



ANNEX 1

EMERGENCY STOCKPILES OF DISASTER RELIEF ITEMS AVAILABLE FOR INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE

Note: All emergency stockpiles are grouped in this list by type of responsible organization as follows:

- United Nations System organizations
 - International non-governmental organizations
 - National governmental organizations
 - National non-governmental organizations
 - Private non-commercial organizations
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UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM ORGANIZATIONS

FIELD OPERATIONS DIVISION, UN DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION
AND MANAGEMENT

Stockpile:

United Nations Supply Depot (Pisa, Italy)

UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN'S FUND, SUPPLY DIVISION (UNICEF)

Stockpile:

UNICEF Procurement and Assembly Centre (Copenhagen, Denmark)

**UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS****Stockpile:**

DHA Pisa Warehouse (Pisa, Italy)

UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR)**Stockpile:**

UNHCR Central Emergency Stockpile (Geneva, Switzerland)

WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION (WHO)**Stockpile:**

WHO Emergency Health Kit Stockpile (Amsterdam, Netherlands)

INTERNATIONAL NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS**ADVENTIST DEVELOPMENT AND RELIEF AGENCY (ADRA), Australia****Stockpiles:**

ADRA Stockpile, Sydney (Sydney, Australia)
ADRA Stockpile, Honiaria (Lunga, Honiaria, Solomon Islands)
ADRA Stockpile, Vila (Vila, Vanuatu)
ADRA Stockpile, Lae (Lae, Papua New Guinea)

INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT SOCIETIES (IFRC)**Stockpiles:**

IFRC Stockpile, Panama (Panama, Panama)
IFRC Stockpile, Chile (Santiago de Chile, Chile)
IFRC Stockpile, Singapore (Singapore, Singapore)
IFRC Stockpile, France (Marseille, France)

**MEDECINS SANS FRONTIERES (MSF)****Stockpiles:**

MSF Stockpile For Central America And Caribbean (San Salvador, El Salvador)

Medecins Sans Frontieres Logistique Emergency Stockpile (Bordeaux-Merignac, France)

OXFAM UK**Stockpile:**

OXFAM Emergency Stores (Bicester, Oxfordshire, United Kingdom)

NATIONAL GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS**AUSTRALIAN INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE BUREAU (AIDAB)****Stockpiles:**

Australian Disaster Earmark Store, Dubbo (Dubbo, Australia)

Australian Disaster Earmark Store, Melbourne (Melbourne, Australia)

CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND FIRE SERVICES DIRECTORATE, MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR, NETHERLANDS**Stockpile:**

Netherlands Logistic Centre (Zoetermeer, Netherlands)

JAPAN INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AGENCY (JICA)**Stockpiles:**

JICA-JDR Stockpile, Tokyo (Tokyo, Japan)

JICA-JDR Stockpile, Singapore (Singapore, Singapore)

JICA-JDR Stockpile, Washington D.C. (Washington D.C.) United States)

JICA-JDR Stockpile, Mexico (Mexico, Mexico)

**NORWEGIAN EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS SYSTEM (NOREPS)****Stockpiles:**

NOREPS - ABB Nera AS (Billingstadsletta, Norway)
NOREPS - Apotekernes Faellesindkjoeep (Oslo, Norway)
NOREPS - Beira Warehouse (Beira, Mozambique)
NOREPS - A/S Denofa OG Lilleborg Fabriker (Fredrikstad, Norway)
NOREPS - AS Norconserv Products (Stavanger, Norway)
NOREPS - Compact A/S (Bergen, Norway)
NOREPS - Fiskars Norge AS (Oslo, Norway)
NOREPS - NAPS Norway AS (Oslo, Norway)
NOREPS - Norwegian Dairies Association (Oslo, Norway)
NOREPS - O.B.Wiik A/S (Skedsmokorset, Norway)
NOREPS - Permanent Emerg. Preparedness Stores (Nairobi, Kenya)
NOREPS - Plastec A.S. (Jaren, Norway)
NOREPS - Rofi Industrier AS (Molde, Norway)
NOREPS - W. Giertsen A/S (Laksevaag, Bergen, Norway)

OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION, UNITED KINGDOM (ODA)**Stockpile:**

Disaster Unit, Overseas Development Administration (London, U.K.)

SWEDISH NATIONAL RESCUE SERVICES BOARD**Stockpile:**

Swedish National Rescue Services Board Stockpile System (Sweden)

SWISS DISASTER RELIEF UNIT (SDR)**Stockpile:**

SDR Stockpile (Bern, Switzerland)

**USAID OFFICE FOR FOREIGN DISASTER ASSISTANCE (OFDA)****Stockpiles:**

AID/OFDA Stockpile New Windsor (New Windsor, Maryland, U.S.)
AID/OFDA Stockpile Guam (Guam)
USAID Bangkok, Thailand (Bangkok, Thailand)
AID/OFDA Stockpile Panama (Panama, Panama)
AID/OFDA Stockpile Leghorn (Livorno, Italy)

NATIONAL NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS**BRITISH RED CROSS SOCIETY (BRCS)****Stockpile:**

British Red Cross - Kingsbury Depot (London, United Kingdom)

ERIKSHJALPEN, ULANDSDEPAN (THE ERIK AID), SWEDEN**Stockpile:**

The Erik Aid Stockpile (Holsbybrunn, Joenköping, Sweden)

SWEDISH RED CROSS SOCIETY (SRCS)**Stockpile:**

Swedish Red Cross Relief Warehouse (Halmstad, Sweden)

PRIVATE NON-COMMERCIAL ORGANIZATIONS**STAR OF HOPE INTERNATIONAL, SWEDEN****Stockpile:**

Star of Hope International Relief Division (Trehörningsjö, Sweden)



ANNEX 2

United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs (UN/DHA) (Geneva, Switzerland)

SUMMARY OF REPLIES

provided by: Mr. Fabrizio Gentiloni, Senior Relief Coordination Officer, Relief
Coordination Branch, DHA-Geneva
Ms. Isabelle de Muyser-Boucher, Relief Coordination Officer, Relief
Coordination Branch, DHA-Geneva

on: 27 April 1994

to: Dmitri Balabanov, Senior Programme Officer
Relief Coordination Branch, DHA-Geneva

Present situation

1. When the Italian Government offered in 1985 to finance the construction of a warehouse at the Pisa Airport, UN/DHA (then UNDRO) readily accepted this offer. The following considerations influenced the decision:

- the Pisa Airport was well-placed for rapid access to developing countries, notably in Africa;
- its airstrip could accommodate the largest aircraft;
- the DHA (UNDRO) Warehouse at the Pisa Airport could be attached to the already existing United Nations Supply Depot, the personnel of which (working for peace-keeping) had accumulated extensive stockpiling and shipping experience.

