ANNEX AA
TERRORISM

I. SITUATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS

A. Terrorism has become a fact in today's world. The tactics terrorists use to obtain their goals include: bombing, arson, hijacking, ambushes, kidnaping, hostage taking and assassination. The purpose of these acts is to destroy the public's confidence in the governments ability to protect its citizens. In order to allow large scale dissemination of the act of terror the news media will be used by the terrorists to spread word of their actions.

B. In order for terrorism to remain a viable news media event, it must over time escalate its attacks on society. Chemical, biological, and/or nuclear weapons (NBC) or weapons combining conventional explosive material with these materials may be used to maintain this news media viability.

C. The term terrorism means activities that --

1. Involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of Kentucky, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or Kentucky.

2. Appear to be intended --

a) To intimidate or coerce a civilian population;

b) To influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or

c) To affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnaping;

D. The threat by a terrorist group or individual to use a bomb may or may not involve an actual weapon. All incidents, however, must be treated as a real threat until a search has proven otherwise.

E. The threat to use a bomb or committing acts of kidnaping or assination will be treated as a terrorist incident.

F. Primary responsibility for an incident involving a nuclear weapon rests with the federal government and is defined in the "Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Defense and Department of Energy Joint Agreement for Response to Improvised Nuclear Device Incident." (Appendix AA-1)

G. The implementation of this plan can result in either a peaceful resolution of the crisis or a terrorist act. Both contingencies are considered in this plan.

H. Terrorist threats may be made either by phone or mail.

II. MISSION

To establish the procedures and policies that will prevent or minimize terrorist activities and apprehend the persons responsible for the incident.

III. DIRECTION AND CONTROL

A. The Director of KyDES, or in the Director's absence the Executive Director, at the direction of the Governor, or successor, will coordinate all the Commonwealth's organizational response.

B. Kentucky State Police will be the lead Commonwealth law enforcement agency.

C. Once the federal government becomes officially involved, a federal agency may become the lead agency with state and local agencies acting in support.

IV. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

A. Operations and missions under this plan will be carried out during given distinct time periods: Preparedness, Response, and Recovery.

1. The Preparedness Phase covers normal readiness.

During this period plans will be reviewed to insure they are still valid and exercise and training of personnel will be accomplished on an annual basis.

2. Response Phase

a. The Increased Readiness Period includes readiness during the time the threat is being confirmed. Readiness to implement the plan will take precedence

during the alert until advice is received from the field that the threat is real or not.

b. The Emergency Operations Period begins when a threat of the use of a terrorist device within Kentucky or in a state adjacent to Kentucky has been confirmed.

3. The Recovery Phase begins when it is determined that no weapons exists, the weapon has been rendered inoperable, or its effects are dissipating.

B. All terrorist threats or activities must be reported to the local police and KSP. Local DES or KyDES will not be part of the direct law enforcement response to a terrorist incident. Local DES or KyDES will act to coordinate actions in support of the police activities. The actual situation will determine if the EOC should be open or the Incident Command System put into place.

C. Terrorists may resort to arson, bombing, hijacking, ambushes, kidnaping, hostage taking and assassination or threaten any of the acts to achieve their goals. Their primary objective is to destroy the public's confidence in the ability of the government to protect the citizens. Local officials are generally not equipped to deal with a major terrorist incident. Therefore, assistance will be needed immediately from state DES and law enforcement agencies. If the severity of the incident warrants such action, federal agencies will be requested to support local and state officials.

D. Types of NBC Threats

1. Dispersal of chemical, biological or radioactive material with no explosive involved.

2. Dispersal of chemical, biological or radioactive material by an explosive device.

E. **Antiterrorism** involves the measures taken by installations, organizations or individuals to reduce the probability of their falling victim to a terrorist act. Educational programs, physical security, personal protection techniques, and operational patterns are all passive means of making a target less appealing to a terrorist.

F. Counterterrorism is the full range of offensive measures to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. Participation in counterterrorist actions is normally limited to specially trained and equipped forces kept on status for that purpose.

V. ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT

A. Support of this operation will consist of assistance from all State agencies, local government and the federal government.

B. Augmentation and training of emergency organization will be carried out as set forth in CPG 1-7-"Guide for Increasing Local Government Civil Defense Readiness During Period of International Crisis".

VI. APPENDICES

AA-1 Nuclear Terrorist Response

AA-2 Conventional Bomb Threat

APPENDIX AA-1
NUCLEAR TERRORIST RESPONSE

I. SITUATION AND ASSUMPTIONS

A. Primary responsibility for an incident involving an improvised nuclear weapon rests with the federal government and is defined in the "Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Defense and Department of Energy Joint Agreement for Response to Improvised Nuclear Device Incident".

B. Types of Nuclear Terrorist Threats

1. Dispersal of radioactive material other than plutonium and uranium.

2. Detonation of a conventional bomb salted with radioactive material (plutonium, strontium or other known radioactive isotope).

3. Detonation of an improvised nuclear explosive device.

4. Detonation of a nuclear weapon.

II. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

A. Operations and missions under this plan will be carried out during the following distinct time phases: Preparatory, Response, and Recovery.

1. The Preparatory Phase covers normal readiness.

2. The Response Phase

a. The Increase Readiness Period includes the period the threat is being confirmed. Readiness to implement the plan will take precedence during this period until advice is received from the Federal government that the threat is real or not real.

b. The Emergency Operation Period begins only when the threat of the use of a nuclear device within Kentucky or an adjacent state has been confirmed as a viable threat by the Federal government or a device has been exploded.

3. The Recovery Phase begins whin it is determinded that no weapon exists or the weapon has been rendered inoperable or the area has been declared safe for entry after an explosion.

B. Under Federal law the Federal government assumes the responsibility of responding to an incident involving criminal misuse of nuclear material to include improvised nuclear devices, nuclear dispersal devices or stolen nuclear weapons. This is spelled out in the "Joint FBI, DOE, and DOD Agreement for Response to Improvised Nuclear Devices." See Annex A of this SOP.

C. As "first responders" local and state government agencies will be responsible for carrying out their normal emergency responsibilities as defined in the Kentucky Emergency Operation Plan until the Federal government has assumed responsibility from the Governor.

