

5. THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM FOR HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE: PROBLEMS AND POSSIBILITIES¹²

This review of Save the Children's operational experience raises issues and suggest reforms which are specific to each country. It also illustrates the impact of information, influence and decisions moving up and down different channels in the wider international system. Many of the current discussions and recommendations for reform concentrate on how changes in policy and structure may improve the speed and effectiveness of these channels. But how far can reforms to the wider system improve the delivery of humanitarian assistance in the field? Will adherence to a set of universal principles in a tighter structure improve aid delivery, or is it just a question of pursuing a clear humanitarian strategy in each country, backed by more money and better staff?

Such discussions also tend to focus on the UN system, as the place where all the actors in the system coincide. Suggested reforms range from recommendations about how, for example, the UN should organise itself in-country, through the organisation and function of the DHA in Geneva and New York, up to changes in Security Council composition. These will be considered in turn, but as Paul Taylor emphasised¹³, the history of 'coordination reform' in the UN's polycentric system does not set a healthy precedent for the DHA.

¹² Key documents:

UN General Assembly Resolution, A/46/182 Strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian emergency assistance of the United Nations, 19/12/91.

Report of the secretary-general A/48/536 Strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian emergency assistance of the United Nations, 18/10/93.

Taylor, P. Options for the Reform of the International System for Humanitarian Assistance, LSE, June 1993.

¹³ Taylor, p.19., *ibid*.

Moreover, any reforms to the UN system need to be assessed in the wider context of the international state system and the policies of member states, coupled with economic orders and the actions of financial institutions.

Common themes and problems do emerge from this operational review. Conclusions and recommendations are not so evident. Recommendations tend to state the obvious, or be necessarily speculative in the context of volatile conflicts. Nevertheless an operational view demands answers to two key questions. Firstly, can a global organisation committed to finding political solutions by force if necessary, simultaneously maintain neutral humanitarian operations ? Secondly, will a pragmatic country-by- country approach to humanitarian aid suffice, or does the international system need to operate by more general principles, if necessary enshrined in international law?

5.1 Involvement: Information and Response

Although difficulties and necessary improvements with information systems were identified, early warning mechanisms were widely reported to be serving a function within the system: no one blamed inaction on ignorance. In resolution 46/182 the UN recognised the wider use of governments, intergovernmental organisations and NGO's to pool early warning information. The secretary general's update¹⁴ in October 1993 reported DHA-led improvements, with more expected.

Response was a different matter. Somalia was clearly the worst case of indecision and delay.

¹⁴ A/48/536 paras 99-103, *ibid*

Liberia also demonstrated an excessive concern with security. In both cases senior individual UN officials felt an earlier select UN presence could have been effective, but was prevented by excessive security concerns. According to the secretary-general's report¹⁵ these are still under review, although as yet unresolved.

Quality of response, when it came, was still critically dependent on better information. The Secretary General's report devotes a whole section to information management and all DHA reform proposals (see below section 5.4) give it priority. The selection and sharing of relevant information is made the responsibility of the DHA through IERRIS: the International Emergency Readiness and Response Information System.

Better in-country information was reckoned to be one of the key functions of a coordination structure. In Angola the information function appeared uneven, in Liberia generally good. In both Iraq and Somalia NGO's had more trust in their own information sources, and frequently were the major source of information for the donor agencies. Again the Secretary General's report reaffirms the leadership role of the DHA in conducting inter-agency assessment missions. Commentators felt it had not yet made a significant difference.

Conclusions and Recommendations

5.1.1 Although there were high expectations of the DHA to fill the information vacuum, newly-created structures rarely work by themselves and can often become a new source of 'constipation'. Essentially a change of culture and attitude was required, where the UN

¹⁵ A/48/536, para 62, *ibid.*

system at the centre was more 'porous', facilitated by UN agencies and NGO's as willing partners. The DHA would be crucial in promoting this 'glasnost' (see section 5.4. below).

5.2 Sovereignty, anarchy, intervention, and the military role in humanitarian crises

The close relationship between the breakdown of order and human suffering has necessarily focused attention on the role of the military in the international system, and its ability to provide the security for a political solution and facilitate humanitarian operations. This role may progressively 'harden', from the guarding of humanitarian aid by a peacekeeping force, through an intervention without consent to deliver aid, right up to a full-scale war to restore order. Political and military contingencies currently determine which approach is used in differing circumstances¹⁶. Lack of peacekeeping resources must now be added to the political equation.

