I. Material: Title:	Daishingat Talsaku no tameno Shingigakuteki Chosa Kenkyu Vol. 11, Saigaiji ni okeru Koso Biru Riyosha no Ishiki Chosa. (Report on the Psychological Study for Counterneasures against Earthquake Disaster, Vol. 11, Survey Research on People's Consciousness in the High-Rise Buildings)			
Author: ~	Guard Police Psychology Research Society			
Publisher and Year:	Guard Police Psychology Research Society and Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department, 1976			
II. Study:				
(1) Agent and/or Event Type of Disaster:	Hypothetical earthquake			
	The first article of the Contraction of the Contrac			
Location:	Tokyo			
Casualties and Damage	3 :			
(2) Method				
Method in detail:	 Questionnaire delivered by police and responded to by mail. Sample: 3,855 persons from buildings over 31 meters high (includes office buildings, residential buildings, and department stores) Valid responses: 2.530 (67%) 			
Date of Study:	Office and residential buildings: May 15-25, 1976 Department stores: May 18-19, 1976			

III. Hypothesis and Findings.

I.		ople who were anxious about a possible earthquake	
		saster Residents of high-rise buildings	83.6%
		Frequent visitors to high-rise buildings	82.0%
		Less frequent visitors to high-rise buildings	75.3%
	D.	Workers in high-rise buildings	77.1%
11.		ople who perceive high-rise buildings as less dangerous Men are less likely than women to perceive high-rise	40.6%
	а.	buildings as dangerous.	
		1. Men who answered high-rise buildings were dangerous	35.1%
	73	2. Women who answered the same	51.7%
	D.	The elderly are less likely than the young to perceive high-rise buildings as dangerous.	
		1. People in their 20s who answered high-rise buildings	
		were dangerous	54.2%
		2. People in their 30s who answered high-rise buildings were dangerous	46.5%
		3. People in their 40s who answered high-rise buildings	401376
		were dangerous	37.5%
		4. People over the age of 50 who answered high-rise	
	^	buildings were dangerous	29.2%
	٠.	Residents of high-rise buildings were more likely than workers to perceive high-rise buildings as dangerous.	
		1. Residents who perceived high-rise buildings as dangerous	43.3%
	•	2. Workers who perceived high-rise buildings as dangerous	38.6%
	D.	Visitors are more likely than residents to perceive high-	
		rise buildings as being dangerous in an earthquake.	
		1. Frequent visitors who perceive high-rise buildings as being dangerous in an earthquake	45.4%
		2. Less frequent visitors who perceive high-rise buildings	43.4%
		as being dangerous in an earthquake	47.3%
	E.	People on the higher floors are less likely to perceive	
		high-rise buildings as dangerous.	
		1. People living or working higher than the 30th floor	34.6%
		2. People living or working between the 10th and the 30th floor	in (9)
		3. People living below the 10th floor	42.6%
	F.	People who have been assigned an emergency role in	41.VA
		their organizations compared to people who have no emergency	
		role tended to perceive high-rise buildings as less dan-	
		gerous.	
III.	Ped	ople who perceived high-rise buildings as dangerous	
	att	tributed this view to	
		The disorder and confusion which would ensue in an earthquake	
		Possible fires	22.1%
	U.	Being unable to follow the evacuation route	17.5%

	Five projected response patterns if there were an earthquake A. People will wait and see what the situation will be (observer B. People who will try to extinguish fires (extinguishers) C. People who will try to protect themselves under a desk or furniture (Shelter-seekers) D. People who will lose their composure (the discomposed type) E. People who will try to leave a house or building (evacuaters) Most persons who have experienced an earthquake in the	
	past were A. Observers B. Extinguishers	83.8% 11.6%
	People in high-rise buildings tended to be observers. A. The projected responses of people in high-rise buildings were 1. Observers 2. Extinguishers 3. Shelter-seekers 4. Evacuaters 5. The discomposed type B. Women and youth more than men and the elderly are more likely to be discomposed. C. Resident on the higher floors compared to those on the lower floors think they will be calm in an earthquake. D. The longer people have lived in their present residence, the less likely they are to think they will be discomposed in an earthquake. E. What people are most anxious about if an earthquake were to happen 1. Observers expected social disorder and confusion and then the threat of fire 2. Extinguishers expected fires and then the collapse of houses or buildings	57.4% 17.5% 11.9% 5.6% 4.5%
	After the quake there is the expectation that A. People will conform to the instruction of leaders or play their allocated role in an emergency organization. B. People will try to immediately escape or to rush into stairways or elevators. 1. Women and youth think they are more likely to try to escape or rush into stairways or elevators. 2. People who are above the 30th floor think they will be more likely to follow instruction of leaders to play their allocated emergency roles. Emergency organizations	66.0%
- we as it. w	A. People who are organized for emergency operations 1. Workers in high-rise buildings 2. Residents of high-rise buildings	78.9% 35.8%
IX.	Disaster drill in high-rise buildings A. Residents who have had such a drill B. Residential high-rise building occupants are less likely to have had a drill than workers in office buildings.	93.0%

χ.	Em	ergency equipment and facilities	
	A.	People in high-rise buildings who are familiar with	
		1. Emergency exits	74.6%
		2. Fire extinguishers	73.5%
		3. Anti-fire doors	-59.2%
		4. Fire plugs	52.9%
	В.	People in high-rise buildings who are unfamiliar with relief sacks	18.2%
	c.	People in high-rise buildings who are unfamiliar with	20,000
	•	emergency elevators	19.2%
	D.	Men are more familiar than women with these facilities.	2,
		The older the person, the more likely they are familiar with these facilities.	
	F.	Workers more than residents in high-rise buildings are familiar with these facilities.	
XI.	Th	e degree of credence or trust given to evacuation planning	
		r high-rise buildings	
		People who trust such planning	38.2%
		Men are more likely than women to trust.	
		Older persons are more likely than younger to trust.	
	D.	Workers more than residents of high-rise buildings trust.	
	E.	People from the 30th or higher floors more than those from th	e
		lower floors are likely to give higher credence to evacuation planning.	

