



Figure 7 Temporary Government Headquarters at Brades - November 1998



6.13 Work to identify an alternative fixed-wing airlink illustrates the advantage, in changing and uncertain circumstances, of attempting to separate urgent emergency requirements from potentially extremely costly longer-term reconstruction decisions. A feasibility study looked at 3 options, including one for a new facility comparable to Bramble Airport with wider development benefits. Since the study was completed, the evolving volcanic situation means that it is possible to prepare for rehabilitation of Bramble Airport, combined with only an emergency grass strip at one of the other sites. The volcanic situation in 1997-98 was still too uncertain to allow appropriate and cost-effective decisions about a longer-term solution, but immediate action in 1997 to construct an emergency grass strip would have had early benefits.

6.5 Institutional and management aspects

6.14 The number of institutions involved and their overlapping roles resulted in delays in decisions and confusion. Three particular problems affected the investment programme – lack of delegated authority, high staff turnover and poor consultation with GoM. DFID's office in Montserrat, the Aid Management Office (AMO) was established in early 1997 (see paras 8.2-8.4). It was handicapped during the main construction period by not having delegated authority and capacity to supervise Brown and Root, the contractor managing the immediate housing and GHQ programmes. Proper on-island supervision would have reduced cost overruns but at the time of the evaluation Brown and Root was effectively responsible to DFID in London through its UK head office. GoM has complained about the lack of proper consultation by AMO and other DFID representatives in the region. Several staff did seek to consult effectively and to understand GoM's views but there was sometimes a lack of sensitivity in dealings with GoM.