In operational terms, the limited use of humanitarian intervention and military assistance beyond short-term rescue has been well-illustrated by Iraq, Somalia, and Liberia. For the international system the challenge is to deliver humanitarian assistance in the complexities of civil conflict, often during the long search for a political settlement. This requires the skilful balance of political and humanitarian roles, which should be explicit in any mandate, and is best delegated to a 'safe pair of hands' in country.

¹⁶ For a review of recent literature on the legality and practice of humanitarian intervention, see Scott, C., Humanitarian Intervention Revisited, MSc dissertation, March 1993.

Conclusions and Recommendations:

5.2.1 The limitations of a military, non-consensual humanitarian intervention, particularly in a peace-enforcement role under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, should be recognised. Its use should be reserved for short-term rescue in the anarchy of 'disintegrated states'.

5.2.2 The use of humanitarian assistance as part of consensual peace-keeping operation could be more widely tested. Its failure in Somalia (pre December 1992) should not rule out the potential for peace-keeping forces 'negotiating aid through' as evidenced on occasions in Bosnia. It is the method, not the principle, which is in question. Equally, the use of armed UN guards as used in Iraqi Kurdistan merits further exploration. Principles guiding the relationship between military and humanitarian operations based on these examples would be useful, although whether these could be more than country-specific is still at issue.

5.2.3 Any use of the military in humanitarian crises must be judged by humanitarian objectives, and backed by the international system with a funded, long-term commitment to civil rehabilitation. Foreign troops cannot rebuild states, though they may have a legitimate policing role in the early stages of anarchy.

5.2.4 Generally, the return of international focus to the use of negotiated 'humanitarian corridors' without armed military assistance, (as in Operation Lifeline into southern Sudan), is likely to produce more lasting benefits. In the long-term, aid cannot be fought through, is hard to force through, and suffers from being used as a political bargaining chip. The UN

system with its historical reluctance to erode state sovereignty will work more effectively with the 'negotiating' approach based on need rather than 'equal shares'.

5.3 In-country systems: the political/security and humanitarian balance, aid coordination, and technical performance.

a) The political/humanitarian balance

There are no general formulas for the balanced management of the political and humanitarian aspects of a UN country operation. Even where such management was vested in one official, the special representatives of the secretary-general, (in Angola, Liberia and Somalia), humanitarian operations have been eclipsed by political-security considerations. This does not mean the model is wrong. But it does reveal some inability of the DHA as the humanitarian advocate to redress the balance. Is it presenting a losing argument in the face of overwhelming political forces, or is it failing to present a good case sufficiently strongly? Reported criticism suggested that the DHA did not have the collective weight of the UN humanitarian agencies behind it, because they perceived no added advantage in its 'corporate approach'. Evidence from the case studies suggested that without a clear strategy for humanitarian assistance there was little chance of getting the structures or the balance right.

b) In-country coordination

Save the Children has argued that humanitarian assistance is best managed by well-informed, well-resourced agents, close to the problem. As a general principle, the more that can be

devolved to these on-site managers, the faster and more effective will be the response. A variety of in-country coordination models have been illustrated in the case studies, and the UNDP and DHA have recently agreed on a formula¹⁷ for the different arrangements. Whichever of these models is used, the key factor is the way in which the political-humanitarian balance is exercised, and the need for a clear humanitarian assistance strategy.

In summary the UNDP/DHA arrangements are:

- a) The DHA in "consultation and cooperation" with other UN agencies will "transform existing units into integrated inter-agency teams".
- b) Leadership will either be by the resident coordinator or humanitarian assistance coordinator.
- c) The USG for Humanitarian Affairs (head of DHA) "will maintain close contact and provide leadership to the resident coordinator", and the latter has "direct access" to the former.
- d) Where there is a special representative of the secretary general, the resident coordinator reports through s/he (eg Angola, Liberia). Where there is no resident coordinator, a humanitarian assistance coordinator will be appointed.
- e) Where there is a humanitarian assistance coordinator in addition to a resident coordinator or representative, the former reports to the USG (DHA), and the latter both to the secretary general and UNDP. Close cooperation between the two coordinators is a "sine qua non" (sic) for "successful international assistance", especially on the "relief to rehabilitation and development continuum".