2. Experience prior to 1985 had shown that the United Nations lacked a quick response facility to meet immediate needs in case of sudden-onset disaster. In a number of instances, relief items such as tents and blankets had been quickly depleted in the international market due to the magnitude of demand after the disaster. Therefore, the establishment of an emergency stockpile of relief supplies was deemed useful, in order to provide the regular availability of relief items.

3. The DHA Pisa Warehouse was inaugurated by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Javier Perez De Cuellar, on 21 April 1987.

4. From the very beginning, it was the fruit of international cooperation. Apart from



financing the construction of the warehouses, the Italian Government funded the provision and maintenance of a comprehensive stock of disaster relief items. The Governments of Norway and Finland donated emergency goods to the stockpile. On 1 April 1988, UNDRO signed an Agreement with the Government of Japan for the stockpiling at Pisa of a large quantity of goods donated by Japan. In the spring of 1992, the Government of Luxembourg joined the other donors. Various other donors also send goods to the warehouse on a case-by-case basis for specific operations.

5. Negotiations are under way with other United Nations humanitarian agencies (such as WHO) with a view to widening the composition and use of the stockpile in the context of a rational and cost-effective distribution of tasks within the United Nations system. In this regard, consultations are taking place also with WFP. The DHA Pisa Warehouse has already rendered services to UNICEF's Supply Division in Copenhagen, Denmark.

6. At present the stock of the DHA emergency stockpile in Pisa consists of about twenty different kinds of basic relief items. These items are dispatched to emergency-stricken areas as gifts. The magazine "DHA News" usually contains a summary list of the items on stock. Standard relief items stocked are tents, blankets, water containers of various sizes, generators, tools (e.g. picks, shovels, hammers, nails), plastic sheeting, sets of cooking utensils, etc.

The storage premises of the DHA emergency stockpile at Pisa include three warehouses, two of which are situated at Pisa's civilian airport. A third warehouse is located within the Italian Air Force Base and is divided into two parts of approximately the same size, one of which is air-conditioned and suitable for medicines and other perishable items.

7. As mentioned above, the advantages of locating an emergency stockpile at Pisa are twofold.

On one hand, Pisa, Italy, is strategically located for access to air lanes to Africa, the Middle and Far East and South America. Road, rail and sea connections are equally convenient from Pisa. The seaport of Livorno is only ten kilometres away. The emergency stockpile can operate year-round. Since the beginning of its operations, no flight has ever been grounded due to bad weather. Even the largest type of aircraft can land at the military airport.

On the other hand, the DHA emergency stockpile has a central location between the headquarters of major United Nations and non-governmental humanitarian agencies, such as WFP, UNHCR, WHO, FAO and the International Red Cross.

8. The DHA emergency stockpile is run by a limited number of staff who are all United Nations employees and operate under the guidance of UN/DHA-Geneva. This arrangement makes it possible to keep administrative costs to a minimum.

9. Contrary to other United Nations relief agencies, UN/DHA is not an operational agency and does not conduct its own relief operations. However, its mandate for coordinating UN and international assistance in case of sudden-onset emergencies requires its presence in the field at an early stage of relief operations to assist others. Similarly, the DHA emergency stockpile plays a supporting role in the delivery of disaster relief items by operational agencies and organizations to a disaster-affected area. It is involved primarily in cases when the



required international in-kind assistance (from the UN, governments and other donors) is either insufficient, slow to arrive, or even absent.

10. Since the start of operations in 1987, 220 shipments have been organized from Pisa, totalling over 5,000 tons of relief goods dispatched to at least 64 countries. Approximately 81% of the shipments were made by air, 16 percent by sea, and 3 percent by land transport. Turnover of the stock varies with the goods and the donor (between 0.5 and 3.5 times per year).

11. Nearly 1 of every 2 operations (45%) went to 30 countries in Africa. Because of DHA's involvement in various NIS countries, Europe came second with 11% of shipments. The others went to Arab Countries, especially during the Gulf Crisis (9%), the Americas and the Caribbean (8%) and Asia (6%). Most airlifts from Pisa were effected in airplanes chartered by DHA, although commercial airlines were used whenever feasible. In a certain number of cases (approx. 15%), goods were put aboard aircrafts placed at DHA's disposal by various Governments (Argentinean/Belgian/Italian Air Forces, OFDA, etc.).

12. The DHA emergency stockpile was particularly useful in 1991 during the Gulf crisis. At that time the Argentinean Government put a 35-ton airplane at UNDRO's disposal from February to April 1991. In cooperation with UNHCR, UNICEF, ICRC and various governments, 19 flights (out of a total of 25) to countries involved in the Gulf crisis were carried out from Pisa, and the DHA emergency stockpile demonstrated its capacity to serve as an international relief assembly centre. It played the same role of an assembly point during UN/DHA's operations for Georgia in 1993.

13. Since the Gulf Crisis, a new trend has appeared in that a number of donors which do not normally contribute to Pisa stocks, are now sending goods to the DHA Warehouse on a case-by-case basis during operations, for grouped dispatches to affected areas. This approach has continued after 1992 to such an extent that in 1993 these goods amounted to 44% of all dispatches. It is to be noted that these donations consist mostly of items not usually kept in stock at Pisa, such as winter clothing/shoes, food rations and medicines. Most of these (89%) originated from various Governments, 8% from the UN system and 3% from NGOs. It is foreseen that this trend will continue also in the future.