I. Material:	Daishinsai Taisaku no tameno Shinrigakuteki chosa Kenky Dai Jishin ni mottomo Kiken to Sareta Chiiki deno Ishiki Chosa, Dai 12 - ho. (Report on the Psychological Research for Countermeasura Against Earthquake Disaster - The Residents of the Area:
Title:	More Vulnerable to Earthquake, Vol. 12)
	Keibi Shinrigabu Kenkyukai (Guard Police Psychology Reso Society)
Publisher and Year:	Keishi - cho (Tokyo Metropolitan Police Board), 1977
II. Study:	
(1) Agent and/or Event	
Type of Disaster:	Hypothetical Earthquake
Date of Occurrence:	TO THE PARTY OF TH
Location:	Tokyo
Casualties and Damage:	
(2) Method	
Method in detail:	See the attached
Date of Study:	Makendedha vi utumi utahiningkangkangkangka umumumpus utah makkapipus nyas. untu di di di visikangkan tumidid

III. Hypothesis and Findings.

I.	Samples	
	A. 3,000 persons living in or working in the 14 wards in Tokyo which rearnked as relatively highly dangerous 1. Response: 2,500	
	2. Workers: 500	
	B. Questionnaires, answered by mail 1. Valid answers: 1,586	52.9%
	C. Study done: May 10-20, 1977	34.9%
	and a subject to a	
II.	Concerns about earthquake	
	A. Percentage of persons who are anxious about earth-	
	quakes in their everyday lives	84.7%
	B. No significant difference between men and women in the	
	degree of concerns about an earthquake.	
	C. Residents are more concerned about earthquake than workers.	
	D. Persons who had an experience of earthquake tended to	
	predict the occurrance of a great earthquake.	
	E. Persons who live in rented houses are more likely to	
	predict the occurrance of a great earthquake than persons who live in their own houses.	
	F. Men and women who are anxious about an earthquake	
	1. Anxious about	
	a) men	87.7%
	b) women	91.3%
		24.13/0
III.	What people would worry about if an earthquake occurred	
	A. Fires	70.3%
	B. The long distance to the evacuation place	44.5%
	C. The unavailability of roads to the evacuation place	25.5%
	D. The collapse of houses	17.9%
#10	Subjective manifelia, of	
T.A.	Subjective possibility of evacuation A. Impossible to evacuate	01 00
	B. Possible to safely evacuate	34.9%
	C. Possible to evacuate but with difficulty	2.8%
	D. Persons who think that it will be impossible	22.1%
	to evacuate	
	1. Men	31.0%
	2. Women	42.6%
	E. Workers are more optimistic about the possibility of	44.0%
	evacuation than residents.	
V.	What people would worry about after a major quake	
	A. The possibility of communicating with a family-nember	60.1%
	B. Confusion of panic	27.1%
	C. Rumors	5.2%
	D. Women are more likely to worry about the possibility of	
	communicating with family-members, while men are	
	more likely to worry about confusion or panic.	
	E. Workers worry about confusion and panic to a higher	
	degree than regidents	

	Dai Shinsai Taisaku no Tameno Shinrigakuteki Chosa
	Kenkyu-Jishin Yochi Keiho Batsureiji ni okeru Kodo Yocoku, Dai 13-no.
	(Report on the Psychological Research for Countermeasure
I. Material:	Against Earthquake Disaster-Responses to an Earthquake Prediction Warning, Vol. 13)
1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 commence of the contract of th	Prediction Warning, Vol. 13)
	Keibi Shinrigaku Kenkyukai (Guard Police Psychology
	Research Society) Keishi-cho (Tokyo Metropolitan Police Board), 1978
and the second s	Table - A Table Ladge Ammentings white Made Address and the West Control of the Made Address
II. Study:	
(1) Agent and/or Event	
Type of Discater:	Hypotherical earthquake
Date of Occurrence:	
Location:	Tokyo
Casualties and Damage:	
(2) Method	•
Method in detail:	See the attached
Date of Study:	
III. Hypothesis and Firdings	_

I.	Questionnaire	answered by	mail				
		of Business answers: 4		0			
		answers: 4 s of busines		,000			
		answers: 1		, 000			
		of Schools,		ens, Hospi	tals,		
		Senior Citiz		608			
		answers: 4		1 60	n		
		s of Senior answers: l		mes: 1,00	C.		
	5. Housewive		, 0, 0				
		answers: 1	,238				
	6. Total:		202			۲.	t 0%
	B. No descript:	answers: 4				0.	1.0%
	C. Date of Stu			cedures			
II.	On the possibi	lity of eart	hquake pred	iction			
	(Sample No.)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(:	5)
	pos sibl e	72.4(%)	70.4(%)	74.5(%)	74.0(%	62.6	5(%)
	impossible	15.6	21.0	14.0	12.7	20.6	5
III.	On issuing an	earthquake w	arning				
	⟨Sample No.⟩		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Should be done	cautiously	58.8(%)	65.8(%)	63.7(%)	67.1(%)	57.8(%)
	should be done	as soon as					
	possible		35.9	29.5	32.1	25.9	35.8
	should not be	issued	1.6		1.0	1.1	0.7
īv.	The degree of	trust in the	warning				
	√Sample No. →	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	((5)
	trust	85.3(%)	81.9(%)	8 8.9(%) 83.8	(%) 87	7.4(%)
	distrust	10.7	14.4	8.5	8.4	8	3.1
٧.	Expected respo		warning				
	⟨ Sample	К. ои		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	2. would ph	to workplac	es	ly 29.8(% 34.2	10.4(%)	31.1(%) 38.2	18.7(%)
	3. would at warning	tempt to con	rirm the	17.8	53.5	17.6	51.1

B. If heard at workplace (1) (2) (3) (4) (Sample No.) 1. would indicate employees to wait for further information 45.9(%) -48.5(%) 2. would indicate employees to 40.7 play an emergency role 35.4 3. would play an emergency role -35.4 42.8 20.2 33.9 4. Would phone to families 5.9 5.0 5. would go home or evacuate Vl. Expected responses of housewives to the warning 87.1% A. Would put fire out 76.8% B. Would communicate with husband 76.4% C. Would communicate with children 64.4% D. Would check things to be removed from the home 40.3% E. Would evacuate 33.2% F. Would discuss with neighbors

I. Material: Title:	Dai Shinsai Taisaku no tameno Shinrigakuteki Chosa KenkyuKeikai Sengen Hatsureiji ni okeru Jidosha Untensha no Ishiki to Kodo, Dai 14-ho. (Report on the Psychological Research for Countermeasure Against Earthquake Disaster—The Drivers' Responses to an Earthquake Prediction Warning, Vol. 14)
	Market Danger - Land A. Sand A. William State St
Author:	Keibi Shinrigaku Kenkyukai (Guard Police Psychology Research Society)
	Keishi-cho (Tokyo Metropolitan Police Board), 1980
II. Study:	
(I) Agent and/or Event	
Type of Dimester:	Hypothetical earthquake
Date of O currence:	
Location:	Tokvo
Casualties and Damage:	·
(2) Mathod	
Method in detail:	See the attached
Date of Study:	1980
III. Hypothesis and Findings.	