D. Once the Federal agents arrive on scene and assume responsibility for finding and deactivating the weapon, state and local agencies will provide support to requesting Federal agencies by carrying out any protective action not in conflict with the Federal response.

E. Upon the federal government assuming responsibility the FBI will formulate necessary liaison with personnel from DOD, DOE, FEMA, KyDES, KSP, CHR, NR&EPC and SFM plus local officials designated by Mayor and County Judge/Executive.

F. Federal Agency Tasks and Responsibilities

1. The following outline of agency tasks and responsibilities is provided for guidance and should be the basis for developing supporting plans and operating procedures.

a. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) - Although local government is responsible for the protection of the public health and safety from nuclear hazards, the FBI by Federal statute is the lead investigative agency in all cases where threats are made involving radioactive material. As the lead investigative agency, the FBI is responsible for the investigative functions; however, the nuclear aspects of assessment and search will be delegated to the Federal Department of Energy, or to the state. In addition the FBI will:

1) alert FBI headquarters and appropriate local, state and federal agencies;

2) coordinate all investigative efforts with appropriate military or civilian law enforcement agencies;

3) assist in the assessment of the threat;

4) coordinate news releases regardingf all aspects of the threat and operations;

5) provide a location at the FBI command center or in near proximity for representation of all assisting agencies to receive updates, commit resources and coordinate all activities; and

6) other duties as defined in Annex A of this SOP.

b. Department of Energy (DOE)

With threats involving Special Nuclear Material (SNM) DOE will accept from the FBI the responsibility for control and coordination of the nuclear aspects of the assessment and searc operations and, when requested, cases involving other radioactive materials. In addition, upon arrival at the scene, DOE will provide radiological assistance to the state or local agencies having the regularly constituted authority for the protection of the general public health and safety in accordance with the Interagency Radiological Assistance Plan. Representatives from DOE or its Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST) will intergrate operationally with the FBI and other agencies. Duties include:

1) alert state and federal agencies as appropriate;

2) assist in assessment of the threat;

3) assist in the search for analysis of the nuclear device in accordance with current DOE Plans;

4) prepare input regarding nuclear and radiological aspects of the threat and operations for news releases

c. Department of Defense (DOD)

1) Military Weapons - In threats involving military neclear weapons, the responsible military services or the FBI has jurisdiction. However, when control of the nuclear weapon is lost into the civil sector the FBI assumes jurisdictional responsibility for recovery and control of weapon.

2) Other threats - DOD will provide technical support when requested through the FBI. Such support will include those functions within the purview of the department and to the extent that the principal military mission is not compromised. These functions will include but are not limited to the following:

a) assist in providing security;

b) assist in locating the device;

c) assist in deactivating and removing the device.

d. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) - FEMA has the responsibility for coordinating emergency planning and close out operations following resolution of the criminal aspects of the nuclear misuse. Once the weapon is deactivated and secured or clean-up operations commence FEMA will assume command of the incident from the FBI.

G. Pursuant to directive of the President, the FBI will assume command and control of the incident management while criminal misuse activities are existent. This means that all agencies will be expected to cooperate in the resolution of the problem under direction of the FBI.

H. It is not intended that this document supersede any DOD directive currently in effect regarding handling of DOD special devices.

I. State or local agencies upon receiving a nuclear weapon's threat will immediately notify the FBI, KyDES, and KSP.

J. Response

1. Should a nuclear threat occur which requires meeting demands or making concessions during a ery short time interval, the local agency receiving the threat may, by necessity, have to respond using only those skills and resources immediately available. Concessions to demands in a nuclear extortion are of national interest and must be carefully evaluated. However, the nearest FBI field division, KyDES and KSP must be immediately advised of the threat. These agencies will alert additional resources and persons and have them available as rapidly as possible.

2. Some threats may provide time to meet the threat demand, thus allowing time for a more deliberate, orderly, and effective response to evaluate the true nature of the threat. The following guidelines provide a basis for response action:

a. The Threat

1) Receipt of a nuclear threat can be received in many different forms, such as telephone calls, tape recordings, and letters. Regardless of the threat, it is imperative that the individual or the agency receiving the threat acquire and preserve all possible material and information concerning the threat.

2) This and all other information regarding the threat, must be immediately forwarded to the FBI at the time of notification. Inasmuch as the exact wording and tone of a threat message can be of invaluable assistance in determining the credibility and the potential hazard associated with the threat, it is imperative that the exact wording and tone of threat be conveyed accurately. See Annex F of this SOP.

3) Everything associated with the threat should be handled cardfully and preserved as evidence for possible future examination and evaluation by experts. As few people as possible should physically touch the evidence.

b. Notification - The FBI and KyDES should be contacted immediately upon receipt of a nuclear threat. The telephone number for the FBI is (800) 752-6000 for KyDES (502) 564-7815, and for KSP (800) 222-5555.

c. Threat Credibility Assessment - The FBI, in cooperation with DOE, KSP and local law enforcement agencies will provide for assessment of the threat to determine the credibility and implications of the threat. Credibility must be continuously reviewed and assessed as investigative and search intelligence is acquired.

d. Coordination between Agencies

1) The nucleus of the agencies with immediate interest will, as a minimum, be the FBI, FEMA, USDOE, DOD, KyDES, KSP, Department for Health Services, Fire Marshal, NR&EPC, and local DES. The FBI, as the lead investigative agency, will coordinate with all interested agencies in order to maintain continuity and cohesiveness of the actions taken. Command decisions will be made by respective members of the Task Force with regard to the discharge of their responsibilities as the situation develops. All decisions for action will clear through the state and on scene Emergency Operations Center.

2) An on - scene emergency operationcenter will be established where the coordinating agencies can meet and evaluae information, make operational decisions based on information collected, and solve the technical problems involved in the search, identification and removal of any device.