¹⁷ UNDP/ADM/93/57, Cooperation between UNDP and UN Department for Humanitarian Affairs.

These arrangements read more like a statement of the status quo than a prescription for coordination. In practice the execution of office may have more impact than the theoretical organisation. Experience from country programmes bore this out. In Liberia UNSCOL had a relatively positive experience of coordination between agencies. In Angola the concept rarely got beyond information-sharing, with a good deal of agency in-fighting¹⁸. There were also mixed reports of arrangements for coordinating aid with government structures where they existed. In Liberia for example, there was criticism from all parties on neutrality of aid. In Somalia ignorance of local structures doomed aid to failure. Coordination cannot therefore be defined as an isolated structural and technical function, separate from its context.

c) Technical Performance

A number of respondents questioned the technical competence of officials in key posts, although for obvious reasons were reluctant to go on record for criticising named individuals. NGO's were not exempt from criticism.

The secretary generals latest assessment¹⁹ reports "ensuring adequate staff support for field coordination activities in complex emergencies continues to be a matter of concern". Lack of funds had brought delays causing the secretary general to recommend release of CERF funds for coordination arrangements. Effective coordination also required "a degree of delegation".

¹⁸ Reported as recently as 16/11/93, The Guardian, *ibid*.

¹⁹ A/48/536, para 56, 18/10/93, *ibid*.

Conclusions and Recommendations:

5.3.1 Structure follows strategy. Without a clear strategy for humanitarian assistance no amount of structural reform will correct the balance. Nor can strategy and structure be a discrete in-country matter. Consistency in the wider UN and international system is considered in sections 5.4. and 5.5.

5.3.2 The political/security and humanitarian roles should be merged in-country in the person of the senior UN official. This official should maintain an effective balance between these roles, noting that the political role is essentially a peace-making function. This function, as the secretary general made clear, is largely about the peaceful settlement of disputes where "amelioration through assistance" could be contributory²⁰, but should not cause humanitarian aid to be diverted from meeting need.

5.3.3 Conversely NGO's should be prepared to accept a degree of coordination of their own activities by in-country systems, where they may be accountable for their actions. Experience in Liberia demonstrate this can be achieved by consensus and a commitment to partnership.

5.3.4 For immediate effectiveness of aid and longer term rehabilitation purposes local government and other local structures should be involved in coordination, although it is conceded this consumes time and resources, and may not necessarily avoid charges of partiality.

²⁰ Boutros Ghali, Agenda for Peace, para. 40, 1992.

5.3.5 Technical criticisms of UN coordination staff can only be improved by better recruitment, resources and staff accountability.

The Secretary General's recommendations²¹ on field coordination needed implementation. Such improvements applied throughout the international system.

5.4 The UN humanitarian management structure and performance

a) Expectations

The creation of the DHA following resolution 46/182 was widely expected to strengthen the humanitarian role of the UN system. But due to its institutional, managerial and technical shortcomings it has not yet met these expectations. It has been subject to a barrage of criticism, and reportedly a stream of consultants. At least two high-level independent reports²² have assessed these shortcomings, but because they are thought to be threatening to the status quo are said to be 'on ice'. DHA's own plans for restructuring are due to be released shortly and launched in January 1994.

The DHA was intended to provide leadership and coordination for the international community in four ways:

- a) By preparing "consolidated appeals" and being "involved with the systematic pooling and analysis of early warning information".
- b) By serving as a "central focal point" within the international system via the establishment

²¹ A/48/536 paras 56-7, *ibid.*

²² Dewey, G., *A Contract for Change*, USAID, 1993, and Martin, J., *DHA Implementation Plan*, August 1993.

of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC).

c) By providing a rapid, coordinated, initial response through a central emergency revolving fund (CERF) of \$50 million.

d) By promoting the smooth transition from relief to rehabilitation and reconstruction.

At the DHA's inception in April 1992, Save the Children (UK) recommended its coordination role be that of "an informed facilitator, with its main strength at field level". It should have appropriate personnel and resources, and the capacity to argue persuasively within the international system based on its operational experience. Progress to date still leaves most commentators expressing cause for concern.

b) Critics

A USAID commissioned report on the DHA²³ concentrates less on its structure and more on its internal and external political relations. It argues that the DHA's terms of reference are flexible enough for it to assume a leadership function and that it should not get sidelined into a solely operational role. It should build a "facilitator/leader role" and achieve an "added value" to the international system, (thereby dispelling UN agency "paranoia" about it) by providing core services. These core services include: information, early warning, emergency response, coordination, mobilising of resources, managing the humanitarian continuum, training, and accountability. All this requires both external actions in relation to ECOSOC and General Assembly resolutions, and internal reforms within DHA.