ı.	Method		
	A. Questionnaire answered by mail.		
	B. Sample: 5,000		
	C. Valid answers: 2,972		59.44%
	D. Sampling procedure was not discu	ssed.	
	E. Details of the sample	1 605	
	 Managers for Safety Driving: Taxi Cab Drivers: 	1,000 1,000	
	3. Truck Drivers:	1,000	
	4. Ordinacy Drivers:	1,000	
	5. Private-truck Drivers:	1,000	
II.	On preparations in transportation c an earthquake warning A. The emergency system in a compan		F 0%
	1. clearly planned		5.0%
	 roughly planned not planned 		15.4% 54.9%
	4. never thought about		22.5%
			Ang day de upl FC\$
	There was no significant difference company. In comparison with others stronger concerns about planning of	, taxi companies showed the emergency systems.	
	Major actions defined in the emerge	ncy planning.	
	1. to phone the company		52.5%
	2. to drive back to the company		20.9%
	to go back to the company but at a certain place	leaving the vehicle	3.0 O.00
	B. Predictions made by managere abo	st there drivers	12.2%
	B. Predictions made by managers abo	ut there drivers	12.2%
	B. Predictions made by managers abo probable responses to the warnin	ut there drivers g.	
	 B. Predictions made by managers about probable responses to the warning. 1. They would phone the company. 2. They would drive back or go be 	g. ack to the company	66.7% 14.8%
	 B. Predictions made by managers about probable responses to the warning. 1. They would phone the company. 2. They would drive back or go be 3. They would evacuate and leave. 	g. ack to the company	66.7%
	 B. Predictions made by managers about probable responses to the warning. 1. They would phone the company. 2. They would drive back or go be 	g. ack to the company	66.7% 14.8%
	 B. Predictions made by managers abording probable responses to the warning 1. They would phone the company 2. They would drive back or go be 3. They would evacuate and leave 4. They would go home. Predictions made by drivers about the probable of the probability of the probabilit	g. ack to the company the vehicle.	66.7% 14.8% 12.9%
	 B. Predictions made by managers abore probable responses to the warning. 1. They would phone the company. 2. They would drive back or go be 3. They would evacuate and leave. 4. They would go home. Predictions made by drivers about the warning. 	g. ack to the company the vehicle.	66.7% 14.8% 12.9% 4.0%
	B. Predictions made by managers abo probable responses to the warnin 1. They would phone the company 2. They would drive back or go b 3. They would evacuate and leave 4. They would go home. Predictions made by drivers about t a warning. 1. They would phone the company.	g. ack to the company the vehicle. heir own responses to	66.7% 14.8% 12.9% 4.0%
	B. Predictions made by managers about probable responses to the warning 1. They would phone the company 2. They would drive back or go b 3. They would evacuate and leave 4. They would go home. Predictions made by drivers about ta warning. 1. They would phone the company. 2. They would walk away leaving	g. ack to the company the vehicle. heir own responses to the vehicle.	66.7% 14.8% 12.9% 4.0%
	B. Predictions made by managers abordone probable responses to the warning 1. They would phone the company 2. They would drive back or go be 3. They would evacuate and leave 4. They would go home. Predictions made by drivers about the a warning. 1. They would phone the company. 2. They would walk away leaving 3. They would phone a family mem 4. They would go back or drive be	g. ack to the company the vehicle. heir own responses to the vehicle. ber.	66.7% 14.8% 12.9% 4.0% 37.1% 17.9%
	B. Predictions made by managers about probable responses to the warning 1. They would phone the company 2. They would drive back or go b 3. They would evacuate and leave 4. They would go home. Predictions made by drivers about ta warning. 1. They would phone the company. 2. They would walk away leaving	g. ack to the company the vehicle. heir own responses to the vehicle. ber.	66.7% 14.8% 12.9% 4.0% 37.1% 17.9% 12.8%
III.	B. Predictions made by managers abo probable responses to the warnin 1. They would phone the company 2. They would drive back or go b 3. They would evacuate and leave 4. They would go home. Predictions made by drivers about t a warning. 1. They would phone the company. 2. They would walk away leaving 3. They would phone a family mem 4. They would go back or drive b 5. They would drive home. Drivers expected responses to the w	ack to the company the vehicle. heir own responses to the vehicle. ber. ack to the company.	66.7% 14.8% 12.9% 4.0% 37.1% 17.9% 12.8% 12.1%
III.	B. Predictions made by managers abo probable responses to the warnin 1. They would phone the company 2. They would drive back or go b 3. They would evacuate and leave 4. They would go home. Predictions made by drivers about t a warning. 1. They would phone the company. 2. They would walk away leaving 3. They would phone a family mem 4. They would go back or drive b 5. They would drive home. Drivers expected responses to the w A. How would they know about the wa	ack to the company the vehicle. heir own responses to the vehicle. ber. ack to the company.	66.7% 14.8% 12.9% 4.0% 37.1% 17.9% 12.8% 12.1% 7.2%
III.	B. Predictions made by managers abo probable responses to the warnin 1. They would phone the company 2. They would drive back or go b 3. They would evacuate and leave 4. They would go home. Predictions made by drivers about t a warning. 1. They would phone the company. 2. They would walk away leaving 3. They would walk away leaving 3. They would phone a family mem 4. They would go back or drive b 5. They would drive home. Drivers expected responses to the w A. How would they know about the wa 1. car radio	ack to the company the vehicle. heir own responses to the vehicle. ber. ack to the company.	66.7% 14.8% 12.9% 4.0% 37.1% 17.9% 12.8% 12.1% 7.2%
III.	B. Predictions made by managers abo probable responses to the warnin 1. They would phone the company 2. They would drive back or go b 3. They would evacuate and leave 4. They would go home. Predictions made by drivers about t a warning. 1. They would phone the company. 2. They would walk away leaving 3. They would walk away leaving 3. They would phone a family mem 4. They would go back or drive b 5. They would drive home. Drivers expected responses to the w A. How would they know about the wa 1. car radio 2. from other cars	ack to the company the vehicle. heir own responses to the vehicle. ber. ack to the company.	66.7% 14.8% 12.9% 4.0% 37.1% 17.9% 12.8% 12.1% 7.2%
III.	B. Predictions made by managers abo probable responses to the warnin 1. They would phone the company 2. They would drive back or go b 3. They would evacuate and leave 4. They would go home. Predictions made by drivers about t a warning. 1. They would phone the company. 2. They would walk away leaving 3. They would walk away leaving 3. They would phone a family mem 4. They would go back or drive b 5. They would drive home. Drivers expected responses to the w A. How would they know about the wa 1. car radio 2. from other cars 3. loud-speaker trucks	ack to the company the vehicle. heir own responses to the vehicle. ber. ack to the company.	66.7% 14.8% 12.9% 4.0% 37.1% 17.9% 12.8% 12.1% 7.2% 67.4% 19.1% 6.7%
III.	B. Predictions made by managers abo probable responses to the warnin 1. They would phone the company 2. They would drive back or go b 3. They would evacuate and leave 4. They would go home. Predictions made by drivers about t a warning. 1. They would phone the company. 2. They would walk away leaving 3. They would walk away leaving 3. They would phone a family mem 4. They would go back or drive b 5. They would drive home. Drivers expected responses to the w A. How would they know about the wa 1. car radio 2. from other cars 3. loud-speaker trucks 4. C.B. radios	ack to the company the vehicle. heir own responses to the vehicle. ber. ack to the company. arning. rning?	66.7% 14.8% 12.9% 4.0% 37.1% 17.9% 12.8% 12.1% 7.2%
III.	B. Predictions made by managers abo probable responses to the warnin 1. They would phone the company 2. They would drive back or go b 3. They would evacuate and leave 4. They would go home. Predictions made by drivers about t a warning. 1. They would phone the company. 2. They would walk away leaving 3. They would phone a family mem 4. They would go back or drive b 5. They would drive home. Drivers expected responses to the w A. How would they know about the wa 1. car radio 2. from other cars 3. loud-speaker trucks 4. C.B. radios The young drivers and the drivers o be more likely to rely on car radio	ack to the company the vehicle. heir own responses to the vehicle. ber. ack to the company. arning. rning?	66.7% 14.8% 12.9% 4.0% 37.1% 17.9% 12.8% 12.1% 7.2% 67.4% 19.1% 6.7%
III.	B. Predictions made by managers abo probable responses to the warnin 1. They would phone the company 2. They would drive back or go b 3. They would evacuate and leave 4. They would go home. Predictions made by drivers about t a warning. 1. They would phone the company. 2. They would walk away leaving 3. They would phone a family mem 4. They would go back or drive b 5. They would drive home. Drivers expected responses to the w A. How would they know about the wa 1. car radio 2. from other cars 3. loud-speaker trucks 4. C.B. radios The young drivers and the drivers o be more likely to rely on car radio B. Expected responses on less crowded.	ack to the company the vehicle. heir own responses to the vehicle. ber. ack to the company. arning. rning?	66.7% 14.8% 12.9% 4.0% 37.1% 17.9% 12.8% 12.1% 7.2% 67.4% 19.1% 6.7%
III.	B. Predictions made by managers abo probable responses to the warnin 1. They would phone the company 2. They would drive back or go b 3. They would evacuate and leave 4. They would go home. Predictions made by drivers about t a warning. 1. They would phone the company. 2. They would walk away leaving 3. They would phone a family mem 4. They would go back or drive b 5. They would drive home. Drivers expected responses to the w A. How would they know about the wa 1. car radio 2. from other cars 3. loud-speaker trucks 4. C.B. radios The young drivers and the drivers o be more likely to rely on car radio	ack to the company the vehicle. heir own responses to the vehicle. ber. ack to the company. arning. rning? f trucks thought they would s. ed roads to a warning.	66.7% 14.8% 12.9% 4.0% 37.1% 17.9% 12.8% 12.1% 7.2% 67.4% 19.1% 6.7%