14. Extra-budgetary contributions constitute the only funding for the DHA emergency stockpile. The major donors are:

Italy: The main donor. The Italian Government grants DHA a cash contribution to cover the purchase cost of relief items, their storage and transportation to a disaster site. In 1994, this contribution amounts to some US \$4 million. DHA purchases relief items through the procurement services of the United Nations Office at Geneva. DHA and the Italian Government consult each other on each relief operation arranged from Pisa. Furthermore, a joint review of operations is carried out every year.

Japan: The second main donor. Japan started delivering goods to Pisa in September/October 1988. The value of goods deposited is on the order of US\$ 880,000. Goods are delivered to Pisa in kind, and Japan pays DHA cash for the costs of storage and transportation to affected countries, mainly in Africa, the



Middle East and Eastern Europe.

Luxembourg: The Government of Luxembourg joined other donors in the spring of 1992, by providing construction materials. It pledged to cover their transport costs to emergency-stricken areas.

Norway: It has delivered goods in kind, namely high-protein biscuits and "RubbHall" tents (very large tents, used for mainly storage purposes). Norway was the second donor to start using Pisa after Italy. The first goods were delivered in early 1987, for a total value of over US\$ 200,000. As Norway has now established NOREPS, UN/DHA has approached the Government for purposes of replenishment and a renewal of cooperation. At present, Norway is using the DHA emergency stockpile for specific operations.

Finland: It has delivered blankets and pumps. Now, it is using the DHA emergency stockpile for specific operations.

Other Donors: For example, Austria, Switzerland and the United Kingdom are using the DHA emergency stockpile for specific operations.

15. All requests for goods from the DHA Pisa Warehouse, should be made to UN/DHA in Geneva, since the stockpile acts only upon instructions from UN/DHA-Geneva.

As the UNDP Resident Representative is also the UN/DHA Representative, a Government requesting international assistance in a disaster/emergency situation may use the UNDP Resident Representative as the channel for a request to UN/DHA in Geneva.

General considerations for establishing an emergency stockpile

16. An emergency stockpile is not an end in itself but a specific tool to support the basic activities of the stockpile holder. As the establishment of an emergency stockpile is a costly operation, it can be considered a viable solution only if the activities it supports are sufficiently long-term.

17. For a donor-supported emergency stockpile like the DHA Pisa Warehouse, geographical position is very important: it should be within easy reach of both donor and recipient countries.

18. It is also desirable for the stockpile warehouse to have (or to have access to) facilities such as assembly, packaging, refrigerated storage, etc., so that it can be used as an assembly and/or consolidating centre in a multi-donor environment.

Attitude toward regional stockpiles

19. Regional stockpiles may be cumbersome and require strong organizational capacity and a stable source of funding. For a small organization like UN/DHA whose goal is rapid, flexible action and which depends entirely on donor contributions, it would be difficult to set



up and run regional emergency stockpiles. Besides, UN/DHA might be seen as competing with UN operational agencies.

20. The stated policy of the DHA Pisa Warehouse is to fill in gaps which cannot be covered by other organizations. Therefore, instead of setting up its own regional emergency stockpiles, DHA would prefer making arrangements with other emergency stockpile holders (for example, JICA) enabling the United Nations through UN/DHA to draw upon their regional emergency stockpiles whenever necessary.

Proposals for improvement

21. In UN/DHA's opinion, the measures recommended by the Workshop on Emergency Stockpiles constitute a sound basis for improving utilization of the existing capacities. DHA-Geneva is presently implementing, or participating in the implementation of, these measures as feasible.

22. Particular attention is being paid to promoting the cooperative use of the DHA emergency stockpile.

UN/DHA is negotiating agreements with WHO and WFP so that these organizations may store a portion of their relief supplies in the DHA emergency stockpile. The present stock will be enlarged to include medical and sanitation equipment, food supplies and vehicles. It may be stated that the DHA emergency stockpile is becoming a true inter-agency tool for responding to emergencies.

23. UN/DHA is trying to expand the donor base and use its emergency stockpile at Pisa as an assembly point for combined relief shipments by governments and non-governmental organizations.

24. UN/DHA is also looking at the possibility of expanding its storage capacity by renting additional space at Pisa's civilian airport.

25. Another type of cooperative effort to increase the United Nations regional response capacity might be for UN/DHA to make arrangements with regional stockpile holders (for example, JICA) allowing the United Nations through UN/DHA to draw upon their regional stockpiles whenever necessary.



ANNEX 3

International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) (Geneva, Switzerland)

SUMMARY OF REPLIES

provided by: Mr. Ric Hanna, Head, Supplies and Logistics Department

on: 8 April 1994

to: Dmitri Balabanov, Senior Programme Officer, Relief Coordination
Branch, DHA-Geneva

Present situation

1. IFRC presently operates 4 emergency stockpiles: 3 regional - in Chile (Santiago de Chile), France (Marseille) and Panama (Panama), and 1 central - in Switzerland (Geneva).

2. Regional emergency stockpiles were established initially to meet the needs of the relief operations in particular countries and then remained as "regional" stockpiles maintained for emergencies in the corresponding region.

In Chile and Panama these stockpiles are housed and managed by local Red Cross and Crescent (RCC) Societies which pay all costs relating to the warehouses except the actual cost of the goods they contain.

In Marseille the warehouse is provided free by the Port Authority, and IFRC pays all related handling charges to a freight agent in the port.

In Geneva IFRC pays a comprehensive rent covering all related costs to the owners of the warehouse who manage and maintain the facility under IFRC's direction.

3. The contents of all warehouses, except Geneva, are donations in kind from mainly European national RCC Societies. The Geneva stock is a mixture of donations and purchases.

4. For its central emergency stockpile, IFRC considered renting a warehouse at the Pisa airport but then decided against it.

Its role is mainly to support the Federation's Assessment and Coordination Team (FACT). IFRC always sends its assessment team to a disaster area, usually by chartered plane. The team also takes along to the disaster area relief items from the Geneva stockpile.