3) One public information center will be established through which all agencies will issue news releases. Due to the potential for public panic in this type of situation no releases will be made without approval of the Commander of the EOC. PIOs of various agencies will assist in the media coordination of the event.

e. Investigation - Investigation of a viable threat is the basic responsibility of the FBI. However, to mount an effective investigation the cooperation of local, state and federal agencies, is necessary.

f. Search

1) Once it has been determined that the nuclear threat is credible and protective actions commensurate with the situation have been taken, search for the device should begin. Sophisticated searcher equipment will be brought to the scene by NEST. Premature searching may arouse public awareness and unwanted concern. If the response time is very short the search may be started by the local response agency and the information in Annex E shall be considered.

2) When the demands are to be met in a longer time period, search for a nuclear device will be conducted by NEST, as requested by the FBI with assistance of appropriate local, state and federal agencies as needed.

3) Prior to the arrival of NEST, a visual search by persons familiar with the area may be conducted. This action must be carefully evaluated due to creation of unwanted public concern. Concurrent with the search, law enforcement agencies in concert with the FBI will endeavor to provide additional information about the threat and its source.

4) If radiation detection equipment is used in the initial search, it should be remembered that xommonly available meters (including all civil defense meters) are incapable or at best unreliable for the detection of alpha, beta, or low energy gamma emitters.

g. Device Located

1) If a suspected nuclear device is found during a search prior to the arrival of NEST, the area should be evacuated and other protective actions taken appropriate to the situation. DOE and the Cabinet for Human Resources, Radiation Control Branch will advise of the area to be evacuated. Prior to arrival of trained EOD personnel, NO ATTEMPT shall be made to neutralize, deactivate, or move the device.

2) When a military nuclear weapon is involved a military Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) Team will be involved in deactivation and disposal of the weapon.

3) If an improvised (homeade) device is involved, designated persons from DOD and DOE familiar with design characteristics of nuclear weapons or improvised explosive devices should determine the appropriate action to be taken.

4) If a nuclear weapon is involved only DOE nuclear weapons experts and/or specially trained EOD teams shall be involved.

5) Annexes C and D of this SOP discuss hazards and exposure criteria that should be taken into account when searching for a suspected nuclear weapon.

h. Protective Action

1) Protective actions are nonsequential because it may be necessary to institute them at any time or reapply them at a later a time. They should be considered in two phases:

a) Those actions (preventive) taken to prevent loss of life, injury or destruction of propety; and

b) Those actions (restorative) that would be taken if the threat should be carried out.

2) CHR, Radiation Control Branch is responsible for recommending protective actions to the Governor or the Director of KyDES.

I Medical

In the event of nuclear detonation or the dispersal of radioactive materials, special medical care may be required for irradiated and/or contaminated patients. Most hospitals are not equipped with adequate facilities and trained pesonnel for required teatment; thus, cases of severe exposure should be directed to University of Kentucky Medical Center, Humana Hospital University in Louisville, St. Luke in Fort Thomas or Reacts in Oak Ridge, TN.

1) Local - Local Government is responsible for planning and coordinating medical services during the emergency. The medical plan shall provide for:

a) Identification, coordination and control of local medical emergency response forces.

b) Medical planning including designation, training, and exercising medical facilities and personnel.

c) Special medical treatment and services required for treating radiation exposed and/or contaminated patients.

d) Coordination of assistance provided by private hospitals, clinics, medical associations, health and other societies and quasi - governmental groups.

2) State - Cabinet for Human Resources, Department for Health Services, is responsible for emergency medical care in support of local government and will provide:

a) Technical advice;

b) Procurement of special equipment and services, such as whole body counters, laboratory service, decontamination facilities, radioactive waste disposal, etc.;

c) Emergency procurement, storage, distribution, and handling of supplemental medical supplies;

d) Liaison with the Kentucky Disaster and Emergency Services; and

e) Procedures for procuring medical assistance from other state departments.

3) Federal - Federal agencies will provide technical advice, equipment and supplementary resources in support of medical operations.

J. Health

After the spread of radioactive materials, special health problems result from radioactive contamination. Therefore, plans for health services must address this problem as well as normal sanitation and other health problems.

1) Local - Local government is responsible for providing health and sanitation services. These services include but are not limited to:

a) Personnel decontamination;

b) Sanitation in reception centers;

c) Inspection of food to determine radioactive contamination;

d) Potable water;

e) Protection of agricultural products from radioactive contamination.

2) State

a) Kentucky Disaster and Emergency Services will coordinate the efforts of State agencies to support local emergency operations.

b) The Department of Health Services will have the primary responsibility for the administration and application of health services support and will provide resources, personnel and technical advice.

3) Federal - Appropriate agencies can provide supplementary emergency equipment, supplies and technical advice to local health authorities. Local jurisdictions should forward their request to KyDES who will notify FEMA which in turn will contact the appropriate federal agency.

k. Public Information

1) Though information of all types from many different sources will be processed, some types are more important than others. In recognition of this act and the necessity of using available public information facilities in the most efficient and effective manner, the following priorities are established:

a) Lifesaving - Information essential to survival, health, and safety before, during and after the incident.

b) Recovery - Information concerning disaster recovery and relief programs and services.

c) Other - Non-emergency information released by participating government and voluntary agencies.

2) Coordination of Releases: In coordination with the FBI, U.S. Department of Justice, the local, state, and federal agencies will be responsible for preparing releases pertaining to their activities. All state releases will be made through KyDES PIO.

l. Other State Resources

1) State Fire Marshal is responsible for coordinating fire and suppression equipment and manpower in support of local government.

2) Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet is responsible for providing technical assistance to local and governments concerning water and air quality sampling.

m. Restoration - The problem to be solved and the work required during restoration may be complicated by the presence of radioactive contamination. Thus local government may require state and federal support.

1) Local - Local government is responsible for the evacuation of and re-entry into affected areas. Tasks that may have to be undertaken during this period include:

a) Decontamination of property and food supplies;

b) Security of evacuated areas to prevent unauthorized entry and vandalism;

c) Mass care and welfare;

d) Monitoring of people and property for radiation contamination;

e) Transportation;

f) Identificaton and dispersal of radioactive contaminated matelals that can't be decontaminated;

g) Engineering support;

h) Long - term radiation monitoring;

I) Control of radiation exposure to the public and workers;

j) In concert with state and federal assistance, establish a program for dealing with long term medical problems.