²³ Dewey, G., A Contract for Change, August 1993.

On coordination the USAID report is particularly outspoken on behalf of the DHA. It outlines the DHA's need to coordinate vertically in the UN system to get greater political help, and horizontally between UN agencies. In addition it must provide a "credible coordination service", especially through training. All this should be spelt out in clear terms of reference, negotiated with member states and NGO's, and coordinated through the IASC. As a final act of faith in the DHA the report recommends it develops a financial strategy to prevent "the international system rapidly sinking into a financial morass as far as funding the totality of humanitarian and peacekeeping operations". The message is 'win authority through better performance'.

Not inconsistent recommendations emerge from an ODA commissioned report²⁴, but with more detail on restructuring. It takes its lead from the 1993 ECOSOC session on the DHA which emphasised the primary role of the IASC in coordination of policy, and the importance of the emergency relief coordinator (now head of DHA) as the humanitarian advocate in complex emergencies. It also listed as key action points, availability of CERF funds for urgent relief needs, an improved consolidated appeals process, better information systems, and early consideration of rehabilitation and development needs. To achieve these goals the ODA paper noted that "leadership, commitment and determination will be required...too often in the past the UN secretariat has produced paper plans left to gather dust on the shelves". Key tasks were now:

- a) Horizontal coordination between UN agencies on responsibilities, appeals, emergency teams, and rehabilitation.

²⁴ Martin, *ibid*.

- b) Vertical coordination, representing humanitarian concerns in peace-making and peace-keeping operations.
- c) Humanitarian diplomacy, including negotiating access.
- d) Building disaster-preparedness and rapid response capacity.
- e) Information

Key instruments for achieving these were:

- a) The IASC and its subsidiary bodies.
- b) The resident coordinator system, disaster management team, and other coordination structures.
- c) CERF
- d) Needs assessment missions and consolidated appeals.

The ODA report notes that the IASC has only met four times since April 1992, (now six) and its subsidiary the Inter-Agency Working Group (without decision making powers) eight times. This had failed to fill the operational coordination role foreseen by resolution 46/182 and confirmed by ECOSOC. As a result the report recommended a new structure of frequent, task-oriented working groups under the IASC. The output from this structure would form the basis for coordination of field operations, input into the Security Council via the Secretary General, DHA advocacy in peace-keeping operations and negotiation of humanitarian access.

c) Problems and prospects

It is widely felt the DHA has made a slow start. Commentators thought there had been some 'credible coordination' concerning Angola and Mozambique, but it was yet to make a generally significant impact. Some of the criticism was levelled at the leadership, in particular for not prioritising the 'compromise conglomeration' that was 46/182. But failures in a particular department of the UN were also a reflection of a wider functional problem within the UN system. Coordination is an ambiguous word, especially in the context of multilateral institutions. As one senior UN official put it, "Diplomats can live with fudges, but starving people can't eat ambiguities". Lack of leadership not only failed to fill the coordination shoes, but got the DHA "trapped" in the political culture of the UN, outgunned by the more knowledgeable departments of peacekeeping and political affairs. In Somalia, for example, it should not have permitted so much linkage between the political and humanitarian operations. In particular, the DHA lacked supportive leverage outside the UN, allies who could offset its weakness within the UN.

Conclusions and Recommendations

5.4.1 Coordination, the 'fudge word'. It should represent three functions. Firstly the effective sharing of information. Secondly, cooperation in an inter-governmental setting, with accountability. Thirdly, it would entail spirited humanitarian advocacy in the wider political culture. Performance, quality of aid, would alone test its worth.

5.4.2 Consolidated appeals

The UN/NGO task force was a welcome initiative planned to produce an 'operations up' process. This was the closest the DHA had come to effective coordination, ie cooperation

within the wider system. However some commentators have expressed disappointment with the results, in particular the lack of any 'perceived gains'. Also reported was UN agency suspicion of a new process which offers them no net gain at the price of 'creeping corporatism'. Perceived gains should now be its main objective.