5. In addition, IFRC has an agreement with an Amsterdam company (the same one WHO uses) which stocks the cholera kits bought by the Federation from suppliers. This stock is almost exhausted, and IFRC is thinking of changing this agreement to a different one stipulating that the supplier should arrange for a renewable stock with a guaranteed minimal shelf life (e.g. 18 months) at any particular moment.

6. The disaster relief items sent from an emergency stockpile usually constitute about 5% of the total cost, volume and quantity of relief goods the IFRC would normally send in an emergency.

7. The determination of whether to use air or surface transport to an affected area depends on the urgency, proximity and budget. However in the first immediate stages, air is used most often, while surface is used to put the goods into the pipeline. It is estimated that 20% of relief goods are sent by air and 80% by surface transport.

8. The total cost of shipment (value of shipped items plus transportation) is greater for a sudden emergency than for a slow on-set disaster because of the cost of air freight and real emergency items in the first case versus surface freight and more development-oriented items in the second case.

9. The value of the goods versus transport cost varies greatly. In a real, sudden emergency when most of the initial relief items are flown in, the cost of transport can often exceed the cost of the goods. This ratio reverses itself once goods in the pipeline begin to arrive by surface transport.

10. IFRC faces the following constraints in operating its stockpiles:

- in Geneva the airport is closed from 00h00 to 06h00;
- in Marseille the warehouse is 30 km from the airport and the French labour situation is often unreliable;
- in Panama the warehouse is not in a bonded, duty-free zone.

In Panama, IFRC plans to move its stockpile to the duty-free Canal Zone with the assistance of the National Red Cross and Customs authorities.

11. Usually IFRC does not encounter Customs or administrative problems when moving relief items from one developing country to another, but such a move does require proper preparatory work with the respective authorities.

General considerations for establishing an emergency stockpile

12. An emergency stockpile is a costly operation in terms of both finances and resources.

13. IFRC experience shows that what is delivered from its emergency stockpile is often negligible in comparison with the total volume of disaster relief items delivered by other relief providers, national RCC Societies being the most important among them.



14. Consequently, if the advantages of an emergency stockpile are limited just to the potential savings from buying relief items in advance for a central/regional stockpile and then delivering them to a disaster area in an emergency, these advantages might be far outweighed by inconveniences (and/or expenses) connected with the establishment and running of an emergency stockpile.

Attitude toward regional stockpiles

15. In principle, IFRC believes that regional stockpiles have a role to play and that local management of them is best, because local personnel know the language, customs, procedures, geography, costs and customer preferences. International organizations should be partners with local organizations to ensure transparency of the operations and donor satisfaction.

16. Regional stockpiles can increase promptness of response in a sudden emergency but less so for ongoing emergency situations where supplies can arrive continuously via a surface pipeline from outside sources.

17. Regional stockpiles can improve cost-effectiveness in the delivery of relief items by using surface versus air transport and improving the speed of delivery. If initial needs can be met by a regional stockpile, then other supplies can be put into a surface pipeline to arrive regularly during the emergency avoiding some of the costly air transport.

18. In summary, the advantages of a regional emergency stockpile are faster response to an emergency in the area than otherwise, better knowledge and lower cost of the items being sent and full control of consignments.

19. The disadvantages of a regional emergency stockpile are that perhaps some of the items in stock may not be appropriate, and the cost of the warehouse and stock maintenance.

20. Therefore IFRC looks very carefully at every particular case concerning the regional stockpiling of relief supplies. In its considerations, IFRC follows several basic rules:

- Any request for the Federation's involvement must be assessed with regard to the frequency of disasters, the geography, physical facilities and logistics, Customs formalities and duties, and the availability of funds. The funding aspect is a crucial deciding factor.
- While the Federation would look favourably upon a warehouse project funded totally by a National Society from which IFRC could draw supplies in a regional emergency, it would not commit itself financially to any warehouse project of a preparedness nature unless it can be proven beyond reasonable doubt that it would be useful.
- A track record of past regional emergency needs must be established before it gives the matter any further consideration. Even then, in some areas of the world an expensive warehouse facility would not be reasonable if ample stocks of relief supplies are available from local vendors when necessary.

This is particularly the case in Southeast Asia, where one can generally find everything



required for a relief operation already in stock with vendors in Singapore, Bangkok, Jakarta or Manila for immediate dispatch to a disaster site.

21. The Federation has considered but rejected proposals from the National Red Crescent Societies of United Arab Emirates and Malaysia for regional emergency preparedness stocks there because it was felt that, in an emergency, the IFRC could meet the needs in those regions with either in-kind donations or local purchases.

For the same reason, IFRC closed its emergency stockpile in Singapore after several years of operations.

Proposals for improvement

22. IFRC considers the proposals for improvements made by the Workshop on Emergency Stockpiles as useful and practical and would like to see more progress made in their implementation.

23. In particular, IFRC would support:

- jointly operating stockpiles on a cost-sharing basis with other operational partners;
- stocking locally made items;
- utilizing easier-to-handle packaging; and
- setting up a coordinated delivery system with all operational partners.

24. IFRC would also support the establishment of new stockpiles, provided this was done after a study to determine which traditionally disaster-prone areas cannot meet their needs through local purchases when necessary. Such studies must be done regularly since needs and areas change, and one must be flexible enough to change the locations of long un-used stockpiles to more likely disaster areas when they are identified.

25. Operational capacity could be further improved by ensuring:

- complete Customs facilitation at every stage of the operation;
 - pre-packaging in easy-to-handle sizes;
 - good marking on packaging; and
 - already prepared export documentation.
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**ANNEX 4**

**Secretariat of the Japan Disaster Relief Team
of
the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)
(Tokyo, Japan)**

SUMMARY OF REPLIES

provided by: Mr. Yoshiaki Sakamaki, Managing Director
Mr. Katsuji Onoda, Director, Relief Coordination Division
Mr. Kenzo Iwakami, Disaster Relief Coordinator, Relief Coordination Division
Mr. Toshiaki Furuya, Deputy Director, Planning Division of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Development Study Department, JICA (former Deputy Director of Relief Coordination Division)

on: 4 April 1994

to: Dmitri Balabanov, Senior Programme Officer, Relief Coordination Branch, DHA-Geneva

Present situation

1. On 1987 JICA established several emergency stockpiles and started operations in their present form. Before then JICA was providing relief goods to disaster-affected countries by purchasing them directly from suppliers on a case-to-case basis.