2) State - Kentucky Disaster and Emergency Services will coordinate state support during the emergency and restoration.

3) Federal - The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) will provide assistance to the local and state government upon request.

VI. TABS

AA-1-1 Joint Federal Agreement

AA-1-2 Weapon Materal

AA-1-3 Radiation Exposure Control

AA-1-4 Protective Actions

AA-1-5 Search Technique

AA-1-6 Threat Documentation

AA-1-7 Federal Response Scenario

TAB AA-1-1

JOINT FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AGREEMENT FOR RESPONSE TO IMPROVISED NUCLEAR DEVISE INCIDENTS

I. PURPOSE AND SCOPE

To set forth and define specific areas of responsibility and procedures for responding to emergencies involving improvised nuclear devices (IND) within the United States, District of Columbia, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and U. S. possessions and territories, by representatives of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Department of Energy (DOE), and the Department of Defense (DOD). These provisions amplify the current DOD/DOE Agreement of 1 March 1977. DOE/FBI Memorandum of Understanding of June 1976 dealing with response to accidents or incident involving nuclear material, and the Attorney General's letter to the Secretary of Defense on assistance to Federal agencies combatting terrorism, dated 10 November 1972.

II. TERMS OF AGREEMENT

A. This agreement shall be effective upon signature by representatives of the FBI, DOE and DOD.

B. Amendments, modifications, or termination of this agreement may e made by written agreement of all parties.

III. POLICY

In the event of a nuclear threat incident involving an IND, the FBI is responsible, as set forth in Section 221.b of the Atomic Energy Act, as amended, for investigating all alleged or suspected criminal violations of that Act.

The FBI has primary jurisdiction where a question of the violation of Federal law exists and, where appropriatre, will coordinate the utilization of available resources in the interest of public health and safety. DOE and DOD will provide assistance and support to the FBI as listed in Section V of this agreement.

IV. IMPLEMENTATION

Each party will issue its own departmental instructions and detailed operating proceducres implementing this agreement and will develop and exchange additional instructions and procedures as are deemed necessary for the continued implementation of this agreement.

V. RESPONSIBILITIES

A. The FBI will:

1. Act as the Federal agency in charge at the scene of an IND incident and assume jurisdiction over all field organizations.

2. Establish and maintain contacts and coordinate IND incident support requirements with other Federal and local law enforcement agencies.

3. Provide security for personnel and equipment to be utilized in search, deactivation, and cleanup operations.

4. Provide, at the incident scene, a representative to act as liaison with Federal and local authorities.

5. Notify appropriate individuals and offices of any nuclear threat incident.

6. Notify DOE Headquarters of support requirements and provide:

a. The exact wording of threat messages, copies of drawings, nuclear material samples, or other related intelligence for scientific analysis and credibility assessment.

b. All information pertinent to an assessment of a threat perpetrator's technical capabilities to carry out a threat.

7. Notify the National Military Command Center (NMCC)/Emergency Ordnance Disposal (EOD) of support requirements for either standby or deployment.

8. Provide additional support as required by DOE and DOD/EOD personnel in carrying out assigned operations.

B. The DOE, upon notification by the FBI of an IND incident, will:

1. Provide scientific and technical assistance and advice to the FBI and DOD in the areas of threat assessment and search operations, device deactivation, hazards assessment, containment, relocation and storage of special nuclear material evidence, and in post-incident cleanup.

2. Analyze threat messages for technical content, nuclear design feasibility, and general credibility and provide such analyses to the FBI.

3. Acquire, maintain, and make available any special equipment and capabilities required to provide the necessary scientific and technical support.

4. Coordinate IND incident activities with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), as appropriate. (IND incidents involving facilities or material within the jurisdiction of the NRC are initially reported by NRC to the FBI.)

5. Arrange for any special transportation of DOE equipment, personnel, and/or nuclear material, as required.

6. Notify the DOD and civilian agencies of, and request assistance for, post-incident cleanup activities as soon as appropriate.

7. Have final authority concerning the classification of Restricted Data and DOE-originated National Security Information associated with source material, special nuclear material, radioactive by-products, or nuclear weapons/components.

8. Provide, upon request by the FBI, scientific and technical information and testimony for use in any legal action undertaken by the Department of Justice.

C. DOD, upon request by the FBI, will:

1. Provide EOD technical and operational assistance to the FBI.

2. Provide EOD technology, procedures and equipment for working point access, device deactivation, and nonnuclear device diagnostics.

D. The FBI, DOE, and DOD will:

1. Coordinate all proposed press releases related to IND incidents. Any media or public inquiries will be initially referred to the FBI; responses to such inquiries will be coordinated with DOE and DOD.

2. Treat all IND incident information with adequate security and confidentiality commensurate with National Security classification guidelines and the standards for the preservation of criminal evidence.

3. Review the IND incident for the purpose of improving upon future joint responses.

4. Provide a mechanism for coordinated planning and for coordinated training and testing of IND incident management, equipment, and personnel.

E. The DOE and DOD, in support of the FBI, will:

1. Develop working point operating procedures to be followed after location of in IND.

2. Provide for:

   a. IND EOD training material including inert nuclear and high-explosive devices and fuzing and firing systems.

   b. Realistic training exercises that include participation by all parties (FBI, DOE, and DOD/DOE).

   c. Training in EOD practices, procedures, and component identification safety precautions for IND.

   d. Research and development in the areas of render safe and disposal technology including radiation dispersal containment concepts.

VI. PROCEDURES

A. Initial Notification

1. IND incidents could initially come to the attention of the FBI, DOD or the DOE. Upon receipt of such information, the agency informed shall immediately notify he nearest FBI office and provide all known information. The FBI will officially notify all agencies involved of the incident.

2. All agencies shall notify the various branches, offices, or individuals concerned within their jurisdictions about the situation and specify what actions and/or resources might be required.

B. Initial Notification

1. The FBI will designate a Special Agent to take command of field operations and Special Agents to act as liaison with DOE Headquarters, local police jurisdictions, and the NMCC.

