



SESSION 1

Reports From the Fronts

Bosnia: Creative *Ad Hoc*ery Busts Down Institutional Walls

Dare, Doubt, and Dilemma of The New World Order

As moderator Michael Vlahos observed at the opening of this session, "Bosnia is now our benchmark of everything different in what we want to do, and of every doubt we harbor of the doing." The conflict in Bosnia challenges the ideas of "the end of history" and the management of peace by the international community, and does so right in the back yard of the West.

High-level negotiators, and representatives from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), and NATO have worked together, with varying success and cohesion, to bring an end to the conflict. Panelists representing each of these groups discussed the missions of the organizations they served and the dilemmas they confronted.


- **Ambassador Charles Thomas** was Special Envoy for the Former Yugoslavia and the U.S. Representative on the Contact Group from the middle of 1994 until January 1995. From January to September 1995, he was Special Envoy for the Bosnian Federation.

Dr. Alan Brown, the Director of the Operational Training Team at the Center for Naval Analyses, was the coordinator for the Bosnia case study. The rapporteur for this panel was Ms. Anne Dixon, a research analyst at CNA.

- **Major General J. A. MacInnis** was the Deputy Force Commander of UNPROFOR from early 1993 until June 1994. He then established the planning team for the withdrawal of UNPROFOR, and remained in Bosnia until the end of 1994.
- **Lieutenant General Marvin Covault** was the Chief of Staff at Allied Forces, Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) from the spring of 1993 until the summer of 1994.
- **Ms. Candace Lekic** worked with Convoy Operations at UNHCR Belgrade, charged with supplying the UN Safe Havens in Eastern Bosnia.
- **Mr. Anne Willem Bijleveld** was first a liaison officer for UNHCR in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Command Headquarters, and then the Coordinator at UNHCR Headquarters. He also served as the High Commissioner's Special Envoy for the Former Yugoslavia.
- **Dr. Michael Vlahos**, a Senior Fellow at the Progress and Freedom Foundation and an Olin Fellow at The Johns Hopkins Paul Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, moderated this panel.

To Rebuild or To Refurbish?

The panel agreed that the complex structures of NATO and the United Nations impeded the effectiveness of both humanitarian assistance efforts and efforts to use force to back diplomacy. The need to harmonize both within and among these cumbersome organizations resulted in, in the words of General Marvin



MajGen. J. A. MacInnis

Covault, "negative *ad hocery*" and, as General J.A. MacInnis noted, "incongruent mission creep." Some speakers found the ad hoc approaches they were forced to adopt both difficult and inefficient. Thus, much of the discussion responded to a single basic question posed by the moderator at the outset: do we want to reconstruct these institutions, or merely refurbish them?


C2: Command and Control vs. Coordination and Cooperation

In his keynote address, General Zinni observed that in complex humanitarian emergencies, C2 is as much about coordination and cooperation as it is about command and control. The discussion among the panelists explored C2 issues and dilemmas in both these contexts.

Fragmented military chains of command

Unfamiliar territory. Coordination between the main intervening organizations has been done at arm's length in Bosnia.

When they were both intervening in Bosnia, NATO and UNPROFOR had their own chains of command.¹ UNPROFOR was in charge on the ground with a mandate to protect UNHCR relief convoys and the populations in need of aid and protection. NATO commanded the air operations, first Operation Deny Flight and then offensive air strikes. Hardly an integrated air-ground operation!



LtGen. Marvin Covault

Within NATO, all the different nations wrestled with how to respond to an out-of-area conflict. This is because NATO has never had more than one plan—the General Defense Plan—which assumes a sudden and complete transition from peace to total war along the Central Front. There has never been a general plan for an out-of-area contingency.

Plans and politics. AFSOUTH in Naples was the lead for most of the operational planning for the NATO operations in former Yugoslavia. The plan included land, air, and sea operations:

- NATO ground operations included a plan to evacuate the UN troops.
- Operation Sharp Guard challenged more than 50,000 vessels in the Adriatic.
- Operation Deny Flight included the initial air space denial and close air support for air drops, and then the offensive air strikes.

General Covault observed that the multinational planning done in the military arm of NATO worked well on the operational level. "What NATO brings is in-place, integrated C2." Nationalities, grades, and ranks know their roles and their missions.

But relations among the members are more complicated at the political decision-making level. Because France, a key player in the intervention, is not part of NATO's unified command structure, the very lengthy plans developed at AFSOUTH required approval above the unified command structure, in the political-level North Atlantic Council. The result? Delays and dilution. AFSOUTH submitted a complex but workable plan. But Covault warned, "When it came (sic) out the back door, in some respects it may be a formula for failure. NATO can fail in this ground plan."

¹ Following the Dayton peace accord, NATO ground forces took over for UNPROFOR in December 1995.

Ad hoc-ing it. Because the situation on the ground evolved faster than the NATO plan, the parties were left to coordinate on the ground. General MacInnis observed that four nations with experience in out-of-area, rapid expeditionary deployments—the U.S., the U.K., France, and Canada—coordinated effectively. They know how to work together because of frequent NATO military-to-military contacts and exercises. But the key is that they have real experience and their own national doctrine for this type of conflict.

Covault added that there was “not enough modern thinking and nontraditional thinking” in NATO. Its members still tend to think in terms of sectors of responsibility, and lack shared doctrine, tactics, and equipment for conducting either out-of-area or civil-military operations. Covault declared that “there is zero thought on the subject.”

Therefore, ad hoc planning cells were brought in, many from the United States. General Covault asserted that if NATO cannot build effective forces for these missions, it cannot carry them out. This situation “has led...a number of senior people to say we cannot execute ground operations in Bosnia without the United States, because of some of what the United States will bring militarily that nobody else can, period.”

Mixed mandates, mixed messages

The proper escort. The coordination difficulties within the UN were a clash of world views between UNPROFOR (its military arm) and the UNHCR (which has the mandate to deliver humanitarian assistance). In Eastern Bosnia, UNHCR negotiated directly with the Serbs, and to maintain trust allowed its vehicles to be inspected. But as the environment grew more dangerous, UNPROFOR was directed to escort the aid convoys. The UNPROFOR escorting forces did not allow the convoys to be inspected. Candace Lekic held that this policy increased the danger to the convoys. UNHCR thus began to take convoys without escort—a clear example of “negative *ad hocery*” and “reverse mission creep.”

True colors. Anne Willem Bijleveld described a difference in perspective between UNPROFOR and the NATO Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) in Central Bosnia. While the UNPROFOR convoy escorts were white, the RRF began to use green (combat) armored vehicles. Furthermore, the military escorts at times tried to force their way through roadblocks. For UNHCR, this was “an absolute no-go” because it would “turn us into basically a party to the conflict.”



Mr. Anne Willem Bijleveld

Secrecy and security—for whom? Lekic described the difficulty UNHCR had communicating with NATO in Naples on the scheduling and exact location for air drops. AFSOUTH, the NATO command, was