At that time Japan had very few stocks of relief goods, and procurement usually took a long time. Moreover, it took many other hours to have the relief goods delivered to disaster-affected countries located far away from Japan.

2. Therefore, to solve these problems, JICA divided the world into 4 regions: Asia/Pacific, Central America, South America and Middle East/Africa. Then JICA selected the most suitable countries where its emergency stockpiles could be located, taking into consideration conditions such as transportation, economic activities, presence of a JICA Overseas Office which could handle the stockpile, etc.

3. Finally, JICA established 5 emergency stockpiles: in Singapore (Singapore), Mexico (Mexico), United States (Washington D.C.), Italy (Pisa) and Japan (Narita, Tokyo). Their primary task is to respond to natural, mostly sudden-onset disasters.



4. The role of the emergency stockpile in Narita is to store relief items for disasters occurring in countries near Japan (such as China) and to complement the activities of JICA's other overseas stockpiles.
5. JICA emergency stockpiles cannot store items with short-term validity or those which must be kept at low temperatures, such as food or medicines. Therefore, JICA uses the services of the UNICEF Procurement and Assembly Centre (UNIPAC) in Copenhagen for the procurement and delivery of these items to disaster-affected countries.
6. Based on the request of an affected country, Japanese Government decides whether or not to provide relief assistance. The total value of relief assistance depends on the scale of the disaster (number of dead/injured/affected persons, etc.).
7. JICA's policy is to keep in a regional emergency stockpile a range and quantity of disaster relief items sufficient to cope with a sudden disaster in the area of the stockpile activity. Very rarely, when a regional emergency stockpile is short of the disaster relief items required for a relief operation, JICA uses another stockpile (usually Narita) to support it.
8. Whenever possible, the disaster relief items for a regional emergency stockpile are bought locally, which minimizes the expenses on transportation to the stockpile. Another reason for local purchase is that goods bought in Japan are sometimes accompanied by instructions only in Japanese.
9. However, for promptness of response, relief items are delivered from the stockpile to a disaster area mostly by air transport. JICA usually uses the services of convenient air carriers.
10. The ratio between the value of the items shipped and the delivery cost depends on the items shipped and the location of the affected countries. Usually this ratio is 8 to 2 or 7 to 3 - i.e. the value of the goods constitutes 80% and the airfreight 20% (or 70% and 30% respectively) of the total cost of the relief operation. But, in isolated cases when recipient countries are situated a long distance from the stockpile location, this ratio can change to 6 to 4 or even 5 to 5.
11. At the moment the JICA stockpile system is working smoothly and there are no immediate plans to change it.

General considerations for establishing an emergency stockpile

12. As mentioned above, when making a decision on whether or not to establish a regional emergency stockpile in a particular location, JICA usually considered the following basic conditions:

- the availability of transport facilities for shipping disaster relief items to and from the stockpile;
- the possibilities for local procurement of disaster relief items;



- the presence in the country of a JICA Overseas Office to better control the operations of the regional emergency stockpile; and
- the presence in the area of an adequate company with a warehouse and the capability of running the regional emergency stockpile on behalf, and under the control, of JICA.

Attitude toward regional emergency stockpiles

13. JICA is in favour of establishing regional emergency stockpiles. It considers that, for a prompt response to both sudden-onset and slow-onset disasters, several regional stockpiles in the world are better than one central emergency stockpile.

14. JICA sees the following as advantages for regional emergency stockpiles:

- reduced time for procuring relief items, because they are provided locally;
- reduced time for the delivery of disaster relief items (including reduction of time-loss caused by the time differential between Tokyo and the country of stockpile location); and
- reduced transportation costs.

15. JICA believes that establishing regional emergency stockpiles improves the cost-effectiveness of delivering disaster relief items to affected countries.

16. However, to achieve the optimal result, it is necessary to have the right combination of central and local management control and responsibility over the operations of each regional emergency stockpile.

Proposals for improvement

17. JICA considers that the recommendations of the Workshop on Emergency Stockpiles provide sufficient ground for improvement when implemented. Special attention should be paid to the development and promotion of user-friendly packaging.

18. In addition to these recommendations, JICA suggests investigating ways of improving international response capacity in the Newly Independent States, which is at present handicapped by the difficult transport conditions in these countries.



ANNEX 5

Norwegian Emergency Preparedness System (NOREPS) (Oslo, Norway)

SUMMARY OF REPLIES

provided by: Mr. Knut Moerkved, Ambassador, Special Adviser on Humanitarian Assistance and Refugee Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Bjoern Eriksen, Special Adviser, Norwegian Trade Council
(Officer responsible for NOREPS)
Mr. Knut Ringstad, Commercial Counsellor, Embassy of Norway in
Zimbabwe (former Norwegian Trade Council Officer
responsible for NOREPS)

on: 21-22 March 1994

to: Dmitri Balabanov, Senior Programme Officer, Relief Coordination
Branch, DHA-Geneva

Present situation

1. The Norwegian Emergency Preparedness System (NOREPS) is a joint undertaking of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (NMFA), the Norwegian Trade Council (NTC) and five major Norwegian non-governmental organizations (NGOs): Red Cross, Church Aid, People's Aid, Refugees Council, and Save the Children.
2. Discussions, with the involvement of Norwegian NGOs, on ways to contribute to the efforts of United Nations Agencies and NGOs conducting relief operations showed a preference for the NOREPS solution: selected relief items organized in emergency preparedness stocks ready to be airborne within 24 hours, and teams of experienced relief workers available within 72 hours.
3. NMFA and NTC, jointly performing the role of "stockpile holder", are not operational agencies. They control but do not manage the NOREPS emergency stockpiles which, by agreement, are run by Norwegian suppliers who maintain a minimal, agreed-upon stock of selected items at their warehouses at their own cost and risk.
4. Prior to 1994, suppliers were selected and the items and prices were agreed upon every year. Beginning in 1994 the prices are being "recommended" only. The items are paid for only at the moment of their release from the supplier's warehouse (the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not guarantee their purchase). This arrangement allows NMFA not to tie up money allocated for international assistance in relief items until they are really required.