2. DOE will consult with the FBI and will assign personnel to provide required support. An FBI liaison representative will be designated by competent authority to accompany DOE personnel to the scene of an IND incident for local coordination purposes.

3. The NMCC will, upon the receipt of notification by the FBI of a credible IND incident, notify the applicable DOD Emergency Operations Center (EOC) which will utilize its established notification system in order to dispatch an EOD unit and other technical and operational support to the incident site. An FBI representative will be designated by competent authority as point of contact for EOD personnel at the scene of an IND incident for local coordination purposes.

4. The DOD/DOE command post will be colocated in the incident sit control center.

C. Threat Assessment

1. The FBI with DOE assistance, including DOD participation when appropriate, will provide a threat assessment.

2. DOE will provide scientific and technical assistance for determining the credibility of specific nuclear threats and the potential hazards associated with those threats and report its assessments to the FBI.

3. DOE will determine, in coordination with the NRC, if any source material, special nuclear material, or radioactive by-products are missing or unaccounted for the report results to the FBI. DOD and DOE will, when requested by the FBI, determine if any nuclear weapons or components are missing.

4. The FBI will notify DOD through the NMCC of any credible threat and request DOE and DOD/EOD assistance.

D. Search and Location

1. DOE will have primary responsibility for the search and location of INDs.

2. DOE will dispatch, upon request of the FBI, a DOE response group and necessary special equipment to the scene of an incident.

3. The DOE response group will, by use of specialized equipment, attempt to determine the presence and location of an IND.

4. DOE will relay all data relating to the IND including radiological readings, configurations, and location to the FBI and the DOD/EOD team.

5. DOD/EOD personnel will identify the presence or suspected presence of booby-trapped devices in the area or structure in which the DOE response group is searching.

6. The DOD/EOD team present will be responsible for the clearance of any booby-traps or other hazardous item sencountered by the DOE team during the search.

7. The FBI will have primary responsibility for security of, and access to, the location of an IND incident.

E. Incident Site Reconnaissance and Clearance

1. DOD/EOD, with DOE technical assistance, will have primary responsibility for incident site reconnaissance and clearance.

2. DOD/EOC personnel will clear the area/structure of explosive devices.

3. DOD will provide a qualified individual for safety and coordination of functions at the working point.

F. Diagnostics and Measurements

1. DOE, with DOD/EOD assistance, will have primary responsibility for diagnostics and measurements.

2. DOE personnel will determine, through use of diagnostic and measurement equipment, details of the suspected device, including its structure and function.

3. Data relative to the anticipated structure and function of the device will be provided by DOE to the FBI and DOD/EOD personnel.

4. Provide a hazard assessment to the DOD and FBI as related to the incident.

G. Dispersal Containment Preparations

1. DOD with DOE and FBI support will have primary responsibility for dispersal containment preparations.

2. DOD/EOD and DOE personnel will develop, with FBI support, any required containment apparatus for explosive and radiological matter.

H. Device Deactivation

1. DOD/EOD, with FBI and DOE support, will have the primary responsibility for device deactivation.

2. DOD/EOD personnel will develop suitable render safe procedures.

3. DOD/EOD personnel will perform the approved deactivation procedures. DOD/EOD, FBI, and DOE personnel will work in close cooperation to achieve the deactivation of the device.

I. Post Incident Operations

1. The FBI, with support of DOE, DOD and other Federal, state and local authorities will have primary responsibility for post-incident operations.

2. DOD/EOD and DOE personnel will work closely with, and in support of, the FBI in the presevation of evidence.

3. DOE and DOD will arrange for any special transportation of nuclear material in coordination with the FBI.

$. The FBI will request assistance from DOE, DOD, and appropriate civilian agencies for post-incident cleanup.

J. Major Emergency or Disaster - In the event of a major emergency or disaster, DOE will assist in the response to post-incident cleanup requirements in coordination with the DOD and various civilian agencies as provided for under other agreements. DOE will have assistance from the DOD as provided for in the 1 March 1977, DOD and DOE Agreement In Response to Accidents - Incidents Involving Radioactive Material or Nuclear Weapons.

VII. EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE EXPENSE

DOD, DOE, and the FBI will each fund for the costs which they incur in providing the equipment and services required to meet their responsibilities defined in the agreement. Any reimbursements which may subsequently be agreed upon by the undersigned in furthrance of this agreement will be in accordance with the Economy Act, 31 U.S.C. 8.

TAB AA-1-2
WEAPON MATERIAL

I. SITUATION AND ASSUMPTION

A. A variety of materials could be used in making an improvised nuclear device. These would pose different levels of hazard to the human body.

B. Hazards

1. Plutonium (Pn)

Plutonium is a fissile nuclear material used in nuclear weapons. It is a radioactive metallic element with a very long half life and is highly toxic and may cause death or permanent injury after internal exposure to small quantities. Entry into body is by ingestion, inhalation, or through a break in the skin.

2. Other Radioactive Isotopes

Some of the more common radioactive isotopes other than plutonium which may be used in a threat are:

a. P-32 (phosphorus)

b. Co-60 (cobalt)

c. Sr-90 (strontium)

d. I-311 (iodine)

e. Cs-137 (cesium)

f. Ir-192 (iridium)

g. Au-198 (gold)

h. Ra-226 (radium)

i. H-3 (tritium)

j. Ca-45 (calcium)

k. Zn-65 (zinc)

All of these and many other radioisotopes could be used in a dispersal device; however, there is a wide variation in toxicity among the radioisotopes depending upon their chemical and physical properties. Thus identification of the isotope and its chemical form is necessary to determine the proper response.

3. Fissile Materials

Only certain isotopes of uranium and plutonium (special nuclear material) are capable of sustaining a chain reaction and are suitable for use in constructing a nuclear explosive. Other elements cannot be used to make a nuclear explosive.

4. High Explosives (HE)

A high explosive (HE) is an essential element in a nuclear explosive. When a radioactive dispersal device is involved in the threat, HE may or may not be present. HE in the form of TNT, dynamite, and others are dangerous to handle at any time. In a bomb, they are especially dangerous since they may be used with crude and/or sensitive detonating devices. Therefore, only an expert familiar with such devices should attempt to disarm them.