5.4.3 Inter-Agency Standing Committee

It has only met 6 times, hardly the frequency of a body expected to be the nerve centre of systematic cooperation (according to the original Nordic concept). Its working groups and support unit might be more likely sources of working cooperation. However a recent attempt at an informal initiative on security, a key issue in response, was delayed by the officially responsible department (DOMS), jeopardising valuable NGO input.

The IASC represents the best opportunity for the DHA not to get boxed in to the UN system. To quote a senior UN humanitarian official, "We have got to think of a system that transcends the UN".

5.4.4 Central Emergency Revolving Fund

Increased flexibility of these quick-response funds (said to be increasing from \$50 million to \$100 million) was still in question. An encouraging change of criteria was their new availability for coordination costs.

5.4.5 Relief to rehabilitation

The Secretary Generals report reaffirmed the July 1993 decision of the IASC to establish a task force to formulate policy on this. In addition the report²⁵ notes some specific guidelines

²⁵ A/48/536, para 133, *ibid*.

to integrate relief and development. In practice UNDP were said to be concerned about duplication by this task force (despite their relatively positive approach to the DHA), and the division remains 'fudged'.

5.4.6 The Geneva/New York divide. Commentators were also divided over the usefulness of this historical acquisition ("when no one knew what to do with UNDRO"). The 'purist humanitarian-separationists' saw the Geneva-based image as useful distancing from the political secretariat. But being in the Secretariat offered greater opportunities for humanitarian advocacy. The divide is likely to continue, and functions should broadly be divided along those lines. Thus complex emergencies involving political departments of the secretariat could only be properly coordinated by the DHA in New York. It remains an unsatisfactory divide which can only drive a wedge in DHA cracks when they appear.

5.4.7 In summary, the Secretary General's report comprehensively addresses the main issues concerning the strengthening of the coordination of UN humanitarian assistance. Determined leadership is now needed to ensure its implementation in a predominantly political culture.

5.4.8 The harsh test which the international system must self-critically apply was whether the overnight closure of the DHA would make any difference to the quality of humanitarian assistance delivered? Current evidence suggested a confidence gap among foes and allies who might not be patient with another year of restructuring.

5.5 The International System: widening the focus.

The attention given the UN system is understandable for two reasons. Firstly it is the forum in the international system where all the actors coincide, and where member states project the responsibility for dealing with humanitarian crises. Secondly, imperfect though it may be, it remains the only such global forum for future cooperation and action. Although individual criticisms may be warranted, there has been a tendency for member states and NGO's to project frustration and failure onto the UN system. A more effective strategy for change might be for NGO's to ally themselves with key partners in the UN in order to influence member states who ultimately decide what the system, including the UN, does with what resources. Evidence from the case studies shows that with the right personnel UN agencies and NGO's in-country work effectively together. There is no reason why this should not be extended to the international stage. The DHA, for example, could acquire more leverage in its humanitarian advocacy. Such alliances would not preclude NGO criticism of UN agency practice, or vice-versa.

Beyond the humanitarian structure created by General Assembly resolution A/46/182 and the DHA, there are no agreed reforms for strengthening humanitarian claims within a political culture. Since the 1993 Vienna conference on human rights there have been renewed calls for a High Commissioner on Human Rights²⁶. The member states are also debating the composition of the Security Council in the light of the new 'world disorder', especially the violent disintegration of states. From the viewpoint of an operational agency it cannot yet be assessed whether such global reforms would improve humanitarian strategies. But clearly NGO's such as Save the Children would be well-placed to comment on the practical outcome

²⁶ Most recently, US President Clinton, in his address to the UN General Assembly, 27/9/93.

of radical reforms.

The UN is not alone in experiencing difficulties with the definition and practice of coordination. The European Community, now European Union, is struggling to achieve complementarity between twelve member state and European Commission aid policies. At the same time NGO initiatives on reforming the international humanitarian system reveal some home truths about coordination. An 'inventory' of such projects (in the UK alone) illustrates a highly splintered approach, with little success in bringing such initiatives together despite a large degree of consensus about the reforms needed.

Conclusions and Recommendations

5.5.1 The focus on the UN needs to widen to accommodate political realities. Only member states can address the major reforms needed: preventive long-term measures, more resources, better staff and a stronger humanitarian strategy in a political culture. They should be persuaded of the need for these changes. Internally motivated structural reforms will not deal with the root causes.

5.5.2 Since reforms rest primarily with political will rather than structural changes, more attention should be paid to the major donors, in particular EC and US foreign aid, in the context of their foreign policies.