5. Experience shows that Norway channels roughly 50% of its relief assistance through Norwegian NGOs and the remaining 50% through United Nations Agencies and the ICRC (in addition to operational grants to UNHCR and other United Nations Agencies). Often, when NMFA wants to make a split cash/in kind contribution (partly to avoid delays due to cumbersome, lengthy UN purchasing procedures) it proposes 2/3 of its assistance in kind and 1/3 in cash (to cover transport and other associated expenses), but this fully depends on the actual situation.

6. Most of the aid goes to ongoing disasters (Mozambique, Horn of Africa) which last for years, are predictable and can be foreseen/planned. Sudden-onset disasters take up only a negligible part in its overall volume. However, the stock in Nairobi has proved to be of use in unforeseen emergencies.

7. Originally, all NOREPS emergency stockpiles were situated in Norway (12 at present). Recently, four permanent emergency preparedness stores (PEPS) have been set up in Africa: first in Kenya (Nairobi) in 1991, then in Ethiopia (Addis-Ababa), in Sudan (Khartoum) and in Mozambique (Beira). In Nairobi, Addis-Ababa and Khartoum, PEPS are located on the Norwegian Church Aid premises, and in Beira, in the warehouse run by a commercial company, Mar Azul Limited.

General considerations for establishing an emergency stockpile

8. The following main principles have been applied for NOREPS emergency stockpiles:

- the relief items are selected by the NMFA and NTC in cooperation with Norwegian NGO's;
- the relief items must be competitive in terms of price and quality;
- all costs for stock are met by the producers; and
- the stockpile staff should have field experience.

Attitude toward regional stockpiles

9. Regional emergency stockpiles are seen as a solution for areas beset by frequently recurring disasters. The decision to establish a regional NOREPS emergency stockpile is usually made:

- on the basis of past experience;
- when there is an ongoing emergency situation; or
- when an emergency situation is foreseen (which happens very rarely).

10. An advantage of a regional emergency stockpile is savings on transportation costs. When disaster relief items are moved from Norway to the area by air, the ratio of the cost of



the items to the freight is 1 to 1.5. The same ratio is 1 to 0.05 when disaster relief items are shipped by sea.

11. Another advantage is quicker delivery from a regional warehouse. It can be effected by road, sea or even plane which is usually cheaper locally.

12. Running a warehouse in a region is not more expensive than it is in Norway. The stocked disaster relief items are kept ready for transportation (in containers, on pallets, etc.). Handling and maintenance are reduced to a minimum and do not require skilled personnel.

Although the prices of items in regional PEPS are 10% higher than they are in Norway, they are still cheaper than if they were airfreighted from Norway, and they are available for assistance much more quickly.

13. An important consideration in establishing a regional emergency stockpile is not to compete with local producers. (The idea of having a PEPS in Bangkok, Thailand, was therefore rejected).

Instead, it is worthwhile considering moving part of the production process to the stockpile location, e.g. W. Guertsen produces portions of their "RubbHall" shelters in Norway and transports them to Nairobi where they are assembled (glued, welded, etc.).

Proposals for improvement

14. To achieve a more effective use of existing emergency stockpiles it is necessary to create better awareness of them among potential users - first among relief operating agencies (UN, NGOs, etc.) and then among Governments.

**ANNEX 6****USAID Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA)**
(Washington D.C., United States of America)**SUMMARY OF REPLIES**

provided by: Mr. Gerard Bradford, III, Assistant Director
Mr. Peter D. R. Smith, Operations Specialist
Mr. Walter "Bob" Keesecker, Logistics Officer (recently retired)

on: 31 March 1994

to: Dmitri Balabanov, Senior Programme Officer, Relief Coordination
Branch, DHA-Geneva

Present situation

1. OFDA operates a network of five emergency stockpiles. Four of them - in Guam, Italy (Leghorn), Panama (Panama) and Thailand (Bangkok) are regional. One stockpile - in the United States (Baltimore, Maryland) - is central. It plays a supporting role for the regional stockpiles.
2. OFDA decided to have regional emergency stockpiles from the very beginning. The bulk of the stocked disaster relief items was to be shipped to the stockpiles from the United States, and OFDA expected to save on transportation costs by delivering disaster relief items by sea. Practical experience over the past years has proved OFDA to be right.
3. Although OFDA's emergency stockpiles are regionally oriented, they may be used for responding to sudden disasters in any region of the world if the response capacity of OFDA's stockpile in that region is overwhelmed by the particular disaster needs.
4. OFDA's stockpiles keep only relief items with unlimited shelf life. For that reason, OFDA stopped stockpiling cotton blankets which lose their quality after having been stocked in compressed-bail form for several years. However, even items such as tents and plastic sheeting with almost unlimited shelf life can deteriorate due to aging. So the rule of "first in, first out" is always applied.
5. OFDA does not have its own warehouses. It prefers to lease the required floor space at existing warehouses and to have its stock of disaster relief items managed by these organizations on a contractual basis. This arrangement allows OFDA to have access to the best professional facilities and expertise available at the stockpile location.
6. OFDA considers its system of emergency stockpiles to be optimal for present needs. So far, it has no plans for new additional stockpiles. In the future, the Panama and Guam



stockpiles may need to be relocated (to the south of the United States and to Australia respectively), because of political (Panama) and logistical (Guam) problems, but the present number of 5 stockpiles (4 regional and 1 central) will be maintained.

General considerations for establishing an emergency stockpile

7. OFDA used the following criteria for choosing the location of each stockpile:

- it should be close to disaster-prone areas;
- it should be in a disaster-free place, so that access to it and shipment from it can be assured in all circumstances;
- it should be close to sea and air transport facilities.