1. They would phone a family member.	12.8%
1. They would go back or drive back to the company.	12.1%
j. They would drive home.	7.2%
C. Expected responses on crowded roads to a warning.	
1. They would walk away leaving the car on a side road.	36.1%
2. They would phone the company.	27.3%
3. They would try to go back to the company.	11.2%
4. They vould phone a family member	8.8%
D. Expected responses on highways to a warning.	
1. They would get off the highway.	84.0%
2. They would drive to the exit closest to the company.	7.6%
3. They would drive the the exit closest to home.	3.9%
E. Predicted responses two hours after the issuing of a	
warnirg.	
1. Would be at the company.	38.4%
2. Whild be somewhere in Tokyo, but out of the car.	25.1%
3. Pould be at home.	22.2%
Persons who live in central parts of Tokyo tended to believe	

Persons who live in central parts of Tokyo tended to believe they would be at home, while persons who live in suburbs of Tokyo or outside of Tokyo tended to believe they would be at the company.

Drivers of taxi cabs felt they would be at the company, while drivers of their own cars thought they would be home.

F.	If there is a police officer on the road, most drivers	
	would expect to conform to the police officer's directions.	97.0%
	Without a police officer they would	
	1. park the car on the left edge of the road	69.5%
	2. do what other cars were doing	20.6%
	3. keep on driving	9.5%
G.	As to traffic control in response to a warning, drivers	
	expect	
	1. total control of traffic by the police	50.5%
	2. voluntary cont ol of traffic in each area	26.1%
	3. partial control of traffic at major traffic points by	
	the police	19.1%
н	Several problems to be solved	

- H. Several problems to be solved
 - 1. Only a few companies have an emergency plan.
 - 2. Most people rely upon telephones.
 - 3. Most drivers would leave cars on roads in order to phone or evacuate, and this will make the traffic worse.
 - 4. Most drivers on highways will try to get off the highways and this will make the traffic on ordinary roads worse.

