the less institutional capacity a transitional state possesses, the more likely it is to become involved in a war. Those democratic transitions that are relatively orderly, preserving a substantial amount of a state's institutional capacity, are most apt to be able to remain on a peaceful course.

The democratic peace proposition has generated very different research agendas. Some have explored its internal operation, seeking to understand possible causal connections between democracy and peace. Others have explored its limits, looking at peace among nondemocratic republics, aggressive interventions among democracies, or the vulnerabilities peculiar to new democracies. While some analysts are skeptical, others see great promise in the proposition. Regarding its basis for policy decisions, however, most are cautious. Mansfield expresses specific reservations about hastening democracies in states that lack strong institutional capacity. Russett concurs more generally:

The model of "fight them, beat them, and then make them democratic" is irrevocably flawed as a basis for contemporary action. It probably would not work anyway, and no one is prepared to make the kind of effort that would be required. A crusade for democracy is not in order. External military intervention, even against the most odious dictators, is a dangerous way to produce a "democratic world order." Sometimes, with a cautious cost-benefit analysis and with the certainty of substantial and legitimate internal support, it may be worthwhile—that is, under conditions when rapid military success is likely and the will of the people at issue is clear. Even so, any time an outside power supplants any existing government the problem of legitimacy is paramount. The very democratic norms to be instilled may be compromised. At the least, intervention should not be unilateral.¹⁷