5. Nuclear Detonation

In the event of a nuclear detonation, thermal, radiation and blast are added hazards in the immediate area. In addition there is the potential for airborne radiation spreading downwind and being deposited as fallout.

TAB AA-1-3
RADIATION EXPOSURE CONTROL

I. SITUATION AND ASSUMPTION

Procedures to be used for limiting radiation exposure have been developed by CHR, Radiation Control Branch. These procedures are contained within that branch's internal SOP.

II. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

The following is general guidance to be observed in limiting radiological exposure if advice is unobtainable from the Radiation Control Branch of the Cabinet for Human Resources.

A. Hazards and Exposure Criteria

Exposure to large quantities of nuclear radiation over a relatively short period of time can cause disabling sickness or death. Exposure to lesser quantities, either externally or through inhalation and ingestion, may result in chronic impairment to health. Radiation exposure may also damage the genetic material in the body of the individuals, resulting in health impairment in future generations. Therefore, stringent limits have been established as follows:

1. General Population

All practicable measures must be taken to limit whole body exposure dose to any individual of the general population to the recommended 2.5 rem in any one year.

2. Emergency Workers

Any persons engaged in operations required to mitigate the effects of the incident is an emergency worker for the purpose of this Plan.

a. Emergency Operations

When an incident occurs, emergency operations will be necessary to save lives and reduce escalation of the radiological problem. Emergency workers who are involved could conceivably become exposed to radiation and contamination while carrying out their duties.

b. Live Saving Actions

If as a result of a release, entry into a radiation aea is necessary to search for and remove injured or trapped persons, exposure limits of 5 rem may be exceeded by workers involved. In such a case, the following guidance extracted from National Council on Radiation Protection (NCRP) Report 39 should be considered.

1) Rescue personnel should be volunteers or professional rescue personnel (e.g. firemen who "volunteer" by choice of employment).

2) Rescue personnel should be broadly familiar with the consequences of exposure.

3) Women capable of reproduction should be advised of the risk before taking part in these actions. This includes all emergency response organizations.

4) Other things being equal, volunteers above the age of 45 should be selected.

5) Planned dose to the whole body shall not exceed 100 rems.

6) Hands and forearms may receive additional dose of up to 200 rems (i.e. a total of 300 rems).

7) Internal exposure should be minimized by the use of the best available respiratory protection, and contamination should be controlled by the use of available protective clothing.

8) Normally, exposure under these conditions should be limited to once in a lifetime.

9) Persons receiving exposure as indicated above, should avoid procreation for a period of up to a few months.

c. Extraordinary Emergency Operations

This applies under less that life saving circumstances where it is still desirable to enter a hazardous area to protect facilities, eliminate further escape of effluents, or to control fires. All elements listed under guidance given for section 2b. above should be followed except paragraphs 2-b-5) and 2-b-6). Change these as follows:

2-b-5) Planned dose to the whole body shall not exceed 25 rems.

2-b-6) Planned dose of hands and forearms shall not exceed 75 rems including the whole body component.

d. Persons receiving exposure as indicated above must be provided expert medical treatment, consultation and service individual personnel dosimeters.

TAB AA-1-4
PROTECTIVE ACTION

I. SITUATION AND ASSUMPTIONS

Procedures to be used for establishing protective actions are set forth in CHR, Radiation Control Branch SOP.

II. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

A. Two different populations at risk will have to be combined when dealing with a nuclear weapon - those at risk from direct effects and those at risk from indirect effects.

1. Direct effects includes blast, fire and initial radiation.

2. Indirect effects includes radioactive fallout and electromagnetic pulse.

B. Types of Protective Actions are:

1. Evacuation

2. In Place Shelter

3. Access Control

4. Agriculture Product Control

C. Kentucky DES maintains list of Facilities providing fallout protection in the state.

D. Evacuees will be moved beyound the projected 2 pound per square inch ibast overpressure shock wave and/or contaminated area, whichever is greater, resulting from the weapon explosion.

E. Evacuees will be sheltered in conformity with Kentucky's Emergency Operation Plan. A wide variety of protecive actions are availabie that can e used to reduce or eliminate the effects of radiation and contamination. For the purpose of this plan, protective actions are considered in two aspects:

1. Covering to Prevent Contamination

Selected objects and material may be protected from contamination by covering them before the "cloud" arrives. For example, to avoid the contamination of food obtained from livestock, all livestock feed should be covered. Machinery that cannot be decontaminated economically should be covered. Windows and doors of homes should be closed and sealed. Livestock should be put into the best covered space. Providing cover against contamination may require time needed for other actions such as

evacuation; thus, under some circumstances, it may not be operationally feasible. Closing water intake valve from a contaminated reservoir to a municipal water distribution system has the same effect as covering. It prevents contamination of the water system and prevents the general public from ingesting contaminated water. This is a no cost action that requires little planning and does not require public participation. It requires coordination with essential water consumers (fire service) and a public information announcement.

2. Shelter from Radiation

The average home offers significant protection, especially if the ventillation system is shut off. Shelter, to be used effectively, requires professional evaluation and planning. If available, it offers an alternative to evacuation.

3. Evacuate

Evacuation is a major countermesure to prevent or reduce exposure and contamination. It is a complex operation possibly involving several governmental departments. Its effectiveness is considerably enhanced by detailed planning. State support for evacuation will be in accordance to the Kentucky Emergency Operation Plan. See Attachment 9 and 10 for additional information.

4. Respirators

Most respirators with the proper filtration cartridges and a good seal around the face are effective in preventing the inhalation of airborne particulate radioactive materials. These are most applicable to emergency workers operating in the contaminated areas. Self contained breathing apparatus are preferable. Respirators offer no protectionfrom gamma radiation.

5. Protective Clothing

Protective clothing is worn to prevent contamination of the skin. Its principal value is to reduce or eliminate the need for skin contamination, but offers no protection from gamma radiation.

6. Import Clean Food and Water

The radiation and contamination levels may be low enough to meet occupancy standards, but not low enough for contaminated food and water in the area to meet ingestion standards. Such food and water should be tested in a laboratory to determine if they meet ingestion standards. Meanwhile, food and water would be imported until local supplies are determined to be safe from contamination.. Uncontaminated foods such as those stored in sealed containers, refrigerators, freezers, etc. could be used.