5.5.3 The international system for humanitarian assistance, such as it is, has a legitimacy only as part of a wider, state-centric system of world politics. This looks unlikely to undergo radical change, even in the new 'world disorder'. Humanitarian operations will therefore

have to continue to accommodate and work around the inherent tensions.

5.5.4 "We must develop a powerful international organisation for child saving which would extend its ramifications to the remotest corner of the globe". Eglantyne Jebb, 1929. This needs refinement. The power will not derive from a supranational, interventionist world bureaucracy. Rather it will come from a 'body' or regime of international law, policy and practice, operating in the increasing 'space' above and below state sovereignty.

5.5.5 Recent failures of the international system, particularly through cultural ignorance, suggest greater use of regional organisations in political and humanitarian operations. Safeguards against national, political exploitation of regional initiatives was a necessary corollary.

5.5.6 NGO's need to find or establish an effective international vehicle for promoting consensus views, where they exist, on reform of the international system. This body needs to acquire effective allies in the UN system and other agencies to bring about required reforms.

5.6 Conclusions: Member states as key actors, not just donors.

To refer to member states as donors is to understate their political importance in humanitarian crises, whilst overstating their economic influence. Their foreign and aid policies are critical, yet may often be dysfunctional in their various permutations²⁷. They are also subject to international economic orders, and the actions of financial institutions and

²⁷ See appendix 1.

private finance²⁸.

Horizontally, between states, policies may lack coherence or complementarity, either in their bilateral form, or within a multilateral setting such as the UN or EC. This was seen in Iraqi Kurdistan where USAID was limited to defence-controlled gifts in kind, whilst other bilateral aid such as the ODA/UK supported Kurdish self-sufficiency. In the same humanitarian theatre two multilateral aid operations, the EC and UN, were reported to be 'in competition', and certainly not complementary. Another example was the establishment within the EC of an emergency unit, ECHO, with its concentration on a rapid and visible response. This has alienated donors and agencies looking for a longer-term, 'relief to development' strategy, and threatened to duplicate coordination mechanisms.

Vertically, within states or multilateral settings, foreign and aid policies may also work against each other. They may be in conflict, as was most clearly seen in Somalia where a humanitarian operation was overtaken by a distortion of its political origins. Otherwise policies may simply fail to be mutually supportive, as in Liberia and Angola, where US aid policy received little backing from diplomatic initiatives. Another potential dysfunction is that political concern with stabilising the former Soviet bloc may re-direct aid spending away from areas of greatest need such as Africa. Vertical conflict was most apparent in the classic UN dichotomy between its political and humanitarian functions. Only member states can resolve it.

²⁸ Examples of each are: the destabilising effects of EC measures and the stop-go progress of GATT, World Bank interventions, and Islamic funding of Bosnian defence.

If the system for humanitarian assistance is to increase its legitimacy in the wider international system, constant operational research is required to highlight these dysfunctions, and offer alternative choices. But only member states can turn these choices into initiatives. And the test of any options for reform would be their improvement of aid delivery to those in need. Assessing this performance remains a major responsibility for NGO's.

Above all operational experience demonstrated that it was the lack of any long-term humanitarian strategy which prevented member states and their 'donor formations' from supporting a more effective system. As a senior EC official commented²⁹, "this results in short-term planning, no pre-positioning of resources, and ad hoc budget decisions. No strategic thinking is engaged. Major structural crises need long-term structured relief and rehabilitation strategies with appropriate resource allocation. ..Reactive rather than proactive policies still dictate action. People die as a result". If a humanitarian strategy is to be developed which informs international action on more than a country-by-country basis, it will be member states who must establish the principles, give them legitimacy within their foreign policies, and backing in operation.


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²⁹ Interview, August 1993.

Appendix 1: Potential dysfunctions in the International System
(from the point of view of the recipient)



Supposing state C is having a humanitarian crisis. State B's aid administration may adopt the most effective humanitarian response from the point of view of recipients in state C. But in an anarchic (no overall sovereign authority) international system this aid operation is subject to duplication, interference even contradiction from various sources. Effective coordination requires an extensive outreach into the international community, and will most effectively originate in the top right of the matrix.

Appendix 2: The International 'system' for Humanitarian Assistance.

(The arrows represent major lines of management, political influence and funding, as described by respondents)