8. An additional consideration was the possibility of using existing warehouse and logistics facilities (e.g. of the U.S. Army).

Attitude toward regional stockpiles

9. OFDA is in favour of regional emergency stockpiles. On the basis of its own experience OFDA is convinced that these stockpiles will produce considerable savings. As stated at the Workshop on Emergency Stockpiles, OFDA's regional emergency stockpiles have already paid for themselves many times over through savings in transportation costs during sudden emergencies.

Proposals for improvement

10. OFDA supports the measures discussed and recommended by the Workshop on Emergency Stockpiles.

11. An additional measure to increase UN capacity to respond to sudden -disasters might be the setting up of regional stockpiles similar to the DHA-run stockpile at Pisa, Italy. DHA may wish to approach emergency stockpile holders having regional stockpiles with a request for each to donate a part of the floor space in one of their regional stockpiles to DHA. Thereafter, other donors might be asked to contribute relief items to these "UN regional stockpiles", which would be under the operational control of DHA.

12. OFDA would not welcome any measures that might limit its freedom of action in relation to the use of its own emergency stockpiles. Therefore, even the Register of Emergency Stockpiles is watched with caution, as OFDA fears that it might encourage some potential users to ask for help more often than OFDA would wish. OFDA would prefer to decide on its own when to intervene, following an established procedure: first the American Ambassador in the disaster-stricken country should send a request to the U.S. State Department, and then OFDA sends its own assessment team and acts on the basis of the team's recommendations.



ANNEX 7

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (Geneva, Switzerland)

SUMMARY OF REPLIES

provided by: Ms. Janet Lim, Chief, Emergency Preparedness and Response Section

on: 7 April 1994

to: Dmitri Balabanov, Senior Programme Officer, Relief Coordination
Branch, DHA-Geneva

Present situation

1. UNHCR established a Central Emergency Stockpile in 1992 in order to respond in the most effective manner to emergencies within its mandate.
2. Originally this emergency stockpile was to ensure the immediate availability of basic relief supplies for 50,000 beneficiaries. The stockpile has been used to a considerable extent, especially for items such as kitchen sets, blankets, "RubbHalls", water equipment, etc., notwithstanding loans from existing stockpiles established for specific operations. The emergency stockpile will therefore be continued and expanded to provide for 100,000 beneficiaries.
3. The basic relief items include tents, tarpaulin/plastic sheeting, water equipment, kitchen sets, blankets and prefabricated warehouses. Not all the relief items are physically stocked by UNHCR. Some have been purchased and are being stored free of charge by the suppliers, while the availability of other items is guaranteed through pre-negotiated contracts with suppliers (to be implemented as and when required).
4. The goods in the Central Emergency Stockpile are regularly renewed, especially through the rotation of specific items with limited shelf life to meet similar needs in ongoing programmes.
5. The Central Emergency Stockpile is also being strengthened with stocks of relief items left over from Persian Gulf operations. Within this stock, reserves have been made to meet the requirements of 100,000 beneficiaries in case of need in the Persian Gulf region.
6. Stand-by arrangements have been established with a selected number of non-governmental organizations who have resources to be deployed as UNHCR's partner in needs assessment and/or programme implementation in key sectors such as health, water, sanitation,



logistics and social services during an emergency.

General considerations for establishing an emergency stockpile

7. A number of considerations have influenced UNHCR's decision to establish its own Central Emergency Stockpile.

8. Emergency stockpiles are established primarily to support the specific operational activity of the stockpile holder (UN agency, governmental relief organization, etc.). Borrowing from these stockpiles cannot be guaranteed in case of need, especially if both the stockpile holder and the borrowing organization are simultaneously involved in the same or similar relief operation.

9. In addition, borrowing from other emergency stockpiles (e.g. UNICEF, MSF-Logistique) is sometimes more costly, as their prices are higher than those on the market and/or their specifications are not satisfactory (one would not borrow winter blankets for Africa). Besides, UN financial regulations prohibit the use of relief items procured by others, including UN agencies, if their prices are higher than the current market price.

10. The size of the stock should be such that, on one hand, it will meet the minimal need for relief items in an emergency and, on the other, it will allow for a sufficient turnover of stocked relief items so that they do not deteriorate because of a long stay in the warehouse.

11. An arrangement to physically store relief items with suppliers in a regularly renewable stock provides a most viable solution, but not all suppliers will agree to keep on hand a stock of relief items (e.g. vehicles, tents).

12. Finally, after a year of testing its concept of emergency response, UNHCR emphasizes that emergency resources, including an emergency stockpile, should be used only to meet needs during the crucial initial phase of an emergency relief operation.

Attitude toward regional stockpiles

13. UNHCR is cautious about the establishing regional emergency stockpiles, unless clear benefits can be demonstrated after taking into account the considerable resources needed to establish and manage physical stocks and the possibilities for rotating stockpiled items.

Proposals for improvement

14. UNHCR has nothing to add to the recommendations of the Workshop on Emergency Stockpiles.

**ANNEX 8**

**Supply Division
of the
United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)
(Copenhagen, Denmark)**

SUMMARY OF REPLIES

provided by: Mr. Jean Wasselin, Deputy Director
Mr. Ole Boye, Shipping Officer and Emergency Coordinator
Mr. Lars Glistrup, Chief, Warehouse and Production

on: 24 March 1994

to: Dmitri Balabanov, Senior Programme Officer, Relief Coordination
Branch, DHA-Geneva

Present situation

1. UNICEF's emergency stockpile is an integral part of the Supply Division's warehouse which functions as a procurement, assembly and packing centre for ongoing projects and represents roughly one-third of UNICEF's supply activities. Goods come to the warehouse from many suppliers and at different times. Here they are assembled into ready-to-use sets (e.g. 1 small vaccination kit is assembled with 48 different items from 30 suppliers in 18 countries) and remain temporarily until they are shipped out for distribution to final users.

These activities make up 75% of the warehouse operations, the other 25% being in response to emergency situations (15 to 20% for complex emergencies and the remaining 10 or 5% for sudden-onset disasters).