Dai-shinsai Taisaku no tameno Shinrigakuteki Chosa KenkyuKeikai Sengen Hatsureiji ni okeru Tonai
Kakueki de no Jitai Yosoku, Dai 15-ho (Report on
the Psychological Research for Countermeasures Against Farthquake DisasterThe Railway- and Subway-stations
an Earthquake Warning, Vol. 15)
Keibi Shinrigaku Kenkyukai (Guard Police Psychology
Research Society)
Keishi-cho (Tokyo Metropolitan Police Board), 1980
- Hypothetical earthquake
TO key the construction development and the construction of the co
a:
Questionnaire answered by mail Sample: salaried-workers 2,500 residents near stations 1,500
Nothing mentioned about sampling procedures
Return ratio: 62.2%

III. Hypothesis and Firdings.

- 1. The purpose of this study is to canvas responses to earthquake warrings.
 - A. How did people understand the warning?
 - 1. Poople who correctly understood the content of the warning

approximately 70.0%

- B. How do people expect to respond to the warning?
 - 1. Most people would take some preventive measures and preparations against earthquake.
 - 2. Many people would try to phone their families.
 - a) Prople are generally dependent upon telephones and are family-oriented.
 - 3. Men are more likely to take preventive measures and have positive attitude, while women are more likely to do nothing until someone issues an order.
 - 4. Women and youth tend to conform or be a source of panic.
- C. How do people predict traffic conditions after the issuance of the warning?
 - 1. Most people predict that public transportation systems vill break down in the immediate situation.
 - 2. Most people think that subway systems are most dangerous when an earthquake hits.
 - 3 However, if the warning includes the words of "within a few days," people predict that public transportation systems will be available as usual.
- D. How do people predict the situations at stations after the issuance of a warning?
 - 1. Most people predict that considerable confusion and crowds will be caused half an hour after the issue of the warning.
 - 2. Most people think that all of the station-staffs will work to prevent severe confusion and crowd formation.
 - a) At the same time, most people think that the confusion and the crowds will not be confrollable by the station-staffs.
 - 3. Most people have strong anxiety about confusion and crowds at stations.
 - a) Since the anxiety can be a source of panic, some measures to decrease the degree of anxiety are necessary.
- E. Some problems clarified by this study
 - 1. Responses to a warning including "within several hours" are different from those including "within a few days." We should make the difference clear.
 - 2. Anxieties about public transportation systems are very strong. To avoid the anxieties becoming a panic source, we should let people know about the emergency plans of public transportation systems.
 - 3. Anxieties about subway systems are especially strong. The authorities should let people know about subway system safety measures. The same thing can be said for underground shopping malls.
 - 4. Since women and youth can easily be a source of panic, we should provide them with more opportunities for disaster education and training.

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5. Most people still rely on telephones in emergencies. The authorities should let them know the fact that telephone systems are not always available, and guide them toward appropriate responses without using a telephone.

I. Material: Title:	Managua Jishin-Taikensha o Kakemu Zadankai Kiroku (Round Table Talks by Japanese Engineers on Their Experiences of the Managua Earthquake)
Author:	Keishi-cho (Tokyo Metropolitan Police Board)
Publisher and Year:	Keishi-cho (Tokyo Metropolitan Police Board), 1973.
II. Study:	
(1) Agent and or Event	
Type of Disaster:	Earthquake
Date of Occurrence:	1972
Location:	
Canualties and Damage:	:
(2) Method	
Method in detail:	
Date ({ Study:	January 26, 1973
III. Hyptathesis and Findings	

This is a record of a round-table talk by four Japanese who experienced the Managua Earthquake, as well as three psychologists, nine police officials, and some observers.

Four Japanese reported

- 1. Why they were in Managua at the time of the earthquake
- 2. what they were doing on the previous day
- 3. how they responded to the quake
- 4. what the situations in the town were.

No analysis is provided.

I. Material:	(Survey of the Awareness of the People in Kita Ware
Title:	
Author:	Kita Kuyakusho (Kita Ward Office)
Publisher and Year:	Kita Kuyakusho (Kita Ward Office), 1974
II. Study:	
(1) Agent and/or Event	
Type of Disaster:	Hypothetical earthquake
Date of Occurrence: -	rauta sakkin akin - 180-1800 ningakan manung pungan kan antugan da punja dalam kalang kan antuga da punja dalam kan antuga da punja da p
Location:	Tokyo
Casualties and Damag	a:
(2) Method	
≠Method in detail:	Questionnaires answered by mail. Sample: 3,988 of Kita Ward residents over 20 years of age Sampling Procedure: Stratified random sampling Valid answers: 1,303 (32.67%)
Date of Study:	January, 1974
III. Hypothesis and Finding.	9.