B. Restorative Actions

Recovery of restorative actions are those necessary to allow re-entry into an area or release of things for use after having been contaminated. Some of these actions are:

1. Decontamination

Decontamination is the removal of radioactive material from surface. It is a corrective action to reduce the likelihood of ingestion and beta skin exposure and, to a lesser degree, whole body radiation exposure. Decontamination is a relatively expensive action that is performed under professional supervision. Allowing radioactive material to decay is an alternative to decontamination.

2. Special Chemical Treatment

Special chemical treatment is a form of decontamination applied to contaminated water, milk, or other contaminated substances from which the radioactive chemicals can be removed. It is used to recover resources that would otherwise require disposal,or which would, if ingested, subject the population to internal contamination.

3. Radioactive Decay

Allowing time for radioactive decy is a delaying action, keeping the general population from radioactive items and areas, to provide for time for the natural process of decay to occur. The normal use of items and areas can be resumed when radiation and/or contamination levels meet acceptable standards. Awaiting decay is a major countermeasure applicable to radioisotopes that decay rapidly. The cost of allowing time for decay would be evaluated in relation to the cost of other countermeasures.

TAB AA-1-5
SEARCH TECHNIQUE

I. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

A. General Considerations

1. THE SEARCH SHOULD BE CONDUCTED BY OR IN THE PRESENCE OF TRAINED PERSONNEL EQUIPPED WITH INSTRUMENTS CAPABLE OF DETECTING PLUTONIUM OR OTHER RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS.

2. The search can be expedited if personnel who are familiar with the area or the building and its contents are used.

3. Areas housing critical equipment/machinery should be searched by personnel most familiar ith the area and the equipment.

4. If a suspected nuclear or dispersal device is found:

   a. DO NOT touch or attempt to move the object.

   b. The danger area should be identified, and blocked off with a clear zone.

   c. Call KyDES to request Nuclear Emergency Search Team or military EOD assistance.

   d. Call the FBI immediately to insure appropriate Federal notifications are made and actions taken.

5. Since plutonium is an apiha emitter, it may be carried into a building in any type of package. Alpha radiation, since it is easily shielded, will not be detected through the package. However, there is associated with plutonium a low energy gamma ray which can be detected by sophisticated detection instruments available through DOE.

6. The more common radiological isotopes are capable of being detected by the civil defense CD V low level Geiger counters. Nevertheless, only competent, trained personnel should be involved in the search for these materials.

7. THE CIVIL DEFENSE CD V LOW LEVERL GIEGER COUNTER OR ANY OTHER CD INSTRUMENT CANNOT DETECT ALPHA RADIATION OR VERY LOW ENERGY GAMMA. (SUCH AS ASSOCIATED WITH PLUTONIUM.) THEREFORE, IT IS IMPORTANT TO REMEMBER THAT FALSE/INACCURATE READINGS CAN BE OBTAINED WITH ANY INSTRUMENT. FOR EXAMPLE, IN HIGH RADIATION AREAS THE CD V LOW LEVEL GEIGER COUNTER MAY BECOME SATURATED (AND READY ZERO) THEREBY GIVING A FALSE SENSE OF SECURITY. IT IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT THAT PERSONNEL BE FAMILIAR WITH ALL INSTRUMENT PARAMETERS. DANGEROUS QUANTITIES OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL CAN BE "HIDDEN" FROM DETECTION INSTRUMENT, IF SUFFICIENT SHIELDING HAS BEEN PLACED AROUND THE MATERIAL TO ABSORB THE RADIATION.

TAB AA-1-6
THREAT DOCUMENTATION

A. The original threat message should be immediately turned over to a law enforcement official for preservation as evidence. Handle as little as possible.

B. Telephone Threats

1. When a telephone threat is reported, collect the following information for submission to the threat analyst. PAGE 6-3 contains a Bomb Threat Report Form.

   a. Date and time of threating call

   b. Exact words of person making call

   c. Name (If given, request exact spelling)

   d. Sex

   e. Accent

   f. Speech pattern (stuttering, lisp, slurred, etc.)

   g. Tone of voice (irate, calm, frightened, nervous, etc.)

   h. Is the voice familiar?

   i. Background noises

   j. Local or ling distance call

   k. If a tape has been made of the message, submit it to the FBI or State Police for a voice print analysis.

TAB AA-1-7
FEDERAL RESPONSE SCENARIO

1. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

   A. Information on threat is forwarded to FBI.

   B. FBI contacts Department of Energy to evaluate threat.

   C. If threat is considered viable from a non-technical point of view the Nuclear Emergency Search Teams (NEST) at Andrews Air Force Base at Washington and McCarran Airport at Las Vegas are put on two hour alert.

   D. Technical information on the threat is forwarded by DOE to Sandia and Los Alamos National Laboratories in New Mexico and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California.

   E. Threat Documentation is forwarded to FBI forensic laboratory for examination. Copies are sent to RAND Corporation in Santa Monica, California and Syracuse Reasearch Center in Syracuse, New York for background information on the sender.

   F. If the threat is confirmed the NEST team is dispatched to the site and a ground and aerial survey using sophisticated radiological detection gear is carried out. At this point the FBI becomes the lead agencyand all proposed actions by state and local government should be coordinated through the FBI.

   G. Once the weapon's general position is located a military EOD team and NEST carry out the final search.

   H. Upon actual location of the weapon the military EOD team and NEST determines if it can be deactivated.

   I. NEST advises the Governor of protective actions which are needed.

APPENDIX AA-2
BOMB THREATS

I. SITUATION AND ASSUMPTIONS

A. There are two types of bomb threats .

1. Hoax
2. Real

B. Bomb threats are normally made by phone or mail. Rarely are they made in person.

C. All bomb threats must be treated as real until proven otherwise.

D. The bomb threat report form (Tab AA-2-1) will be filled out as the threat is received or immediately afterward.

E. Bombs may be sent by mail, delivery service or placed on site by an individual.

II. DIRECTION AND CONTROL

A. The building superintendent is responsible for coordinating the search for a bomb.

B. Each individual is responsible for searching his area for the bomb and reporting any suspicious objects to his/her supervisor before evacuating.

III. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

A. The building supervisor will be immediately notified of the bomb threat. He/she will have the occupants of the area search their area for any signs of a bomb. Whether a bomb is found or not the area will be evacuated until after the deadline for the explosion of the bomb.

B. The local police and fire departments will be notified, but will not take part in the search. Only people familiar with the building will conduct the search.

C. Only when a possible bomb is located will the appropriate emergency response agencies enter the building.

D. If a bomb is found the bomb threat becomes a police matter. Even if a bomb is not found the incident may become a police matter. All documentation should be made available to the police.

E. Direction and control of all activities at a bomb scene declared a terrorist act will be assumed by the local police unless the incident is such that the KSP or the FBI has jurisdiction.

F. If no bomb is found after the initial search and no explosion takes place in the indicated time bracket, the building will be searched again before returning to routine operations.

G. When the building is evacuated all evacuated people will report to designated areas. They will remain there until normal end of shift or the building is declared safe to re-enter.

H. Maintenance personnel should search all public areas in or around the building.

I. The explosion of a bomb in or near a building should be treated as a fire emergency.

J. The Incident Command system will be used in response to a bomb threat or explosion when local or state government is involved.

IV. **TABS**

AA-2-1 Bomb Threat Report Form.
AA-2-2 Bomb Threat Procedures during working hours.
AA-2-3 Bomb Threat Procedures during non working hours.
AA-2-4 Bomb Threat Procedures suspicious package found.

TAB AA-2-1
BOMB THREAT REPORT FORM

INSTRUCTIONS:BE CALM, BE COURTEOUS, LISTEN, DO NOT INTERRUPT THE CALLER, NOTIFY SUPERVISOR/FELLOW EMPLOYEE BY PREARRANGED SIGNAL WHILE CALLER IS ON LINE.

Date_____TimeCallStarted_____TimeCallEnded_____

Exact Words of Person Placing Call:_____

_____

_____

QUESTIONS TO ASK:

1. When is the bomb going to explode?_____

2. Where is the bomb right now?_____

3. What kind of bomb is it?_____

4. What does it look like?_____

5. Why did you place the bomb?_____

TRY TO DETERMINE THE FOLLOWING (CIRCLE AS APPROPRIATE)

Caller's Identity: Male Female Adult Juvenile Age____years

Voice: Loud Soft High Pitch Deep Raspy Pleasant

intoxicated Other _____

Accent: Local Not local Foreign Region

Speech: Fast Slow Distinct Distorted Stutter Nasal

Slurred Lisp

Language: Excellent Good Fair Poor Foul Other_____

Manner: Calm Angry Rational Irrational Coherent

Incoherent Deliberate Emotional Righteous Laughing

Intoxicated

Background Noises: Office machines Factory machines Bedlam

Trains Animals Music Quiet Voices

Mixed Airplanes Street Traffic Party

Atmosphere

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: _____

action to take immediately after call: Notify appropriate personnel as specified in written instructions on bomb threats. Talk to no one other than instructed by your supervisor.

RECEIVING PHONE NUMBER

PERSON RECEIVING CALL

TAB AA-2-2
BOMB THREAT PROCEDURES - DURING WORKING HOURS

Courses of Action - Depending on the Circumstances

Bomb Threat		Concurrent Action		If No Bomb Found
Action	Reaction	Emergency Team	Employee Related	
Via Telephone	Keep caller on line as long as possible and obtain as much information as possible. Have call traced/ recorded by police. Advise Supervisor immediately	Activate emergency center Activate bomb threat control team. Advise security staff and responsible building authority. Warn police and fire department. Evaluate threat Bomb threat control team searches evacuation routes. Bomb threat control team searches common and public areas. Maintenance personnel search maintenance and utility areas.	Warn employees of danger. Have them visually check their work spaces and lock up. Restrict entry into building. Restrict elevator use to handicapped (down only). Employees evacuate.	Bomb threat control team search public areas and evacuation routes again, more thoroughly. Maintenance personnel conduct more detailed search of maintenance and utilities areas. Re-occupy the building. Have employees re-examine their office spaces more thoroughly for unidentified packages. If no bomb found resume work.
Via Mail or Note	Minimum handling of letter/note (fingerprints) Advise Supervisor immediately			

TAB AA-2-3

BOMB THREAT PROCEDURES - DURING NON WORKING HOURS

Courses of Action - Depending on the Circumstances

Bomb Threat		Concurrent Action		If no Bomb Found
Action	Reaction	Emergency Team	Employee Related	
SUSPICIOUS PACKAGE FOUND or TELEPHONE BOMB THREAT or NOTE THREAT	Advise police and responsible building authority	No Emergency Team on Duty	Warn employees of bomb threat and to watch for suspicious package. Sound fire alarm. Evacuate building. Call police Move maintenance employees to another building Restrict entry into building. Advise responsible building authority.	Maintenance personnel conduct detailed search of: 1. public areas 2. evacuation routes 3. maintenance and utility areas 4. cursory examination of office areas If police dogs or explosive detector available have building searched again. If no detonation takes place by next working day, request employees to carefully search their office areas when re-occupying the building.

BOMB THREAT PROCEDURES - SUSPICIOUS PACKAGE FOUND (ANYTIME)

Courses of Action - Depending on Circumstances

Bomb Threat			Concurrent Action
Action	Reaction	Emergency Team	Employee Related
SUSPICIOUS PACKAGE FOUND	Do not touch or approach. Memorize area around package and details of package to report to explosive disposal team.	Activate emergency control center. Activate bomb threat control team. Advise security staff and responsible building authority. Warn police and fire department. Evaluate threat (IV.8) Bomb threat control team searches evacuation routes. Bomb threat control team searches common and public areas. Maintenance personnel search maintenance and utility areas.	Warn employees of danger. Have them visually check their work spaces and lock up. Restrict entry into building. Restrict elevator use to handicapped (down only). Employees evacuate.