2. The items prepared according to the needs of ongoing UNICEF projects are shipped by sea (on average, the cost of sea freight is 10% of the total value of the goods). Airlift operations relate almost exclusively to emergency assistance. The cost of transportation can be as high as 100 - 200% of the cost of the items shipped (e.g. blankets) or as low as 10% (e.g. medicines). In general, for the same goods, shipment by air is far more expensive than by any other means of transport. However, in some situations air shipments, particularly to land-locked countries, may have an even better cost-benefit ratio.

3. The total value of the stock in inventory is about US\$ 30 million, of which 10% or about US\$ 3 million (60 selected disaster relief items) is reserved for emergency response and constitutes a proper emergency stockpile integrated into the structure of the Supply Division.



4. The stock of most frequently used items (80% by cost) is changed 3-4 times a year (e.g. the 1993 turnover was US\$ 112 million).
5. The building is provided cost-free by the Danish Government.
6. The proper planning of replenishment is very important for an effective running of the warehouse because UN procurement procedures require obligatory world-wide bidding to avoid any favouritism towards European suppliers.

General considerations for establishing an emergency stockpile

7. If a stockpile is located somewhere between suppliers and the receiving country, the additional cost for goods to stop at the warehouse is negligible. It is better to have a stockpile closer to suppliers as they are situated more compactly than are recipient countries.
8. It is not recommended to set up emergency stockpiles in countries with a weak infrastructure and administration. Weeks may be lost in an attempt to move goods from the warehouse (even if it is located in a Customs-free zone) to another country.
9. The shelf life of an item is a very important consideration. If the stock does not move, it loses its quality (especially medicines, which must be thrown away)

Attitude toward regional stockpiles

10. A regional emergency stockpile does not necessarily mean quicker response to a sudden disaster:

- neighbouring countries may not be on speaking terms, and it could require many days to clear formal obstacles, whereas from Europe one can send a plane without such a problem;
- Customs authorities in the country of stockpile location may cause delays of many days in letting UN goods out of the country.

For example, an emergency stockpile might be situated in a country of western Africa, but to send goods from it to another African country would require a flight through Europe, i.e. Africa - Europe - Africa. The reasons for this are various, e.g. even now there is little or no connection between the former colonies of France, England and Portugal in Africa. Obtaining overflight rights may also cause problems, especially time delays.

11. A regional stockpile does not necessarily mean a cheaper response to sudden disaster:

- UNICEF's experience shows that the cost of air freight from Europe to Africa or from Africa to Africa is almost the same: mileage plays a very small part in it and may be neglected;
- in a regional warehouse, the orders are smaller and thus more expensive;



- overhead expenditures (on the premises, on creating an experienced work force, etc. are usually higher for a smaller stockpile.

12. A regional stockpile is more difficult to manage effectively:

- it has a smaller turnover, which makes it more difficult to maintain a proper renewal of the stock before the relief items, especially medicines, deteriorate;
- it is also more difficult to make the right decision on what items should be stored and in which quantities;
- it may not have any assembly facilities for preparing kits out of relief items received from different manufacturers.

13. Therefore, UNICEF is not in favour of regional stockpiling, although it might be useful for specific relief items in specific areas.

For example, regional stockpiles might be good for storing:

- tents - you can store them for unlimited periods;
- food - you can dispose of it any time its shelf life is close to expiration.

14. Medicines are not suitable for regional stockpiling due to their short shelf life. Unlike food, they cannot be consumed and should be destroyed

Proposals for improvement

15. DHA should increase the coordination of appeals to donors to avoid competition between UN Agencies in seeking funds for their operations. For example, funds allocated to several UN Agencies to purchase the same disaster relief items should be earmarked for use through one single Agency because goods are cheaper when purchased in large quantities.

16. For its part, UNICEF is ready to increase its ordering for (supplying) other UN Agencies and other relief organizations within its area of expertise. In particular, UNICEF offers to do the following for others:

- to procure and keep in stock its usual items in quantities sufficient to cover the needs of other UN Agencies. The only condition is that, when these items are required, the Agencies buy them from UNICEF. The overhead charge will be 6% for handling and storage;
- to perform warehouse services for other Agencies for the relief items they (the Agencies) would procure themselves. One precondition for this is a guaranteed payment.

17. The UNICEF warehouse is not a commercial enterprise. Whatever UNICEF earns on the sale of disaster relief items from its stock goes back into UNICEF-executed/supported programmes. Therefore, UNICEF would prefer that WHO and others buy the new emergency



health kits from UNICEF's emergency stockpile in Copenhagen rather than from an Amsterdam commercial company.

18. UNICEF does not pretend to be the only procurement service in the United Nations system. WHO might be better at buying some specific medicines, FAO better at food, UNHCR at something else, etc. Therefore, each Agency should do what it is best at among the UN Agencies and not duplicate the others.

19. This specialization through cooperation should be imposed on the Agencies by the United Nations Secretary-General through DHA. The Secretary-General should make a decision, and DHA should prepare and implement proposals to achieve it. In particular, DHA should:

- define and propose specialization for each of the UN Agencies concerned;
- appeal for funds through consolidated appeals without earmarking them to Agencies in the appeal; then, after the funds have been received, DHA should retransmit them to the appropriate Agency according to its specialization.

20. Another measure proposed to improve the use of existing emergency stockpiles is to increase an awareness of each other stocks. An exchange of information and experience and visits to each other, at least among major emergency stockpile holders would be beneficial for this purpose.

21. It is important to know not only the names of stocked disaster relief items, but their actual quality and precise conditions for drawing these items from the stockpile. UNICEF is not interested in donations in kind from other emergency stockpiles. It would prefer to pay for the items, but only if the quality is right.

22. A rule for saving costs in emergency delivery: never send everything at once by air. Send only those items and those quantities which:

- are required to cover needs until the rest of the supplies can arrive by sea, road or rail; and
- can be handled at the destination.

Otherwise, relief items will be stocked in inappropriate conditions and deteriorate at the airport of arrival for lack of logistic infrastructure to handle them or simply because they are to be consumed later.