I.	People who think that a great earthquake will occur in the near future	53.0%
	A. The young are more likely to think that it will not	~ ~ ~ √ /4
	B. Residents in houses of reinforced structure tend to	
	think that it will not occur.	
II.	Prediction about major damages due to an earthquake	
	A. Fire	85.3%
	B. Disruption of water supply and electricity	69.1%
	C. Collapse of houses	66.2%
	D. Traffic confusion	40.4%
III.	Expected determinants of evacuation behavior	
	A. Approaching fires	33.2%
	B. Issuance of an evacuation order	34.8%
	C. Perception of other risks	18.3%
IV.	Expected temporary evacuation place	
	A. Nearby heights	18.1%
	B. Designated places	38.4%
	C. Public facilities	17.3%
	D. Nearby parks	16.7%
	The older the person, the less likely they would evacuate to the designated evacuation place.	
v.	The designated evacuation place (by sampling subclusters)	
	-ric acarbided excenderon brace int pambring ambernatens)	
	A. Ratio of recognition	61.4%-87.6%
	A. Ratio of recognition B. People who have been there	61.4%-87.6% 42.9%-100%
	A. Ratio of recognition B. People who have been there C. Whether or not they evacuate to the	42.9%-100%
	A. Ratic of recognitionB. People who have been thereC. Whether or not they evacuate to the designated places	-
	A. Ratic of recognitionB. People who have been thereC. Whether or not they evacuate to the designated placesD. Reasons they would evacuate to the designated	42.9%-100%
	 A. Ratic of recognition B. People who have been there C. Whether or not they evacuate to the designated places D. Reasons they would evacuate to the designated places 	42.9%-100%
	 A. Ratio of recognition B. People who have been there C. Whether or not they evacuate to the designated places D. Reasons they would evacuate to the designated places 1. Safe 	42.9%-100% 22.8%-67.8% 54.6%
	 A. Ratio of recognition B. People who have been there C. Whether or not they evacuate to the designated places D. Reasons they would evacuate to the designated places 1. Safe 2. Near 	42.9%-100%
	 A. Ratio of recognition B. People who have been there C. Whether or not they evacuate to the designated places D. Reasons they would evacuate to the designated places 1. Safe 	42.9%-100% 22.8%-67.8% 54.6%
	A. Ratio of recognition B. People who have been there C. Whether or not they evacuate to the designated places D. Reasons they would evacuate to the designated places 1. Safe 2. Near E. Reasons they would not evacuate to the designated	42.9%-100% 22.8%-67.8% 54.6% 26.5%
	 A. Ratio of recognition B. People who have been there C. Whether or not they evacuate to the designated places D. Reasons they would evacuate to the designated places 1. Safe 2. Near E. Reasons they would not evacuate to the designated places 1. Far 2. Not safe 	42.9%-100% 22.8%-67.8% 54.6% 26.5%
	 A. Ratio of recognition B. People who have been there C. Whether or not they evacuate to the designated places D. Reasons they would evacuate to the designated places Safe Near E. Reasons they would not evacuate to the designated places Far Not safe Do not know the way 	42.9%-100% 22.8%-67.8% 54.6% 26.5%
	A. Ratio of recognition B. People who have been there C. Whether or not they evacuate to the designated places D. Reasons they would evacuate to the designated places 1. Safe 2. Near E. Reasons they would not evacuate to the designated places 1. Far 2. Not safe 3. Do not know the way F. How they would evacuate	42.9%-100% 22.8%-67.8% 54.6% 26.5% 55.1% 19.6%
	A. Ratio of recognition B. People who have been there C. Whether or not they evacuate to the designated places D. Reasons they would evacuate to the designated places 1. Safe 2. Near E. Reasons they would not evacuate to the designated places 1. Far 2. Not safe 3. Do not know the way F. How they would evacuate 1. On foot	42.9%-100% 22.8%-67.8% 54.6% 26.5% 55.1% 19.6% 11.8%
	A. Ratio of recognition B. People who have been there C. Whether or not they evacuate to the designated places D. Reasons they would evacuate to the designated places 1. Safe 2. Near E. Reasons they would not evacuate to the designated places 1. Far 2. Not safe 3. Do not know the way F. How they would evacuate 1. On foot 2. By bicycle or motorcycle	42.9%-100% 22.8%-67.8% 54.6% 26.5% 55.1% 19.6% 11.8% 96.5% 0.6%
	A. Ratio of recognition B. People who have been there C. Whether or not they evacuate to the designated places D. Reasons they would evacuate to the designated places 1. Safe 2. Near E. Reasons they would not avacuate to the designated places 1. Far 2. Not safe 3. Do not know the way F. How they would evacuate 1. On foot 2. By bicycle or motorcycle 3. By car	42.9%-100% 22.8%-67.8% 54.6% 26.5% 55.1% 19.6% 11.8%
	A. Ratio of recognition B. People who have been there C. Whether or not they evacuate to the designated places D. Reasons they would evacuate to the designated places 1. Safe 2. Near E. Reasons they would not evacuate to the designated places 1. Far 2. Not safe 3. Do not know the way F. How they would evacuate 1. On foot 2. By bicycle or motorcycle 3. By car G. Whether or not they think they can reach the	42.9%-100% 22.8%-67.8% 54.6% 26.5% 55.1% 19.6% 11.8% 96.5% 0.6%
	A. Ratio of recognition B. People who have been there C. Whether or not they evacuate to the designated places D. Reasons they would evacuate to the designated places 1. Safe 2. Near E. Reasons they would not evacuate to the designated places 1. Far 2. Not safe 3. Do not know the way F. How they would evacuate 1. On foot 2. By bicycle or motorcycle 3. By car G. Whether or not they think they can reach the designated places	42.9%-100% 22.8%-67.8% 54.6% 26.5% 55.1% 19.6% 11.8% 96.5% 0.6% 0.4%
	A. Ratio of recognition B. People who have been there C. Whether or not they evacuate to the designated places D. Reasons they would evacuate to the designated places 1. Safe 2. Near E. Reasons they would not evacuate to the designated places 1. Far 2. Not safe 3. Do not know the way F. How they would evacuate 1. On foot 2. By bicycle or motorcycle 3. By car G. Whether or not they think they can reach the	42.9%-100% 22.8%-67.8% 54.6% 26.5% 55.1% 19.6% 11.8% 96.5% 0.6% 0.4%
	A. Ratio of recognition B. People who have been there C. Whether or not they evacuate to the designated places D. Reasons they would evacuate to the designated places 1. Safe 2. Near E. Reasons they would not evacuate to the designated places 1. Far 2. Not safe 3. Do not know the way F. How they would evacuate 1. On foot 2. By bicycle or motorcycle 3. By car G. Whether or not they think they can reach the designated places 1. Can reach 2. Cannot reach	42.9%-100% 22.8%-67.8% 54.6% 26.5% 55.1% 19.6% 11.8% 96.5% 0.6% 0.4%
	A. Ratio of recognition B. People who have been there C. Whether or not they evacuate to the designated places D. Reasons they would evacuate to the designated places 1. Safe 2. Near E. Reasons they would not evacuate to the designated places 1. Far 2. Not safe 3. Do not know the way F. How they would evacuate 1. On foot 2. By bicycle or motorcycle 3. By car G. Whether or not they think they can reach the designated places 1. Can reach	42.9%-100% 22.8%-67.8% 54.6% 26.5% 55.1% 19.6% 11.8% 96.5% 0.6% 0.4%
	A. Ratic of recognition B. People who have been there C. Whether or not they evacuate to the designated places D. Reasons they would evacuate to the designated places 1. Safe 2. Near E. Reasons they would not evacuate to the designated places 1. Far 2. Not safe 3. Do not know the way F. How they would evacuate 1. On foot 2. By bicycle or motorcycle 3. By car G. Whether or not they think they can reach the designated places 1. Can reach 2. Cannot reach a) Reasons they think they cannot reach (1) traffic confusion (2) road debris or destruction	42.9%-100% 22.8%-67.8% 54.6% 26.5% 55.1% 19.6% 11.8% 96.5% 0.6% 0.4%
	A. Ratio of recognition B. People who have been there C. Whether or not they evacuate to the designated places D. Reasons they would evacuate to the designated places 1. Safe 2. Near E. Reasons they would not avacuate to the designated places 1. Far 2. Not safe 3. Do not know the way F. How they would evacuate 1. On foot 2. By bicycle or motorcycle 3. By car G. Whether or not they think they can reach the designated places 1. Can reach 2. Caunot reach a) Reasons they think they cannot reach (1) traffic confusion (2) road debris or destruction (3) fires	42.9%-100% 22.8%-67.8% 54.6% 26.5% 55.1% 19.6% 11.8% 96.5% 0.6% 0.4% 33.4% 17.8% 50.0%
	A. Ratic of recognition B. People who have been there C. Whether or not they evacuate to the designated places D. Reasons they would evacuate to the designated places 1. Safe 2. Near E. Reasons they would not evacuate to the designated places 1. Far 2. Not safe 3. Do not know the way F. How they would evacuate 1. On foot 2. By bicycle or motorcycle 3. By car G. Whether or not they think they can reach the designated places 1. Can reach 2. Cannot reach a) Reasons they think they cannot reach (1) traffic confusion (2) road debris or destruction	42.9%-100% 22.8%-67.8% 54.6% 26.5% 55.1% 19.6% 11.8% 96.5% 0.6% 0.4% 33.4% 17.8% 50.0% 17.2%

VI.	Preparations made for an earthquake	
	A. Have	63 68
	1. Flashlight	81.0%
	2. Transistor radio	69.5%
	3. Have discussions at home	60.9%
	4. Made confirmation of safer places	49.1%
	5. Fire extinguisher	49.7%
	6. First-aid kit	48.2%
	7. Taken care of valuables	42.1%
	8. Water for fire	30.9%
	9. Emergency food	27 .9 %
	10. Emergency drinking water	18.5%
	B. The older people are, or the longer they have lived	
	in their present residences, the more they are	
	prepared for an earthquake.	
	C. People who think that a great earthquake will occur	
	in the near future or who live in their own houses	
	were more likely to prepare.	
VII.	Conversation with neighbors about emergency cooperations	
****	A. Have talked	6.9%
	B. Have not	54.3%
	C. Want to talk	34.8%
	o, want to talk	34.0%
VIIĮ.	Participation in community organizations for disasters	
	A. Would join, if established	55.0%
	B. Would definitely join	20.0%
	C. Would join, if asked	13.9%
	D. Would not join	7.1%

.	Experimental Study of Escape Benavior in a Simulated Panic Situtation. (Mogi Risai Jokyo ni okeru Hinan Kodo
I. Material: Title:	
Author:	
Publisher and Year:	in The Japanese Journal of Experimental Social Psychology Vol. 20, pp. 55-67, 1980
II. Study:	total may be an only thou
(1) Agent and/or Event	
Type of Dissater: -	Experiment
Date of Occurrence	
Location:	
Casualties and Dam	\$ge:
(2) Method	
Method in detail:	See the attached
Date of Study:	Production days assumption of the Company and the Company and and the company of
III. Hypothesis and Findin	ng s.

I. Experiments

- A. Subjects: 295 freshman and sophomores (men: 173, women: 122)
 - 1. They were divided into 55 groups segregated by sex.
 - a) 7 groups of 3 men, 3 groups of 3 women
 - b) 5 groups of 4 men, 5 groups of 4 women
 - c) 6 groups of 5 men, 4 groups of 5 women
 - d) 7 groups of 6 men, 3 groups of 6 women
 - e) 6 groups of 7 men, 4 groups of 7 women
 - f) 2 groups of 9 men, 3 groups of 9 women

B. Design

A room was divided into 9 enclosed booths. In each booth, there was a box containing three buttons of "escape," "attack," and "concession," and the counter which shows the subject the distance to an exit. On the front wall, there was a panel containing 27 lamps (9 lamps for each of three colors: red, yellow, and green). The red lamps show by being lit that a crisis (electric shock in this experiment) is approaching the subject. Upon the red lamps being lit, the subject push the "escape" buttons so that the counters show how many "escape" buttons were pushed, indicating the distance to a safe place. When one of the subjects pushes the "escape" button, the red lamps disappear and the yellow lamps are temporarily lit. If two or more subjects push the "escape" button at the same time, all counters for all of the subjects stop in spite of the "escape" buttons being pushed so that nobody can escape.

In this situation, the subjects have three choices, the "attack" buttons, the "concession" buttons, or to await other subjects' responses with no response on their own. When one subject pushes the "attack" button, the number on the counters for all of the other subjects except the subject is turned back to zero, which means that other subjects are forced to be back in a crisis situation. When the "concession" button is pushed by a certain subject, only the subject who pushed the button turns back to zero.

Repeating these procedures, the subjects who gain 100 points on the counter are regarded as successful evacuees. When a certain subject successfully escapes, the green lamp in front of the subject is lit. The time was 30 seconds per subject after the red lamps are lit. Therefore, 90 seconds were given to the group of 3 persons, while 270 seconds were given to the group of 9 persons.

The experiments were conducted in a dark room and each subject wore a headphone during the experiments so that the subjects could see and hear nothing and would do nothing but look at the counters, three buttons, and three lamps.

C. Date of Study: Not specified

II. Purposes and Hypotheses

A. Purpose

1. To experimentally examine the effect of group size on escaping behaviors in a simulated panic situation

B. Hypotheses

- 1. As the size of a group grows, the ratio of successful escapes will decrease and the degree of confusion will increase.
- 2. As the size of a group grows, the "escape" or the "attack" behaviors will increase and the "concession" behaviors will decrease.

III. Findings

- A. As the size of a group grows, the degree of confusion increases and the ratio of successful escapes decreases. The most distinctive decrease in the ratio of escapes was observed between experiments with groups of four persons and groups of five persons.
- B. Subjects of medium-size groups (groups of six persons) were more likely to be aggressive than those of large groups (groups of seven or nine persons) or of small groups (groups of three or four persons).
- C. In the situation that aggressive responses (the "attack" behaviors) increased and concession responses decreased, there was almost no possibility for the subjects to successfully escape together.

I. Material: Title:	Reliability and Effectiveness of Actions for Earth- quake Disaster Prevention (Toshi no Bosai Taisei no Shinraisei Yukosei ni kansuru Kenkyu)
Author:	Institute for Future Technology (Mirai Kohgaku Kenkyusho
Publisher and Year:	1979
II. Study:	
(1) Agent and/or Event	
	Farthquakes January 14, 1978, 12:24 p.m. Juna 12, 1978, 5:14 p.m.
Date of Occurrence:	June 12, 1978, 5:14 p.m.
Location:	Shizuoka Prefecture and Miyagi Prefecture, Japan
Casualties and Damage:	The 1978 Izu Oshima Kinkai Earthquake*
(2) Method Method in detail:	Killed: 25 Injured: 205 Total loss: 39.3 billion yen (164 million U.S. dollars) Completely destroyed houses: 96 Partially destroyed houses: 4,786 Landslides: 191 Destroyed portion of roads: 1,126
	See the attached
Date of Study:	See the attached
	*The 1978 Miyagiken Oki Earthquake
•	Killed: 28 Injured 10,247

Completely destroyed houses: 1,279
Partially destroyed houses: 132,594

Flooded houses: 5

Destroyed portions of roads: 1,037

Landslides: 167

Fires: 12

I. Methods

- A. Interviews with a large number of persons
- B. Analysis of documents
- C. Date of Study: 1977-1978

II. The report consists of four parts

- A. Case study of the 1978 Izu Oshima Kinkai Earthquake
- B. Case study of 1978 Miyagiken Oki Earthquake
- C. Status quo of anti-earthquake measures and problems
- D. Roles of organizations in promoting the implementation of countermeasures and future direction

III. Case Study of the Izu Oshima Kinkai Earthquake


- A. After the description of the event, damages, emergency responses, recovery processes, fifty-four problems or lessons in 12 disaster-related functions are indicated. Some of them are as follows:
 - 1. Earthquake prediction
 - a) to recognize the limit of prediction and to make the public and the government understand the failure of prediction
 - b) to legally elaborate the prediction notification system
 - 2. Emergency operation center
 - a) to clearly allocate roles
 - b) to set up a group which would deal with incoming or outgoing information in emergency situations
 - c) to seek a more effective network of organizations
 - 3. Communication system
 - a) to set up an interorganizational network sharing information in common
 - b) to improve a format to effectively receive information
 - 4. Rescue activity
 - a) to accurately estimate necessary equipment and materials
 - b) to clarify the routes on which extra-heavy equipment can be transported
 - 5. Evacuation
 - a) to provide sufficient food and water at shelters
 - b) to use mobile houses as shelters
 - 6. Evacuation of tourists
 - a) to clarify who is in charge
 - b) to inform them of shelters and provide them with food or water
 - c) to get them home
 - 7. Management of industrial waste
 - a) to amend the regulation about dumps
 - b) to regulate the storing of poisoneous materials in a river basin
 - 8. Supply of water
 - a) to set up an emergency water supply system, especially by sea
 - b) to repair according to the present rule of priority
 - 9. Supply of gas
 - a) to have gas cylinders equipped with quake-proof devices (propane gas)
 - b) to set up a mutual mids system covering a broad area in order to supply gas as soon as possible after the earthquake

- 10. Telephones
 - a) to improve a means to transport staffs and equipment for repairing
 - b) to prevent the congestion and breakdown of the telephone system by educating the public, and by giving a priority to disasterrelated organizations
- 11. Electricity
 - a) to reinforce the structures of facilities against an earthquake
 - b) to set up a more effective communication network with other organizations
- 12. Roads and traffic
 - a) to cooperate with private construction companies in adjacent areas
 - b) to assign a clearly defined role
 - c) to set up a priority order of recovery
- IV. Case Study of the Miyagiken Oki Earthquake
 - A. After the description, sixty-three lessons are specified. Some of them are as follows:
 - 1. Emergency operation center
 - a) to set up a more effective communication channel with mass media
 - b) to elaborate the notification system among staffs
 - 2. Fire fighting
 - a) to safely store chemical substances
 - b) to prepare against simulteneous, multiple fires
 - 3. Rescue activity
 - a) to use taxi or private cars to transport the injured
 - b) to make an emergency plan for elevators
 - 4. Evacuation
 - a) to set up voluntary mutual aids systems in addition to checking the existing evacuation sites
 - 5. Areas of industries which store the dangerous materials such as gas stations, oil refineries, and the like
 - a) to check oil tanks
 - b) to elaborate emergency plans for industrial areas
 - 6. Roads and traffic
 - a) to have major signals equipped with batteries or self-generators
 - b) to elaborate an emergency traffic control system
 - 7. Telephone
 - a) to make use of mass media so as to prevent the breakdown of the telephone system
 - 8. Public relations activity
 - a) to provide the public with private information
 - b) to report not only negative news (such as damages or casualties) but also positive news (such as children's safety at a kindergarten)
 - c) to specify the source of information
 - d) not to use telephones for obtaining information
- V. Status quo of anti-earthquake measures and problems
 - A. A summary is given of six current functions. In addition, each measure is classified according to the degree of urgency and importance and according to time dimension (pre-disaster, post-disaster, etc.). Finally, obstacles in taking measures are indicated. The obstacles are classified into:

- 1. organizational obstacles
- 2. legal obstacles
- 3. budgetary obstacles
- 4. public opinion
- 5. technological obstacles

The six functions discussed are

- 1. fire prevention (includes 26 measures)
- 2. rescue, medical services, and evacuation (includes 36 measures)
- 3. supply of water, food, and other essential goods (includes 28 measures)
- 4. supply of energy (includes 35 measures)
- 5. traffic and transportation (includes 25 measures)
- 6. communication (includes 35 measures)
- VI. Roles of organizations in promoting the implementation of countermeasures
 A. The mechanism of stagnancy in implementing countermeasures



- B. Three major problems to be solved
 - 1. To elaborate emergency planning. The planning should especially be concrete and practical.
 - 2. To coordinate organizations and their planning. Organization should be coordinated both vertically and horizontally.
 - 3. To set up a special section directly responsible for measures against a future great earthquake at the national level.
- C. Four directions of organizational or interorganizational development
 - 1. To remain in the present situation, improving each organization individually.
 - 2. To remain in the present situation, but creating a certain coordinating agency.
 - 3. To establish a "National Emergency Management Agency."
 - 4. To establish a "Ministry of Disaster Management."